The Geopolitics of the Arab Spring

Introduction

The Arab Spring was a wave of protests, uprisings, and revolutions that began in December 2010 and spread across the Arab world, leading to the fall of several long-standing authoritarian regimes [Wikipedia (b2), 2025]. It was ignited by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, who faced extreme poverty, discrimination and systemic humiliation, an act that resonated with the mounting frustrations of the masses. Bouazizi’s sacrifice became the catalyst for a broader movement, driven by widespread discontent with corruption, political repression, economic hardship, and lack of freedoms.

The eruption of protests began in Tunisia, leading to the ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. The revolution in Tunisia inspired similar movements in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. Social media was instrumental in the rapid propagation of the uprising (Tufekci, 2017, see note 1 below). In some instances, the uprisings resulted in the fall of entrenched regimes, while in others, they gave rise to violent civil wars and protracted conflict. The Arab Spring brought profound changes to the political landscape of the Levant and North Africa (see note 2 below), challenging decades of autocratic rule and fostering aspirations for democracy, reform, and greater freedoms. Yet, the aftermath of these events has been mixed. Some countries experienced reform and improved governance, while others descended into chaos, internal conflict, or renewed authoritarianism, leading to an ongoing geopolitical struggle for con­trol and influence in the region.

Geopolitical Context

The Arab Spring did not emerge in isolation but was the product of complex geopolitical, economic, and social forces that had been shaping the region for decades (Gordon, 2018). Thucydises’ concept of fear — the fear of losing power or influence — can be seen clearly in the longstanding authoritarian regimes of the region. These governments, bolstered by oppressive measures and often supported by external powers, lived in constant fear of losing control over their populations. The brutal suppression of political opposition and the strategic use of violence to maintain dominance were rooted in the rulers’ under­standing that power, once lost, could lead to their destruction. The fear of revolt, even among the leadership themselves, kept these regimes entrenched in a cycle of repression and exclusion, laying the groundwork for the uprisings that would soon follow.

At the same time, Honour — the desire to maintain dignity, legitimacy, and respect — played a significant role in driving the uprisings. For many of the protesters, the rebellion was not just about economic grievances but about restoring their dignity and sense of honour. Years of subjugation, corruption, and injustice created an environment ripe for a demand for social and political respect. Leaders such as Presidents Hosni Mubarak of Egypt or Ben Ali of Tunisia, who had maintained power through patronage and military support, were ultimately confronted by the public’s collective desire for honour — a demand for political legitimacy that the entrenched rulers could not provide (Adelina Marini, 2011).

Moreover, the relationship between fear and honour in the Arab Spring was not always clear-cut. Thucydides suggests that the motivations of one rival often become more potent than the fear of a pow­erful opponent. This dynamic is evident in the uprisings: at times, the honour of the oppressed — driven by a sense of dignity, autonomy, and justice — overpowered the fear of the consequences of challenging powerful regimes. This fluidity between fear and honour led to unpredictable outcomes and miscal­culations. It is essential to note that often, when honour becomes the central driver, even the most formidable powers misjudge the resolve of those they seek to control, thus escalating tensions and increasing the likelihood of conflict. The fluidity of these motivations heightened the volatility of the Arab Spring and contributed to the complexity of the ensuing geopolitical landscape.

Yet, as with Thucydises’ analysis of power, interest — both economic and strategic — was a key driver for many external actors involved. External powers, such as the United States, European countries, and regional actors like the Gulf States, had long supported these regimes for strategic reasons, including the protection of oil interests, regional stability, and counterterrorism goals. In this sense, the Arab Spring was not only a product of internal dynamics but also an external battleground of competing interests, with foreign powers trying to safeguard their own political, economic, and security stakes. The US, for example, had supported President Mubarak for decades due to the role of Egypt in peace with Israel and its strategic position in the region. Yet, as the uprisings gained momentum, these powers had to recalibrate their strategies, shifting their support from regimes they had once propped up to new political realities that were less predictable (Hamid, 2011).

In the case of the Arab Spring, the political turmoil illustrated Thucydises’ view that the cycle of Fear, Honour, and Interest leads to conflict and instability, as the dominant powers in the region — the ruling autocrats — sought to maintain control at all costs, while the broader population and external actors each pursued their own competing interests.

Domestic Causes of the Arab Spring

Economic Factors

The economic factors that led to the Arab Spring were deeply intertwined with the broader political and social structure of the region [Rosenberg, 2011; Gordon, 2018]. A critical aspect of this was the widespread economic instability that plagued most of the Arab nations. High levels of unemployment, particularly among the youth, were a defining characteristic of the Arab world in the years leading up to the uprisings. According to reports, youth unemployment rates in some countries reached as high as 30%, and many of the young protestors who took to the streets were frustrated by their lack of job prospects despite growing educational attainment.

Political Factors

This economic stagnation was compounded by corruption at both the governmental and corporate levels, where wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small elite, while large sections of the population lived in poverty. These were undoubtedly the fundamental factors that nurtured the Arab Spring. However, as Gordon (2018) put it, “The ‘black swans’ or spontaneous occurrences that trigger destabilizing events are by definition virtually unpredictable”, or, in proverbial terms, “A fortune teller can always predict your mortality, just not the date and time.”

Geopolitically Influenced Conditions Leading to the Arab Spring

External Interventions

External interventions and regional rivalries played a pivotal role in shaping the political landscape that preceded and accompanied the Arab Spring. While the uprisings were primarily driven by local grievances — authoritarianism, corruption, unemployment, and social injustice — they unfolded within a geopolitical environment heavily influenced by both global and regional powers. The United States and the European Union were not the only actors involved; increasingly assertive regional players — such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — also pursued strategic agendas that directly affected the trajectory of political change in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria.

For decades, the United States and key European powers supported authoritarian regimes across the Arab world, prioritizing stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and secure access to energy over democratic governance. Figures like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia were long-standing Western allies, whose repressive rule was tolerated or even quietly encouraged in the name of regional order. This external backing gave these regimes a sense of impunity, shielding them from the political consequences of domestic discontent. As the Arab Spring unfolded, many protesters saw not only their own governments but also their foreign patrons as complicit in perpetuating injustice (Hamid, 2011).

At the same time, the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT), under a broader policy frame­work pursued by Ankara, played an active and covert role in the uprisings, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and later Syria. Guided by ideological and strategic motives — especially the affinity of the AKP government with the Muslim Brotherhood — MIT coordinated the distribution of funds, propaganda, and in some cases, direct logistical support to Brotherhood-affiliated political actors. Turkey sought to position itself as a model for post-authoritarian governance and to install ideologically aligned governments across parts of the Arab world — particularly in North Africa and the Levant — where Islamist parties had gained ground in the wake of regime collapse. This ambition was part of a broader geopolitical pivot toward the extended Levant, where Turkey, alongside Qatar, envisioned a regional order shaped by political Islam and favorable to their own leadership aspirations. These moves deepened tensions with rival powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who supported secular or anti-Brotherhood factions and viewed Turkish influence with suspicion.

In Egypt, MIT reportedly supported Muslim Brotherhood-linked media channels broadcasting from Constantinople (Istanbul) and directed surveillance of Brotherhood figures — reportedly coordinating efforts to reinstate their political role after the 2013 coup, prompting the detention of Turkish-linked operatives in Cairo [Wikipedia (e4), (2025)]. In Tunisia, while covert activity is less well documented, the broader ideological commitment of Turkey to Brotherhood networks suggests a deliberate, if discreet, attempt to consolidate Islamist-aligned parties during the post-revolutionary transition (SWP Comment, 2021). In Libya, MIT deployed intelligence operatives in Tripoli to support the UN-recognized Government of National Accord, facilitating arms transfers, coordinating foreign militia — including Syrian fighters — and embedding itself more deeply through covert links to Muslim Brotherhood groups [Wikipedia (e5), (2025)]. These operations formed part of a cohesive strategy: to establish friendly Islamist-leaning regimes, reshape the political landscape, and deepen the strategic footprint of Ankara in the Arab world.

The 2003 Iraq invasion and its destabilizing effects on the region further exacerbated tensions and contributed to the conditions that led to the Arab Spring (Majumdar & Jones, 2011). The invasion, led by the US and its allies, toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and created a power vacuum in Iraq, unleashing sectarian violence and regional instability. The chaos that followed, including the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and the destabilization of neighboring countries, highlighted the fragility of the political order of the extended Levant. The invasion also underscored the vulnerabilities of authoritarian regimes in the region, as the fall of one such regime — Saddam Hussein’s — led to the rise of extremist groups, which in turn prompted harsh reactions from other Arab leaders. These developments contributed to the broader sense of insecurity, prompting countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to re-evaluate their political strategies, especially in regard to their internal stability and relations with external powers.

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the geopolitical dynamics in the Levant shifted dramatically. The US stance on democracy and its involvement in the region became increasingly complex, probably due to the declinist ideology (see note 3 below) that prevailed — a sense that American power should be conserved and selectively applied in an age of relative decline (Kupchan, 2007; Hamid, 2011). On one hand, the US pushed for political reform and democracy, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which was partly justified by the need to spread democratic ideals in the region under the ‘flag’ of interventionist liberalism. On the other hand, the US maintained strategic alliances with repressive regimes, often turning a blind eye to their human rights abuses in the name of regional stability and the fight against terrorism. This contradiction between promoting democracy abroad and supporting authoritarian regimes at the same time created a sense of betrayal among the populations of the Levant. Many protestors viewed the US as complicit in maintaining oppressive systems that stifled their political freedoms and economic opportunities. The inconsistent approach of the US to democracy — especially in countries like Egypt, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia — further fueled the sense that external powers prioritized their own interests over the welfare and desires of the people of the region.

Overall, the geopolitical interventions of external powers, combined with the lingering effects of the Iraq invasion and shifting dynamics in the extended Levant post-9/11, created conditions where authoritarian regimes were able to maintain power, but also sowed the seeds of discontent that would eventually explode into the Arab Spring.

Geopolitical Consequences of the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring had profound geopolitical consequences, not only in the countries where uprisings directly occurred but also across the broader Levant and North Africa region. While countries like Tunisia and Egypt initially saw regime changes, they did not experience the same prolonged conflict or fragmentation that engulfed Libya and Syria. The Arab Spring led to the ousting of several long-standing autocrats, but the aftermath was far from uniform. In some countries, there were brief moments of optimism, as in Tunisia, where political transitions, despite challenges, eventually led to the establishment of a more democratic system. Egypt, after initial hopes of reform, fell back into military rule under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, with some of the key demands of the uprisings left unmet. However, the events in Libya and Syria became the focal points for understanding the broader geopolitical shifts in the region.

The case of Libya

In Libya, the NATO intervention in 2011, which officially aimed to protect civilians during the civil conflict upon a UN mandate, directly led to the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. While this was the official justification for the military intervention, there are valid arguments that regime change was also a significant objective — maybe the only objective, and that the humanitarian mandate may have been used as a pretext for broader geopolitical goals (Green, 2019). What followed was a profound destabilization of the country. The intervention initially succeeded in removing a dictator who had ruled for over four decades, but it left behind a fractured state. The absence of a strong central government quickly resulted in a power vacuum (see Chapter 4), with competing militias and factions vying for control (Alfa Shaban, 2017). This instability allowed extremist groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, to establish strongholds in Libya, further exacerbating the descent of the country into chaos. The rise of these groups and their growing influence in the region posed significant challenges to both Libyan stability and regional security. The geopolitical effects of Gaddafi’s collapse were far-reaching, as the instability in Libya created new opportunities for regional actors to intervene.

For example, European powers, including France and Italy, sought to secure their interests in the oil and gas reserves of Libya, as the vast energy resources of the country became vulnerable in the wake of Gaddafi’s downfall. At the same time, the Gulf States, particularly Qatar and the UAE, took sides in the Libyan conflict, supporting different factions aligned with their political and ideological preferences. Turkey became a critical actor in Libya, primarily motivated by its desire to expand its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and secure energy deals. Turkey supported the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, both militarily and diplomatically, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen its position in the region, particularly against Greece and Cyprus in disputes over maritime boundaries and energy exploration. This involvement was also strategic in terms of securing access to oil and gas resources in Libya and ensuring the survival of a government aligned with Turkish interests in the broader North African context.

On the other hand, Russia sought to expand its geopolitical influence in the broader Levant and North Africa, positioning itself as a counterbalance to NATO and the Western-backed Libyan factions. The support of Russia for General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) was not only about gaining access to the energy resources of Libya but also about strengthening its strategic foothold in the region, particularly in Africa. The involvement of Moscow in Libya provided it with leverage over European powers, especially in the context of the broader competition for influence in the Mediterranean. The military support of Russia, including the provision of mercenaries and weapons, allowed it to expand its presence in North Africa, furthering its ambitions to challenge the dominance of NATO in the region.

Regional neighbours, such as Egypt and Algeria, also became increasingly involved as they sought to control the flow of arms and mitigate the spillover effects of the Libyan crisis, including the spread of jihadist activity across North Africa. For Egypt, the Libyan conflict presented a direct security threat, as it feared the rise of Islamist groups along its western border and instability spilling over from its neighbor.

The case of Syria

In Syria, what began as peaceful protests in 2011 against Assad’s authoritarian rule rapidly transformed into one of the most devastating conflicts in modern history, due to the out-of-proportion reaction of the government (CFR-Editorial, 2024). The Syrian Civil War quickly escalated into an international proxy war, with major powers like Russia, Iran, the US, and Turkey all becoming involved, each with their own geopolitical interests (see also Chapter 9 for more details).

Russia intervened militarily in 2015 to secure Assad’s survival, aiming to maintain its naval and air bases in Syria and preserve its influence in the broader Levant, particularly in counterbalance to Western and NATO influence. The involvement of Russia allowed it to reassert itself as a regional power and to strengthen its alliances with Iran and Hezbollah, until the Assad regime was finally overthrown. Russia is currently trying to establish contact with the new islamist regime of Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa [Wikipedia (b3), 2025].

Iran, similarly, provided military and financial support to Assad, driven by its desire to maintain its so-called “Shiite Crescent” — a corridor of influence stretching from Tehran to Beirut through Syria. The backing of the Assad regime by Iran was crucial to its broader strategy of ensuring the survival of its allies, notably Hezbollah, in Lebanon (Rubin, 2024), and securing its foothold in the region, particularly as a counterbalance to Sunni rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Fulton et al., 2013). Ultimately, all of these objectives were aimed at serving the central goal of Iran: the destruction of Israel (Rubin, 2024).

On the other side, the US and its allies provided support to various opposition groups, including Kurdish forces, motivated by the desire to weaken Assad’s regime, limit Iranian influence, and combat ISIS. How­ever, the support of the US was often disjointed, with competing factions emerging among the opposition, complicating the situation. The US was also keen to limit the influence of Russia and Iran in the region, and prevent Syria from becoming a haven for terrorist groups, although its inability to consolidate a coherent opposition strategy led to a prolonged stalemate [Wikipedia (c1), 2025].

Turkey was involved in Syria to counter Kurdish autonomy along its border, fearing that Kurdish forces in Syria could inspire separatism within the Kurdish population within the borders of Turkey. The support of Turkey for certain rebel groups and military interventions in northern Syria aimed to neutralize Kurdish forces and prevent the establishment of a Kurdish-run region, which it saw as a direct threat to its national security. The involvement of Turkey further complicated the conflict, as it found itself at odds with both Russia and the US at different points, depending on the shifting alliances on the ground. Turkey is the big winnwer of the Syrian civil war and ultimately of the Arab Spring (Khalifa & Mandıracı, 2025).

The involvement of these major regional powers turned the Syrian Civil War into a proxy battleground, with Russia and Iran backing the regime and the US and Turkey supporting opposition factions. The geo­political consequences of this intervention were profound: the war entrenched divisions between major global powers, drew new lines of influence in the region, and destabilized the broader Levant (Karim & Islam, 2016). It also prolonged the conflict, leading to significant loss of life, a massive refugee crisis, and a reshaping of alliances in the region.

The conflict in Syria not only resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths but also created one of the largest humanitarian disasters of the 21st century. Millions of Syrians were displaced, and the resulting refugee crisis placed immense strain on neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on Europe, which saw a surge in refugees seeking asylum. The geopolitical interests of external actors in Syria, such as the desire of Russia to maintain its foothold in the Levant, and the ambitions of Iran to secure its influence through a Shiite axis, turned Syria into a battleground for broader regional and international rivalries. At the same time, the conflict became a focal point for the struggle against ISIS, which had exploited the chaos to expand its territorial control in parts of Syria and Iraq, further complicating the situation (Podraza, 2018).

The geopolitical consequences of the Arab Spring were most visibly realized in Libya and Syria, where the aftermath of regime change spiraled into deeper instability and conflict. These countries became central to the struggle for influence and control in the Levant/North Africa region, drawing in external powers with conflicting interests. However, the reverberations of the Arab Spring extended beyond these two countries, as the uprisings and their outcomes altered the regional balance of power, deepened existing rivalries, and reshaped the relationships between regional and global actors. The Arab Spring, though it sparked a desire for reform and change, ultimately highlighted the complex interplay of internal and external forces, and the unpredictable consequences of popular uprisings in a region marked by long-standing autocratic rule.

Why only Libya and Syria?

The Arab Spring uprisings swept across several Arab and Muslim countries of North Africa and the Levant, but only in Libya and Syria did the initial protests escalate into prolonged and devastating conflicts. What specific conditions in these two countries led to such divergent outcomes, transforming their uprisings into protracted civil wars of extreme brutality, while other nations managed to avoid similar fates?

Power void-The Central Problem of Libya

Libya presents a unique geopolitical situation due to its lack of a strong central government, which has created significant opportunities for both foreign intervention and regional actors to exert influence — the typical vacuum of authority (see Chapter 4). Since the fall of the admittedly strong and long-lived leader Muammar Gaddafi (see note 4 below) in 2011, Libya has been embroiled in political fragmentation, with various factions — tribal, regional, militias etc — vying for control. The absence of a unifying central authority has allowed numerous foreign powers, including regional neighbours like Egypt and Algeria, as well as international actors like the US, Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states, to involve themselves in the internal conflicts of the country, each supporting different sides based on strategic interests. This situation resulted from a critical oversight: the US and NATO, focused on removing Gaddafi, failed to establish a clear post-intervention plan. While they succeeded in toppling Gaddafi’s regime, they did not anticipate the power vacuum that would follow or the challenges of rebuilding the political and institutional structures of Libya. The lack of planning and the underestimation of the tribal and regional divisions of Libya left the country vulnerable to internal conflicts, as various factions, militias, and tribal leaders sought to fill the leadership void.

The geopolitical importance of Libya is further magnified by its vast oil reserves, making it one of the richest countries in Africa in terms of natural resources. This resource wealth has attracted the attention of foreign powers eager to secure access to Libyan oil — such as France, Italy, the UK, and the EU — leading to increased foreign intervention. The absence of a central government allowed these actors, along with others, like Russia and Turkey, to exert their influence by militarily supporting rival factions, further complicating efforts to stabilize the country. The strategic location of Libya in North Africa, bordering the Mediterranean and serving as a gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa, further enhances its significance in global geopolitical calculations. Control of Libya is not only valuable for its oil but also for its ability to influence migration flows into Europe and its proximity to other key regional players, including Egypt, Tunisia, and the Sahel region.

In summary, the descent of Libya into civil war following the Arab Spring was significantly influenced by foreign intervention, particularly the removal of Muammar Gaddafi by the allied powers, but without a clear post-conflict plan. The international and regional competition for influence, combined with the fragmented political landscape, has prevented the emergence of a stable central authority in Libya. This situation underscores the challenges of rebuilding a nation after the removal of a longstanding leader. Foreign actors tend to exploite the power vacuum, further complicating the unstable situation of the country. The Libyan experience underscores the challenges of rebuilding a nation after intervention and highlights the need for comprehensive planning to prevent similar destabilization.

Strategic Importance-The Curse of Syria

Syria holds immense strategic importance in the broader Levant, primarily due to its proximity to Israel and its geopolitical alignment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, which have all shaped the dynamics of the post-Arab Spring Syrian conflict. Under Assad, Syria was a key ally of Iran, playing a central role in the ‘Axis of Resistance’, a coalition opposed to Western influence and Israel. The alignment of Syria with Hezbollah further solidified its position in the broader Levantine balance of power, particularly regarding tensions with Israel and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict.

What began as a simple protest during the Arab Spring quickly escalated into the Syrian conflict, which spiraled into a civil war, and became a protracted proxy battleground. Western powers, including the US and the EU, supported opposition groups seeking to overthrow Assad’s regime, while Russia and Iran provided vital backing to the government. Meanwhile, Turkey, with its expansionist ambitions, played both sides, advancing its own regional interests. The involvement of these external powers has transformed Syria into a key focal point in the larger geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia, with both sides using the conflict to further their regional ambitions.

In summary, the broader rivalry between the US — with its fluctuating policies, the EU — with its procra­stination and its divergent views, and Russia — with its strategic, pragmatic approach, coupled with the complex diplomatic maneuvers of Turkey — exploiting both sides of the conflict — has turned Syria into a battleground not only for influence in the Arab/Muslim world but also for dominance in global geopolitics. The adaptable foreign policy of Turkey, taking advantage of both sides for its own gain, has added complexity to the situation. The outcome of the Syrian conflict, therefore, carries profound implications for the balance of power in the Levant and beyond, as it will determine the future role of regional actors such as Iran, Russia, and the West in shaping the political landscape of the region.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring uprisings in Libya and Syria both resulted in civil wars, but the paths to this outcome were influenced by distinct factors that were abscent in all other countries where the Arab Spring broke out. In both Libya and Syria, foreign intervention played a pivotal role in perpetuating conflict. In Libya, the intervention of the US and NATO to remove Gaddafi from power was followed by a lack of planning for post-conflict governance, creating a power vacuum that foreign powers exploited. In Syria, the conflict escalated into a proxy war involving major powers like Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the West, each with their own strategic interests. The involvement of these external actors, coupled with the unreliable leadership of the US, which has been retreating from the region, has complicated efforts to stabilize both countries. The fluctuating policies of the US, and the divergent views of the EU leading to diplomatic inactivity (see Chapter 7) have created an environment where other powers, like Russia and Turkey, have filled the void, often exacerbating tensions. In both Libya and Syria, the absence of a strong central authority has allowed foreign powers to exert significant influence, leading to prolonged conflicts. The strategic importance of these countries — oil reserves of Libya and the geopolitical position of Syria — has further entangled them in broader geopolitical rivalries. Ultimately, the outcomes of these conflicts will significantly impact the balance of power in the extended Levant and beyond, shaping the future roles of regional actors like Turkey, Iran and Russia. The lessons from Libya and Syria underscore the need for careful planning and coordination in international interventions to prevent similar destabilization in the future.

This article, in its abridged form, is part of the book “Thucydidean Geopolitics for the Educated Layperson”

Note 1: Zeynep Tufekci, drawing on detailed fieldwork and case studies — including the Occupy Wall Street movement, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, and the Egyptian Tahrir Square uprising — demonstrated that social media have become powerful facilitators in spreading ideas, including their dark side: misinformation, conspiracy theories, propaganda, and fake news, with significant potential to influence geopolitical events.

Note 2: Countries of the Levant and North Africa are often collectively referred to as MENA countries, an acronym derived from Middle East and North Africa. However, in this work, we differentiate between the Levant, which includes countries like Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, and the broader Levant, encompassing countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. Egypt, while geographically part of North Africa, is often politically associated with the Levant. This distinction is necessary because, if Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan were considered to be the Middle East, it would inaccurately place countries like Greece and Turkey in the Near East, which is not consistent with historical or geographical definitions. If we were to adopt this distinction, it might suggest using a term like NENA (Near East and North Africa), but this is not a commonly accepted term, and we avoid it to prevent confusion. Therefore, we maintain this distinction to provide clarity in our analysis.

Note 3: Declinism: The prevalence of the idea that America has less power to shape events than it used to. This ideology has been widely supported by authors like Fareed Zakaria — The Post-American World, Parag Khanna — The Second World, and Charles Kupchan — The End of the American Era. The Obama administration has been criticized to have appropriated the main arguments of these authors. As Ryan Lizza explained in a nutshell in The New Yorker, “the relative power of the US is declining … and that the US is reviled in many parts of the world” (Remnick, 2011).

Note 4: Muammar Gaddafi was never officially the President of Libya. Instead, he held various verbose titles, most notably “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution” and “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) after seizing power; he led a coup d’état against King Idris in 1969 and ruled until his death 2011, all in all 42 years. That makes him one of the longest-ruling non-royal leaders in modern history.