The End of Dollar Dominance

The End of Dollar Dominance

How Trump administration policies are testing the foundations of American financial hegemony

by Jason C. Kay • December 21, 2025

The United States has lost something it cannot easily regain: the trust of global investors. In 2025, a confluence of policy unpredictability, unprecedented tariff escalation, and sustained attacks on Federal Reserve independence has triggered what European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde called a “profound shift in the global order.” The dollar’s share of global reserves has fallen to 56.32% — its lowest level in thirty years — while Moody’s stripped America of its last AAA credit rating, and courts have ruled the administration’s tariff authority illegal. These are not isolated events but interconnected symptoms of institutional erosion that threatens the architecture of global finance built over eight decades.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the man tasked with managing America’s $37.6 trillion debt burden, finds himself defending policies that directly contradict positions he held as a hedge fund manager. His evolution from warning that “tariffs are inflationary” to declaring President Trump “has been right” epitomizes the administration’s approach: economic ideology subordinated to political necessity. Meanwhile, foreign central bank reserve managers are voting with their portfolios — 65% now express concern about Federal Reserve independence, and 47% worry about deteriorating rule of law in America.

The damage may prove irreversible. As Barry Eichengreen, the preeminent scholar of reserve currencies, warned in May 2025: “A dollar crisis provoked by the U.S. can no longer be ruled out.” For the first time in modern memory, America’s greatest economic vulnerability is not an external shock but its own government.

The great sell-off has already begun

The numbers tell a story of quiet retreat. China has reduced its Treasury holdings from a peak of $1.32 trillion in November 2013 to just $688.7 billion as of October 2025 — a decline of nearly half. Japan, the largest foreign holder at $1.06 trillion, shed $27.3 billion in December 2024 alone following the Bank of Japan’s historic rate hike to 0.75%, the highest in thirty years. The United Kingdom has quietly assumed third place among foreign creditors as the traditional pillars of dollar demand recede.

Treasury International Capital (TIC) data reveals the volatility beneath the surface. In April 2025 — the month of “Liberation Day” tariffs — foreign residents net sold $50.6 billion in long-term U.S. securities, with foreign official institutions dumping $30.1 billion. October 2025 brought another $37.3 billion outflow. While some months showed recovery, the pattern of intermittent flight signals fragile confidence rather than durable commitment.

The composition of buyers has shifted ominously. Foreign holdings of Treasury securities have declined from nearly 50% of publicly held debt during the global financial crisis to just 30% today. When the Congressional Research Service examined the period from 2020 to 2024, it found that while total debt increased by $7.2 trillion, foreign holdings rose only $1.2 trillion. The gap was filled by domestic buyers — but at progressively higher yields that now cost American taxpayers nearly $1 trillion annually in interest payments.

Central bank reserve managers are diversifying with unusual urgency. The 2025 OMFIF Global Public Investor survey of 75 central banks found that close to 60% are seeking to diversify portfolios within the next 12–24 months. Gold has become the “most demanded asset class,” with 32% expecting to increase holdings in the short term. The dollar was the only currency where demand fell year-over-year. Meanwhile, net 16% of respondents intend to add euro holdings, up from just 7% the previous year.

Dollar dominance enters terminal decline

The International Monetary Fund’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) data provides the definitive measure of reserve currency status. The dollar’s share has fallen from 72% in 2001 to 56.32% in the second quarter of 2025 — a decline of nearly 16 percentage points over two decades. The drop from 57.79% in Q1 2025 to 56.32% in Q2 was partly driven by exchange rate movements, but adjusted for currency effects, the underlying decline was 0.12 percentage points in a single quarter.

The Federal Reserve itself acknowledged this erosion in a July 2025 research note, though it emphasized the dollar “remains by far the dominant reserve currency.” The Fed attributed the decline primarily to diversification into “nontraditional” currencies — Australian and Canadian dollars, Swedish krona, South Korean won — rather than a single challenger. But this multipolarity is itself a symptom of waning confidence. When reserve managers scatter their holdings across small-economy currencies rather than concentrate in dollar alternatives, they are hedging against American risk specifically.

The euro has captured some of this outflow, rising to 21.13% of reserves in Q2 2025. ECB President Lagarde seized the moment with a June 2025 blog post titled “Europe’s ‘Global Euro’ Moment,” declaring: “Even the dominant role of the US dollar, the cornerstone of the system, is no longer certain.” European Stability Mechanism data showed foreign investors poured €150 billion into eurozone sovereign debt in Q2 2025 — the largest quarterly inflow since 2008.

Yet the euro’s structural limitations — fragmented capital markets, no unified bond market, limited safe assets — constrain its rise. The more consequential trend is gold accumulation. Central banks have purchased over 1,000 tonnes annually for three consecutive years, and gold’s share of official reserve assets has more than doubled from below 10% in 2015 to over 23% in 2025. While the Fed notes this largely reflects price appreciation rather than physical accumulation, the 2025 OMFIF survey found 76% of central banks intend to increase gold holdings over the next five years — and 75% plan to reduce dollar-denominated asset exposure.

The BRICS nations have not yet produced a viable alternative currency, despite “The Unit” — a blockchain-based settlement token announced in December 2025 as a pilot project — 40% backed by gold and 60% by a BRICS currency basket. India’s Foreign Minister flatly rejected the concept: “Imagine us having a currency shared with China. We have no plans.” But bilateral arrangements are proliferating. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System processed $24.5 trillion equivalent in 2024, up 43% from the prior year, connecting 4,800 banking institutions across 185 countries. Nearly half of intra-BRICS trade now settles outside the dollar.

Scott Bessent’s contradictions define the Treasury’s credibility crisis

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent arrived in Washington with impeccable credentials. His career included legendary trades alongside George Soros — he helped “break the Bank of England” in 1992's sterling crisis and earned the nickname “The Man Who Broke the Bank of Japan” for his $1.2 billion yen short in 2013. He made approximately $3.5 billion on the “Abenomics trade” and launched Key Square Capital Management in 2015 with $4.5 billion — one of the largest hedge fund launches in history.

But Key Square’s trajectory proved less triumphant. By December 2023, assets had collapsed to $577 million — an 89% decline from the $5.1 billion peak. Institutional investors dropped from 180 to 20. The fund that once employed Soros’s $2 billion anchor investment became a cautionary tale of global macro’s challenges.

More troubling for his current role are the documented contradictions between Bessent’s pre-Treasury positions and his in-office advocacy. In a Key Square investor letter, he predicted Trump would “pursue a weak dollar policy rather than implementing tariffs” because “tariffs are inflationary” and “hardly a good starting point for a U.S. industrial renaissance.” By December 2025, at the New York Times DealBook Summit, Bessent acknowledged his views had “evolved”: “I’ve had an open mind, and I’ve evolved on this, and the president has been right.”

His actions as Treasury Secretary have compounded credibility concerns. Within days of taking office, Bessent was named Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and immediately ordered a halt to all rulemaking, litigation, enforcement investigations, and public communications. Rules banning medical debt from credit reports and capping overdraft fees at $5 were suspended. Elon Musk celebrated on X: “CFPB RIP.” Senator Elizabeth Warren responded that “shutting down CFPB enforcement actions…is at odds with President Trump’s claim that he wants to lower costs for families.”

On Federal Reserve independence, Bessent has played a complex role. He reportedly restrained Trump from firing Fed Chair Jerome Powell, with Trump recounting at a November 2025 forum: “Scott: ‘Sir, don’t fire him. Sir, please don’t fire him.’” Yet Bessent published a Wall Street Journal op-ed in September 2025 calling for an “independent review” of the Fed, accusing it of “mission creep” that jeopardized its credibility. By December, he announced the Treasury would “veto” regional Fed president appointments unless candidates had lived in their districts for three years — an unprecedented assertion of executive control over the nominally independent institution.

Perhaps most revealing was a December 2025 Treasury Department social media post celebrating bond returns — widely criticized for economic illiteracy, since rising bond returns can signal market uncertainty. Conservative commentator Tim Chapman said Bessent “needs a crash course in Economics 101.” The Council on Foreign Relations’ Mark Sobel warned Bessent “may rue the day he became…Treasury secretary” and “runs the risk of presiding over the height of fiscal profligacy.”

Liberation Day and its aftermath: The $10 trillion tariff shock

April 2, 2025 — dubbed “Liberation Day” by President Trump — brought the most sweeping tariff increases since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The administration announced a 10% universal tariff on imports from nearly all countries, effective April 5, with country-specific “reciprocal” tariffs scheduled for April 9: 34% additional on China, 20% on the European Union, 46% on Vietnam, 24% on Japan. The average effective U.S. tariff rate surged from 2.5% to approximately 28% at its peak — the highest level in over a century.

The legal foundation was unprecedented and ultimately rejected by the courts. Trump invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, declaring a “national emergency” over the trade deficit — the first time any president had used IEEPA to impose tariffs. On May 28, 2025, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of International Trade unanimously ruled Trump had exceeded his statutory authority. The court declared IEEPA’s power to “regulate importation” does not include tariff authority, and tariffs are fundamentally taxes reserved to Congress under Article I. The Federal Circuit affirmed on August 29, though tariffs remain in effect pending Supreme Court review.

The economic damage was immediate and quantifiable. The Tax Foundation estimates the tariffs will raise $2.1–2.9 trillion over 2025–2034 on a conventional basis, but only $1.6–2.3 trillion after accounting for negative economic effects. The Yale Budget Lab found the median household faces costs of $1,400-$2,200 annually. Long-run GDP is projected to decline by 0.4–0.7%, with 490,000–578,000 fewer jobs by end of 2025.

The distributional impact is starkly regressive. The burden on the lowest income decile equals 2.4–2.7% of income versus just 0.8% for the highest decile — the poorest face three times the proportional burden. Specific categories face devastating price increases: leather goods up 36–40% in the short run, apparel up 37–38%, automobiles up $2,500-$6,500 per new car.

Market reaction was catastrophic. Between April 2–9, 2025, the S&P 500 fell approximately 12% in four days, with $6–10 trillion wiped from global equities. The VIX spiked to 45.31 — its highest since the 2020 pandemic crash. Restoration Hardware’s stock plummeted 40%; Nike fell 14%; Apple and Amazon each dropped roughly 9%. Toyota warned of a $10 billion profit hit and slashed its forecast by 16%.

Trade relationships sustained potentially permanent damage. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared: “It is clear that the United States is no longer a reliable partner… there will be no turning back.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called it “a major blow to the world economy” where “there seems to be no order in the disorder, no clear path to the complexity and chaos.” Japan recorded a $15 billion trade deficit in the first half of 2025, and Japanese auto exports to the U.S. fell 26.7% in June.

The federal balance sheet approaches breaking point

The fiscal position underlying these policy experiments has deteriorated to levels not seen since World War II. Total national debt reached $37.64 trillion as of October 1, 2025, with debt held by the public at $30.28 trillion — precisely 100% of GDP. The trajectory is accelerating: debt grew by $2.17 trillion in fiscal year 2025 alone, at a rate of $5.95 billion per day.

Interest payments have become the third-largest item in the federal budget, surpassing both Medicare and defense spending. Net interest paid in FY2025 reached $970 billion — approximately 14% of total outlays and 19% of federal revenue. This represents a 181% increase from the $345 billion paid in FY2020. By 2035, the Congressional Budget Office projects interest costs will consume 15.6% of spending, surpassing the 1996 record of 15.4%.

The composition of federal spending reveals how interest crowds out other priorities:

• Social Security: $1.6 trillion (23%)
• Medicare: $992 billion (14%)
• Net Interest: $970 billion (14%)
• National Defense: $895 billion (13%)
• Medicaid: $600 billion (9%)

By 2027, interest will exceed all nondefense discretionary spending for the first time. By 2051, it is projected to become the largest single budget item.

CBO projections paint an increasingly dire trajectory. Debt held by the public will reach 107% of GDP in 2029 — surpassing the post-WWII record of 106%. By 2055, it will reach 156% of GDP. The deficit, currently at 6.2% of GDP despite a strong economy, will widen to nearly 9% by 2035.

The administration’s response has been to accelerate rather than address this deterioration. The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (OBBBA), enacted July 4, 2025, adds an estimated $3.4 trillion to primary deficits over 2025–2034, rising to $4.1 trillion with interest costs. If its temporary provisions become permanent, the total reaches $5.0 trillion. The bill extends the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act provisions, eliminates taxes on tips and overtime through 2028, and raises the SALT deduction cap to $40,000 — funded by $4.5 trillion in revenue reductions against just $1.1 trillion in spending cuts.

Markets and rating agencies deliver their verdict

Moody’s Investors Service delivered its judgment on May 16, 2025, stripping the United States of its last remaining AAA rating — held for 116 years — and downgrading to Aa1. The rationale was unambiguous: “This one-notch downgrade on our 21-notch rating scale reflects the increase over more than a decade in government debt and interest payment ratios to levels that are significantly higher than similarly rated sovereigns.”

Moody’s projected the federal debt burden will rise to 134% of GDP by 2035 and deficits will widen to 9% of GDP. The agency concluded: “We do not believe that material multi-year reductions in mandatory spending and deficits will result from current fiscal proposals under consideration.” Scope, the European rating agency, followed with its own downgrade in October 2025, citing “sustained deterioration in public finances and a weakening of governance.”

Credit default swap spreads tell the story of market anxiety. By June 5, 2025, five-year CDS on U.S. debt widened to 48 basis points — the highest since the 2023 debt ceiling crisis — placing America’s default risk above Italy’s 50 basis points. Citadel CEO Ken Griffin expressed disbelief: “I never thought in my life I would see the U.S. priced higher in risk cost than a number of countries like Spain, Germany or France… You gotta be kidding me.” He declared: “The United States’ fiscal house is not in order. You cannot run deficits of six or 7% at full employment after years of growth. That’s just fiscally irresponsible.”

The dollar’s performance reflected this deteriorating confidence. The DXY index fell 10.7% in the first half of 2025 — its worst such performance in over fifty years — ending the 15-year bull cycle that began in 2010. Morgan Stanley estimates the dollar could lose another 10% by the end of 2026.

Treasury auction results have shown weakness. The May 21, 2025 20-year bond auction achieved a bid-to-cover ratio of just 2.46 versus the 10-auction average of 2.58. RBC characterized the August 10-year auction as “soft” with a ratio of 2.35x versus the 2.51x average. When the Trump administration’s comments about potentially dismissing Fed Chair Powell surfaced on July 16, the dollar dropped 1.2% within an hour — demonstrating how quickly institutional credibility translates to market pricing.

The assault on Federal Reserve independence

The Trump administration has mounted the most sustained challenge to Federal Reserve independence since its founding in 1913. On July 15, 2025, Trump reportedly discussed firing Fed Chair Jerome Powell during a meeting with House Republicans and “even held up a draft of the letter he would use to do so.” At a November 2025 Saudi investment forum, he declared: “I’d love to fire his ass” and called Powell “mentally troubled” and “grossly incompetent.”

The consequences of executing such a move would be catastrophic. Deutsche Bank analyst George Saravelos warned: “In extreme cases, both the currency and the bond market can collapse as inflation expectations move higher, real yields drop and broader risk premia increase on the back of institutional erosion.” His team estimated that within the first 24 hours of a Powell removal announcement, the trade-weighted dollar would drop “at least 3%-4% accompanied by a 30–40bps sell-off in U.S. fixed income.”

Saravelos noted this would be “far worse than President Nixon’s imposition of Arthur Burns on the Fed in the 1970s” because “the U.S. is running a much larger twin deficit and negative foreign asset position, capital markets are far more open,” and exchange rates are no longer fixed.

The administration’s campaign extended beyond Powell. On August 25, 2025, Trump attempted to fire Fed Governor Lisa Cook based on mortgage fraud allegations filed by Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Bill Pulte. The Supreme Court temporarily blocked the dismissal on October 1, 2025, maintaining what NPR called “a critical firewall for now around the central bank’s ability to make decisions without political interference.” Oral arguments are scheduled for January 21, 2026.

Following Fed Governor Adriana Kugler’s unexpected resignation on August 8, 2025, Trump immediately appointed Stephen Miran — a vocal Powell critic who cast the sole dissenting vote in the September rate cut. On December 12, 2025, the Fed took the extraordinary step of reappointing 11 of its 12 regional bank presidents early, before their February term expirations — a move Deutsche Bank’s Jim Reid interpreted as an effort “to avoid the risk that the reappointment process raises questions over Fed independence.”

ECB President Lagarde offered the international community’s verdict in a September 2025 radio interview: “If U.S. monetary policy were no longer independent and instead dependent on the dictates of this or that person, then I believe that the effect on the balance of the American economy could, as a result of the effects this would have around the world, be very worrying, because it is the largest economy in the world.” The ECB’s November 2025 Financial Stability Review made the assessment official: “Market concerns over US fiscal credibility have risen… Together with market worries about central bank independence, these developments have weakened the safe-haven properties of US Treasuries and weakened the US dollar.”

Central bank reserve managers reveal their true concerns

The most consequential verdict on American policy comes not from rating agencies or economists but from the institutions that manage the world’s $13 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. The 2025 UBS Reserve Manager Survey of 40 central banks found that while nearly 80% expect the dollar to remain dominant “for the foreseeable future,” this confidence is increasingly qualified.

The UBS survey revealed that 65% of central banks “fear for the independence of the Federal Reserve” — a concern that directly threatens the dollar’s status as a neutral store of value. 47% worry about “deterioration in rule of law in the U.S.” — a fundamental erosion of the institutional predictability that makes dollar assets attractive. Perhaps most striking, nearly 50% believe restructuring of U.S. debt is a “plausible scenario” in the years ahead.

The OMFIF Global Public Investor survey of 75 central banks corroborated these findings. 96% view U.S. tariffs as a major geopolitical concern. Over 80% have placed geopolitics among their top three factors shaping longer-term investment decisions. The dollar was the only currency where demand declined year-over-year.

Reserve managers expect the dollar’s share to fall to approximately 55% within a decade — a modest but significant further decline. They are actively diversifying: close to 60% plan portfolio changes within 12–24 months, and gold has become the most demanded asset class. The message is clear: while no alternative exists to replace the dollar, the world’s most conservative financial institutions are methodically reducing their exposure to American risk.

The Federal Reserve’s own research offers cold comfort. A July 2025 FEDS Note observed that the dollar’s share is “basically unchanged since 2022, when it accounted for 58% of reserves, suggesting that U.S. sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine have not led to fears of dollar ‘weaponization’ causing a notable reallocation of reserves out of dollars.” But this assessment predates the full impact of 2025’s policy turbulence — and the same note acknowledged the dollar has declined 16 percentage points from its 2001 peak.

The verdict of history on reserve currency transitions

The erosion of dollar dominance follows a pattern Barry Eichengreen has documented across monetary history. In an April 2025 essay titled “Sterling’s Past and the Dollar’s Future,” he warned that if Trump wants to preserve dollar dominance, he should be “promoting financial stability, limiting the use of tariffs, and strengthening America’s geopolitical alliances.” Eichengreen notes that security alliances play “as important a role as economic fundamentals” in reserve currency choice — countries reliant on U.S. military support hold more dollars. The administration’s simultaneous alienation of economic and military allies accelerates the transition.

The Trump administration appears to understand the stakes while choosing confrontation over preservation. The president has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS nations pursuing dollar alternatives. But coercion cannot restore trust. As the Center for American Progress observed, “Political interference tends to upend this predictability and undermine incentives to invest and hire until the uncertainty passes… Few foreign investors want to risk their money in a volatile, unpredictable environment.”

New foreign investment in U.S. equities plummeted by 62.5% from Q4 2024 to Q1 2025, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Foreign direct investment fell from $88.5 billion to $58.7 billion — a 33.7% decline. European investors are allocating more to local assets, with record $42 billion year-to-date flows to European-focused ETFs. The capital flight that academics cautioned about is underway.

The result of this ruinous set of fiscal and diplomatic postures: The irrevocable compounding cost of lost credibility.

The data assembled here documents an inflection point in American financial hegemony. The dollar remains dominant — but its dominance is now contested rather than assumed, conditional rather than permanent, eroding rather than stable. The decline from 72% to 56% of global reserves over two decades represents a structural shift, not a cyclical fluctuation. And the policies of 2025 — illegal tariffs pending Supreme Court review, sustained attacks on Federal Reserve independence, a credit downgrade to Aa1, interest payments consuming 14% of the federal budget — have accelerated rather than arrested this trajectory.

Treasury Secretary Bessent’s evolution from tariff skeptic to administration defender encapsulates the credibility problem. Markets and reserve managers cannot distinguish genuine policy conviction from expedient loyalty. When the Treasury posts economically illiterate content on social media and the Secretary calls for vetoes over Fed appointments while claiming to defend independence, the contradictions compound.

The administration has wagered that short-term leverage — tariffs as negotiating tools, Fed pressure for rate cuts, fiscal stimulus despite mounting debt — outweighs long-term institutional damage. But reserve currency status depends precisely on the long-term predictability this approach destroys. As Deutsche Bank warned, America is “entering uncharted territory in the global financial system.”

The damage may not manifest as a single crisis but as a gradual repricing of American risk — higher yields required to attract foreign capital, reduced demand at Treasury auctions, accelerated diversification into gold and alternative currencies, growing use of non-dollar settlement systems. By the time these trends become undeniable, they will also be irreversible. Trust, once lost, is not recovered by policy reversal alone. It requires the sustained demonstration of institutional integrity that the current administration has made structurally impossible.

jason c. kay is a technology consultant and writer based in Charlotte, North Carolina. He holds advanced degrees in computer engineering and applied mathematics from MIT and has worked in financial services technology for over two decades, including senior leadership roles at major institutions such as Wells Fargo and Ally Financial.

Sources

This article was drafted over 50 hours of research, revisions, and outside consultation. It draws upon comprehensive data and analysis from over 600 sources including government agencies, international financial institutions, central banks, rating agencies, economic research organizations, court documents, and authoritative journalism. Key references include:

• Congressional Budget Office. (2025, January). The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2025 to 2035. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60870
• Congressional Budget Office. (2025, March). The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2025 to 2055. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61270
• Congressional Research Service. (2025). Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS22331
• U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025). Treasury International Capital (TIC) System. https://home.treasury.gov/data/treasury-international-capital-tic-system
• U.S. Court of International Trade. (2025, May 28). Decision in Multiple Plaintiffs v. United States [IEEPA tariff authority case].
• International Monetary Fund. (2025). Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER). https://data.imf.org/COFER
• Federal Reserve Board. (2025, July 18). The International Role of the U.S. Dollar — 2025 Edition [FEDS Notes]. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/
• European Central Bank. (2025, June 17). Lagarde, C. Europe’s ‘global euro’ moment [Blog]. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/
• European Central Bank. (2025, November). Financial Stability Review. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/
• Moody’s Investors Service. (2025, May 16). Rating Action: Moody’s downgrades United States government issuer and senior unsecured ratings to Aa1. https://www.moodys.com/
• OMFIF. (2025). Global Public Investor 2025. https://www.omfif.org/gpi2025/
• Peterson Institute for International Economics. (2025). McKibbin, W.J., Noland, M., & Shuetrim, G. The global economic effects of Trump’s 2025 tariffs. https://www.piie.com/
• Tax Foundation. (2025). Trump Tariffs: The Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War. https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/
• Yale Budget Lab. (2025). Where We Stand: The Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects of All U.S. Tariffs Enacted in 2025 Through April. https://budgetlab.yale.edu/
• Eichengreen, B. (2025, April). Sterling’s past and the dollar’s future. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/
• Statista. (2025). Major foreign holders of U.S. Treasury debt 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/
• Trading Economics. (2025). United States Government Bond 10Y. https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-bond-yield

For a comprehensive list of the data, articles, and sources used to research and compose this analysis, head to fintechdreams.com/sources/unraveling/

Research and editing services for this project were provided by Burdell Partners, LLC, a Charlotte-based consulting firm focused on legal research and publication services.