Aquinas’ Sent. III & Psuedo-Chrysostom on Usury

It seems that there is a parallel between the passage of Psuedo-Chrysostom on usury and Aquinas discussion of usury in his Commentary on the Sentences

Adhuc dicit aliquis: Qui agrum locat, ut agrariam recipiat, aut domum, ut pensiones recipiat, nonne est similis ei, qui pecuniam dat ad usuram? Absit. Primum quidem, quoniam pecunia non ad aliquem usum disposita est, nisi ad emendum; secundo, quoniam agrum habens, arando accipit ex eo fructum, habens domum, usum mansionis capit ex ea. Ideo qui locat agrum uel domum, suum usum dare uidetur, et pecuniam accipere, et quodammodo quasi commutare uidetur cum lucro lucrum; ex pecunia reposita nullum usum capis. Tertio ager uel domus utendo ueterascit. Pecunia autem cum fuerit mutuata, nec minuitur, nec ueterascit.

Someone may still say: ‘A person who rents out a field to receive the farm‑rent, or a house to receive the payments — surely he is like someone who gives money at interest?’ By no means. First, because money is not disposed for any use except buying; second, because a person who owns a field receives produce from it by cultivating it, and one who owns a house gains the use of dwelling in it. Therefore, someone who rents out a field or a house seems to give up their own use and to receive money, and in a certain way seems to exchange profit for profit; but from stored money you gain no use. Third, a field or a house grows old through use, whereas money, once it has been lent, is neither diminished nor worn out.

Decretals of Gratian, Pars I, D. 88, ch 11 (https://geschichte.digitale-sammlungen.de/decretum-gratiani/kapitel/dc_chapter_0_948)

Respondeo dicendum, quod ab omnibus dicitur communiter quod dare ad usuram peccatum mortale est. Sed diversi diversas rationes assignant. Quidam enim dicunt, quod ideo pecuniam pro certo lucro concedere non licet, sicut donum vel equum, vel alia hujusmodi, quia pecunia non deterioratur ex usu, sed aliis rebus aliquid deperit ex usu. Sed ista ratio non est generalis: quia in aliquibus rebus, pro quarum concessione aliquid accipi potest licite, nihil ex usu deperit, sicut in concessione domus ad usum ad unum diem; et praeterea pretium quod accipitur, non commensuratur damno quod accidit ex usu rei; non enim tantum deperit in mutuo quantum datur.

I answer that it is commonly said by all that usury is a mortal sin, but they assign diverse reasons. For some say that it is not licit to loan someone money for a determinate profit — for example, a gift or a horse or the like — because money does not deteriorate from the use of it, whereas other things are worn out by their use. But this argument is not universal, since in some things for which it is licit to receive something when loaning them are not worn out by their use; for example, in loaning one’s house for a day’s use. And further, the payment that is received is not commensurate with the loss that its use incurs, for it does not lose as much as is given in the loan.

Et ideo alii assignant aliam rationem, quia videlicet quando pecunia mutuatur, transfertur dominium, quod non fit in domo et in aliis rebus. Justum autem videtur ut pro usu rei quae mea remanet, scilicet domus, aliquid accipere possim; sed pro usu rei, scilicet pecuniae, quae fit alterius ex hoc ipso quod mutuatur, aliquid accipere, nihil aliud est quam accipere aliquid ab aliquo pro usu rei propriae; et ideo videtur quod est quaedam exactio, et peccatum. Et haec ratio satis probabilis videtur; et ideo simile accidit in omnibus rebus in quibus transfertur dominium per mutuum, sicut granum, vinum, et hujusmodi, pro quorum usu nihil accipere licet ultra valorem ejus quod mutuatum est.

And therefore others assign a different reason: namely, because when money is loaned, its ownership is transferred, whereas when a house or other things are loaned this does not occur. Now, it appears just that I would receive something for the use of a thing that remains mine, like a house, but to receive something for the use of my money, which occurs differently because of the fact that it is loaned, is nothing other than to receive something from someone for the use of the latter’s own property. Therefore this appears to be a tax, and a sin. And this reason appears sufficiently probable; and it is why something similar happens in things wherein ownership is transferred through a loan, like grain, wine, and the like, for whose use it is illicit to receive anything beyond the value of what was loaned.

Potest tamen et alia ratio assignari; quia aliae res ex seipsis habent aliquam utilitatem, pecunia autem non, sed est mensura utilitatis aliarum rerum, ut patet per Philosophum in 5 Ethic. Et ideo pecuniae usus non habet mensuram utilitatis ex ipsa pecunia, sed ex rebus quae per pecuniam mensurantur secundum industriam ejus qui pecuniam ad res transmutat. Unde accipere majorem pecuniam pro minori, nihil aliud esse videtur quam diversificare mensuram in accipiendo, et dando; quod manifeste iniquitatem continet.

Nonetheless, another reason can also be assigned: because all other things have a certain utility from themselves, whereas money does not, but is only a measure of the utility of other things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. And therefore the use of money does not have a measure of its utility from the money itself, but only from the things that are measured by money, according to the industry of the one who exchanges money for things. Whence to take more money for something less appears to be nothing more than to change the measure in receiving and giving, which manifestly contains a lack of equity.

Aquinas, Sent. III, d. 37, q. 1, a. 6, co. (https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Sent.III.D37.Q1.A6.C)

Argument from Deterioration

P-C:

Third, a field or a house grows old through use, whereas money, once it has been lent, is neither diminished nor worn out.

Aquinas:

For some say that it is not licit to loan someone money for a determinate profit — for example, a gift or a horse or the like — because money does not deteriorate from the use of it, whereas other things are worn out by their use.

This appear to be a straightforward discussion of the same idea. This argument also appears in the Summa of Alexander of Hales. Hence, it may have been discussed at the University of Paris during Aquinas’ early days, rather than Aquinas drawing from P-C’s passage specifically.

Argument from Ownership

P-C:

Therefore, someone who rents out a field or a house seems to give up their own use and to receive money, and in a certain way seems to exchange profit for profit; but from stored money you gain no use.

Aquinas:

Now, it appears just that I would receive something for the use of a thing that remains mine, like a house, but to receive something for the use of my money, which occurs differently because of the fact that it is loaned, is nothing other than to receive something from someone for the use of the latter’s own property.

This argument also appears in Alexander’s Summa and is common among the Scholastics. Alexander specifically references canon law in his Summa, so he likely has this passage in mind.

Argument from Money

P-C:

First, because money is not disposed for any use except buying;

Aquinas:

And therefore the use of money does not have a measure of its utility from the money itself, but only from the things that are measured by money, according to the industry of the one who exchanges money for things.

This is a novel addition by Aquinas. Alexander does not appear to discuss this in his Summa. However, Aquinas takes this and develops his argument from it.