INCELS at the Ready: Reform’s cultivation of hatred and violence towards women

British politics has undergone a transformation as seismic as it is unsettling. Populism has surged, cultural divides have deepened and a generation of young men finds itself disillusioned, directionless and increasingly drawn towards dangerous subcultures. At the centre of this new political landscape stands Nigel Farage, a figure whose influence on British discourse far outstrips his electoral record. As the leader of Reform UK, Farage has once again demonstrated his talent for locating and amplifying resentment. Yet today, the target of his rhetoric is not only Brussels or immigration. Increasingly, Reform is cultivating the grievances of disaffected young men, many of whom are entangled in the world of INCEL (involuntary celibate) culture.

Farage’s strategy is not incidental but deliberate. Along with figures such as Zia Yusuf and Andrew Tice, Farage has been actively advancing the claim that in modern Britain, being young, white and male is not an advantage but a disadvantage. This claim resonates with a growing subculture of INCELs who share a worldview defined by victimhood, misogyny and bitterness towards a society they believe has left them behind. Farage’s open admiration for Andrew Tate, the internet personality notorious for his promotion of hyper-masculine, misogynistic values, is emblematic of how mainstream populist politics is absorbing the tropes of a once-fringe internet ideology (BBC News, 2025).

The dangers are clear. By cultivating this demographic, Reform secures a pool of young men who can be mobilised at rallies and protests, foot soldiers animated by anger and disaffection. More insidiously, the embrace of INCELadjacent rhetoric normalises misogyny, threatening to erode the fragile progress Britain has made toward gender equality. This article reflects how and why Reform has embraced this strategy, the ideological overlaps between populist politics and INCEL culture and the consequences of this convergence not only for gender relations but for the health of democracy itself.

The INCEL phenomenon is no longer a niche curiosity of the internet. It has, in fact, been implicated in acts of deadly violence. In 2014, Elliot Rodger killed six people in Isla Vista, California, leaving behind a manifesto steeped in misogynistic rage. In 2018, Alek Minassian drove a van into pedestrians in Toronto, killing ten people; in a Facebook post shortly before, he declared allegiance to the “INCEL Rebellion.” These acts were not isolated aberrations but the visible eruptions of a deeper online ecosystem where misogyny and nihilism intertwine. Research by Ging (2019) demonstrates how INCEL communities valorise such acts, mythologising perpetrators as martyrs for the cause. Similarly, Jaki et al. (2019) provide a detailed linguistic analysis of INCEL forums, finding that violent fantasies and dehumanising language towards women are not marginal but central to community identity.

In Britain, the risks have become painfully clear. In 2021, Jake Davison, a 22-year-old man who described himself as an “INCEL,” killed five people in Plymouth before taking his own life. Davison’s online activity revealed a fascination with misogynistic and self-defeating narratives drawn directly from INCEL communities (Kelly, 2021). The tragedy underscored that INCEL radicalisation is not confined to North America; it has taken root in the UK too. Security services have since acknowledged INCEL-inspired extremism as a growing security concern, placing it alongside jihadist and far-right violence (Johnson and Mejia, 2020).

This is the context in which Reform UK’s rhetoric must be understood. When Zia Yusuf and Andrew Tice insist that white men are structurally disadvantaged, they are not simply engaging in rhetorical provocation. They are feeding a narrative of dispossession that resonates with young men already primed by INCEL culture. These young men are told that their unemployment, loneliness or lack of romantic success is not a personal failing but evidence of a social order tilted against them. Reform offers an explanation and, more importantly, a political outlet for their resentment. Undercover reporting by OpenDemocracy describes rallies dominated by “angry white men” eager to channel their frustrations into political action (OpenDemocracy, 2025).

Farage himself has always excelled at blending populist grievance with performative authenticity. His claim that men are more willing than women to sacrifice family life for career (The Guardian, 2025) is revealing. On the surface, it appears as a throwaway comment, but its ideological implications are profound. It valorises male sacrifice, subtly criticises women as less committed and reinforces the idea that men are more naturally suited to struggle and leadership. For INCEL-influenced young men, the implication is that their suffering is noble, their resentment justified and their anger politically useful.

The embrace of Andrew Tate cements this ideological overlap. Tate has become a hero to young men across the globe, building an empire on the claim that modern society is rigged against men. His advice, often couched in the language of self-improvement, is steeped in misogyny: women, he insists, are possessions, inferior to men and there to be dominated. For Farage to praise Tate is to endorse this worldview, to bring it into the political mainstream (BBC News, 2025). The consequence is that misogynistic ideas once confined to the darkest corners of the internet are given the imprimatur of political respectability. Papadamou et al. (2020) show how YouTube has already facilitated the mainstreaming of INCEL discourse by promoting misogynistic influencers through algorithmic recommendation. Farage’s endorsement magnifies this process at the political level.

The overlap between Reform rhetoric and INCEL ideology is visible in three recurring themes. First, both insist upon the victimhood of young men, particularly white men, as though historical privilege has been inverted into oppression. Second, both valorise anger and resentment as legitimate responses to this perceived dispossession. Third, both fixate upon women as the root of the problem, whether by denying men romantic or sexual attention or by supposedly advancing at men’s expense in the workplace. In this convergence, misogyny ceases to be merely an online subculture and becomes a political resource.

The dangers are considerable. When misogynistic rhetoric is repeated by political figures, it becomes normalised. What once circulated on obscure forums now gains legitimacy from parliamentary platforms. As Scaptura and Boyle (2019) demonstrate, even in broader male populations, threats to masculinity can provoke violent fantasies; political legitimation of these narratives makes such outcomes even more likely. Furthermore, as Ging (2019) notes, the leap from rhetoric to real-world violence is alarmingly small. By echoing INCEL themes, Reform provides a bridge between online radicalisation and offline mobilisation.

Nor is this phenomenon unique to Britain. Across Europe, populist parties have embraced narratives of male victimhood. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) appeals to men who perceive feminism and multiculturalism as existential threats (Vogt and Riedl, 2021). In Spain, Vox has mobilised young male voters by attacking so-called “gender ideology” and seeking to dismantle protections for women. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has positioned his government as the defender of “traditional families” against feminist encroachment. In the United States, Donald Trump consistently framed men as victims of political correctness, often downplaying or dismissing sexual harassment claims as part of a “witch hunt” against men. These movements demonstrate that the exploitation of male grievance is not confined to one country but is part of a broader pattern of populist politics.

The broader social consequences are grim. Gender relations are poisoned, hostility between men and women deepens, and women in public life face escalating harassment. Mackenzie and Green (2022) argue that digital spaces have accelerated this process, creating new forms of “digital masculinity” that fuse online misogyny with radical right politics. Female politicians and journalists already endure disproportionate abuse; the normalisation of INCEL themes in mainstream politics risks intensifying this harassment and deterring women from public participation.

Political pluralism also suffers. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) observe that populism thrives by dividing society into virtuous insiders and corrupt outsiders. For Reform, the insiders are disaffected white men; the outsiders are feminists, women, and minorities supposedly stealing their place. This erodes democratic foundations by narrowing the definition of “the people” to exclude half the population.

Resisting this trend requires more than condemnation. Structural interventions are necessary. Education must equip young people with critical tools to resist misogynistic online content (Nagle, 2017). Feminist activism must continue to expose the dangers of these narratives and articulate inclusive visions of masculinity. Policy must treat INCEL radicalisation as a form of extremism akin to other violent ideologies (Johnson and Mejia, 2020). Progressive movements must also address the genuine economic frustrations of young men — stagnating wages, insecure employment, and unaffordable housing — without succumbing to misogynistic scapegoating. Only by tackling both material grievances and toxic cultural narratives can the tide be stemmed.

The cultivation of an INCEL following by Reform UK is deliberate, cynical, and dangerous. Farage, Yusuf and Tice are not passively reflecting disaffection; they are actively stoking it, shaping it into a narrative of dispossession with immediate political utility. Their admiration for Andrew Tate reveals that the project is about more than Brexit, immigration or sovereignty. It is about reasserting patriarchal dominance and mobilising a generation of young men through anger, grievance and misogyny. If this strategy is allowed to take root, it threatens not only women’s safety and gender equality but the stability of British democracy itself. The challenge now is urgent: to confront this toxic alliance of populism and misogyny before it consolidates its place at the heart of national life. Farage, Tice and Yusuf must be stopped.

References

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Ging, D. (2019) ‘Alphas, betas, and incels: Theorizing the masculinities of the manosphere’, Men and Masculinities, 22(4), pp. 638–657.

Jaki, S., De Smedt, T., Gwóźdź, M., Panchal, R., Rossa, A. and De Pauw, G. (2019) ‘Online hatred of women in the Incels.me forum: Linguistic analysis and automatic detection’, Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict, 7(2), pp. 240–268.

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Scaptura, M. N. and Boyle, K. M. (2019) ‘Masculinity threat, “Incel” traits, and violent fantasies among heterosexual men in the United States’, Feminist Criminology, 14(3), pp. 278–297.

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