Jamaica’s Energy Facade: License Non-Renewal as a Tool for Cronyism and Private Gain?

By Investigative Correspondent Published: July 14, 2025

Legal Disclaimer

This article presents documented facts, public records, and raises questions about policy decisions in Jamaica’s energy sector. Where analysis or conclusions are drawn, they represent the author’s interpretation of available evidence and public information. All individuals and organizations named have the right to respond to any characterizations made herein. This analysis serves the public interest by examining energy policy decisions and their implications for Jamaican citizens. The patterns identified warrant further investigation by appropriate authorities.

The Government’s Crisis Decision

The Jamaican Government’s July 1, 2025, announcement to not renew the Jamaica Public Service Company’s (JPS) all-island electricity distribution license under its current terms, expiring July 8, 2027, has exposed deep-seated issues in Jamaica’s energy sector. Energy Minister Daryl Vaz cites high electricity prices — US$0.285–US$0.36 per kWh versus the Dominican Republic’s US$0.117 — blaming the “deeply flawed” 2001 People’s National Party (PNP) agreement.

Yet, based on the available evidence, the sector’s woes extend beyond pricing, marked by a troubling pattern of dysfunction spanning nearly two decades. From the 2007 Cuban light bulb scandal under former Energy Minister Phillip Paulwell, to current electricity theft costing US$258.9 million in 2023 (representing 18–30% of generation from 2021–2025), and JPS’s contradictory bypassing of renewable energy professional Mr. Rodger McKenzie’s LED and microgrid proposals while pushing less effective solutions.

Mr. McKenzie’s innovative plans, submitted to JPS and politicians with follow-up engagements, were overlooked, only to be echoed uncredited in politician rhetoric, highlighting a documented pattern of apparent misappropriation of ideas and political opportunism.

This article dissects the JPS license decision, the proposed divestment of the Government of Jamaica’s (GOJ) 19.9% JPS stake, the burden of electricity theft, JPS’s contradictory policies, and the 2023 nuclear ambitions, revealing a sector that public records suggest may be plagued by questionable practices and mismanagement, where both GOJ and JPS appear to act against public interest when convenient.

A History of Political Opportunism and Apparent Misappropriation of Innovative Solutions

Looking back to understand the present crisis, Jamaica’s energy sector emerges as a battleground for elite influence, where scandals and apparent intellectual property misappropriation overshadow public welfare. The 2007 Cuban light bulb scandal, under Paulwell’s Ministry of Industry, Technology, Energy, and Commerce, exemplifies this pattern that would repeat itself with more sophisticated innovations in subsequent years.

Cuba donated four million fluorescent bulbs for free distribution to reduce demand, but the J$276 million (US$3.9 million) project, with J$114 million paid and J$162 million outstanding, was riddled with allegations of fraud. According to public records, a junior minister, his assistant, and a businessman faced charges of conspiracy to defraud, money laundering, and breaching the Anti-Corruption Act after payments to unregistered companies like Universal Management and Caribbean Communications.

Notably, J$49 million was allegedly paid to Cuban volunteers, despite Cuba covering their stipends. A government probe cleared Paulwell, but the case’s referral to the Fraud Squad cemented perceptions of corruption. By 2014, the accused parties were freed after a no-case submission, but the scandal remains a hallmark of mismanagement.

In 2013, Paulwell proposed reviving the project, promising transparency at a Montego Bay Chamber of Commerce forum, citing prior demand reduction per the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR). He noted thousands of bulbs remained in Cuba, but no timeline emerged, fuelling scepticism.

They Overlooked Innovation: Mr. Rodger McKenzie’s Comprehensive Energy Solutions

Fast-forwarding to the present decade, the documented pattern of overlooking effective energy conservation solutions would repeat itself with far more sophisticated proposals. Between 2015–2016, renewable energy professional Mr. Rodger McKenzie submitted innovative proposals to JPS — supplying LED bulbs to 200,000 households free of cost to cut consumption and deploying microgrids, to decentralize power and reduce theft. Despite follow-up engagements, Mr. McKenzie’s comprehensive plan was not considered.

His detailed proposal included two strategic phases:

Stage 1 — Free LED Distribution Initiative:

• Target: 200,000–250,000 households
• Original cost (2015–2016): US$35 million
• Current cost (2025): US$15–18 million due to LED price reductions
• Projected savings: 50–70% reduction in theft
• Targeted Financing: USAID (2015–2016) partnership or JPS sunk cost combatting theft
• Distribution: 10 LED bulbs (Assorted or 10 x 9 Watts) per household
• Impact: Address 26% of JPS’s customer base (180,000 illegal connections)
• Cost per household: US$60–72 (2025 pricing)

Stage 2 — Microgrid Deployment:

• Decentralized renewable energy systems
• Blockchain-based billing at US$18–27/month flat rate
• Target: Same 200,000 households with illegal connections
• Design: Community-based power independence
• Technology: PV Solar or Next Generation Renewable Energy (Gen3REN) process
• Capacity: 2kW minimum equivalent PV solar per household

Mr. McKenzie’s proposals represented a comprehensive approach to addressing Jamaica’s energy challenges through proven technology and innovative financing mechanisms. His background in renewable energy systems and understanding of Jamaica’s specific challenges informed solutions that could have been implemented immediately with measurable results.

The Contradictory Response: JPS’s Double Standards and Management Dysfunction

The vindication of Mr. McKenzie’s approach becomes undeniable when examining subsequent JPS statements. In a March 10, 2020, OUR consultation, JPS CFO Vernon Douglas pushed for a government task force to combat theft and a ban on incandescent bulbs, claiming LEDs could save 90% of stolen electricity. Douglas stated: “You can buy one 10W LED bulb, which gives the same illumination that a 100W incandescent light bulb gives, so even if persons are stealing electricity using a LED light, having removed those incandescent light bulbs from the market, we would save 90 per cent of the electricity.”

Yet JPS, GOJ, and opposition politician key decision makers overlooked Mr. McKenzie’s LED plan, which could have addressed 26% of JPS’s customer base (180,000 illegal connections) more effectively. When Mr. McKenzie presented the proposal during a meeting arranged by then-CEO Kelly Tomblin (an American executive willing to hear the proposal), the LED plan was not considered by a senior executive, who reportedly expressed the view that “he does not believe in rewarding those who steal, with free LEDs,” despite Douglas’s public acknowledgment of the 90% savings potential four years later.

Significantly, this senior executive, though holding a key position within JPS at the time, was the second person to head JPS’s eStore, with the third manager also overlooking Mr. McKenzie’s offer. All three managers who overlooked the proposal no longer work at JPS, while the theft problem has worsened.

Based on the available evidence, this documented pattern raises questions about whether there was systematic incompetence, or what may have been deliberate protection of expensive, ineffective approaches over cost-effective solutions. The contradiction becomes even more stark when considering that JPS’s own technical analysis would have supported Mr. McKenzie’s approach. The company’s public statements acknowledged the exact benefits Mr. McKenzie’s LED proposal would deliver, yet management consistently overlooked the solution that could have achieved those benefits at a fraction of their own spending.

The Gravy Train: Massive Spending, Minimal Results, Maximum Suspicion

Moving to 2022, the scale of JPS’s anti-theft spending with deteriorating results raises serious questions about accountability and effectiveness. At the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce Breakfast Conversation event at The Jamaica Pegasus hotel in April 2022, JPS President and CEO Michel Gantois revealed alarming statistics that would validate Mr. McKenzie’s earlier warnings.

Gantois revealed that electricity theft had reached critical levels, costing Jamaica approximately US$200 million per year in fuel and lost revenue. He characterized electricity theft as “the most pervasive and growing crime on the island, committed with impunity and receiving little attention,” noting that JPS had invested “significant money and time to better locate where theft occurs, conduct raids and audits, as well as working with the police to arrest crooks.”

However, despite these acknowledgments and massive investments, the theft problem has only worsened, creating a stark contrast with the cost-effective solution Mr. McKenzie had proposed years earlier:

JPS’s Inefficient Spending vs. Mr. McKenzie’s Approach:

• JPS Total Investment: US$150 million (2016–2021) + J$13.2 billion/US$84 million (2025–2034) = US$234 million over 19 years
• JPS Annual Losses: US$200 million (2021) rising to US$258.9 million (2023)
• JPS Achievement: Could not save even 14% from theft despite massive investments
• System losses: 27.3% in 2023 (17.91% from theft, 7.67% technical)
• JPS Cost per illegal connection: US$1,170 per household over 19 years

Mr. McKenzie’s Superior Alternative:

• Total Cost: US$35 million (2015–2016), US$15–18 million (2025 pricing)
• Projected Results: 50–70% reduction in theft
• Cost per household: US$60–72
• Efficiency Ratio: JPS spending 13–16x more for potentially 1/5 the results
• Potential Savings Lost: US$1.2–1.6 billion over 8 years (2016–2024) if implemented

The documented inability to achieve even 14% theft reduction despite US$234 million in spending raises questions about either competence or the systematic allocation of resources. The irony is particularly stark given Gantois’s 2022 emphasis that theft reduction could lead to “more potential dividends for shareholders,” including the very government that overlooked cost-effective solutions while maintaining its profitable stake.

The Divestment Push: Elite Interests vs. Public Opposition

Against this backdrop of massive spending and minimal results, elite advocacy for divestment emerged as another contradiction in Jamaica’s energy policy. In 2022, John Mahfood, President of the Jamaica Manufacturers and Exporters Association, urged divesting the GOJ’s 19.9% JPS stake via the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE). Speaking at the Lions Club of Kingston’s virtual meeting, Mahfood argued the Government should “focus on things that relate to the needs of the people,” claiming state funds could be put to better use.

Mahfood dismissed the government’s shareholding as merely tying up cash, stating: “The money that they could get from divesting their interest could be used for other purposes.” He contended that full privatization would allow “thousands of Jamaicans to own a piece of the JPS, which is a profitable company,” while brushing aside concerns about rate increases, insisting the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) would protect consumers.

Most tellingly, Mahfood claimed: “The Government’s ownership in 20 per cent of JPS… gives them no right to monitor the performance of JPS. It’s just simply an investment that is tying up cash.”

However, a 2020 RJRGLEANER poll showed 76% public opposition to divestment, with only 14% in favour, despite support for JSE listings like Wigton Windfarm’s $14 billion IPO in 2019. The disconnect between elite advocacy and public sentiment reveals a pattern of decisions that the evidence suggests may benefit connected interests while dismissing popular opposition.

GOJ Complicity and the Nuclear Distraction: Playing Both Sides Against the Public

The GOJ’s role in this dysfunction extends beyond mere regulatory oversight — it actively participates in contradictory policies that the documented evidence suggests may serve elite interests over public welfare. This pattern becomes particularly evident when examining the government’s simultaneous pursuit of expensive nuclear options while failing to address fundamental theft issues.

The Nuclear Facade: A Misguided and Costly Distraction

In 2023, Energy Minister Daryl Vaz and Prime Minister Andrew Holness promoted Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a “medium to long-term” solution for Jamaica’s energy needs, citing discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Coincidentally SMRs were being championed around the same time by billionaire Michael Lee-Chin, a major Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) supporter, this push ignored significant risks highlighted by Mr. McKenzie in a 2023 Kingston Chronicle article.

SMRs produce up to 30 times more nuclear waste than traditional reactors and face cost overruns of 300% or more, as seen in projects in Russia, China, and Argentina. Jamaica’s seismic activity environment makes it ill-suited for nuclear waste management, risking catastrophic impacts on tourism and agriculture. Lee-Chin’s claim that SMRs are safe, likening them to nuclear submarines and stating “not one person died” in Fukushima, overlooks long-term health impacts and the fact that 80% of Fukushima’s radiation dispersed into the Pacific Ocean.

The SMR proposal, estimated to cost US$1–3 billion for a 300 MWe reactor, with potential cost overruns of US$4–7 billion based on IAEA capital cost estimates (IAEA, 2020), contrasts sharply with Jamaica’s renewable potential. Based on the available evidence, this preference raises questions about whether motives may favour elite-driven projects over public interest, as evidenced by the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, signed without sufficient or significant transparent public consultation.

The Divestment-Nuclear-License Contradiction:

• 2020–2022: GOJ explored selling its 19.9% JPS stake despite 76% public opposition, with Mahfood arguing the government gains “no special rights or privileges” from ownership
• 2023: GOJ pushed expensive SMRs estimated to cost US$1–3 billion
• 2025: GOJ announces non-renewal of JPS license while maintaining ownership stake, directly contradicting Mahfood’s claim that ownership provides no leverage
• Pattern: The documented evidence suggests GOJ may alternate between divesting from and controlling JPS based on political convenience

The Accountability Vacuum: The GOJ failed to hold JPS accountable for US$234 million in anti-theft spending with worsening results, while providing no transparent reporting on where these massive funds went. Meanwhile, the government ignored cost-effective local solutions like Mr. McKenzie’s while embracing expensive foreign alternatives, raising questions about governance and elite capture.

The Systematic Pattern: Understanding the True Motives

Based on the available evidence, Jamaica’s energy sector dysfunction extends beyond mere incompetence to what may be systematic problems that potentially benefit specific interests. The 2025 JPS license non-renewal decision, when viewed against the pattern of overlooking cost-effective solutions while maintaining expensive failures, raises questions about whether motives may prioritize financial extraction over public welfare.

The Concerning Indicators:

Preference for Expensive Failure: Consistent overlooking of cost-effective solutions like Mr. McKenzie’s US$15–18 million (current cost) LED program while approving US$234 million in anti-theft spending that achieved no measurable results

Idea Appropriation Without Attribution: Systematic apparent misappropriation of local innovations for political credit while ensuring originators receive no recognition or compensation

Contradictory Policy Positions: GOJ alternating between divestment advocacy and ownership leverage based on political convenience rather than consistent principle

Opacity in Spending: No transparent accounting of where US$234 million in anti-theft investments actually went, despite worsening theft rates

Elite Benefit Protection: The documented pattern suggests maintaining systems that generate lucrative contracts and consulting opportunities for connected interests

This pattern of idea appropriation extends beyond the energy sector. In 2019, Mr. McKenzie proposed to the National Water Commission (NWC) a 35 MW Next Gen Solar Power Plant to power a 15 MGD Desalination Plant. On July 16, 2020, at 3:30 PM, international partners informed him that the NWC had issued an Expression of Interest (EOI) for a similar project, incorporating elements of his innovative 24/7 renewable energy solution without attribution (NWC, 2020).

The matter was reported to the relevant state authority, but no direct connection can be confirmed, with not long after, the primary point of contact reportedly leaving the NWC. This mirrors the energy sector’s pattern, where local innovators develop comprehensive solutions, present them to authorities, see them overlooked, and then watch as diluted versions appear in official proposals without credit or compensation.

The Institutional Capture: Why Mr. McKenzie’s Solutions Were Overlooked

The systematic bypass of Mr. McKenzie’s proposals reveals what the evidence suggests may be institutional capture serving vested interests rather than public welfare.

The Local Management Problem:

• Three successive JPS eStore managers overlooked Mr. McKenzie’s cost-effective solutions
• American CEO Kelly Tomblin was willing to hear proposals; local management consistently overlooked them
• Management turnover hasn’t brought innovation, suggesting cultural rather than individual problems
• The reported moral posturing (“rewarding thieves”) over practical problem-solving exemplifies this dysfunction

The Vested Interest Protection:

US$234 million in anti-theft spending creates lucrative contracts and consulting opportunities that effective solutions would eliminate. Complex, expensive approaches justify higher executive compensation and consultant fees, while simple, cost-effective solutions like Mr. McKenzie’s threaten established patronage networks at the expense of the Jamaican consumer.

Idea Appropriation in Energy Policy: The 2025 Validation

The vindication of Mr. McKenzie’s approach becomes undeniable when examining Paulwell’s May 2025 sectoral debate contribution, where he advocates for “provisions to facilitate a revolution in rooftop solar, with special licences to include feed-in tariff as incentives.” This aligns perfectly with Mr. McKenzie’s comprehensive renewable energy strategy, yet Paulwell presents these as original PNP innovations despite the party’s prior access to Mr. McKenzie’s detailed proposals through Paul Burke.

Paulwell’s Conversion to McKenzie’s Vision

Paulwell’s January 2025 promise to reduce electricity costs from “US$0.40 odd cent to US$0.15 per kilowatt hour” — a reduction of 62.5% — ironically validates Mr. McKenzie’s original projections of 50–70% theft reduction through LED deployment and microgrid implementation. However, Paulwell’s claim of current prices at US$0.40 per kWh exaggerates Jamaica’s 2025 electricity costs, which range from US$0.285–0.36 per kWh, suggesting political posturing to inflate the promised savings.

Most tellingly, Paulwell’s specific targeting of the same “200,000 homes” that “steal electricity” mirrors the exact demographic Mr. McKenzie identified for his LED distribution program. The Opposition spokesman’s calculation that eliminating theft would reduce bills “by almost 20 per cent” aligns with Mr. McKenzie’s technical analysis, yet presents this insight as original PNP policy.

The Critical Gap: Paulwell’s Incomplete Understanding

However, Paulwell’s 2025 strategy reveals a fundamental flaw that exposes the dangers of idea appropriation without proper understanding. While embracing Mr. McKenzie’s microgrid concept, Paulwell failed to address the LED/light bulb energy conservation component that forms the crucial foundation of Mr. McKenzie’s approach.

Mr. McKenzie’s two-stage approach was deliberately designed with free LED distribution preceding microgrid deployment because energy conservation must come first to reduce overall demand. Installing microgrids without prior consumption reduction requires larger, more expensive systems, while the LED stage creates behavioural change and community engagement essential for microgrid success.

Paulwell’s failure to include the LED component suggests either incomplete understanding of the technical requirements, or deliberate omission to avoid acknowledging Mr. McKenzie’s foundational contribution. Either way, implementing microgrids without significant energy conservation would represent exactly the type of expensive, inefficient approach that has characterized Jamaica’s energy sector dysfunction.

Energy Policy Opportunism: License Non-Renewal as a Tool for Favouritism

The US$1.055 billion NFE sale to Excelerate Energy (May 14, 2025) precedes the GOJ’s license non-renewal announcement, suggesting the ownership change may have altered the energy sector’s power dynamics. This shift could potentially enable new approaches to power purchase agreements while leaving JPS in a weaker negotiating position post-2027.

Suspicious Timing: Policy Convergences That Raise Questions About Jamaica’s Energy Future

The convergence of multiple GOJ policy initiatives between 2017–2025 reveals a pattern of timing that warrants investigation to determine whether these developments represent coincidental policy evolution or coordinated planning. The timeline of events — JPS divestment promotion, SMR negotiations, and strategic license non-renewal — creates circumstances that raise questions about transparency and public interest.

The Timeline of Concerning Coincidences (2017–2025)

The Divestment Promotion Period (2017–2022): From 2017–2022, GOJ actively promoted JPS share divestment as a “public opportunity,” with Prime Minister Holness promising it would “broaden the ownership base and increase the value of the light and power company.” Elite advocates like John Mahfood pushed divestment despite 76% public opposition, marketing it as democratizing ownership where “thousands of Jamaicans could own a piece of the JPS.” However, this promotion occurred during the same period when license renewal discussions would have been taking place internally — raising questions about whether potential investors had access to all material information about the company’s future operational status.

The Nuclear Development Period (2020–2023): In 2020, GOJ began SMR discussions (Vaz’s admission of “3 years” of discussions places the start at 2020), with the public SMR push emerging in 2023 featuring Michael Lee-Chin backing and IAEA consultations. The 2024 Canada MOU was signed without extensive public consultation. The nuclear planning period (2020–2023) overlapping with divestment promotion (2017–2022) creates questions about whether these initiatives were developed independently or as part of a broader energy sector restructuring plan.

The License Decision (2025): The July 1, 2025 license non-renewal announcement occurred after divestment promotion but before any actual sale, creating a decision that could significantly affect the value of promoted JPS shares. The GOJ maintains its 19.9% stake while using non-renewal as leverage, contradicting Mahfood’s 2022 claim that ownership provides “no special rights.”

Questions Raised by the Timeline

Information Transparency Concerns: The evidence raises questions about potential securities law implications, including whether the promotion of JPS shares as a public investment opportunity was conducted with full disclosure of material information about license renewal uncertainties, market liberalization plans, and ongoing discussions about alternative energy frameworks that could fundamentally alter Jamaica’s energy sector structure.

Timing Coincidences: The coordinated timing of these announcements creates questions about advance knowledge of license decisions, with elite advocates pushing divestment while connected to alternative energy investments. The strategic timing of announcements maximized government leverage while minimizing public awareness, potentially creating information asymmetry between government officials and the investing public.

The SMR-License Connection: The current JPS license structure restricts competitive generation, potentially limiting first rights of refusal for SMR deployment. License non-renewal would be necessary for preferential agreements with nuclear providers. This creates questions about motives: whether policy decisions were driven by technical considerations or by opportunities for connected interests to participate in energy sector restructuring.

Investigative Questions That Warrant Answers

The convergence of these policies within a narrow timeframe raises questions that deserve investigation: Was the promotion of JPS share divestment as a public opportunity conducted with full disclosure, or were there undisclosed factors that could have affected investor decisions?

The overlap between SMR discussions (2020–2023) and divestment promotion (2017–2022) suggests possible advance planning. If GOJ officials knew license renewal was unlikely or conditional, what information was available to potential investors about these discussions?

How do we explain the timing coincidences of Lee-Chin’s SMR advocacy and JLP support, Mahfood’s divestment push and business connections, nuclear MOU timing with license non-renewal announcement, and elite dismissal of overwhelming public opposition (76% against divestment)?

Why was the public encouraged to view JPS divestment as an opportunity while potentially lacking access to complete information about ongoing nuclear negotiations, license renewal uncertainties, alternative energy sector restructuring plans, and true costs of SMR implementation?

Potential Legal and Ethical Implications

These circumstances raise questions about potential regulatory violations, including: whether there was material misrepresentation or omission of facts, questions about disclosure obligations, whether investors could reasonably rely on public statements, and what financial harm might result from incomplete information.

The documented pattern of timing also raises questions about whether there was coordinated action between government officials and private interests, systematic policy development spanning multiple years, and whether actions consistently served stated public interests.

License Non-Renewal: A Tool for Procurement Evasion?

The 2025 JPS license non-renewal announcement raises questions about whether this may be less about reducing electricity costs, and more a strategic move to secure power purchase agreements (PPAs) for politically favoured entities. Jamaica’s Public Procurement Act (2015) mandates competitive bidding for adding or replacing grid capacity under the existing JPS license. However, the non-renewal threat may create leverage to renegotiate terms, potentially allowing the GOJ to designate preferred suppliers under less stringent oversight.

The 2013 Armorview-Tank Weld project, backed by Chris Bicknell and Musson Jamaica, raised concerns as its failed bid for a 360MW LNG power plant was approximately 4–6 cents per kWh higher than the competing bids, yet had support from politically connected figures. This history of politically connected energy deals, provides grounds to question whether license non-renewal could facilitate similar arrangements.

The Political Theatre:

• Vaz’s 2025 criticism of JPS, ignores GOJ’s role as 20% owner and regulator
• Both GOJ and JPS appear to benefit from higher capital expenditures passed to consumers
• The timing of license non-renewal coincides with election cycles rather than technical assessments
• The documented evidence suggests GOJ’s nuclear ambitions and divestment plans may serve political and private sector narratives rather than true energy security

Ramifications for Jamaica’s Energy Future

Economic Instability:

JPS’s “grave concern” warns of investment delays and price volatility, undermining affordability promises. The utility’s threat to reduce capital expenditures could worsen service quality, while regulatory uncertainty may drive up financing costs ultimately passed to consumers.

Public Trust Erosion:

Ignoring 76% public opposition to divestment and lacking transparency risks undermining public trust. The pattern of rejecting cost-effective local solutions like Mr. McKenzie’s while embracing expensive foreign alternatives reinforces perceptions of governance issues and elite capture.

Innovation Bottlenecks:

The systematic bypassing of local innovations creates a potentially hostile environment for entrepreneurship. Young Jamaican innovators witness how their ideas can be overlooked while their contributions receive no recognition, potentially creating a brain drain as talent seeks more supportive environments.

Political Favouritism:

The documented evidence suggests both GOJ and JPS may benefit from maintaining expensive, inefficient systems that justify higher spending and complex arrangements. The preference for politically connected solutions over technically superior alternatives threatens sector efficiency and consumer welfare.

The Path Forward: Breaking the Cycle

Immediate Reform Requirements:

1. Transparency and Accountability

• Conduct transparent consultations on JPS’s future, detailing investors and terms
• Publish detailed accounting of all US$234 million in anti-theft spending
• Establish independent oversight for energy deals to prevent favouritism
• Provide public recognition for innovators like Mr. McKenzie whose ideas were appropriated without compensation

2. Innovation Recognition and Support

• Investigate past scandals and innovative idea misappropriation, to deter misconduct and credit innovators
• Implement fast-track approval processes for cost-effective local solutions
• Establish innovation rewards for proven theft reduction technologies
• Create legal protections for intellectual property in energy sector proposals

3. Institutional Reform

• Address local management culture that overlooks or rejects cost-effective solutions
• Separate GOJ’s ownership, regulatory, and policy roles to eliminate conflicts of interest
• Implement performance-based compensation linked to measurable theft reduction
• Establish independent innovation evaluation processes aided by artificial intelligence (AI)

4. Immediate Implementation

• Deploy Mr. McKenzie’s LED solution as a pilot program with proper attribution
• Test microgrid technology in select communities under Mr. McKenzie’s guidance
• Measure and publish results transparently

Conclusion

Based on the documented evidence and analysis presented, Jamaica’s energy sector crisis reflects what may be systemic dysfunction, where GOJ and JPS appear to prioritize political and financial interests over public welfare. The documented rejection of Mr. Rodger McKenzie’s 2015–2016 LED (current price US$15–18 million) and microgrid plan, which projected a 50–70% reduction in electricity theft, while spending US$234 million with less than 14% reduction, raises questions about whether there may be institutional capture by elites who could potentially benefit from costly failures.

This has cost Jamaica an estimated US$1.2–1.6 billion in potential savings (2016–2024), with ongoing annual losses of US$200–258.9 million (2021–2023). The GOJ’s contradictory policies — pursuing divestment, nuclear options, and license non-renewal — raise questions about whether energy policy decisions prioritize political considerations over technical merit, exemplified by Mahfood’s 2022 claim of no ownership leverage, contradicted by its 2025 use against JPS.

Paulwell’s 2025 strategy, mirroring Mr. McKenzie’s uncredited proposals, highlights a documented pattern of apparent idea appropriation that may discourage innovation while maintaining expensive dysfunction. Without reforms crediting innovators, prioritizing cost-effective solutions, and ensuring transparency, Jamaica risks continued economic instability, environmental harm, and eroded public trust.

The bipartisan convergence on solutions originally proposed by Mr. McKenzie demonstrates the technical validity of his comprehensive approach, yet this convergence occurs without acknowledgment, reinforcing the systemic pattern of apparent idea appropriation that holds Jamaica’s energy future hostage to political and elite interests.

The patterns identified in this analysis warrant further investigation by appropriate authorities to determine the full scope of these issues and their implications for Jamaica’s energy future.

About Mr. Rodger McKenzie

Mr. Rodger McKenzie is the founder, CEO & CTO of TrueSPAC Energy. He holds a BA in Economics from California State University, Hayward. McKenzie is also the inventor of the Next Generation Renewable Energy (Gen3REN) power plant, which competes with nuclear SMR and fossil fuel power plants. He is a Software/DeFi/Blockchain Architect and an Ecosystem Analyst. His achievements include being a 2020 Top 6 Finalist at the IDB Caribbean Pivot Moonshot Event and being shortlisted in 2014 and 2018 MSET/NCST Innovation Awards in the energy category. His recent professional speaking engagement took place at the 31st National Science and Technology Conference, hosted by Jamaica’s Scientific Research Council.

Investment Disclaimer

This article is not intended as investment advice. The analysis of JPS divestment and share values is presented to highlight potential negative impacts on shareholders and questions about information disclosure, not as commentary on investment decisions. The examination of policy decisions and their potential market impacts is presented for public interest analysis only and should not be construed as investment advice or recommendations. Potential investors should conduct their own research and consult financial advisors.