Political Islam: Has Syria’s Time Come?

Political Islam: Has Syria’s Time Come? By Bishop Elias Toumeh** Introduction Following the weakening, subsequent collapse, and total dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, a sense of frustration and loss prevailed across the Islamic world. This sentiment grew and intensified as Western powers seized control of many Islamic countries following the First and Second World Wars. Many Islamic thinkers sought to justify the loss of the Muslim Ottoman Empire’s glory by claiming that Muslims had "abandoned God’s law." It was precisely from this point that the idea of reviving the lost glory was born—a project later termed "Political Islam." The Beginnings There is no doubt that anyone reading the early literature of Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, will see how it was initially built on a narrative of mourning lost glory. We find parallels to this in Byzantine Christian literature following the fall of the great Byzantine Empire. The Egyptian Hasan al-Banna, at least in his beginnings, is much like the Byzantine Niketas (886) in his theological justification regarding the rise of Islam. The Project of Political Islam The fundamental hypothesis upon which the Political Islam project is built is the revival of Sharia (God’s law). Proponents argue that abandoning Sharia was the primary reason for the retreat of Muslims and the decline of their civilization. The path to achieving this is the establishment of a fully-fledged Islamic state, thereby returning Islam to the global forefront as it once was. Political Islam views Islam not merely as a religion or a set of rituals, but as "a system of political governance that encompasses all aspects of life." Among all Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood became the most prominent, perhaps because it was the most organized and resilient. The Critique of Political Islam It must be noted here that this project is not unanimously accepted by all Islamic intellectual currents. Ali Abdel Raziq, a former Sheikh of Al-Azhar, wrote a unique book titled "Islam and the Foundations of Governance" (1925), in which he argued that there is "no theory of governance in Islam." He viewed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a divine sign and maintained that Islam does not impose a specific political system on society, criticizing the Ottoman experience and calling for a civil state. While the book and its author faced severe criticism in Egypt, his defenders were not few—most notably Dr. Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad. We also cannot forget the Sufi currents, which believe that Islam’s restoration of glory comes through the "Greater Jihad" (the struggle of the soul) rather than the armed "Lesser Jihad." Political Islam in Syria In Syria, the name of the Muslim Brotherhood has been linked to armed action. The previous regime committed heinous crimes against the group’s leaders and members, planting the idea in the minds of Syrians that the Brotherhood is a "basket of killers, traitors, and agents." Under the Assad regime, religiosity itself became an offense punishable by law. This was used as a pretext to shell and destroy the city of Hama, killing thousands of innocent people under the guise of fighting the Brotherhood. In short, Political Islam in Syria—like all other political currents such as Communists and Nationalists—was subject to arrest, torture, and abuse; Sednaya Prison stands as a living witness to this. However, it is noteworthy that the elder Assad (Hafez) allowed very narrow margins for the political movement of Communists and Nationalists (for example, licensing a party and a newspaper that was forbidden from distribution!). Yet, he allowed the Muslim Brotherhood no margin of freedom, even an illusory one. This is attributed to his deep fear of the devout Sunni street, while he, an Alawite, held the reins of power. Conversely, the Brotherhood chose the path of violence and assassinations—a path not taken by other oppressed political forces. Political Islam and the Syrian Revolution Political Islam disappeared from the Syrian political scene for long decades after the group was banned under Ba’athist dictatorial rule. Therefore, the fall of [the central authority of] Assad provided an opening for its return through the gateway of the revolution. All Syrians who witnessed the revolution since 2011 know that the Islamic current appeared early in the protest squares, eventually dominating them by the beginning of 2014. The regime utilized the "Islamization of the revolution" to tarnish its image. Sharia courts were formed in areas liberated from the dictator’s tyranny, eventually leading to the emergence of ISIS and Al-Nusra Front. The infighting between armed Islamic factions eventually led to their placement on international terror lists. Political Islam in the Context of Syria’s Transitional Phase "He who liberates, dictates"—this slogan summarizes the Islamic euphoria of victory over Assad after years of "Sunni victimhood." Many Islamists feel that the omens of restoring "lost glory" are on the horizon, following the proverb: "If your winds blow, seize the moment." The “de facto” transitional authorities in Syria will strive—and this is a legitimate pursuit in their eyes—to transform into an official governing power through the force of law, constitution, and elections. They do not hide their intentions, nor do they practice the "Taqiyya" (dissimulation) customary in some Political Islam circles. However, if we measure things by what happened in Tunisia and Egypt—where the Ennahda Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively tried to monopolize power—the experience was disappointing for Islamists. This is despite the fact that the religious and ethnic diversity in those two countries does not compare to the diversity in Syria. The attempt failed in Egypt and Tunisia despite following a policy of "Pragmatic Islam," as they could not revive the country or its people due to collapsing economies and the rejection of Sharia implementation by a large segment of the population. I do not wish to list other equally important examples, such as Sudan. While the percentage of Muslims in Syria exceeds 80%, many are secularists, liberals, communists, nationalists, atheists, and so on. Naturally, these groups do not want a religious state. Conclusion In summary, the project of a religious state has no future in Syria due to the diversity of its society and its multiple orientations. However, Political Islam must express itself through participation alongside all other parties and political forces in political, social, and cultural life. Islam in the Levant (Bilad al-Sham) has a unique character; it is adorned with Christian love, Druze chivalry, Kurdish authenticity, and Arab generosity. It is the beautiful Syrian robe, where Islam forms the primary fabric, embroidered with the threads of all other religious, cultural, and ethnic components.

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