Why Force isn’t Enough for the Tyrant to Stay

How is it that some governments endure while others collapse?

Iran’s current leadership — a theocracy — is especially an interesting example. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has faced wars, economic crises, international sanctions, and most importantly, repeated, multiple forms of civil disobedience throughout the years. Most recently, the country has experienced significant public unrest, with many Iranians openly opposing the current political system, and subsequently, the state responding with large-scale silencing of the masses with coercion. However, more than four decades after its creation, the regime is, to this day, in power.

Many may point to the continuous repression as the answer. It is in fact accurate that the Iranian state possesses powerful security institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as its integrated paramilitary volunteer militia Basij. Moreover, there exists great evidence that with the help of those institutions, it has repeatedly used force against its own people asking for freedom in many areas of life — notably the recent January 2026 protest crackdowns documented by both local and international human rights organizations.

The Iranian flag with the lion and sun from before 1979 being waved by demonstrators in Iran (January 2026).

Yet, one wonders whether repression alone can explain the regime’s endurance; because if force were enough, every authoritarian government would stay forever.

Beyond Repression

A thinker who offers a useful perspective in this conversation is the 20th century German sociologist Max Weber. Weber argued that people “obey” authority for three reasons. Sometimes authority comes from tradition. In other times, it comes from laws and bureaucracy. And from time to time, it comes from the personal appeal of a leader.

This idea is understood as legitimacy. In simple terms, legitimacy is the belief that a government has a right to rule — it depends on a degree of civic acceptance.

In that view, when you look at Iran’s modern history, legitimacy seems just as important in its survival as its background of documented compulsion.

The Khomeini Era

Ayatollah Khomeini’s portrait taken in Paris just prior to the 1979 revolution. Denis Cameron/Rex Features photo.

In the years following 1979, much of the Islamic Republic’s authority was tied to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini himself. For many supporters — who named themselves as Khomeinists — he was not simply a political leader, but the symbolic figure of the revolution and its broader goals within the region, mostly tied to the expansion of distinct Shia ideology, which helps explain another source of the regime’s legitimacy attempts: religion.

The clerical authority and the role of Islamic principles, proved by the doctrine of Guardianship of the Jurist embedded in the constitution of the new Iran, connected the state to longstanding religious traditions that many viewed as justified at first.

Weber described this situation as the combination of charismatic and traditional authority. In this sense, people follow because they believe in the exceptional qualities of a leader, but also because they view religious traditions as established and legitimate sources of representation.

But if charisma is tied to one individual, what happens when that individual dies?

Khomeini passed away in 1989. Did the Islamic Republic fall?

Not A One Man Rule

After Khomeini’s death, the still-very-alive regime of Iran faced a challenge familiar to many revolutionary systems: charisma is difficult to inherit. However, the religious institutions and traditions that formed part of its legitimacy remained intact.

The death of Khomeini therefore was almost a test of Weber’s theory. If charismatic authority was the regime’s primary source of legitimacy, one would expect institutional instability following his death.

Authority, at this point, became increasingly rooted in the “legal-rational”. Elections, parliament, and the presidency became the dominant mechanisms through which the state once again attempted to claim a form of public participation. While many observers have questioned the democratic and procedural characteristics of these institutions, they nonetheless formed part of the state’s strategy in sustaining its legitimacy.

This did not mean that the government abandoned charisma entirely, nor did it rely on a single source of authority. Instead, it drew on several forms of legitimacy at once. For a period of time, this flexibility may have helped the system last; but, not for long.

An Intensifying Conflict

Today, the situation appears different.

Anti-regime protest waves, markedly the Green Movement in 2009, the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and the recent 2025–2026 crackdown revealed growing tensions between the state and the diverse sections of society, showing a clear disapproval by the people’s will. Increasing numbers of the population have questioned not only particular actions and policies put forward by the government–both internally and externally — such as the morality police or proxy groups, but also the root of the problem: the system itself.

Even though popular sovereignty appears increasingly contested–from the very formation of the Islamic Republic — whether that translates into regime change remains uncertain as of now. That said, it does raise important questions about legitimacy — questions not just relevant to Iran.

How long can a government endure when more and more citizens no longer accept its claim to rule?

With multiple factors present in the answer to that question — with other scholars point to institutionalization, elite cohesion, patronage networks, and control of economic resources as additional explanations — Iran’s case reminds us that dictatorial states are not sustained by mere political oppression.

They also depend on the stories they tell about why they deserve to govern, and on whether people continue to believe them or not.

Written June 2026.

This essay examines regime legitimacy through the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran using Max Weber’s ideal types of authority.

Sources

Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Arjomand, Said Amir. After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Amnesty International. Iran: State Repression and Human Rights Violations. Various reports, 2022–2026.

Amnesty International. “What Happened at the Protests in Iran?” January 26, 2026.

Human Rights Watch. Iran Country Reports and Coverage. Various reports, 2022–2026.

Human Rights Watch. “Iran: Authorities’ Renewed Cycle of Protest Bloodshed.” January 8, 2026.

Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Freedom House. Freedom in the World: Iran. Annual reports.

Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Geddes, Barbara, Wright, Joseph, and Frantz, Erica. How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse. Cambridge University Press, 2018.