From Frontlines to Frameworks: Lessons About Managing Reputation and Crisis

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Having spent almost two decades in government communications, I thought I knew a thing or two about crisis management. I had supported operational teams through incidents and participated in crisis exercises. I therefore entered the Managing Reputation, Crisis and Media Relations module at the Wee Kim Wee Master of Media and Communications programme expecting familiar territory. Instead, the course reframed my understanding entirely. It taught me that effective crisis management is not just about operational control but also about leadership, ethics, and the strategic management of reputation. The module deepened my appreciation of how theory informs practice — connecting my experiences with established frameworks.

Reputation as Organisational Capital

Before taking the module, I saw reputation as the public image that a communications team creates and protects. This is crucial as organisations face a complex operating environment. Andrew Griffin notes that organisational reputation faces higher risks from declining trust, lower risk appetites, tighter regulations, rising expectations, and increased scrutiny driven by social media and activism (2014). I have seen this reality in the public sector, where even small missteps are quickly highlighted and spread online.

Through the lectures and case studies, I now understand reputation as organisational capital — a bank of trust built up through consistent performance, authenticity in interactions and ethical conduct. The notion of reputation as an insurance policy particularly resonated with me. Many times I have seen agencies with stronger reputations and higher public trust weather crises more effectively because they have built credibility and grown a base of supporters. This changed my perspective: reputation is a long-term asset to be proactively strategised and serves as the foundation for all communication decisions, rather than merely maintained and managed is what differentiates the good from the best. And perhaps no other government agency exemplified this better than how well the Singapore Police Force (SPF) bounced back from the Little India Riot.

Crisis Management vs Crisis Communication

On 8 December 2013, a drunk migrant worker was run over by a private bus, triggering a riot — the first violence on the streets in over four decades since 1969. The Committee of Inquiry (COI) found that the force’s crisis response faced challenges, primarily due to technical communications problems on the ground. Officers on the scene were unable to communicate with the command centre as radio signals were jammed, and this meant that they were operating in silo, without intel to fully appreciate the full scope of the situation. This delayed coordination for reinforcements to quell the rioting.

The lack of a full understanding of the ground situation understandably meant that official public communications lagged behind, even as social media was afire with photos and videos from members of the public on the chaos. The first police statement was issued about three and a half hours after the incident, providing details and statistics on the extent of the damage. This was followed up an hour later with a press conference as well as social media updates. To the credit of the teams at SPF and MHA, the messaging was clear — the authorities provided the facts, with then DPM and Minister of Home Affairs declaring the situation under control, urging against speculations and asserting a firm stance against lawlessness. The Prime Minister’s Office also released a statement from the Prime Minister calling for restraint in reacting against foreign workers. This is no doubt a testament to the comms team’s preparedness — as elucidated by Coombs and Holliday (2010) in pre-crisis planning: knowing the escalation paths and being able to fast-track approval processes meant shorter response time in reestablishing control of the narrative.

While the incident reinforced how the communications chain is only as strong as its weakest link, the management, ie, operational response and communication, ie, public statements, were aligned (Coombs, 2007); both signaled control, reassurance, and decisiveness by the authorities. Though the COI highlighted gaps, the Committee also praised the police for responding “relatively swiftly and efficiently” — the melee was brought under control within two hours without tear gas or a single shot being fired. Put together, this shows the public that action is being taken and the organisation is responsive.

Message Framing

A public disorder, police officers injured by rioters, damage to police and emergency vehicles — such an outbreak of violence represented high severity, with a stronger reputational threat and corresponding need for a robust response as predicted by Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), particularly given that SPF is a high-trust organisation and the stakes are higher.

The SCCT framework for a moderate-to-high responsibility thus called for a rebuilding strategy: corrective action; rebuilding trust; and bolstering stakeholder relationships. This was only partially followed, at least in the beginning. The first public statement seemed to frame the incident as a fatal traffic accident, taking on a ‘victim cluster’ framing — a minimisation of organisational responsibility — while photos and videos of the mayhem trended on social media, which led to a certain degree of credibility loss and ridicule online. However, it could also be argued that investigations were ongoing then, and a more cautious stance was taken for the first statement to be mostly factual. Furthermore, the SPF had thus far displayed a good track record with high public trust, which served as a good cushion to buffer serious reputational damage.

In the immediate days following the incident, SPF was swift in providing updates via press conferences and social media on the actions taken such as arresting the bus driver for causing death by negligent act (who was eventually cleared), investigating and making arrests, charging and repatriation of the riot instigators, as well as the restriction of alcohol sale and consumption within the areas demarcated under the Public Order (Preservation) Act.

The police were equally transparent in the updates of the COI on social media platforms, highlighting key messages especially from leadership group (LG) officers who took the stand. Taking the heat from the committee, the LGs were under fire as they defended the actions of their men who had acted according to protocol. The commissioner, in particular, commended the officers for displaying courage and the right instincts in a fluid situation, as he fended off criticisms from the committee.

The post-crisis messaging emphasised reforms, commitment to upholding law and order in preventing a recurrence, promises, as well as announcements of structural and procedural changes to close the gaps identified by the COI, demonstrating a close crisis management-communication alignment. Social media posts on the Minister of Home Affairs and Prime Minister separately meeting with officers involved in the incident lent a human touch, showing the force as a caring organisation that has officers’ welfare at heart. All these served to strengthen the force’s reputation and credibility, enabling it to regain public trust.

Preparation and Pre-Emption: The Real Work

Looking back at my various responsibilities over the years, I’ve come to realise that a large part of my work was focused on shoring up public trust and pre-empting the outbreak of crises.

When I was a lowly civil servant newly inducted to government communications, I was first schooled in media monitoring and sentiment analysis — day in, day out, even on weekends, the team kept a close watch on mentions of the organisation, particularly in international media and on socials. Prodromes, as Fearn-Banks (2011) wrote, are crucial because the best cure for crises is prevention.

And our team was kept busy with work described under Mitroff’s first two out of the five stages of a crisis (1994): cultivating good relations with the media; improving internal communications; attending to feedback promptly and rolling out corporate social responsibility programmes. Red-teaming and crisis simulations are also a regular part of our operations and processes, and I now appreciate how those exercises embody what Fearn-Banks describes as pre-crisis communication — working well with the media, managing the internal publics, and taking care of customers as well as the external publics.

As Griffin argues that preventing risks from turning into crises is better than being prepared for the next crisis (2014), the work behind preparing and pre-empting is unglamorous but essential. And a long-term strategy incorporating reputation management that can be utilised when the need arises will be even more important for organisations to navigate the challenges of a VUCA world.