Leverkusen vs BMG (Bundesliga)

Germany Bundesliga (21.09.2025)

Both teams’ atmosphere is not very good, as Leverkusen recently sacked Ten Hag and BMG are currently in the relegation zone.

My main focus in this match was to observe Castrop’s condition within his team, as he is a new member of KORMNT and I had not previously had the chance to watch him play a full match.

This was his first appearance as a starter, and he played 72 minutes.

Therefore, this report will provide a detailed analysis of the match from BMG’s perspective.

1. Formation

base structure

BMG’s base structure is 3–4–2–1, the same as Leverkusen’s formation.

• When they start the build-up, Engelhardt (P6) or Reitz (P27) drop down to support the defenders.
• In possession, Ullrich (P26) and Scally (P29) both move higher to take charge of the width.

So, during on-possession, they changed their structure to 3–2–4–1 or 3–2–5.

2. Phase

- Attack

• In the build-up phase, their GK mostly passed to the center-backs, and then the center-backs tried either to play long balls into the space in behind or to pass into midfield.
• When the midfielders received the ball from the center-backs, they constantly looked for space behind the rival’s defensive line, and if there was enough room, they attempted long balls into the empty space.

Despite these efforts, their long-ball success rate was below average.

long ball to space in behind

Unlike Leverkusen, whose back three often saw one defender step forward or one forward drop deeper to help create a numerical advantage in midfield, BMG failed to show such movements and were frequently intercepted when trying to progress the ball through the midfield line.

• As a result, Machino (P18) isolated many times in the final third and didn’t make any dangerous chances.

- Attack-Defense

When they lost the ball, even in the final third, they chose to regroup rather than counter-press in the high area.

• When they lost the ball in the middle third, they were often exposed to numerical disadvantages and runs in behind, so they chose to commit a deliberate foul and take a yellow card.
• The goal they conceded below came from the late recovery of the wing-backs and midfielders, which left two free men due to numerical inferiority.

numerical inferiority

- Defense

• If the rival started with a goal kick or a throw-in in their defensive third, they initiated a high press with a man-oriented approach.
• But when the opponents managed to progress into the middle third, they converted their pressing from man-oriented to zonal.
• In the defensive third, they dropped both wing-backs to form a five-man back line.

five man-back line

- Defense-Attack

• When they regained the ball in their defensive third, they tried to pass it to the midfield, but because of numerical and dynamic disadvantages, they failed to move it to the final third on most occasions.

4v1

• The sequence below was their only dangerous chance, created by Castrop’s (P17) aggression, which allowed him to break through the 3-v-1.

3v1

3. Set-Pieces

- Corner Kick

• When they defend the opponent’s corner kicks, they often set up with four zonal markers, three man-markers, and two players positioned for the second ball, as shown below.

defending corner kick

• On their own attacking corner kicks, they use six runners, spreading across different areas to create a 1-v-1 situation for P15.

As a result, they made a dramatic goal from this corner kick.

attacking corner kick