Pipe Dreams (2): Sh. ʿUmayrī’s Definition of ʿIbāda

Authored by Tahir Muhammad, Salman Nasir

A PDF version of this article is available here.

All praise is due to Allāh, Lord of the Worlds. We bear witness that there is no god but He, alone in His Majesty, without partner in His Dominion, and we bear witness that Muḥammad is His Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him.

Sh. ʿUmayrī’s conception of shirk and its underpinning typology are the subject of separate articles. This article is aimed at engaging his definition of worship (ʿibāda) in a more direct manner.

Introduction

For someone whose legacy is largely based on shirk in worship (ʿibāda), Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s works however lack a clear definition or principled conceptualisation of ʿibāda. Whenever he tries to explain the concept, he inexorably ends up resorting to a list of acts that he considers worship to make himself understood, without really explaining why those acts are worship:

فإن قيل: فما أنواع العبادة التي لا تصلح إلا لله؟ قلت: من أنواعها، الدعاء، والاستعانة، والاستغاثة، وذبح القربان، والنذر، والخوف، والرجاء، والتوكل، والإنابة، والمحبة، والخشية، والرغبة، والرهبة، والتأله، والركوع، والسجود، والخشوع، والتذلل، والتعظيم الذي هو من خصائص الألوهية

“If it is asked: what are the types of ʿibāda that we are not allowed to address to anyone other than Allāh? I say: from those types are supplication, seeking assistance, seeking help, sacrifice, vows, fear, hope, reliance, love, apprehension, aspiration, awe, deification, inclination (rukūʿ), prostration, devotion, self-humbling, veneration that is specific to divinity.” [1]

وأنواع العبادة التي أمر الله بها مثل: الإسلام، والإيمان، والإحسان، ومنه الدعاء والخوف، والرجاء، والتوكل، والرغبة، والرهبة، والخشوع، والخشية، والإنابة، والاستعانة، والاستعاذة، والاستغاثة، والذبح، والنذر، وغير ذلك من أنواع العبادة التي أمر الله بها (…) فمن صرف من ذلك شيئا لغير الله، فهو مشرك كافر

“The types of worship (ʿibāda) ordered by Allāh are for example: submission (Islām), faith (imān), charity, prayer/supplication, fear, hope, reliance, aspiration, awe, devotion, apprehension, seeking assistance, seeking refuge, seeking help, sacrifice, vows, etc (…) Whoever directs any of these to other than Allāh, then he is a disbelieving polytheist (mushrik kāfir).” [2]

العبادة: كونه ما يدعو إلا الله، ولا ينذر إلا لله، ولا يذبح إلا له، ولا يخاف خوف السر إلا منه، ولا يتوكل إلا عليه; فالمسلم: من وحد الله بأفعاله سبحانه وأفعاله بنفسه; والمشرك: الذي يوحد الله بأفعاله سبحانه، ويشرك بأفعاله بنفسه.

“Worship is: no one being called upon except Allāh, no one being made vows to except Him, no one being sacrificed to except Him, no one being feared with unseen fear except Him, and no one being relied upon except Him. So the Muslim is the one who singles out Allāh not only for [ascribing divine actions] (ndlr: tawḥīd al rubūbiyya), but also [as the addressee of] his own [human] actions (ndlr: tawḥīd al ulūhiyya). Whereas the mushrik is the one who singles out Allāh regarding divine actions, but associates partners to Him regarding his own [human] actions.”[3]

The closest Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb gets to defining ʿibāda is the following vague statement, which is probably a better fit for works of a more spiritual nature, about purification of the soul, and exhortations to more pious ways of life, than works deciding whether someone is a mushrik or a Muslim:

فإن قيل: فما الجامع لعبادة الله وحده؟ قلت: طاعته بامتثال أوامره، واجتناب نواهيه

“If it is asked ‘what is a comprehensive [definition of] Allāh The One’s worship (ʿibāda)?’ I would say: it is obedience through abidance by what He ordered, and avoidance of what He prohibited.” [4]

Sh. ʿUmayrī attempted to fill this conceptual gap in his book Taḥqīq al Ifāda bi Taḥrīr Mafhūm al ʿIbāda by trying to define ʿibāda. In so doing, he relies heavily, albeit not solely, a number of linguists who articulated their definition of worship around the notions of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility). Sh. ʿUmayrī however takes the absence of a mention of rubūbiyya in those to be proof that those scholars did not see it as a condition for worship. He therefore conceives of acts of worship as embodiment of humility and submission having breached a certain threshold of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility), both of which are conceived of by Sh. ʿUmayrī as states of the heart. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the validity as well as utility of his definition. We will also see that within Sh. ʿUmayrī’s paradigm, shirk in ʿibāda is necessarily accompanied by something from a set of beliefs he refers to as inḥirāf in rubūbiyya. As it transpires in the book, this inḥirāf can be in the form of ascribing, to a creature, some form of rubūbiyya,[5] but also in the form of a belief wherein some divine attributes are either negated altogether for Allāh (e.g. God does not hear) or have been considerably diminished (e.g. God only hears one creature at a time). However, he failed to consider the fact that much like his own definition of ʿibāda, the definition of the linguists and other scholars he quoted also had a concomitant that necessarily accompanies shirk in ʿibāda. But in contrast to Sh. ʿUmayrī’s blurry inḥirāf, we will argue the belief necessarily accompanying shirk in ʿibāda for those scholars was more specific and limited to a belief of shirk which involved ascription of some form of rubūbiyya to other than Allāh (i.e. it did not include negated or diminished divine attributes).

With regards to utility, Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definition is not, as one might expect, a standalone and self-contained measure that can be applied to any given situation to determine whether ‘worship’ had occurred or not. In practice, Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definition comes with an important addition (the inḥirāf mentioned above, and not referenced in the body of the definition) and a plethora of exceptions that make it no more useful than Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s list of actions in generating a clear concept, or make it as useful as can be expected of a definition whose exceptions possibly outnumber the instances where it is applicable.

I. Sh. ʿUmayrī’s Definition and Concept of ʿibāda

a. ʿIbāda Is Determined by the Internal Intensity of Humility & Submission

Sh. ʿUmayrī defines ʿibāda as:

مقام اختياري يجتمع فيه غاية الخضوع مع نهاية الذل يوجب على المرء التعلق بمعبوده والاستسلام لإرادته والحرص على الاتصال به والعمل لإرضائه

“It is that intentional state which combines feelings of utmost humility and submission which stirs the individual to cling unto his object of ʿibāda, submit to its will, stay in continuous connection with it, and perform actions to please it.” [6]

This definition is based on related discussions from scholars of different backgrounds and fields,[7] but more specifically, Sh. ʿUmayrī spends considerable time arguing for or defending the conformity of his concept of ʿibāda with that of classical Arabic grammarians and linguists.[8] Indeed, he counts the lexical meaning of ʿibāda as one of his evidences that shirk in rubūbiyyah is not necessary for shirk in ʿibāda to occur.[9] One of the main authorities in the field of linguistics he cites and who defined ʿibāda using the terms ‘ultimate submission’ and ‘utmost humility’ is:

Al ‘Askarī (d. 395 H.):

أن العبادة غاية الخضوع ولا تستحق إلا بغاية الإنعام ولهذا لا يجوز أن يعبد غير الله تعالى

“Worship is ultimate submission and is not deserved except in exchange of ultimate bounty. This is why it is not allowed to worship anyone other than Allāh.”[10]

Moreover, Sh. ʿUmayrī takes the time to highlight the following from Ibn Sīda (d. 458 H.) as one of the best linguistic explanations of ibāda:

يقال: تعبد فلان لفلان: إذا تذلل له، وكل خضوع ليس فوقه خضوع فهو عبادة، طاعة كان للمعبود أو غير طاعة. وكل طاعة لله على جهة الخضوع والتذلل فهي عبادة والعبادة نوع من الخضوع لا يستحقه إلا المنعم بأعلى أجناس النعم كالحياة والفهم والسمع والبصر والشكر، والعبادة لا تستحق إلا بالنعمة.

“Ta’abbada fulān li fulān: He showed humility to him. Any [instance of] submission (khuḍūʿ) above which there is no submission, is ʿibāda, whether it is an act of obedience (ṭāʿa) or not. Every act of obedience (ṭāʿa) for Allāḥ done with submission and humility is ʿibāda. And ʿibāda is a type of submission that only the one who provides the highest type of bounties is deserving of, for example, life, understanding, hearing, sight, gratitude etc. ʿIbāda is not deserved except in exchange of bounty.”[11]

Sh. ʿUmayrī’s reading of these texts leads him to the conclusion that the meanings conveyed by a combination of terms such as ‘utmost/ultimate’ (ghāya/nihāya) and khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility) are the defining factor in determining what turns an act into worship. In other words, it is the acts generated or necessitated by this feeling of utmost humility and submission that are considered ʿibāda/worship. In his introduction of the book, while presenting the view he endorses Sh. ʿUmayrī explains that the locus for the essence of ʿibāda is the heart:

أن حقيقة العبادة وجوهرها يرجع إلى معان قلبية مخصوصة وهي غاية الحب ونهاية الذل والتعظيم، وما يلزم عن ذلك من الأعمال الظاهرة

“The reality and essence of ʿibāda goes back to a sense of utmost love and ultimate submission and glorification in the heart, and the apparent actions necessitated by it.”[12]

Elsewhere, Sh. ʿUmayrī rephrased his concept and definition of ʿibāda as:

يمكن أن يقال في تعريف العبادة هي الأعمال الباطنة والظاهرة النابعة عن غاية الذل ونهاية الخضوع في القلب

“It is [also] possible to define ‘ibāda as: the actions, internal [i.e. of the heart] and external [i.e. of the limbs], springing from the utmost submission and ultimate humility found in the heart.”[13]

And while explaining the different clauses of his definition, Sh. ʿUmayrī says:

“يجتمع فيه بين غاية الخضوع مع نهاية الذل”: يعد هذا المعنى أصلا من الأصول القلبية المكونة لمفهوم العبادة

“‘[intentional state which] combines feelings of utmost humility and submission’: This is one of the essential components in the heart that make up the concept of ʿibāda.”[14]

As such, for Sh. ʿUmayrī it is not conceivable that the threshold of humility and submission in the heart, which turns actions into worship, could be breached without generating actions that point to its occurrence in the heart:

ومن الممتنع أن يتحقق في قلب المعين غاية الذل ونهاية الخضوع لمعين ما ثم لا يظهر على جوارحه فعل من الأفعال يدل على مقتضى ما تحقق في قلبه

“It is impossible that utmost humility and ultimate submission would obtain for an individual without the actions indicating the necessity of what has obtained in his heart not becoming manifest on his limbs.”[15]

This is the reason why he defines tawḥīd al ulūhiyya as:

إفراد الله تعالى بما يستحقه من غاية الذل ونهاية الحب وما يستلزم ذلك من الأعمال الظاهرة

“[Tawḥīd al ulūhiyya] is singling out Allāh ﷻ with regards to what He deserves in terms of utmost submission and ultimate love, and the apparent actions necessitated by it.”[16]

And, explaining his concept from a different vantage point, Sh. ʿUmayrī defines shirk in ulūhiyya as:

تسوية غير الله بالله في ما يختص به من معاني التذلل والخضوع ومن الأعمال الظاهرة الدالة على ذلك

“[Shirk al ulūhiyya] is equating other than Allāh with Allāh in what is only due to Him of the meanings of submission and humility, and the apparent actions indicating that.”[17]

The actual shirk (in ulūhiyya) then, for Sh. ʿUmayrī, is indeed the level or measure of submission and humility in one’s heart, when it has breached a certain virtual threshold, a level to which the adjectives ‘utmost’ and ‘ultimate’ become applicable, and the embodiment of which is then called ʿibāda. It is in this vein that we see him say:

فمن قام في قلبه غاية التذلل ونهاية الحب لمخلوق من المخلوقات لأي سبب من الأسباب فهو واقع في الشرك بالله تعالى

“Whenever feelings of utmost submission and ultimate love for a creature amongst creatures are found in someone’s heart for whatever reason, then that person is guilty of shirk with Allāh.”[18]

ʿIbāda then is conceived of as humility and submission (and love) reaching a certain threshold or quantity in someone’s heart and the actions this feeling generates.

In another passage, he states:

وتوسع عدد من علماء اللغة في توضيح مفهوم العبادة والتعبد، وذكروا أن هناك فرقاً بين معنى العبودية التي تطلق على المماليك ومعنى العبودية بمعنى العبادة والتأله سواء كانت لله أو لغيره، وتفريقهم ذلك راجع إلى مقدار التذلل والخضوع الحاصل لدى المعين ومنطلقه ودافعه.

فذكروا أن المملوك فـإن كان مفهوم التذلل ينطبق عليه إلا أنه لا يصح أن يسمى عابداً؛ لأنه لم يتحقق فيه القدر الذي لا يتحقق مفهوم العبادة والتأله إلا به وهو غاية التذلل والخضوع.

“Numerous scholars in the field of linguistics xpanded at length on clarifiying the concept of worship. They mentioned there is a difference between the meaning of ʿubūdiyya in the sense of servitude, which applied to the slaves, and ʿubūdiya in the sense of worship and deification, be it of Allāh or anyone else. And this differentiation of theirs is based on the quantity of humility (tadhallul) and submission (khuḍūʿ) that obtains for a given individual, as well as its reason and motive.

So they explained that even if humility does apply in the case of the slave, it is however not correct to call him (i.e. the slave) ‘worshiper’ (ʿābid), because the measure (of humility), without which worship and deification do not obtain, has not been reached. And that [measure] is utmost humility and submission.” [19]

Thus, for Sh. ʿUmayrī, the locus of the core of ʿibāda (worship) being the heart, acts of ʿibāda are but indicators pointing to or necessitated by a certain level of humility and submission having been breached. This framing of ʿibāda makes it essentially an internal state which is then expressed or manifested through external actions of the limbs.[20]

However, what exactly that threshold is remains vague and unclear. The reader of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s book is forced to make do with ciphers such as:

• “uncharacteristic of what is prevalent in normal and ordinary circumstances”[21] (in Zawadi’s words),

• it is not one universal level but differs from person to person, for example the Prophet’s ﷺ humility, submission, and love for Allāh ﷻ is far greater than Abu Bakr’s (may Allāh be please with him), and the level attained by Abu Bakr is still higher than all other Muslims, and so forth.[22]

• it is not always possible to delimit the threshold of that high level (of humility and submission) with a clearly defined demarcation point (ḥadd muqannan) in all scenarios.[23]

• The sane person… just… knows the limit and difference between an expression of respect and an expression of ʿibāda.[24]

If we put aside for a moment discussion about the relative strength of these claims, it is evident that this definition and concept of ʿibāda is characterised by vagueness. For it to have any practical significance, either this vagueness will need to be dissipated, or the vacuum it creates filled by (arbitrary) external factors (which is what effectively happens with Sh. ʿUmayrī, as we shall see).

As we are intended to believe that this is the intent of the linguists and scholars in their definition of ʿibāda, it is also worth asking: is there any example that supports this notion from any scholar, much less it being a general view? More importantly ʿUmayrī does not produce anyone at all who said that x action becomes kufr or shirk when it passes a nebulous threshold of intensity of khuḍūʿ. It seems this is a grave oversight if this is indeed what these scholars meant and yet none of them bothered to mention it.

To summarise, Sh. ʿUmayrī conceives of acts of worship as acts driven by instances of humility and submission having breached a certain threshold of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility). He conceives of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility) as a state of the heart. Indeed, this state of the heart is the locus for the essence of ʿibāda. ʿIbāda cannot obtain without it. The external actions identified as ʿibāda then are expressions or indicators of this internal state.

This is however a speculative reading of the classical texts for several reasons.

Firstly, some scholars, such as al Jawharī (d. 393 H.) and Ibn Fāris (d. 395 H.), did not even refer to humility or submission in their definition, and simply defined ʿibāda as: obedience.[25] Others define it as: obedience with submission (al ṭāʿa maʿa al khuḍūʿ).[26] Still others explain it referring to only khuḍūʿ and/or dhull in generic terms (i.e. without qualifying with ‘utmost’).

In the latter case, Sh. ʿUmayrī accepts that these texts cannot be taken at face value. They should not be read in isolation, but rather they must be qualified. Hence, what is meant is not generic or muṭlaq khuḍūʿ and dhull, but rather their highest degree.[27]

However, in interpreting ghāya al dhull wa al khuḍūʿ to mean a degree or level of humility/submission (measured by intensity), he commits the exact error he cautions the reader against: he assumes that the sense conveyed by a decontextualised reading of those definitions is what was intended.

In essence then, he has conveniently chosen a particular approach to the definition, while disregarding other definitions, and has conveniently decided this particular definition can be taken in isolation to determine the reality and nature of ʿibāda .

Secondly, it is not just the case that he has arbitrarily adopted one particular approach to the definition. He then goes on to give this text his own particular (and somewhat arbitrary) reading. He offers the interpretation that these texts refer to a LEVEL or MEASURE (miqdār/qadr) of khuḍūʿ rather than a TYPE of khuḍūʿ. This is not only unjustified, but also contradicts the apparent or literal meaning in some cases. See for instance ibn Sīda’s definition (which Sh. ʿUmayrī sees as one of the best linguistic explanations of ʿibāda) charcterising ʿibāda as a “type of khuḍūʿ above which there is no khuḍūʿ”:

يقال: تعبد فلان لفلان: إذا تذلل له، وكل خضوع ليس فوقه خضوع فهو عبادة، طاعة كان للمعبود أو غير طاعة. وكل طاعة لله على جهة الخضوع والتذلل فهي عبادة والعبادة نوع من الخضوع لا يستحقه إلا المنعم بأعلى أجناس النعم كالحياة والفهم والسمع والبصر والشكر، والعبادة لا تستحق إلا بالنعمة.

“Ta’abbada fulān li fulān: He showed humility to him. Any [instance of] submission (khuḍūʿ) above which there is no submission, is ʿibāda, whether it is an act of obedience (ṭāʿa) or not. Every act of obedience (ṭāʿa) for Allāḥ done with submission and humility is ʿibāda. And ʿibāda is a type of submission that only the one who provides the highest type of bounties is deserving of, for example, life, understanding, hearing, sight, gratitude etc. ʿIbāda is not deserved except in exchange of bounty.”[28]

ʿIbāda here is envisaged by Ibn Sīda as the highest TYPE or CATEGORY (nawʿ) of khuḍūʿ (submission). It is the ultimate khuḍūʿ because it is its greatest type. What then makes it a separate type? According to ʿUmayrī, we are to believe that it becomes a different type when it passes a certain undefined intensity level. However, if we consider how Ibn Sīda also speeks of types (ajnās) in the very next clause of his explanation (“only the one who provides the highest type of bounties is deserving of”), we see that it was not employed to refer to a measurable threshold or degree, or a continuous intensity in the bounty increasing in a linear fashion and changing into a different ‘type’ beyond a virtual point on the line. No, here ‘highest type’ is clearly meant as relating to a being with divine qualities. He goes on to say in continuation of the same passage:

والعبادة لا تستحق إلا بالنعمة؛ لأن العبادة تنفرد بأعلى أجناس النعم؛ لأن أقل القليل من العبادة يكبر عن أن يستحقه إلا من كان له أعلى جنس من النعمة، إلا الله سبحانه، فلذلك لا يستحق العبادة إلا الله.

“ʿIbāda is not deserved (tustaḥaqq) except in exchange of bounty, because ʿibāda is reserved for the highest type of blessings, because the very least ʿibāda is too great to be deserved except by the one who possesses the highest type of blessings. (This is so) except for Allāh, glorified is He. This is why none deserves worship but Allāh.”[29]

Clearly then, for Ibn Sīda worship constitutes acts of submission directed to a being that is believed to be worthy of worship. As a linguist, when Ibn Sīda says that none is worthy of worship but Allāh, he does not mean that the Arabs did not use the term worship (ʿibāda) for other than Allāh. He means that in light of the linguistic meaning of worship, it is not permissible in the sharīʿa that it be directed to other than Allāh.

As for its linguistic meaning, he has explained that it is a type of submission that is due to the one who gives the highest type of blessings, such as life, understanding, hearing, sight, and gratitude. Possessing the divine ability to bestow these blessings is what makes a being worthy of worship, and the one who ascribes them to someone has claimed that that being is worthy of worship. Clearly none ultimately possesses these qualities and therefore none is worthy of worship but Allāh.

The implications of this point become clearer when we see how Ibn Sīdah defines Ilāh. According to Ibn Sīdah, the Ilāh is “the one who is worthy of worship and to whom it is binding.”[30] We have already seen that for Ibn Sīdah that the concept of being worthy of worship (istiḥqāq al-ʿibāda) is tied up in the belief that a being possesses divine qualities.

And this is how ‘utmost/ultimate khuḍūʿ’ in the definitions of ʿibāda should be understood. Namely, that it refers to a type of khuḍūʿ higher than other types because of the belief underlying it. In fact, as we have seen above al ʿAskarī uses ghāya (ultimate) in the same sense as nawʿ (type), and replaces Ibn Sīda’s ‘highest type of bounties’ with ‘ultimate bounty’:

أن العبادة غاية الخضوع ولا تستحق إلا بغاية الإنعام ولهذا لا يجوز أن يعبد غير الله تعالى

“Worship is ultimate submission and is not deserved except in exchange of ultimate bounty. This is why it is not allowed to worship anyone other than Allāh.”[31]

Here, al ʿAskarī uses ghāya (ultimate) for both khuḍūʿ (submission) and inʿām (bounty). In the case of the latter, he evidently uses it in the sense of a TYPE of bounty, not a degree of intensity beyond which the inʿām can be qualified with ghāya. If it does not refer to a level of intensity (with a set threshold) for inʿām, claiming that it does for khuḍūʿ is subject to justification.

Furthermore, just like Ibn Sīda, al ʿAskarī is another figure whose definition of ʿibāda Sh. ʿUmayrī cited, yet al ʿAskarī’s use of the term khuḍūʿ does not fit well with the notion of an internal level or measure. In contrast to Sh. ʿUmayrī locating the khuḍūʿ in question in the heart, for al ʿAskarī the locus of khuḍūʿ is certain actions of the limbs, without any relation to the heart, so that for him one cannot say “his heart submitted”:

والخضوع هو التطامن والتطأطؤ ولا يقتضي أن يكون معه خوف ولهذا لا يجوز إضافته إلى القلب فيقال خضع قلبه

“Khuḍū’ (submission) is the lowering and inclination (of the neck or head) and does not require to be accompanied by fear. Which is why it should not be ascribed to the heart and said, ‘his heart submitted’.”[32]

Clearly, al ʿAskarī saw khuḍūʿ as residing solely in the limbs, not the heart. So when he mentions khuḍūʿ, he has certain physical actions in mind, not a certain state or disposition of the heart.

Fakhr al Dīn Al Rāzī (d. 606 H.) is also one of those cholars who defined ʿibāda as an expression of utmost humility and submission,[33] and considers sujūd itself as being an indication of utmost humility.[34] With this in mind, it is interesting to note that, in the course of the discussion about the angels’ sujūd to Ādam (peace be upon him), he discusses the divergence of opinion amongst his fellow Ashʿarīs about who is of a superior nature: the angels or the prophets? While being himself of the view that the angels are superior,[35] he lists the arguments of those who consider the prophets to be superior to angels; and their first argument is that the angels being ordered to prostrate to Ādam (peace be upon him) shows he was superior to the angels, as sujūd/prostration is itself utmost humility and ordering something of a superior nature to express utmost humility to something of an inferior nature is rationally blameworthy (which is unthinkable of God).[36] Rāzī then lists the answers provided by those scholars who hold the opposing view (himself being oone of them). In response to this particular argument, he explains it is not blameworthy that the superior be made to express utmost humility towards the inferior. Rāzī then lends support to this answer by giving the example of a king who orders his high-ranked subordinates to serve the lowest one, as a form of obedience to the king himself. In such scenarios, as Rāzī and those scholars see it , there is nothing wrong with the superior expressing and being ordered to display utmost humility towards the inferior.[37] If Rāzī had meant by the definition of ʿibāda what Sh. ʿUmayrī understood, then he certainly would not have endorsed the explanation that utmost humility can be addressed to other than Allāh without it being shirk, without at least rasing some concerns. On the contrary, Rāzī would have taken exception to it and pointed out the glaring error. This is another evidence that the scholars who defined ʿibāda as ‘utmost humility/submission’ did not mean an internal threshold of ‘utmost humility/submission’ when they used those terms.

In addition to what we have just mentioned, the alternative reading that ‘highest type of humility’ or ‘utmost humility’ in definitions of ‘ibāda refer to a type of humility expressed towards one’s Lord/Master/Rabb is also supported by a few other factors.

Firstly, some scholars have clearly explained worship as humility to one’s Rabb. For example, Ibn al Anbārī’s (d. 328 H.) said:

فلان عابد وهو الخاضع لربه المستسلم لقضائه المنقاد لأمره

“Fulān ʿābid: ‘he is a worshiper (ʿābid)’ means he submitted (khāḍiʿ) to [the one he considers to be] his Lord (Rabb), submitted to his decree and implemented his order.”[38]

Worship here is also conceived of as khuḍūʿ by ibn al Anbārī, but not in the sense of an inner level or measure of khuḍūʿ. Rather, ibn al Anbārī sees it as a khuḍūʿ to one’s Rabb.

Similarly, al Jurjānī (d. 816 H.) defined ʿibāda as:

العبادة: هو فعل المكلف على خلاف هوى نفسه؛ تعظيمًا لربه

“ʿIbāda is the action of an accountable individual against the passion of his ego, in glorification of his Lord (Rabb).”[39]

Likewise, the mufassir al Wāḥidī (d. 468 H.), after having explained ʿibāda in a similar fashion to Ibn Sīda (as the highest type of khuḍūʿ, submission), he goes on to explain that, etymologically, an ʿabd (servant) is called ʿabd because of his humility and submission towards his master.[40]

Finally, another justification for this alternative to Sh. ʿUmayrī’s reading is the fact that those scholars defined ʿibāda (as khuḍūʿ and dhull) but at the same time limited themselves to matters of iʿtiqād or belief when defining shirk and tawḥīd (see discussion below). This is important because the way one conceives of ʿibāda has significant ramifications on how they conceptualise related notions such as shirk and tawḥīd, as we saw with Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definitions of shirk and tawḥīd al ulūhiyya.[41] This further strengthens the argument that the ghāyat al-khuḍūʿ mentioned in those definitions is not intended to be understood as the intensity level of a certain feeling in the heart. Rather it is a type of khuḍūʿ directed to a being concerning whom the worshipper has certain beliefs of divine qualities. Holding such beliefs concerning Allāh alone would be tawḥīd, of course, while holding them concerning other than Allāh would be shirk.

All of this demonstrates that the expression “utmost submission and humility” (ghāyat al-dhull wa ‘l-khuḍūʿ), used by some linguists in their definition of ʿibāda, is not intended as a sort of internal thermostat to measure ʿibāda. Rather it is a descriptive definition that describes the state of the worshipper. As we have seen that not all linguists chose to define ʿibāda using the terms dhull and khuḍūʿ, it seems likely that those who did choose that approach did so because it reflects the lexical meaning of the root (ع-ب-د) from which the word derives.[42]

Sh. ʿUmayrī’s reading of the classical definitions of ʿibāda as an internal level or measure of khuḍūʿ and dhull is therefore highly contentious, not to mention inconsistent. He is adamant that some acts are in and of themselves indicators of the level of utmost humility and submission in the heart (acts that he called ʿibāda maḥḍa, discussed shortly below). For example, he argues that the ritual ṣalāh prayer being unconditionally an act of worship means that in all cases it indicates whoever is praying has an utmost level of submission and humility in his heart. This is an arbitrary claim and demonstrably false. This is evidently not the case and goes against all lived experience. Most people do not have that putative level of humility and submission during their ṣalāh most of the time. How often do we pray to Allāh yet we are altogether distracted? Either Sh. ʿUmayrī must say that this is not in fact ʿibāda, rendering our prayers invalid, or attempt to claim that utmost humility and submission of the heart are magically present by some manner of hand waving when clearly it is not. Not only is Sh. ʿUmayrī’s claim that performance of this ritual prayer necessarily indicates the existence of utmost humility in the heart an irrational one, it is also without evidence, yet we are to believe this is “established by revelation”. This further adds to the internal inconsistencies of the system Sh. ʿUmayrī has created.

Based on this reading of previous definitions of ʿibāda, for Sh. ʿUmayrī the same act can therefore be performed by the same person with different levels of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility). And this forms the basis of his concept of ʿibāda ghayr maḥḍa: a physical act, sujūd (prostration) for instance, which when performed with an average level of khuḍūʿ and dhull is not considered ʿibāda. However, the same physical act, when performed with a higher (i.e. the utmost or ultimate) level of inner khuḍūʿ becomes an act of worship and thus shirk when addressed to other than Allāh. In contrast, the acts that are considered ʿibāda maḥḍa are those acts he considers inherently, or always worship (e.g. ṣalāh, fasting, Hajj, wuḍū`, etc…). To relate them to his definition, Sh. ʿUmayrī claims they are ʿibāda maḥḍa because they were designated, in and of themselves, as expressions of the ultimate humility and utmost submission found in the heart by the Sharīʿa, but how they were designated as such is a mystery.

In any case, the linguists’ definition of ʿibāda as utmost khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility) is readily accepted by everyone, even by those named by Sh. ʿUmayrī as being explicitly refuted in his book,[43] so that is not the part of his definition that is problematic, as it is not his contribution to the debate. Our contention rather is with his personal contribution to the concept and definition of worship, and this is precisely where his whole edifice collapses, where Sh. ʿUmayrī tries to be an original thinker but fails miserably. In addition to the contentious reading of ghāya al khuḍūʿ wa nihāya al dhull as an internal degree of intensity of humility/submission, and his innovation of introducing the fiqhī concepts of ʿibāda maḥḍa and ghayr maḥḍa into discussions of shirk and by extension takfīr, Sh. ʿUmayrī’s personal contributions to the debate are:

1. His caveat of inḥirāf in rubūbiyya and its relation (of talāzum, i.e. necessary implication) to the level of humility and submission, and

2. His addition that the khuḍūʿ in question “stirs the individual to cling unto his object of ʿibāda, submit to its will, stay in continuous connection with it, and perform actions to please it.”.

The second point above will be addressed later in this article. Regarding the first point, we have seen above that ʿUmayrī sees actions of the limbs considered ‘worship’ as indicating and even necessitating the presence of something in the heart. More explicitly, he stated that the reality and essence of worship goes back to something found in the heart.[44] So for ʿUmayrī the locus of the corresponding shirk is still very much the heart, as it is for those who contend that shirk in ʿibāda must be accompanied by some form of shirk in belief. And for ʿUmayrī, what is found in the heart is twofold: the determining factor (an indistinct threshold of humility/submission), and a belief necessarily accompanying it, referred to as inḥirāf.

b. The Issue of the Belief Necessarily Accompanying ʿIbāda

So far we have seen that although many scholars did define ʿibāda in terms of utmost humility and submission, Sh. ʿUmayrī’s interpretation of the determining factor, or ḍābiṭ, to identify an instance of shirk al ʿibāda, as the internal level of intensity of the khuḍūʿ and dhull is highly problematic. This being the case, one cannot help but ask “what then determines whether shirk in ʿibāda has occurred?” Deeper discussions about shirk al ʿibāda ineluctably gravitate around and go back to some belief necessarily accompanying the actions in question. This much is also acknowledged by Sh. ʿUmayrī who, in addition to this definition, also elaborates on the relation between shirk in ’ibāda and inḥirāf (distortion) in rubūbiyya. He concedes that the former (shirk in ʿibāda) cannot occur without the latter (inḥirāf in rubūbiyya), in a way that shirk in ʿibāda necessarily implies, exists and occurs together with inḥirāf in rubūbiyya.[45] Or in other words, inḥirāf in rubūbiyya is a necessary concomitant of shirk in ʿibāda, in a way that the relation between the two is talāzum (necessary implication): [46] shirk in ʿibāda (the lāzim) necessarily entails inḥirāf in rubūbiyya (the malzūm). [47] See the following, where he states:

أما التلازم فمعناه: أن الإقرار بربوبية الله تعالى يستلزم الإقرار بأنه المعبود وحده سبحانه؛ لأنه لايستحق أن يعبد إلا الخالق الرازق المدبر، فإذا لم يتحقق اللازم وهو إفراد الله بالعبادة فإن ذلك دليل على انتفاء الملزوم أو نقصه وانحرافه.

فكل من أشرك في العبادة فلا بد أن يكون منحرفًا في الربوبية إما باعتقاد باطل فيها وإما بنقص أو خلل في الإيمان بها، فلا يوجد عند المشرك في العبادة توحيد صحيح مستقيم في الربوبية، إذ لو كان عنده توحيد صحيح في الربوبية لما وقع في الشرك في العبادة

“As for the necessary implication (talāzum) [between the two], it means: affirming Allāh’s rubūbiyya necessitates affirming that he is the only One worshiped (ma’būd), because no one deserves to be worshiped except the Creator, the Sustainer, and Governor (of all creation). So when the lāzim (necessitater), which is singling out Allāh for worship, is missing, then this is proof that the malzūm (necessitated) [which is God’s rubūbiyya] is also absent, lacking, or distorted.”

Whoever committed shirk in ʿibāda must necessarily have fallen into (inḥirāf) distortion in rubūbiyya, either due to a false belief about it (rubūbiyya), or defect in his faith in it. The one guilty of shirk in ʿibāda cannot have a tawḥīd that is correct and sound in rubūbiyya, because if that was the case, he would not have committed shirk in ʿibāda.”[48]

Sh. ʿUmayrī further adds:

بل لا توجد أمة مشركة في الألوهية إلا ولديها انحراف وخلل في توحيد الربوبية، حتى كفار العرب ومشركي قريش كما سبق بيانه

“In fact, there is no nation guilty of shirk in ulūhiyya (ʿibāda) except that it has inḥirāf and deficiency in tawḥīd al rubūbiyya. This is even so of the Arab kuffār and the polytheists from Quraysh, as has been mentioned.”[49]

What transpires from the way that the term inḥirāf has been used by Sh. ʿUmayrī in his book, is that on one end of the spectrum of inḥirāf we would find ascribing to a creature attributes of rubūbiyya “either through istiqlal (believing in the independence of that being) or ghalaba (overcoming or compellingly influencing god’s will and power)”. The middle range of the spectrum would be occupied by ascribing attributes of rubūbiyya without istiqlāl/taʾthīr/ghalaba, and at the other end of the spectrum we would find a distorted view of rubūbiyya where (some) divine attributes of Allāh are either negated or affirmed in a diminished sense (without involving ascription of any aspect of rubūbiyya to anything), as per the following:

فثمة فرق بين قولنا: الشرك في الألوهية لا بد أن يصحبه انحراف في الالربوبية، وبين قولنا: الشرك في الألوهية لا بد أن يصحبه اعتقاد الربوبية في المخلوق، فالانحراف في الربوبية معنى أوسع من مجرد أن يعتقد المرء في مخلوق أنه متصف بصفة من صفات الربوبية استقلالا أو تأثيرا في قدرة الله، فالانحراف في الربوبية قد يكون بالانتقاص من عظمة الله تعالى أو الانتقاص من كمال علمه ورحمته أو القدح في كماله المطلق

“There is a difference between saying “shirk in ulūhiyya must be accompanied by inḥirāf in rubūbiyya” and saying “shirk in ulūhiyya must be accompanied by a belief in rubūbiyya (i’tiqād al rubūbiyya) for a creature”. This is because inḥirāf in rubūbiyya is broader than just ascribing an attribute from the attributes of rubūbiyya by way of istiqlāl (believing in the independence of that being) or taʾthīr (overcoming or compellingly influencing god’s will and power), as it (inḥirāf) can take place in the form of diminishing God’s magnificence, or diminishing the perfection of God’s knowledge, mercy, or absolute perfection.”[50]

The notion that Sh. ʿUmayrī asserts in the underlined sentence above is later restated on the same page as:

الشرك في الألوهية لا بد أن يصحبه انتقاص في مقام الربوبية

“Shirk in ulūhiyya must be accompanied by a diminished view of [God’s] rubūbiyya”

These two passages give us an insight into and the limits of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s concept of inḥirāf: it is broader than just ascribing what he calls istiqlāl, taʿthīr or ghalaba, but it is no less than negating or diminishing some of the divine attributes of Allāh (without ascription to another creature necessarily being involved). Effectively, Sh. ʿUmayrī’s concept of shirk al ʿibāda involves two things that are located in the heart: the level of utmost humility/submission and an accompanying belief (in the form of the inḥirāf).

While it is perfectly agreeable that kufrī views about God (e.g. negating some of the divine attributes, limiting or diminishing them etc…) are indeed distorted views of rubūbiyya (inḥirāf), it is however difficult to see how this negation/limitation of a divine attribute ALONE would lead someone to worship something. For an entity to be worshiped, something must be ascribed to it. The denial of divine attributes, while being kufr, cannot itself lead to worship of something other than Allāh. It is the belief that the divine attribute being negated/limited is compensated or supplemented by another entity that leads to the worship of that entity. So that when something is believed to be worthy of worship (istiḥqāq al ʿibāda), this means that it is being ascribed with divine attributes (with istiqlāl/taʾthīr/ghalaba, or without, such as helpers relaying to God the prayers of people He cannot Hear, by His permission, although He can decide not to listen to those helpers whenever He wants). It is difficult to make sense of Zawadi and Sh. ʿUmayrī’s suggestion that shirk in ʿibāda could occur without ascription of such attributes. Consider for instance the examples they provide to make their case. Zawadi says:

The second category is more broad and general than, yet inclusive of the first one. For example, one may have a distorted view in Rububiyah by having a diminished view of Allah’s Mercy (e.g. believing that it’s “necessary” to have intercessors) or greatness of Allah (e.g. believing that Allah is too weak to have complete power over all of creation) or have a negative and distorted view of His Perfection (e.g. one may believe that Allah is not a perfect creator or sustainer of the universe and is doing a poor job at it, etc.). Such beliefs do not necessarily constitute Shirk in Rububiyah, but rather a kufri distorted view regarding it.

The example of the intercessors is the subject of a separate article but, for now, Zawadi did not lay out here his thought process about how a “kufri distorted view” could lead to shirk in ʿibāda. How does the belief that “Allah is too weak to have complete power over all of creation” or that He “is not a perfect creator or sustainer of the universe” make someone worship a particular false god as opposed to something else? It is only when an idol or entity is believed to have the ability to compensate for the weakness or imperfection ascribed to Allāh that the idol in question starts to be worshiped, not without it. This is even more glaring in another example that Zawadi himself provided, but failed to see the implications:

Or they may have a diminished view of Allah’s Knowledge and believe that since Allah does not know what is happening here on earth, that He is not able to hear the invocations of His servants, and as a result, they resort to relying on intercessors closer to Allah who could then relay their prayers to Him. This is also a distorted view in Rububiyah.

Zawadi sees this as an example of inḥirāf that does not involve ascribing divine attributes to a being. The inḥirāf here is the belief in a diminished knowledge of God. However, this kufri view on its own does not push people to worship specific intercessors. Rather, it happens when it is coupled with the belief that those intercessors can affect and compensate divine knowledge, as in this example. Unless Zawadi does not see the ability to affect or compensate an attribute of God as ascription of rubūbiyya, it is hard to see how this is an instance of inḥirāf without ascribing rubūbiyya to other than Allāh. Zawadi or Sh. ʿUmayrī have so far failed to explain, let alone prove, how an act considered shirk al ʿibāda can be addressed to an object of worship without ascribing some divine qualities to it. As such, their extension of the belief necessarily accompanying shirk in ʿibāda to include a “kufri distorted view” about Allāh, without ascribing attributes of rubūbiyya to the object of worship, is redundant.

Therefore, what we are arguing for here is twofold:

1. Just as Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definition cannot be considered in isolation from its caveats and exceptions (of which we will see more later), it would be erroneous to consider those scholars’ definitions that it is based on in isolation from those scholars’ overall concept of ʿibāda AND shirk.

2. We have seen that many of their discussions of ʿibāda give subtle hints of their fuller concept of ʿibāda. However, to alleviate the perceived ambiguity in those scholars’ linguistic definitions of ʿibāda, we can turn to their related discussions. As we have seen above, surveying the different senses in which they used the terms employed in their definitions (as we have seen above with the use of ‘utmost humility’ outside the context of ʿibāda) is one way to shed some clarity. Another way is to consider how they envisaged related matters such as shirk and tawḥīd.

One of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s main sources for ʿibāda being utmost khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility) is Al Zamakhsharī (d. 538 H.).[51] However, when we look at Al Zamakhsharī’s discussion about shirk, he said the mushrik (polytheist) believes his idol deserves to be worshipped.[52] Al Zamakhsharī further explained that no one (who believes in Allāh) would prefer worshiping anything other than Him except with the hope that what they worship would bring them greater benefit. So for al Zamakhsahrī, ʿibāda is accompanied by ascription of certain divine qualities to the object of worship:

أنهم آثروا عبادة الأصنام على عبادة الله، ولا يؤثر عاقل شيئا على شيء إلا لداع يدعوه إلى إيثاره من زيادة خير ومنفعة

“[They] preferred worshiping idols over worshiping Allāh, and no reasonable person would prefer one thing over another except that he has some motive to prefer it such as greater benefit and gain.”[53]

This is an important point in the discussion, for everyone agrees that the pagans believed in their idols being worthy of their worship (istiḥqāq al ʿibāda). And we have seen earlier that belief in istiḥqāq al ʿibāda (being worthy of worship) of an entity does indeed involve ascribing attributes of rubūbiyya to that entity, not merely a “kufri distorted view”. This is supported by the fact that Al Zamakhsharī sees istiḥqāq al ʿibāda as being based on ascription to the idol of some form of perceived benefit or gain, not merely some “kufri distorted view” about God’s attributes. Sh. ʿUmayrī himself said about the Arabs believing in istiḥqāq al ʿibāda (being worthy of worship) of their idols:

والاستدلال بهذا المعنى على تقييد مفهوم العبادة باعتقاد الربوبية غير صحيح، فنحن لا ننكر أن المشركين كانوا يعتقدون في أصنامهم أنها آلهة تستحق العبادة، وأنها شريكة مع الله، ولكن الشأن ليس في ذلك، وإنما الشأن في إثبات كونهم يعتقدون أنها تستحق العبادة بذواتها استقلالًا عن قدرة الله وهيمنته، وإثبات أنها شريكة مع الله تعالى لكونها تستقل بذواتها في القدرة على التدبير أو مغالبة الله تعالى

“Using this meaning [i.e. the belief of the Arabs that their idols were worthy of worship] as evidence to require a belief in rubūbiyya in the meaning of worship is incorrect. This is because we do not deny that the mushrikūn believed their idols are gods worthy of worship, and that they are Allāh’s partners. However, this is irrelevant. What is of relevance is establishing they believed that the [idols] deserved to be worshiped in virtue of their essence (dhāt), independently (istiqlālan) of Allāh’s power and supremacy, and establishing that (they believed) they are partners of Allāh, either due to their being independent in the power to administer )the universe( on account of their essences, or due to their ability to overpower Allāh.”[54]

As far as other scholars and linguists are concerned, their concept of shirk al ʿibāda is better understood through their definition of ʿibāda in conjunction with their definition of shirk, tawḥīd, and ilāh. In this article we will look at how scholars have defined shirk and tawḥīd.[55] Because the question we must ask ourselves is: Why do they define ʿibāda in terms of khuḍūʿ but highlight beliefs with respect to shirk? Simply because ʿibāda is a category of actions motivated by underlying beliefs. The actions cannot take place without those beliefs. However, the belief can be present even in absence of any action. As we have seen, this is true even according to ʿUmayrī. When we consider how these scholars defined shirk, we can see that they explained it as being a certain set of beliefs. So it logically follows that for them shirk al ʿibāda consists of actions expressing utmost humility when performed with an underlying shirk in belief. The difference with Sh. ʿUmayrī is that within his conception of shirk al ʿibāda this would be phrased as: shirk al ʿibāda is actions expressing utmost humility when performed with an underlying inḥirāf in belief.

In his explanation of shirk, we see Ibn Sīda (one of the scholars on whom Sh. ʿUmayrī based his definition of ʿibāda) only mentioning a shirk in belief:

وأشرك بالله: جعل له شريكا في ملكه

“The expression ‘he associated [partner(s)] with Allāh’ means: he assigned a partner to Him in His dominion (mulk).”[56]

And he is not the only scholar who defines ʿibāda in terms of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility),[57] but then when it comes to discussing shirk, only highlights examples that constitute shirk in belief.

Al Rāghib al Aṣfahānī (d. 502 H.), another important source for ʿUmayrī’s definition,[58] explains that in the specific context of religion, man’s shirk is of two types: major shirk, which consists of ascribing partners to Allāh, and minor shirk, which is ostentation and hypocrisy.[59] And he defines major shirk as “affirming a Maker other than Allāh”.[60] Keep in mind that Al Rāghib is discussing the ‘religious’ major shirk; and it is clear that for him, just like Ibn Sīda, shirk is a matter of belief and its locus (in which he does not include actions or a vague level of khuḍūʿ/humility in the heart) is i’tiqād.

Another famous grammarian ʿAbd al Qāhir al Jurjānī (d. 471 H.) also defined ʿibāda as:

العبادة: الديانة، وهو التمسك بالطاعة في تذلل وخضوع

“Worship is religious practice, which consists of adherence to obedience with humility and submission.”[61]

Yet, when ʿAbd al Qāhir al Jurjānī explained shirk, the different types he listed were simply instances of shirk in belief / i’tiqād:

والإشراك بالله من وجهين: إثبات شيء لا ابتداء له مع الله تعالى، والثاني: إثبات مدبر منفرد بفعله دون الله. فالأول: إشراك الدهرية والثنوية، والثاني: إشراك عبدة الجن والإنس والملائكة والنجوم والأصنام

“Associating partners to Allāh occurs in two ways: affirming something without beginning alongside Allāh. And the second: affirming an administrator who acts independently of Allāh. The first is the shirk of the Dahriyya and the Dualists, and the second is the shirk of those who worship jinns, people, angels, stars, and idols.”[62]

Similarly, Al Qurṭubī (d. 671 H.) also defined ʿibāda in terms of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility) in his tafsīr:

وحقيقة العبادة الطاعة بغاية الخضوع ولا يستحقها أحد سوى المالك المعبود

“The reality of worship is obedience with utmost submission. And none is worthy of it except the Master who is worshiped.”[63]

And this is Qurṭubī’s categorisation of shirk:

علماؤنا رضي الله عنهم قالوا: الشرك على ثلاث مراتب وكله محرم. وأصله اعتقاد شريك لله في ألوهيته، وهو الشرك الأعظم وهو شرك الجاهلية، وهو المراد بقوله تعالى: (إن الله لا يغفر أن يشرك به ويغفر ما دون ذلك لمن يشاء). ويليه في الرتبة اعتقاد شريك لله تعالى في الفعل، وهو قول من قال: إن موجودا ما غير الله تعالى يستقل بإحداث فعل وإيجاده وإن لم يعتقد كونه إلها كالقدرية مجوس هذه الأمة، وقد تبرأ منهم ابن عمر كما في حديث جبريل عليه السلام. ويلي هذه الرتبة الإشراك في العبادة وهو الرياء .

“Our scholars, may Allāh be pleased with them, said: shirk is of three ranks, all of which are prohibited:

Its primary form (aṣā) is the belief in partnership of another [being] Allāh’s divinity. That is the greatest shirk, the shirk of the Jāhiliyya, and what was intended in the verse: {Indeed, Allah does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills} (Sura al Nisā` 4:48 & 116).

Below this rank is the belief in a partner of Allāh in actions, Exalted is He. This is the view of those who say that some being other than Allāh, Exalted is He, is independent in originating an action or creating it, even if they do not believe in its divinity, such as the Qadariyya who are the Majūs of this umma; indeed Ibn ‘Umar absolved himself of them as was reported in the ḥadīth of Jibrīl, peace be upon him.

Below this rank is the shirk in ʿibāda and that is ostentation (riyāʾ).”[64]

In the same fashion, Al Azharī (d. 370 H.) defined shirk as:

شرك: قال الله جل وعز مخبرا عن عبده لقمان الحكيم أنه قال لابنه: {وهو يعظه يابنى لا تشرك بالله إن الشرك} (لقمان: 13) والشرك: أن تجعل لله شريكا في ربوبيته، تعالى الله عن الشركاء والأنداد، وإنما دخلت الباء في قوله: {يعظه يابنى لا} لأن معناه لا تعدل به غيره فتجعله شريكا له، وكذلك قوله: {بمآ أشركوا بالله ما لم ينزل به سلطانا} (آل عمران: 151) لأن معناه عدلوا به، ومن عدل بالله شيئا من خلقه فهو مشرك لأن الله واحد لا شريك له ولا ند ولا نديد

“… Shirk is to associate partners with Allāh in His Rubūbiyya (Lordship, Sovereignty), Exalted is He and above any partners and rivals. In the verse ‘O my son, do not associate [anything] with Allah’ (Sura Yāsīn 31:13) the preposition ba (with) was added because it (the verse) is meant as: do not equate anyone with Him, such that you make him His partner. (…) Whoever equates anyone or anything from His creations with Him, then he is a mushrik. Because Allāh is One, He has no partner or rival.”[65]

All of these definitions of shirk explicitly point to a shirk in belief and ascribing divine powers to the object of worship. Was there any other form of shirk for those scholars, surely that was the place to mention it. For example, when discussing the different types of shirk (whether major or minor), al Qurṭubī did not deem it relevant to mention feelings of utmost humility and submission for anyone other than Allāh (as opposed to Sh. ʿUmayrī). It is not as if al Qurṭubī had not considered the question of shirk in ʿibāda, for he specifically mentioned it, but he evidently conceived of it in a completely different fashion than Sh. ʿUmayrī. What he calls shirk in ʿibāda is only listed as the lowest form of shirk, which is minor shirk taking the form of ostentation (riyāʾ).

In addition to ʿibāda and shirk, it is also worth considering how tawḥīd has historically been defined. And it appears that most of those who defined it, did so again as a matter of belief.

One of the earliest linguists of the Arabic language, Al Khalīl (d. 170 H.), said:

والتوحيد: الإيمان بالله وحده لا شريك له

“Tawḥīd is FAITH in Allāh alone and without partners.”[66]

Qiwām al Sunna Abu’l Qāsim al Aṣbahānī (d. 535 H.) defined tawḥīd as:

ومعنى وحدته: جعلته منفردا عما يشاركه أو يشبهه في ذاته وصفاته

(…)

فقولهم: وحدت الله، من باب عظمت الله، وكبرته، أي علمته عظيما وكبيرا، فكذلك وحدته، أي علمته واحدا، منزها عن المثل في الذات والصفات

“‘I made Him one’ [waḥḥadtu, i.e. tawḥīd] means: I consider Him to be one/unique in whatever they ascribe to Him of association (shirk) and assimilation (tashbīh) with regards to His essence (dhāt) and attributes (ṣifāt). (…)

And [the Arabs’ saying] ‘waḥḥadtu, I have made Allāh one’ (…) means: I KNOW Him to be One, free from any equal in His essence (dhāt) and attributes (ṣifāt).”[67]

Al Sharīf al Jurjānī (d. 816 H.) also said:

التوحيد: في اللغة: الحكم بأن الشيء واحد، والعلم بأنه واحد، وفي اصطلاح أهل الحقيقة: تجريد الذات الإلهية عن كل ما يتصور في الأفهام، ويتخيل في الأوهام والأذهان.

التوحيد: ثلاثة أشياء معرفة الله تعالى بالربوبية، والإقرار بالوحدانية، ونفي الأنداد عنه جملة.

“Linguistically, tawḥīd means declaring that the thing is one, and the knowledge that it is one. And in the terminology of the people of truth it means stripping the divine essence off of whatever can be conceived in the [human] minds or imagined in the [human] intellect.

Tawḥīd is three things: knowing Allāh [through] His rubūbiyya (Sovereignty), affirmation of His being One, and negation of any rivals from Him in all respects.”[68]

Similarly, Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 H.) explains how the Ahl al Sunna conceive of tawḥīd:

وأما أهل السنة ففسروا التوحيد بنفي التشبيه والتعطيل ومن ثم قال الجنيد فيما حكاه أبو القاسم القشيري التوحيد إفراد القديم من المحدث وقال أبو القاسم التميمي في كتاب الحجة التوحيد مصدر وحد يوحد ومعنى وحدت الله اعتقدته منفردا بذاته وصفاته لا نظير له ولا شبيه وقيل معنى وحدته علمته واحدا وقيل سلبت عنه الكيفية والكمية فهو واحد في ذاته لا انقسام له وفي صفاته لا شبيه له في إلهيته وملكه وتدبيره لا شريك له ولا رب سواه ولا خالق غيره

“Ahl al Sunna explain tawḥīd as negation of any similarity with anything else (tashbīh) and [at the same time] negation of ta’ṭīl (rejection of divine attribute). And it is in this vein that Abu’l Qasim al Qushayrī reported Junayd [al Baghdādī] having said: tawḥīd is singling out the Eternal (qadīm) from the temporal (muḥdath). Abu’l Qāsim al Tamīmī said in Kitāb al Ḥujja that (…) ‘I have made Allāh one (waḥḥadtu)’ means: I have believed in Him as being One in His essence without anything comparable or equal to Him.

It is also said ‘I have made Him one (waḥḥadtu)’ means: I know Him to be One.

It is also said it means: I have negated any modality (kayfiyya) and quantification (kamiyya), so that He is one in His essence (dhāt) without divisibility, and in His attributes (ṣifāt) without anything being equal to Him in His Divinity, Dominion (mulk), Governance of the world (tadbīr), there is no partner to Him, and there is no Rabb and no Creator other than Him.”[69]

Al Shahrastānī (d. 548 H.) said something similar in his famous Al Milal wa al niḥal:

وأما التوحيد فقد قال أهل السنة، وجميع الصفاتية: إن الله تعالى واحد في ذاته لا قسيم له، وواحد في صفاته الأزلية لا نظير له، وواحد في أفعاله لا شريك له

“Ahl al Sunna and all of the Ṣifātiyya**[70]** said tawḥīd means: Allāh is one in His essence (dhāt) without being subject to divisibility, and one in His eternal attributes (ṣifāt) without anything comparable, and one in His actions without any partner.”[71]

All of these factors we have mentioned, among others we have not,[72] point to the fact that the notion of belief in divine qualities being the underlying motive of worship is implicit in the linguistic concept of ʿibāda. This is not just our reading of the texts. It has also been confirmed by the great Tunisian mufassir and polymath of our times, Sh. Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir b. ʿAshūr, in his magnum opus, al-Taḥrīr wa ‘l-Tanwīr, where he states:

ومعنى العبادة في اللغة العربية قبل حدوث المصطلحات الشرعية دقيق الدلالة، وكلمات أئمة اللغة فيه خفية والذي يستخلص منها أنها إظهار الخضوع للمعبود واعتقاد أنه يملك نفع العابد وضره ملكا ذاتيا مستمرا، فالمعبود إله للعابد كما حكى الله قول فرعون (وقومهما لنا عابدون) .

“The meaning of ʿibāda in the Arabic language before the appearance of sharʿī conventions was precise in its import. The statements of the Imāms of the language concerning it are subtle but what can be gleaned from them is that it is to manifest submission to the one being worshipped and to believe that he possesses the ability to benefit or harm his worshipper in a fashion that is intrinsic and permanent. So the object of worship then is a deity to his worshipper, as Allāh quotes Pharaoh, “And their people are worshippers of us.” (23:47)”[73]

II. Application and Utility of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s Definition of ʿIbāda

Finally, it should be noted that while imposing caveats and asterisks to sustain the validity of his definition and make it meaningful, Sh. ʿUmayrī ended up restricting its usefulness. For example, explaining the difference between worship and servitude within his paradigm, Sh. ʿUmayrī tells us that what turns an act into ʿibāda/worship is the quantity (miqdār) of khuḍūʿ (submission) and dhull (humility). This is what constitutes the core of ʿibāda. He says:

وتوسع عدد من علماء اللغة في توضيح مفهوم العبادة والتعبد، وذكروا أن هناك فرقاً بين معنى العبودية التي تطلق على المماليك ومعنى العبودية بمعنى العبادة والتأله سواء كانت لله أو لغيره، وتفريقهم ذلك راجع إلى مقدار التذلل والخضوع الحاصل لدى المعين ومنطلقه ودافعه.

فذكروا أن المملوك فـإن كان مفهوم التذلل ينطبق عليه إلا أنه لا يصح أن يسمى عابداً؛ لأنه لم يتحقق فيه القدر الذي لا يتحقق مفهوم العبادة والتأله إلا به وهو غاية التذلل والخضوع.

“Numerous scholars in the field of linguistics xpanded at length on clarifiying the concept of worship. They mentioned there is a difference between the meaning of ʿubūdiyya in the sense of servitude, which applied to the slaves, and ʿubūdiya in the sense of worship and deification, be it of Allāh or anyone else. And this differentiation of theirs is based on the quantity of humility (tadhallul) and submission (khuḍūʿ) that obtains for a given individual, as well as its reason and motive.

So they explained that even if humility does apply in the case of the slave, it is however not correct to call him (i.e. the slave) ‘worshiper’ (ʿābid), because the measure (of humility), without which worship and deification do not obtain, has not been reached. And that [measure] is utmost humility and submission.” [74]

In an attempt to render the blurry picture generated by his definition of ʿibāda clearer, we see Sh. ʿUmayrī resorting to terms with a connotation of quantifiability (miqdār/qadr), which could be perceived as projecting an impression of a self-contained, quantified parameter. Yet, when having to explain the difference between a prostration out of respect and a prostration of worship, we see him also say[75] that there is (in Bassam Zawadi’s paraphrase) “no mathematical and statistical demarcation line between what constitutes a difference between ‘showing respect’ and ‘falling into utmost submission and humiliation’”. This has significant ramifications when it comes to the actual implementation of their definition of ʿibāda. For Zawadi and ʿUmayrī, sujūd belongs to the category of acts that are ʿibāda ghayr maḥḍa (i.e. not worship in and of itself). On the one hand, as ʿibāda ghayr maḥḍa it will only be shirk when an internal quantity of khuḍūʿ and dhull has been breached, which varies from one person to another. On the other hand, this definition comes with asterisks, caveats, and a list of scenarios where external factors (e.g. whom or what the prostration/sujūd is being made to) determines whether a particular sujūd in question is shirk or not. For example, prostrating to objects that no sane person usually prostrates to out of respect only, such as the sun, the moon, planets, fire, rocks, trees, etc… Or prostrating to something that is known to be an object of (polytheistic) worship, such as the Buddha, the cross, or an idol.[76] These external factors make the sujūd de facto ʿibāda, and as such indicate that the threshold of internal khuḍūʿ has been breached.

Within this paradigm, the sujūd however has to be intentionally directed TO an idol, the sun, a tree, etc… As such an atheist prostrating (for whatever reason) with his colleagues or friends to a supposedly supernatural being would not be an act of worship, because he did not intend sujūd TO it, since he does not believe that the supernatural being even exists in the first place. He just performed an whereby he touched the ground with his forehead, but did not address it TO anyone. It stands to reason that the same atheist prostrating to the idol of the same supernatural being should also not be worship, as in this case too he is just performing an action imitating others, not intending to address it to anyone or anything in particular. Would this courtesy also be extended to the Muslim politician or public figure prostrating with others doing a prolonged sujūd to a monkey-god or its idol? And if the sujūd to an idol of the supernatural being by the atheist or the Muslim politician is indeed considered worship, this would mean that the inner threshold of utmost humility/submission has been breached in the scenario with the idol, but not without it. This seems arbitrary. Or will the level of inner humility be ignored here, and the ʿibāda of the atheist or Muslim politician solely defined by external factors (in this case sujūd addressed to an object usually worshiped by others)? Which would make Sh. ʿUmayri’s definition of ʿibāda, as essentially an inner state, absolutely redundant. Finally, what is the inḥirāf or kufri distorted view about Allāh’s rubūbiyya that necessarily accompanies the act of shirk in ʿibāda in the case of that atheist or Muslim mentioned above prostrating to the idol?

And how is this sujūd considered submission to the will of the idol, or an action aimed at pleasing it, since the atheist or Muslim politician knows it is a lifeless, inert object and does not represent any real deity? Are these, again, redundant mentions in the definition? Or are they ‘submission’ to the will of the idol and a way to please it in the same sense that ṣalāh means that utmost humility has necessarily obtained in the heart of whoever performs it?

So Sh. ʿUmayrī’s concept comes with a vague, nebulous distinction between prostration of worship and prostration of respect.[77] And an act of ʿibāda ghayr maḥḍa such as sujūd/prostration becomes an act of worship on the basis of external factors. No justification has been provided for the imposition of these external factors. Rather, a handful of scenarios involving sujūd/prostration were specifically and arbitrarily designated as being ʿibāda and thus ghāya al khuḍūʿ. What would have been more judicious is an examination of each external factor/qarīna showing ghāya al khuḍūʿ AND inḥirāf in rubūbiyya have obtained (for his definition to be justifiably applicable in each case). These are all dilemmas that demonstrate the spurious nature of this definition and underlying concept.

Furthermore, his addition in the definition that the khuḍūʿ in question “stirs the individual to cling unto his object of ʿibāda, submit to its will, stay in continuous connection with it, and perform actions to please it” is not of any more practical significance. This is particularly highlighted in the context of ʿUmayrī’s fifth proof[78] about the pagan Arabs addressing acts of worship to rocks they had personally selected for their beautiful appearance or grace. He sees that as a proof that shirk in Ulūhiyya can occur without shirk in any aspect of Rubūbiyya based on the following premises:

• Some pagan Arabs used to select idols (i.e. rocks) based solely on their passions (hawā): urged by the inclinations and desires their selves felt towards beauty and elegance.

• Allāh ﷻ named their desires and the idols selected because of them ‘gods’ and called their actions ʿibāda.

According to Sh. ʿUmayrī, they chose which rock to worship not on account of any particular belief about it, but solely due to their aesthetic attractiveness. [79] But as such any action directed to it falls short of fulfilling the conditions ‘submit to its pleasure’ and ‘perform actions to please it’, since no belief about volition or pleasure was ascribed to those rocks. How is it then worship? Or are these redundant conditions mentioned in the definitions? The other aspect of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s conception that this example makes redundant is the necessary implication of inḥirāf in rubūbiyya: since nothing is mentioned in the texts that their ‘worship’ of the rocks was affected by their beliefs regarding Allāh, or that those pagan Arabs ascribed anything to the rocks. It is then unclear what distortion occurred in this case (keeping in mind Sh. ʿUmayrī’s particularised methodology that each text or dalīl should be individually considered on its own, and not in generalised fashion).

Conclusion

We have seen in this article that Sh. ʿUmayrī’s concept of shirk in ʿibāda involves two elements whose locus is the heart:

1. The essence of ʿibāda (namely utmost humility and submission) is located in the heart.

2. The necessary implicant (malzūm) of shirk al ʿibāda is a kufri distorted view about rubūbiyya, and it can also not be located anywhere but the heart.

Our main contentions about these two elements are as follows:

1. We agree with the essence of ʿibāda being located in the heart. What we do contend however is that this essence is utmost humility/submission, particularly in the sense conceived of by ʿUmayri. As we have explained in the course of this article, this is a speculative reading of the texts, which is difficult to maintain in light of a careful reading of those texts themselves. Rather, we argue that those terms refer to a category of actions of submission and humility, as opposed to an internal threshold of humility. A more rigorous assessment of these texts than the one offered in these articles is merited, but it deserves its own dedicated and separate treatment. We hope to be able to come back to it at a later stage.

2. We also agree that the necessary implicant of shirk in ʿibāda is indeed an underlying belief. However, we contend Sh. ʿUmayrī’s and Zawadi’s proposition that this underlying belief can be simply a “kufri distorted view” of God’s attribute. Rather, that distorted view about divine attributes requires an ascription of some form of rubūbiyya (i.e. divine attributes) to the object of worship (for shirk in ʿibāda to occur). Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the necessary implicant of shirk in ʿibāda is effectively ascription of some attribute of rubūbiyya to other than Allāh.

As for the utility of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definition, although the essence of ʿibāda for him is utmost humility/submission, it is ultimately not possible to ascertain when it has occurred. Explaining their view about how to differentiate a sujūd of respect from a sujūd of worship, Zawadi says there is “no mathematical and statistical demarcation line between what constitutes a difference between ‘showing respect’ and ‘falling into utmost submission and humility’. The reliance then is primarily on external factors, a vague appeal to unclear ‘experiences’, and other indicators that a certain virtual threshold has been breached. This should demonstrate the utility of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s definition. One could rightly ask: what use then is there for such a titular definition of worship? We are effectively back to square one, where Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s long lists of actions that he considers ʿibāda are superseded by lists of external factors that make an act ʿibāda. How these external factors indicate that the necessary level of dhull and khuḍūʿ is reached is never explained.[80] The definition itself is made practically redundant and the scope of its core (utmost submission and ultimate humility) too limited by the caveats and exceptions for the definition to be of any use for assessing cases of shirk. This is not to mention its failure to explain the actions identified by ʿUmayrī himself as ʿibāda.

We ask Allāh to bless us and all the readers to live their lives in the shadow of “Lā ilāha illa Allāh”, that this declaration be the last words we utter as we part from this world, and that we be resurrected upon it on the Day of Resurrection.

Allah knows best. And may peace and blessings be upon mankind’s guiding light, the Prophet Muḥammad, and his Family, his Companions, and all those who follow him.

[1] Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb in al Durar al Saniyya, v. 1 p. 155.

[2] See al Uṣūl al thalātha, in al Durar al Saniyya, v.1 p. 128.

[3] Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb in al Durar al Saniyya, v. 1 p. 62.

[4] Idem v. 1 p. 155. This definition is not useful for understanding shirk al ʿibāda, as not every obedience of other than Allāh is shirk. Also, as our discussion is about shirk in ʿibāda — that is, worship of other than Allāh — defining worship of Allāh in reference to obedience to Allāh is also not very helpful in understanding what constitutes worship of other than Allāh. Obedience to Allāh is indeed worship but clearly there is a particular set of beliefs that underlies a Muslim’s obedience to Allāh. However, it is not our intent to analyse the framework of Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb in this series. It has been mentioned here as it provides the backdrop for ʿUmayrī’s attempt to provide his own definition. It also sets the stage for discussion of particular issues we wish to address concerning the efficacy of ʿUmayrī’s definition. As for Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s paradigm of shirk al ‘ibāda, it needs a separate and dedicated treatment of its own.

[5] With or without istiqlāl (“believing in the independence of that being”) or taʿthīr/ghalaba (“overcoming or compellingly influencing god’s will and power”).

[6] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 36 (translation adapted from Bassam Zawadi’s). ʿUmayrī offers an alternative wording on p. 50 (including ‘ultimate feeling of love’ in addition to humility and submission): “It is that intentional state which combines feelings of utmost humility and submission with an ultimate feeling of love which stirs the individual to cling unto his object of ʿibāda, submit to its will, stay in continuous connection with it, and perform actions to please it.” (Translation Zawadi’s)

According to ʿUmayrī, these two different approaches to the definition, one that mentions “utmost love” and the other which does not, are the same for all intents and purposes. While this does raise some questions, we will not be probing this point further. For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient for the reader to note that ʿUmayrī sees both approaches as similar in their reality and consequence (p. 35), and therefore some of the passages quoted will mention this additional condition. Since these two approaches are interchangeable for ʿUmayrī, we have treated any mention of “utmost love” that is mentioned in any of the passages quoted as redundant and consequently, will limit our discussion to dhull and khuḍūʿ.

[7] See ʿUmayrī’s references for other scholars from different backgrounds who defined ʿibāda in similar terms in Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 37

[8] Idem, pp. 129–134

[9] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, pp. 129–36.

[10] Al ‘Askarī, Al Furūq al Lughawiyya, Cairo: Dār al ‘Ilm wal Thiqāfa lil Nashar wal Tawzī’, p.221. Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 130

[11] Ibn Sīda, Al Mukhaṣṣaṣṣ, 1996 Beirut: Dār Iḥyā` al Turāth al ‘Arabī, v. 4 p. 62. Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 129

[12] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 14

[13] Idem, p. 49. It is important to point out here that this is a significant departure from Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s concept of ʿibāda, since for him the shirk resides in the specific action itself, in most cases, as opposed to the heart for ʿUmayrī. This could be seen as a tacit acknowledgement that Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb’s concept was flawed. This is not within the scope of this article, but something that we hope to probe further at a later point in time.

[14] Idem, p. 37

[15] Idem, p. 47

[16] Idem, p. 55

[17] Idem, p. 56

[18] Idem

[19] Idem, p.128

[20] In addition to the passages just translated above, see also: Taḥqīq al Ifāda p. 45 where Sh. ʿUmayrī explains that actions of ʿibāda maḥḍa are in and of themselves indicators of a core or essence subsisting in the heart (as opposed to ghayr maḥḍa acts, for which that core in the heart is or can be established via other external factors) (emphasis mine),:

أما العبادات المحضة فهي دالة على غاية الخضوع والتذلل بوضع الشريعة، فكل عمل جعلته الشريعة عبادة محضة، فمعنى ذلك أن الشريعة قررت أن ذلك الفعل في مقياسها دال على ما تقصده من معانىي الخضوع والتذلل، فالشرية جعلت الصلاة عبادة محضة، فمعنى ذلك أن الصلاة في مقياسها دالة على جوهر العبادة القلبي.

So for Sh. ʿUmayrī, there is no instance of ʿibāda without its reality and essence subsisting in the heart, making it an essentially internal state. In contrast to this, Zawadi seems to conceive of this differently. According to him, ʿibāda MOSTLY (not essentially, i.e. not always, or not necessarily) involves a certain internal state, as he says:

“Intentional” state, not necessarily “internal,” though the majority of cases would involve an internal state.

And in his original presentation of Sh. ʿUmayrī’s book in English, he also says that it is the action that generates the level of utmost submission which constitutes ʿibāda (as opposed to ʿUmayrī, for whom it is the level of utmost submission that generates the act of worship, as is clear from the passages above). When explaining the same unconditional acts of ʿibāda maḥḍa as ʿUmayrī above, Zawadi says (emphasis mine):

“Such acts are inherently in and of themselves acts which yield the utmost of submission and expression of love and humility to God.”

This is one case of clear contradiction between the original and Zawadi’s presentation of it, where we decided to give preference to the original, and ignore Zawadi’s deviation.

[21] Idem. p37–39:

المراد بالغاية والنهاية هنا: القدر العالي الخارج عن معهود ما يمارسه الناس غي تعاملاتهم الاعتيادية

الدرجات العالية الخارجة عن القدر المعهود

الدرجة العالية من تلك المعاني الخارجة عما يتعاهده الناس في تعاملاتهم

[22] Idem, p. 40.

[23] Idem

تلك الدرجة العالية ليست على مرتبة واحدة

وتحديد تلك المنزلة العالية ليس له حد مقنن في كل المعاني

[24] Idem. p. 202

[25] Al Jawharī, Al Ṣiḥāḥ tāj al lugha wa ṣiḥāḥ al ʿarabiyya, 1987 Beirut: Dār al ʿilm li al malāyīn, v. 2 p. 503, and ibn Fāris, Mujmal al lugha, 1986 Beirut: Muʾassasa al risāla, p. 642:

والعِبادة: الطاعةُ

[26] Al Azharī, Tahdhīb al lugha, 2001 Beirut: Dār iḥyaʾ al turāth al ʿarabī, v. 2 p. 140; and ibn Manzūr, Lisān al ʿarab, Dār Ṣādir, v. 2 p. 138:

قال الأزهري: وَمعنى الْعِبَادَة فِي اللُّغَة: الطَّاعَة مَعَ الخضوع

[27] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 128:

المقصود في مفهوم التعبد والتأله — وهو معنى أخص من المعنى اللغوي المطلق — ليس مطلق الذل والخضوع، وإنما المقصود المراتب العالية منه، وهو الأمر الذي عبر عنه كثير من العلماء بقولهم: “عاية الذل والخضوع”

[28] Ibn Sīda, Al Mukhaṣṣaṣṣ, 1996 Beirut: Dār Iḥyā` al Turāth al ‘Arabī, v. 4 p. 62. Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 129

[29] Idem

[30] Ibn Sīda, Al Mukhaṣṣaṣṣ, 1996 Beirut: Dār Iḥyā` al Turāth al ‘Arabī, v. 5 p. 216

وقيل الإله هو المستحق للعبادة وقيل هو القادر على ما تحق به العبادة ومن زعم أن معنى إله معنى معبود فقد أخطأ وشهد بخطئه القرآن وشريعة الإسلام لأن جميع ذلك مقر بأن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له ولا شك أن الأصنام كانت معبودة في الجاهلية على الحقيقة إذا عبدوه وليس بإله لهم فقد تبين أن الاله هو الذي تحق له العبادة وتجب

It has been said that the ilāh is “the one worthy of worship (al-mustaḥiqq li ‘l-ʿibāda)”. It has also been said: it is “the one who is able to do that by which worship is deserved.” As for those who claim that ilāh has the meaning of “the one who is worshipped”, then he has erred, and the Qur’ān and the Sharīʿa of Islām bear witness to his error, as they all affirm that there is no ilāh except Allāh, alone, without partner. There is also no doubt that the idols were worshipped in Jāhiliyya in reality. They would worship it while it is not actually their ilāh. This makes clear that the ilāh is the one to whom worship is due and binding (taḥiqqu lahu al- ʿibāda wa tajib).

[31] Al ‘Askarī, Al Furūq al Lughawiyya, Cairo: Dār al ‘Ilm wal Thiqāfa lil Nashar wal Tawzī’, p.221. Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 130

[32] Al ‘Askarī, Al Furūq al Lughawiyya, Cairo: Dār al ‘Ilm wal Thiqāfa lil Nashar wal Tawzī’, p.248–9. Other uses of khuḍūʿ or dhull showing their locus being the limbs rather than the heart are:

Al Ṭabarī, (d. 310 H.) who while explaining Sura al Nisā` 4:125 {whoever submits his face to Allah} من أسلم وجهه لله, said that ‘submit one’s face’ here means self-humility (tadhallul) to Allāh’s obedience and compliance to His order. He then adds:

وإنما سمي المسلم مسلما بخضوع جوارحه لطاعة ربه

The Muslim is called Muslim (one who submits) due to the khuḍūʿ (submission) of his limbs to the obedience of his Rabb. (Tafsīr al Ṭabarī, v. 2 p. 510)

من أسلم لله بدنه، فخضع له بالطاعة جسده

Whoever submits his body to Allāh [means that] he has submitted (khaḍaʿa) his body through obedience. (Tafsīr al Ṭabarī, v. 2 p. 512)

Al Qushayrī (d. 465 H.) explicitly states that dhull is the apparent or external aspect of worship (as opposed to inner):

والعبادة ظاهرها تذلل، وحقيقتها تعزّز وتحمّل

The outward aspect (ẓāhir) of worship is self-humility (tadhallul), and its reality is self-fortification and perseverance. (Laṭāif al Ishārāt, v. 1 p.48)

Or consider the following narration from al-Zuhrī:

عبد الرزاق قال: أرنا معمر , عن الزهري في قوله تعالى: {في صلاتهم خاشعون} قال: هو سكون المرء في صلاته

Al Zuhrī explained the verse ‘Who are humble in their prayers’ (Sura Al Muʾminūn 23:2) as: one’s stillness during his prayer. (Tafsīr ‘Abdur Razzāq, v. 2 p. 412; Al Ṭabarī reported the same explanation from both Zuhrī and Mujāhid in his Tafsīr, v. 19. P. 8

In a similar vein, al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī defines ʿibāda and ʿubūdiyya in the following fashion:

العُبُودِيَّةُ: إظهار التّذلّل، والعِبَادَةُ أبلغُ منها، لأنها غاية التّذلّل، ولا يستحقّها إلا من له غاية الإفضال، وهو الله تعالى

ʿUbūdiyya is to manifest humility, while ʿibāda is greater than it, for it is the utmost humility (ghāyat al-tadhallul), and it is not due except to the one who gives the utmost bounties, and that is Allāh, Most High.

So for Rāghib, both ʿubūdiyya and ʿibāda entail making humility manifest. The humility being spoken of then is an external quality.

Raghīb also defines ʿibāda in his tafsīr (v. 1, p. 58), saying:

والعبادة: التذلل، ومنه: طريق معبد.

ʿIbāda is humility

[33] Al Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al ghayb, 1420 H. Beirut: Dār iḥyā` al turāth al ‘Arabī, v. 17 p.314:

والعبادة عبارة عن إظهار الخضوع والخشوع ونهاية التواضع والذل

And Idem, v. 32 p. 298

العبادة هي التذلل والخضوع للمعبود على غاية ما يكون

[34] Idem, v. 16 p. 154:

فخص الركوع والسجود بالذكر لدلالتهما على غاية التواضع والعبودية تنبيها على أن المقصود من الصلاة نهاية الخضوع والتعظيم

[35] In addition to his discussion just mentioned, see also: Idem, v. 31 p. 24:

الملائكة أعظم المخلوقات قدرا ورتبة، وأكثر قدرة ومكانة

[36] Idem, v. 2 p. 443:

واحتج من قال بفضل الأنبياء على الملائكة بأمور: أحدهما: أن الله تعالى أمر الملائكة بالسجود لآدم وثبت أن آدم لم يكن كالقبلة بل كانت السجدة في الحقيقة له، وإذا ثبت ذلك وجب أن يكون آدم أفضل منهم لأن السجود نهاية التواضع وتكليف الأشرف بنهاية التواضع للأدون مستقبح في العقول

[37] Idem, v. 2 p. 445:

أما إذا سلمنا أن السجود كان لآدم عليه السلام فلم قلتم إن ذلك لا يجوز من الأشرف في حق الشريف وذلك لأن الحكمة قد تقتضي ذلك كثيرا من حب الأشرف وإظهار النهاية في الانقياد والطاعة فإن للسلطان أن يجلس أقل عبيده في الصدر وأن يأمر الأكابر بخدمته ويكون غرضه من ذلك إظهار كونهم مطيعين له في كل الأمور منقادين له في جميع الأحوال فلم لا يجوز أن يكون الأمر هاهنا كذلك

[38] See Al Azharī, Tahdhīb al lugha, 2001 Beirut: Dār iḥyaʾ al turāth al ʿarabī, v. 2 p. 140; and ibn Manzūr, Lisān al ʿarab, Dār Ṣādir, v. 3 pp. 273–4

[39] Al Sharīf Jurjānī, Al Taʿrīfāt, 1983 Beirut: Dār al kutub al ʿilmiyya, p. 146

[40] Al Wāḥidī, Al Tafsīr al Basīṭ, Jāmiʿa al Imām, v. 1 p. 516:

معنى العبادة: الطاعة مع الخضوع والتذلل، وهو جنس من الخضوع، لا يستحقه إلى الله عز وجل، وهو خضوع ليس فوقه خضوع، وسمي العبد عبدا لذلته وانقياده لمولاه

[41] See footnotes 16 & 17 above

[42] Ibn Fāris sates in Maqāyis al-Lugha, v. 4, p. 205:

العين والباء والدال أصلان صحيحان، كأنهما متضادان، و[الأول] من ذينك الأصلين يدل على لين وذل، والآخر على شدة وغلظ.

فالأول العبد، وهو المملوك … قال الخليل: … يقال هذا عبد بين العبودة… قال: وأما عبد يعبد عبادة فلا يقال إلا لمن يعبد الله تعالى. … ومن الباب البعير المعبد، أي المهنوء بالقطران. وهذا أيضا يدل على ما قلناه لأن ذلك يذله ويخفض منه. قال طرفة:

إلى أن تحامتني العشيرة كلها … وأفردت إفراد البعير المعبد

والمعبد: الذلول، يوصف به البعير أيضا. ومن الباب: الطريق المعبد، وهو المسلوك المذلل.

The root (ع-ب-د) has two sound root meanings, as if they are opposite meanings. The first of those two root meanings indicates softness and humility. The other indicates severity and coarseness.

In the first, you have ʿabd, meaning: slave… Al-Khalīl states: … This is a slave whose slavehood is clear (ʿabd bayyin al- ʿabūda)… (Al-Khalīl) states: as for “worship” (ʿabada yaʿbudu), it is not to be said except of the one worshipping Allāh, Most High…

Also from this meaning is: the muʿabbad camel, meaning one that has been anointed with tar, this also indicates what we have mentioned because this subdues it and renders it low. Ṭarfah states (in poetic verse): “Until the whole clan came to my defense, and I was singled out like a muʿabbad camel.” Muʿabbad means submissive (dhalūl), and is also used to describe camels.

Another usage from this meaning is: “the muʿabbad path”, meaning: a travelled, mudhallal (beaten, trodden) path.

In the beginning of his Tafsīr, Imām al-Ṭabarī chooses in Surat al-Fātiḥa to explain ʿibāda using words such as khushūʿ, dhull, and istikānah, all indicating humility and submission, rather than fear and hope as in a narration of Ibn ʿAbbās that he was quoting as precedent for his interpretation. In explaining his reason for doing so, he states (v. 1, pp. 159–160):

قال أبو جعفر: وتأويل قوله: {إياك نعبد} [الفاتحة: 5] لك اللهم نخشع ونذل ونستكين إقرارا لك يا ربنا بالربوبية لا لغيرك. كما حدثنا أبو كريب، قال: حدثنا عثمان بن سعيد، قال: حدثنا بشر بن عمارة، قال: حدثنا أبو روق، عن الضحاك، عن عبد الله بن عباس، قال: قال جبريل لمحمد صلى الله عليه وسلم: “ قل يا محمد: إياك نعبد، إياك نوحد ونخاف ونرجو يا ربنا لا غيرك “ وذلك من قول ابن عباس بمعنى ما قلنا، وإنما اخترنا البيان عن تأويله بأنه بمعنى نخشع ونذل ونستكين، دون البيان عنه بأنه بمعنى نرجو ونخاف، وإن كان الرجاء والخوف لا يكونان إلا مع ذلة؛ لأن العبودية عند جميع العرب أصلها الذلة، وأنها تسمي الطريق المذلل الذي قد وطئته الأقدام وذللته السابلة: معبدا. ومن ذلك قول طرفة بن العبد:

تباري عتاقا ناجيات وأتبعت … وظيفا وظيفا فوق مور معبد

يعني بالمور: الطريق، وبالمعبد: المذلل الموطوء ومن ذلك قيل للبعير المذلل بالركوب في الحوائج: معبد، ومنه سمي العبد عبدا لذلته لمولاه. والشواهد من أشعار العرب وكلامها على ذلك أكثر من أن تحصى، وفيما ذكرناه كفاية لمن وفق لفهمه إن شاء الله تعالى .

The interpretation of “You alone We worship”: “To you, O Allāh, do we humble ourselves (nakhshaʿ), make ourselves lowly (nadhill), and submit ourselves (nastakīn), acknowledging, O our Lord, that lordship belongs to You and to no one else. (This interpretation is) as it has been reported to us (…) that Ibn ʿAbbās relates: Jibrīl said to Muḥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم), “O Muḥammad, say, ‘You alone we worship’ (meaning:) You do we declare to be One, (You) do we fear, and (You) do we place hope in, O our Lord, and no one else.”

These words of Ibn ʿAbbās confirm the meaning of what we have stated, only we chose to express the interpretation in terms of humility, lowliness, and submission, rather than those of hope and fear, even though hope and fear are only found together with submissiveness (dhillah). The reason for this is that, according to all of the Arabs, the root meaning (aṣl) of servitude (ʿubūdiyya) is submissiveness (dhillah). Thus, they will refer to the subdued path that has been well-trodden and tamed by travelers as muʿabbad… Likewise, they will refer to the camel that has been subdued for riding for fulfilling tasks as muʿabbad. Also, the slave is called ʿabd because of his submissiveness (dhillah) to his master. The attestations for this in the poetry and speech of the Arabs are too numerous to count, and what we have mentioned is sufficient for the one blessed (by Allāh) to properly understand it, if Allāh wills.

[43] See Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 173 fn 1, p. 178 fn 2, and the discussion about the definition of ‘ibāda in the corresponding book: Abdullah Dashtī, Al Khalal al Wahhābī fī Fahm Tawḥīd al Qur’ānī, p. 149 onward.

[44] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, pp. 14, 37, 47, 49. See footnotes 12 to 15 above for translation.

[45] Which is another point of divergence from Ibn ʿAbd al Wahhāb.

[46] Talāzum, translated here as “necessary implication” means that the relation between two things (one called lāzim, and the other malzūm) is such that if the lāzim is present, the malzūm is necessarily present as well. If the lāzim is absent, the malzūm is necessarily absent as well. In other words, the existence or non-existence of the lāzim necessitates the existence or non-existence of the malzūm.

It is important to note here that, in the book, this inḥīrāf is not the ḍābiṭ or determining factor in establishing whether an act is ʿibāda (as that is the role of the inner level of humility/submission). And although the relation between shirk in ʿibāda and inḥirāf is not detailed in any way beyond this talāzum, it would appear that the inḥirāf generates in a person a feeling of utmost humility and submission (which then yields the devotional acts considered worship).

[47] Lāzim is also referred to in English works of logic as the consequent or the implicate, while malzūm is referred to as the antecedent or implicant. See ‘Azmī T. al-Sayyed Ahmad’s thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1981), Al-Ghazālī’s Views on Logic, p. 158.

[48] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 16. See also p. 14:

الشرك في الألوهية لا بد أن يصحبه انحراف في الربوبية

[49] Idem, p. 27

[50] Idem, p. 18. A point to note here is that phrases such as ‘ascribing (attributes of) rubūbiyya’ or ‘belief in rubūbiyya (of something)’ are primarily used in the book and understood by Sh. ʿUmayrī in the sense of ‘WITH istiqlāl/taʿthīr/ghalaba’, This is the case for the majority of the occurrences of these terms in the book. A minor set of occurrences are either ambiguous (and it should not be surprising that readers understood them in light of how the phrases were primarily used), or their acceptance in the sense of ‘WITHOUT istiqlā/taʿthīr/ghalaba’ is mostly in the form of ‘for the sake of argument’. This quote is an example of where those phrases have been used as synonymous to ascribing rubūbiyya WITH istiqlāl,taʾthīr/ghalaba. Another example can be seen referenced in footnote 54 below.

[51] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 54 and p. 131

[52] Al Zamakhsharī, Al Kashshāf, 1407 H. Beirut, Dār al Kitāb al ‘Arabī, v. 3 p. 154

المشرك زاعم أنّ الوثن تحق له العبادة

[53] Idem., v. 3 p. 3675

[54] Idem, p.189. This is yet another example of how phrases such as ‘ascribing (attributes of) rubūbiyya’ or ‘belief in rubūbiyya (of something)’ are primarily used to mean ascription of istiqlāl/taʾthīr/ghalaba.

Here as in other places in the book, Sh. ʿUmayrī presents the opponents view as iʿtiqād al rubūbiyya (belief in the rubūbiyya of the object of worship). However, he understands this to mean ascription of rubūbiyya either through “istiqlāl (“believing in the independence of that being”) or taʿthīr/ghalaba (“overcoming or compellingly influencing god’s will and power”).

[55] It would also be appropriate to take a look at their definitions of ilāh given the intimate connection between the concepts of ʿibāda and ilāh. We have alluded to one such connection in the discussion of Ibn Sīdah’s concept of ʿibāda, but due to considerations of length, we have chosen to defer a fuller treatment of the linguistic meaning of ilāh to a later time.

[56] Ibn Sīda, Al Muḥkam wa al Muḥīṭ al A’zam, 2000 Beirut: Dār al Kutub al ‘Ilmiyya, v. 6 p. 684

[57] Some of them like al Rāghib and ibn Sīda also point to the meaning of istiḥqāq al ʿibāda WITHIN their definition of ʿibāda. As we have seen Istiḥqāq = Belief, ergo, it is not limited to the action and state of the heart, but also the underlying belief of ascribing certain divine powers (or of rubūbiyya) to the object .

[58] Taḥqīq al Ifāda, p. 54 and p. 131

[59] Al Rāghib al Aṣfahānī, Al Mufradāt fī Gharīb al Qur’ān, 1412 H. Beirut, Al Dār al Shāmiyya, p. 451–2:

وشرك الإنسان في الدين ضربان: أحدهما: الشرك العظيم، وهو: إثبات شريك لله تعالى. يقال: أشرك فلان بالله، وذلك أعظم كفر. قال تعالى: إن الله لا يغفر أن يشرك به [النساء/ 48] (…) والثاني: الشرك الصغير، وهو مراعاة غير الله معه في بعض الأمور، وهو الرياء والنفاق

[60] Al Rāghib al Aṣfahānī, Tafsīr al Rāghib al Aṣfahānī, 1999 Riyadh, Dār al Waṭan, v. 3 p. 1231

[61] ‘Abd al Qāhir al Jurjānī, Darj al Durar fi Tafsīr Āyi al Suwar, 2008 Majalla al Ḥikma, v. 1 p.87

[62] Idem, v. 2 p. 599

[63] Al Qurṭubī, Al Jāmi’ li Aḥkām al Qur`ān, 1964 Cairo: Dār al Kutub al Miṣriyya, v. 11 p. 130

See also v. 1 p. 225: (وأصل العبادة الخضوع والتذلل)

[64] Idem, v. 5 p. 181

[65] al Azharī, Tahdhīb al Lugha, 2001 Beirut: Dār iḥyā` al turāth al ‘Arabī, v. 10 p. 12–3

[66] Al Khalīl, Kitāb al ‘Ayn, Dār wa maktaba al hilāl, v.3 p. 281

[67] Abu’l Qāsim al Aṣbahānī, Al Ḥujja fī bayan al maḥajja, 1990 Dar al Rāya, v. 1 p. 305–6

[68] Al Jurjānī, Al Ta’rīfāt, Beirut:1983 Dār al kutub al ‘ilmiyya, p. 69

[69] Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al Bārī, Dār al ma’rifa, v. 13 p. 344–5

[70] The term ṣifātiyya refers to all those who affirmed real existence of divine attributes, such as Ibn Kullāb, al Ash’arī and their followers, Ahl al ḥadīth, but also the Karrāmiyya, Sālimiyya, as well anthropomorphists; in contrast to those who denied those attributes such as the Mu’tazila, the falāsifa, Jahm bin Safwān, etc…

[71] Al Shahrastānī, Al Milal wa al niḥal, Mu`assasa al Ḥalabī, v. 1 p. 42

[72] A proper, full treatment of the linguistic definition of ʿibāda is beyond the scope of this article, and is worthy of its own dedicated piece. We ask Allāh for His facilitation in writing such a piece at some point in the future.

[73] Al-Taḥrīr wa ‘l-Tanwīr, al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li ‘l-Nashr, 1984 CE, vol. 27 p. 26. It is worth noting here that the specific belief he identifies in this definition is probably the most apparent form of shirk, but it is not the only belief that would constitute shirk.

[74] Taḥqīq al ifāda, p.128

[75] Idem, p.206

[76] Idem, p.206–7

[77] All we are given is hazy statements such as (Taḥqīq al ifāda, p.205) the following, which leave the reader none the wiser after having read them:

المناط المؤثر في وصف السجود راجع إلى حال التحية والإكرام وبين حال التعبد والتنسك

[78] Idem, p. 97

[79] Idem, p. 100.

[80] One may ask whether ʿUmayrī himself even considered this question when devising this list. For our part, we will not be holding our breath waiting for an explanation to be furnished.