Comment: Kaladan Project, Chicken’s Neck, Mizoram, Manipur And India’s Internal Security, Taking A Closer Look

India appears to be going too soft on Kuki-Chin armed groups in Manipur. Action against them can affect the Myanmar side when India needs all the support from Kuki-Chin kindred to guard, complete and operate the Kaladan project

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By RK Nimai

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) — connecting Kolkata and Sittwe after the development of Sittwe Port, and thence a waterway component of 158 km along the Kaladan River from Sittwe Port to Paletwa in Chin State, and a road component of 109 km from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the Indo-Myanmar border in Mizoram through Chin State in Myanmar — is estimated to cost Rs 2,904.04 crore.

This project was envisaged to propel the development of northeast states by providing an alternative route to the Siliguri corridor, reducing pressure on this narrow strip of land. It has tremendous political and strategic significance, to be executed through India’s grant assistance to Myanmar.

Components of the project such as Sittwe Port, power, river dredging, and Paletwa jetty have reportedly been completed, but the Paletwa-Zorinpui road is still incomplete with progress at a standstill due to the conflict in Myanmar. The project which was targeted to be completed by 2014 still drags on even after a decade with no sight of its completion.

This project is a counter-offer to the massive investment made by China in the Sittwe-Kunming pipeline, a 793-km-long pipeline built at a cost of $2.4 billion. Gas from the Sittwe offshore gas fields carried through this pipeline contributes to 6 per cent of China’s annual gas demand, thereby reducing the dependency on the Malacca Strait, and other projects.

Besides this project, India is investing in the 1,000-acre Sittwe Special Economic Zone at Ponnagyun town; Htay Chaung hydropower project, a 1,800 megawatt two-dam project over the Chindwin River in Rakhine State; a 1,200 megawatt dam at Thamanthi, and a 600 megawatt dam at Shwejaye. India will buy power generated from these installations. Besides, there is a proposal for a 1,575-km Sittwe-Aizawl-Silchar-Guwahati-Siliguri-Gaya pipeline, apart from upgrading roads on the Indian side.

The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, announced with much fanfare, has seen no progress.

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The Kaladan project is meant to reduce the pressure on the Siliguri Corridor, popularly known as ‘Chicken’s Neck’, after Bangladesh refused to allow India transport and transit rights to the northeast states. Chittagong port is less than 200 km from Agartala, the capital of Tripura. India is concerned by the small width of the Siliguri Corridor, which at its narrowest is only 13 km and at its widest is 23 km.

In the event of a conflict there, the northeast can be cut off. So, the only alternative after Bangladesh’s refusal to grant rights to transport and transit is the Kaladan project, which can be used to access the northeast during any eventuality.

During peacetime, businesses will not prefer the Kaladan route as they have to load goods at Kolkata Port, unload at Sittwe Port, and transfer them to river barges till they reach Paletwa. From there, the goods have to be unloaded and reloaded on trucks to reach Zorinpui. Finally, they can be sent anywhere in the northeast from Zorinpui. Currently, businesses load goods on trains to reach Assam’s Guwahati, from where they are shipped by either trains or trucks. So, the narrative that the Kaladan project will reduce the load on the Chicken’s Neck is a bit far-fetched.

The concern over the narrow strip of the Chicken’s Neck can be mitigated by enlarging its width through negotiation or grabbing it by force to make the average width not less than 50 km, or if possible, 100 km. If this is so, many parallel roads can run through the strip and if properly guarded, there should not be much concern. Negotiations will take time, Bangladesh may not agree, and the use of force may not be acceptable to the international community.

But when India is pitted against a huge security issue, all is fair in love and war, as the saying goes. India took over Sikkim in 1975 because had it continued as an independent nation, the vulnerabilities of the Chicken’s Neck would have been greater.

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In the present conflict in Myanmar with the Arakan Army controlling most parts of Rakhine state — though there are other ethnic armed groups like the Arakan Liberation Army, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Arakan Rohingya Army — India has to negotiate carefully in dealing with them, especially with the ARSA which Amnesty International accused of killing Hindus in Myanmar.

In Chin State, the junta controls only 15 per cent area, while the rest is under the control of numerous ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) like the Chin National Army, Chin National Defence Force, Chin Brotherhood Alliance, Chinland Defence Force, Yaw Defence Force, and Arakan Army. The Kuki-Chin-Mizo in India are kindred to most of them, so India had to tread carefully and this had an effect on the crisis in Manipur.

Most EAOs in Chin State get support from Mizoram, which was acknowledged, and the Zomi Revolutionary (ZRA) had a presence there, though it was alleged that it sides with the junta. The recent witness by the Chief Minister of Mizoram to a peace deal between the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) was a pointer. The Chinland Council is led by the Chin National Front, the political wing of the CNA, while the ICNCC by the Chin Brotherhood Alliance.

There is a belief that the government of India is going too soft on Kuki-Chin armed groups in Manipur as it can have an impact on the Myanmar side when India needs all the support from their kindred to safeguard, complete and operate the Kaladan project.

The armed groups in Manipur have become belligerent in that they refuse to open National Highway 2 despite orders by the Union Home Minister. The problem with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is that the groups under the suspension of operations (SoO) agreement that they have been talking to seem to have a change in guard, with more younger militant leaders calling the shots, sidelining the leaders who signed the SoO.

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This can lead to a conflict, both inter and intra among the groups constituting the two SoO groups. Those 2,192 cadres whose names figure in the 2008 agreement must have grown older, with many not able to bear the burden of physical conflict, and during the conflict with the Meitei, many younger cadres have been recruited.

Even quite a few Kuki-Chin from Manipur who joined the Kuki National Army (KNA-Burma) after undergoing training with the Kachin Independent Army — quite a few killed in the conflict with the junta and its supporting groups — had returned to Manipur and joined one or the other SoO groups. The strength of the SoO groups increased despite the SoO rules saying no recruitment can be carried out.

As per a 2015 data, Chin State is the poorest among all the states and divisions in Myanmar, with 80 per cent of the population under the poverty line. The population is almost static as many had crossed over to India, either Mizoram or Manipur, thereby creating problems in the Indian states. Despite supporting their kindred in Myanmar, opposing border fencing, and seeking free movement regime’s continuation, there is now concern among the residents of Mizoram that there should be border fencing and movement across the border must be strictly regulated.

Besides, jobs in Mizoram are impacted as the refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) from Manipur undercut wages. If things go on as it is now, a time will come when the people of Mizoram will say, “enough is enough”.

Chin State (as also Rakhine state) is under what is called the ‘Four Cuts Policy’ of the 1960s and 1970s of Tatmadaw, where supply of food, funds, information and fresh recruits are cut off. Chin State would not have survived without support from Mizoram for items like medicines, salt, garment, cooking oil, fuel, etc. Major items of export from Mizoram are chemicals for drug processing, as the acreage under poppy increased sharply in Chin State, as per the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report of 2024.

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All the support was with an eye for the dream of a Greater Mizoram, on the belief that Zofate (sons of Zo or descendants of Zo, the progenitor of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo) will come together under one nation, and those from Mizoram will lead the nation due to better education.

The Kaladan Project is seen not only as an alternative route to the northeast, but also a strategic move to counter Chinese investments in Myanmar. Due to the conflict in Myanmar, the project could not as yet see the light. However, it can only supplement but not compete with the Siliguri corridor due to various constraints during peacetime. The insecurity about the Siliguri corridor due to its narrowness makes the Kaladan project important.

However, it is not a panacea and can be another millstone around the neck of India’s internal security.

RK Nimai is a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer. He lives in Imphal.

This piece first appeared in Imphal Free Press on March 26, 2025.

The opinion here is the author’s own.