Delimiting the Participant-Observer from the System Being Observed: An Issue of Method, Methodology or Meta-Methodology?

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Introduction

The term ‘participant-observer’ belongs to a conceptual framework that was designed for a research method used mainly in social sciences such as anthropology, communication, education, social psychology and many others. The method of participant observation is based on the behaviour and actions of the observer, who is enrolled/integrated in the investigated community or system and participates actively in that community or system with the aim of making valuable observations “from inside”. This task is not limited to presence and observation because sometimes the participant-observer actually plays roles being studied. The participant-observation method or technique relies on the principle that the information/knowledge acquired in this way is deeper, more objective and more insightful than that obtained through “outside” systematic observation[1].

Despite its main function and origin, the concept of the participant-observation method can be generalised also for other sciences, even for physical, biological and environmental sciences where physical or biological systems rather than communities are the objects of study.

The problem of delimiting (of various natures and in various modes) the participant-observer from the system being observed arises in relation to the specific problems this method poses when analysed from both the perspective of its immediate outcomes (data and observations) and the criteria that qualify the method as rational and scientific[2].

This paper argues, within an epistemological framework, that the problem of delimiting is legitimate and formulable at three different levels, one of which is metatheoretical, and that delimiting the participant-observer from the system being observed is justified and necessary at two of these levels. The arguments herein are built on the basis of my analysis of the concept of participant-observer; the relations between the concepts involved in the problem are analysed as concepts of different logical orders and categories.

The epistemological aspect of the concept of participant-observer

With the description in the first paragraph, it is clear that the term ‘participant-observer’ names more a methodological concept than an entity constitutive to a research methodology, since the constituent concepts (participation and observation) are methodological. Ontologically speaking, the participant-observer is a human entity that serves as a methodological means, and this latter has an epistemic character, since it is a means for acquiring knowledge. The participant-observer serves as a means between a discipline, a theory or investigation within that discipline and their object of study. This double nature — ontological and epistemological — justifies a conceptual extension known also in epistemology as the epistemic agent.

The epistemic agent is in direct connection with and plays roles in a universe of beliefs (to which other agents also contribute) and then makes individual judgments by studying those beliefs. It is this concept that has made a shift in the traditional epistemology toward a ‘social epistemology’[3].

Specific issues of the participant-observation method in social research

Concerning the social sciences, the participant-observation method has raised several well-known specific problems, among which are reliability, validity and objectivity. Regarding the first two issues, individual independent notes and observations are not considered to be reliable[4], which would invalidate the method. Concerning objectivity, the level of participation as a balance between the “insider” and “outsider” roles yields the level of involvement and detachment, carrying the risk of affecting the objectivity and functionality of the method[5]. The stresses on the observer (and other implicit psychological-emotional sensations, especially in ethnography research) are also seen to influence the individual’s behaviour and to yield constraints on the delivery of the records and on the records themselves[6]. At the least, there are also ethical aspects of the social investigation carried out through this method[7].

Since these problems put in question the validity of the method in both its epistemic and self-consistency aspects, they can be qualified as critical. Therefore, in order to retain validity, the inquiry of whether and how these problems can be solved must receive the greatest priority.

However, this paper does not attempt to solve the problems enumerated above using a specific approach within a particular discipline or research, but rather, analyses them from the conceptual-epistemic perspective of their primary cause, which has the same nature regardless of the particular domain of application. This cause is, of course, the inside participation of the observer (who was seen first as an epistemic means) that joins the investigated system which is the object of study. Thus, the delimitation of the participant-observer from the system being observed should be understood then as the only theoretical and pragmatic way of cancelling this cause; still, this may assume either outside or inside participation, as I will show further.

The ontological and epistemological aspects of the functioning of the participant-observation method

With the inside participation, the means of research (this time in an ontological sense) becomes a part of the object of study. In fact, there appears to be a new (larger) object of study, and this is not an unjustified statement at all since the new member or object stands in various systematic relations with the former object of study. In terms of social research, because of the roles the participant-observer plays in the investigated community (assumed to be successful), that individual must be identified conceptually with that community even though the individual does not actually belong to it. Given then that mutual influence as a result of those relations (which this time is a real fact and not a simulation), the former object of study cannot be separated from the new one when the final outcomes of the method are implemented into the theoretical body of the research. Thus, the assimilation poses two problems of different types, an ontological and an epistemic one — the participant-observer affects the ontology of the initial object of study, but also its epistemology, since the mutual interaction assumes sharing knowledge and beliefs, not to mention the psychological effects.

However, the ontological problem turns into an epistemic one when observing the method and the object of study to which the method is applied as concepts of different logical orders. Indeed, the object of study falls within the concept[8] of research (using a set of methods or a unique method) as a theoretical entity — that is to say, research is a concept of a higher order than the concept of the object of study. This idea is comparable to, say, logic-mathematical concepts of different orders such as a function and its argument, or a logical predicate applied to a variable, or a set and one of its elements. The two concepts of different order cannot interact in any systemic way without losing the consistency of the formal system using them or yielding linguistic paradoxes. Thus, from this primary logical-conceptual perspective, the delimitation of the participant-observer from the system being observed is not justified, as it is already assumed conceptually.

Moving to the mere epistemic problem, notice that once the method, or parts of it, becomes part of the object of study, we face an epistemic circularity: we investigate the object of study by means tightly related to that object. In epistemological terms, we use a source for assessing the credibility of that source, particularly what I call a methodological circularity[9]. The problem of whether this circularity is benign or malignant cannot be settled at this point, as there is no established theory of circularity providing criteria of decidability for these attributes. However, from a metatheoretical position, the criterion of using a non-circular alternative (if one exists) is legitimate and belongs to the meta-methodology field. Therefore, the problem of delimiting is justified from this perspective; however, it applies to an entire methodology associated with a particular type of research, since it assumes testing, comparing and choosing methods[10] which serve the same purpose, through adequate criteria.

Returning to the participant observation as a method used in a particular discipline or field of research and ignoring the metatheoretical aspects, the delimiting problem reverts to a specific scientific first-order inquiry. The primary aim of such inquiry should be to establish whether the causal area of negative factors related to inside participation (subjectivity, involvement, stress and the like) can be limited so as not to affect the validity and objectivity of the final stage of the investigation (that is, interpretation of the results, theoretical development using those results, and conclusions, within the theoretical body of the research); in other words, to establish whether objective valid results are still possible under incorrect methodology. After all, there is no unquestionable scientific method or an absolute-truth method, not even the mathematical one. As long as the inquiry gives a positive answer to this question, the delimitation is justified (except in the metatheoretical case). The second aim would be to determine how local factors and circumstances can be controlled (theoretically and practically) with respect to the observer, the system being observed and the interactions between them so as to reach the intended limitation of the causal area. Such a project is specific for each kind of research and object of study, is mainly technical and — if successful — will provide a “partial” delimitation of the observer from the system being observed, an epistemic rather than an ontological delimitation of the results, as this latter is assumed by the general raw formulation of the problem.

Notice here that an absolute delimitation is possible only if the observer is kept outside the system, which would turn the participant observation into a naturalistic one and would contradict the initial concept for which the problem was posed. However, this does not make the problem inconsistent or non-genuine. Indeed, the concept of a rational method encapsulates availability, imperfection and relativity; however, this description does not prevent the subsequent rational (meta)investigations of such attributes.

Conclusion

The problem of delimiting the participant-observer from the system being observed, even though formulated in relation to the problems of scientific adequacy and objectivity posed by inside participation, is amenable to different formulations from various perspectives (ontological-epistemological-methodological, theoretical-metatheoretical). As to whether such delimiting is justified, these various perspectives yield different answers,

The concept of participant-observer is mainly epistemological and tightly related to methodology. Analysed from these different perspectives, delimiting is not justified from a formal conceptual-logical perspective, though it may be justified in particular theoretical circumstances from the perspective of a specific method and/or as a strategy within meta-methodology.

Notes:

[1] ‘naturalistic observation’, in the usual terminology of the literature in this field

[2] and even ethical, but the ethical aspect is not discussed in this article

[3] It was actually a smooth transition not rejecting the traditional projects, principles and concepts of the epistemology, but rather a conceptual development and extension that started in the 1970s with the questioning of the notion of truth and objectivity. See (Goldman & Witcomb, 2011) for a concise description and evolution of social epistemology.

[4] See good analyses of the reliability problem in (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982) for ethnography, (Zohrabi, 2013) for language studies, or (Johnson et al., 2006) and (Kirk & Miller, 1986) for general qualitative research.

[5] See the insights of this problem in (Labaree, 2002), (Mullings, 1999), and (De Andrade, 2000).

[6] See, for example, (DeWalt & DeWalt, pp.67–78) for an outlining of these issues from a pragmatic point of view and (Reger, 2001) and (Holland, 2007) for interdisciplinary theoretical approaches of these issues.

[7] See, for instance, (Zinn, 1979) and (Li, 2008).

[8] in terms of a Fregean view on logical concepts

[9] For a detailed description of epistemic circularity, see [Alston, 1986] as a classical text.

[10] Such inquiry into the methods available also has a modal component, as there could be methods available but not yet designed.

References

Alston, W. P. (1986) Epistemic circularity, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47 (1), 1–30.

De Andrade, L.L. (2000) Negotiating from the Insider: Constructing Racial and Ethnic Identity in Qualitative Research. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 29, 268–290.

DeWalt, K.M. & DeWalt, B.R. (2011) Participant observation: A guide for fieldworkers. 2nd ed. Plymouth, Altamira Press.

Goldman, A. & Whitcomb, D. eds. (2011) Social epistemology: essential readings. New York, Oxford University Press.

Holland, J. (2007) Emotions and research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 10 (3), 195–209.

Johnson, J.C., Avenarius, C. & Weatherford, J. (2006) The active participant-observer: Applying social role analysis to participant observation. Field Methods, 18 (2), 111–134.

Kirk, J. & Miller, M.L. (1986) Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Newbury Park, Sage Publications.

Labaree, R.V. (2002) The risk of ‘going observationalist’: negotiating the hidden dilemmas of being an insider participant observer. Qualitative Research, 2 (1), 97–122.

LeCompte, M.D. & Goetz, J.P. (1982) Problems of reliability and validity in ethnographic research. Review of educational research, 52 (1), 31–60.

Li, J. (2008) Ethical challenges in participant observation: A reflection on ethnographic fieldwork. The Qualitative Report, 13 (1), 100–115.

Lipson, J.G. (1994). Ethical issues in ethnography. Critical issues in qualitative research methods, 333–355.

Mullings, B. (1999) Insider or Outsider, Both or Neither: Some Dilemmas of Interviewing in a Cross-Cultural Setting. GeoForum, 30, 337–350.

Reger, J. (2001) Emotions, objectivity and voice: An analysis of a “failed” participant observation. Women’s Studies International Forum, 24 (5), 605–616.

Zinn, M.B. (1979) Field research in minority communities: Ethical, methodological and political observations by an insider. Social Problems, 27 (2), 209–219.

Zohrabi, M. (2013) Mixed method research: Instruments, validity, reliability and reporting findings. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 3 (2), 254.

[1] ‘naturalistic observation’, in the usual terminology of the literature in this field

[2] and even ethical, but the ethical aspect is not discussed in this article

[3] It was actually a smooth transition not rejecting the traditional projects, principles and concepts of the epistemology, but rather a conceptual development and extension that started in the 1970s with the questioning of the notion of truth and objectivity. See (Goldman & Witcomb, 2011) for a concise description and evolution of social epistemology.

[4] See good analyses of the reliability problem in (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982) for ethnography, (Zohrabi, 2013) for language studies, or (Johnson et al., 2006) and (Kirk & Miller, 1986) for general qualitative research.

[5] See the insights of this problem in (Labaree, 2002), (Mullings, 1999), and (De Andrade, 2000).

[6] See, for example, (DeWalt & DeWalt, pp.67–78) for an outlining of these issues from a pragmatic point of view and (Reger, 2001) and (Holland, 2007) for interdisciplinary theoretical approaches of these issues.

[7] See, for instance, (Zinn, 1979) and (Li, 2008).

[8] in terms of a Fregean view on logical concepts

[9] For a detailed description of epistemic circularity, see [Alston, 1986] as a classical text.

[10] Such inquiry into the methods available also has a modal component, as there could be methods available but not yet designed.