Britain’s History of Atrocity Prevention: A Tale of Two Parts

If a state’s history of atrocity prevention (AP) is evidence of its likely future, then understanding Britain’s history is key to understanding its current approach and its likely future. This post will look at how Britain has been involved with the international efforts towards atrocity prevention; where does Britain sit on the spectrum of cheerleader to spoilsport?

This post will look at Britain’s involvement in the development of the Atrocity Prevention agenda from its ‘ancient history’ to the intervention in Libya in 2011. The atrocity prevention agenda and the actions it encompasses are in many ways still developing, and its history as a cohesive idea goes back no further than 1945. I begin this post with Britain’s ‘ancient’ history, immediately post-1945, before looking at Britain’s more recent history, including Blair’s ‘Ethical Foreign Policy’.

Part One: Britain’s ‘Ancient’ History of Atrocity Prevention

As atrocity prevention remains in development, the ancient history of any states approach to atrocity prevention covers its involvement in agreements and organisations that form the basis of atrocity prevention infrastructure and enforcement. This includes international agreements such as the United Nations Charter and the Genocide Convention.

On any issue, states generally sit somewhere on the spectrum from cheerleader to spoilsport. Atrocity prevention is no different. On this spectrum Britain is generally considered to be closer to the cheerleader than spoilsport, but this ‘cheer’ is not wholly consistent and is frequently muted by other political priorities. As a result, the UN Association UK (UNA-UK) gives Britain an Amber rating on atrocity prevention in its traffic light system.

Immediately following World War Two there was a surge in international agreements intended to prevent any return to war. Britain was heavily involved in these agreements and took a place within the five permanent members of the United Nation Security Council. This position awarded Britain some significant powers including a veto on any resolutions that might pass through the Security Council (UNSC). These powers also afford Britain a certain amount of responsibility, Britain must consent to any resolution passed on atrocity prevention.

Alongside this responsibility Britain is also a ‘pen-holder’, with responsibility for drafting resolutions on a number of topics related to atrocity prevention. This includes state-centric resolutions on Libya, Myanmar, Yemen and Sudan, as well as resolutions covering topics such as Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians. Britain is, therefore, not only responsible for passively consenting to resolutions but for drafting and advocating for them.

Britain’s involvement in atrocity prevention began, then, with its role in designing the structures that now support atrocity prevention despite this not being the intention of the post-1945 international agreements.

Further from this, Britain is a signatory to agreements with an explicit atrocity prevention function. This began with the 1948 Genocide convention which provided a clear definition of the crime and states responsibilities to prevent it. This, Britain signed with no reservations.

Britain’s ancient history with regards to atrocity prevention is positive, but not activist. Britain has been involved in agreements that support atrocity prevention structurally, that is by developing international organisations whose function is to support atrocity prevention. In Britain’s ancient history with atrocity prevention, its approach did not lead to functional changes. That is, immediately post-1945 Britain was involved in building structures for future atrocity prevention, but not active in preventing crimes.

Part Two: Ethical Foreign Policy and the 1990’s

Britain’s more recent history, from 1990, was more active on atrocity prevention. However, this more active approach has faced significant criticisms, particularly related to Britain’s involvement in armed intervention and peacekeeping. Britain had led peacekeeping missions prior to the creation of the UN and, since the formalisation of UN Security Council authority over these missions, has continued to contribute.

In the 1990’s this contribution was formalised through, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s Ethical Foreign Policy. The Ethical Foreign Policy was announced by Blair’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, shortly after their election success in 1997 and expanded upon in Blair’s famous Chicago Speech. The basis of the Foreign Policy was four international goals: security, prosperity, quality of life and securing the respect of others for Britain’s international contributions. That is, Blair’s Ethical Foreign Policy had both the selfless aim of improving life for citizens globally, and the selfish aim of making sure Britain was seen to be doing so.

Espousing these selfless and selfish goals together makes Blair’s speech significant. However, more significant was Blair’s Chicago speech, made in the international context of NATO’s action to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities in Kosovo and the wider Balkans. This speech outlined five conditions for the Bosnian interventions, and any subsequent interventions including: being certain of their case, exhausting diplomatic options and being committed to long-term action if necessary. These conditions are significant because they demonstrate positive action towards British involvement in atrocity prevention, that is if there was evidence that the conditions were met Britain would be involved in armed intervention. This strongly indicates British ‘cheerleading’ tendencies.

Britain’s ‘cheerleading’ was also shown during Blair’s leadership in the decision to sign the 1998 Rome Statute that committed them to the rules of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The statute came into effect in 2002 and allows the ICC to prosecute individuals for actions that directly incite Genocide and other atrocity crimes. Since the Statute came into effect it has successfully prosecuted individuals guilty of atrocity crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic with several other investigations open and underway. These prosecutions sit apart from the successes of other international criminal tribunals. Britain’s continued support for the ICC and the presence of a British judge from the Court’s initiation also demonstrates British ‘cheerleading’.

However, Britain’s Ethical Foreign Policy failed to ensure effective atrocity prevention in Kosovo and Bosnia. NATO’s intervention (predominantly through their bombing campaign) failed to stop the massacre of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Croatia. Despite significant successes, then, Britain’s approach in the 1990’s lived up to its amber rating. While there was both a desire to help and significant action in support of atrocity prevention, this was not wholly successful.

Part 3: R2P, Libya and Beyond

Britain continued its more active approach into the 2000’s, intervening in Sierra Leone in response to civil war in 2000, and supporting the proposal of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN World Summit in 2005. The support for R2P by nations including Britain is hugely significant as it further crystallised the atrocity prevention agenda and provided the beginnings of a more solid infrastructure for atrocity prevention.

It would be wrong of me, however, not to mention the ‘bump’ in the road caused by Britain’s involvement in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Britain’s support of the ‘War on Terror’ has been hugely criticised for civilian casualties, possible War Crimes and its 20 year duration, ending with the evacuation of Afghanistan in August 2021.

Britain’s war on terror also largely prevented intervention, in cases of atrocity crimes, and significantly curtailed the development of R2P. Until, that is, the Arab Spring and a wave of revolutions across Arab states in North Africa beginning with the Self-Immolation[i] of a fruit vender in Tunisia. Protests spread quickly across many states leading to the deposing of five leaders and violent protests, and crackdowns, in others.

In Libya in 2011, Gaddafi responded to protests violently and threatened the use of chemical weapons on civilians in Benghazi. In response, NATO members of the UN Security Council pushed for a resolution to allow action. This effort grew and became the first UN authorised application of the principal of the Responsibility to Protect. Resolution 1973 allowed NATO to enforce a no-fly zone in the name of preventing crimes against humanity and placed sanctions on Gaddafi and his supporters. Britain was key in passing and upholding the Resolution but the intervention was not without criticism. NATO were heavily criticised for exceeding their mandate in Libya and pushing for a change in leadership rather than just protecting civilians as was mandated. Criticism aside, Libya was a huge step for R2P and atrocity prevention. It proved that action could be agreed upon and enforced at the UN level in order to protect civilians from the ‘four crimes’ and it’s important that Britain was significant part of both initiating and undertaking action.

Since Libya, Britain has failed to be as vocal or as active in preventing crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. Other states have responded to China’s actions in Xinjiang with official declarations of Genocide and sanctions while Britain was slow to respond or launch official sanctions against Chinese officials. This, at least partly, was the result of British Government concerns over a post-Brexit trade deal with China. Britain finally sanctioned Chinese officials, four of them, in March 2021.

The UNA-UK’s amber rating is deserved then. From 1945 onward Britain has supported atrocity prevention efforts, though this support has often fallen short of effective atrocity prevention. In some cases, Britain’s action has been too far too fast (Libya) in others too little too late (Bosnia and Kosovo).

Britain’s support of humanitarian values and atrocity prevention, however flawed, is better than silence. That being said, there are current and future challenges for Britain that will require a new approach. That, I will discuss in the final post.

[i] The act of setting yourself on fire