The Mirage of “Chindia”

Why Modi–Xi optics cannot erase border militarization, economic dependency, and deep mistrust

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Shashi Tharoor’s editorial** “The Return of Chindia”* interprets the Modi–Xi dialogue as a potential turning point, a long-awaited reopening of channels after years of silence and recrimination. It is presented as a moment where history, culture and shared civilizational experiences intersect with contemporary diplomacy, hinting at a thaw in relations that have remained frozen since 2020. The optimism is attractive, even seductive. Yet it is also misleading. Symbolism and historical nostalgia cannot *disguise the deep structural conflicts that continue to define India–China relations.

Tharoor begins with history, evoking the spread of Buddhism to China, the Bandung Conference, and Nehruvian calls for Asian solidarity. These references are designed to remind readers that India and China once found common ground as post-colonial powers seeking autonomy. But the world of 2025 bears little resemblance to the mid-twentieth century. The forces shaping India–China ties today are not civilizational memories but hard power competition, territorial disputes and economic asymmetries. By leaning on history to frame the present, the article risks projecting a romanticized narrative onto a far harsher reality.

The most glaring omission is the border question. Since the Galwan clashes of 2020, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been transformed into a permanent theatre of militarization. Tens of thousands of troops remain deployed, costly infrastructure has been built, and mutual distrust has hardened into institutional practice. This is not a temporary standoff that can be softened with words about “not letting differences turn into disputes.” It is a structural reality that has reshaped India’s defense posture and strategic planning. Any suggestion of a reset that does not grapple directly with disengagement and de-escalation is little more than wishful thinking.

The economic dimension is equally troubling. India’s trade with China is defined by staggering imbalance. Chinese goods dominate critical sectors from electronics to pharmaceuticals to heavy machinery, while Indian exports remain negligible. This is not mutual partnership but dependency. Far from strengthening India’s bargaining power, such an arrangement makes New Delhi vulnerable to pressure at precisely those moments when strategic disagreements arise. To describe this as a “partnership” is to ignore how economic asymmetry translates into political leverage.

Tharoor does acknowledge China’s dominance in supply chains, but he underplays its implications. China has shown, time and again, that it is willing to use economic tools to advance geopolitical aims, whether in its disputes with Australia, Lithuania, or South Korea. To believe that India would be immune from such tactics is dangerously complacent.

Another blind spot in the editorial is the geopolitical context. India and China do not operate in a vacuum. Beijing’s expanding partnership with Pakistan, its naval forays into the Indian Ocean, its assertiveness in the South China Sea, and its leadership role in BRICS and the SCO all intersect with Indian interests. These developments constrain New Delhi’s strategic space. They cannot be brushed aside in the name of bilateral “clarity.” Any durable rapprochement must account for the fact that China is actively shaping a regional and global order that often runs counter to India’s interests.

Even in the realm of diplomacy, China’s track record inspires caution rather than optimism. Beijing frequently deploys the language of cooperation while pursuing hard-edged unilateral gains. From the South China Sea to the Himalayas, its modus operandi has been to consolidate facts on the ground while talking of peace and partnership. To interpret the Modi–Xi dialogue as a genuine breakthrough, without demanding concrete measures such as verifiable troop disengagement or trade realignments, is to repeat a familiar mistake of mistaking atmospherics for strategy.

There is also the question of domestic political discourse. In India, public sentiment toward China hardened significantly after 2020. “Hindi-Chini bye-bye” was not just a slogan but a reflection of widespread mistrust. Any government in New Delhi will be constrained by this reality. A narrative that imagines leaders simply willing their countries into a new era of solidarity risks ignoring the domestic costs of such moves. Diplomacy does not unfold in a vacuum; it is shaped by public expectations and political accountability.

The fundamental weakness of Tharoor’s argument is that it places excessive faith in symbolism. History, civilizational ties, and rhetoric of solidarity may enrich diplomatic atmospheres, but they cannot substitute for hard policy shifts. Until border tensions are resolved, economic asymmetries reduced, and strategic encirclement addressed, the talk of a “return of Chindia” is a mirage. Dialogue is preferable to silence, yes, but dialogue without substance risks creating the illusion of progress where little exists.

The Modi–Xi meeting may indeed signal a temporary easing of tensions. It may even open doors for limited cooperation in trade or multilateral forums. But to present it as a major reset is to inflate its significance. The material realities of the relationship remain adversarial, not cooperative. India’s challenge is not to embrace nostalgia but to craft a clear-eyed strategy: engage Beijing where interests align, resist where they diverge, and above all, avoid the trap of mistaking diplomatic poetry for political progress.

In the end, what India requires is not the dream of “Chindia” but the discipline of realism. The border remains unresolved, economic dependency continues, and strategic mistrust persists. Until those realities shift, the idea of India and China as development partners will remain more aspiration than fact.

Shariq Us Sabah writes on international relations and global governance, with a focus on South Asia and the Middle East.

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