The Normative Foundation (Full Text)

Author’s Note: This is the complete English translation of The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse. That essay, in turn, is based on my original work, A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism. This series is intended for a global audience. While every effort has been made to convey the original meaning accurately, some nuances may be lost in translation. The complete, original Japanese text is available for reference at the link below. 👉 **[Read the original in Japanese]**

The following essay consists of four chapters and approximately 10,000 words. The main themes of each chapter are as follows: Part 1: Normative Propositions Part 2: “The Special” and “The Boundary” Part 3: Classical Marxism Part 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones (The above links lead to the English articles, divided by chapter.)

The supplementary note (in Japanese) that follows this essay appears as a separate article. Please refer to the link below. 👉 **[The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse【Supplement】]**

The validity and originality of the arguments presented in this essay and its supplement have been analyzed with Gemini 3.0 Pro. For a detailed report of the results, please refer to the links below: 👉 **[Analysis Results for the Essay (English Version)] 👉 [[Analysis Results for the Essay and Supplement (Japanese Version)]](https://gemini.google.com/share/1ae3f1c4ee28)**

The original Japanese text was published on the publishing platform “note” on July 3, 2025. 👉 **[Read the Japanese original as first published]**

Many of the propositions we unconsciously accept in our daily thought and discussions often conceal “norms” that lack decisive justification. This paper focuses on such “normative propositions,” carefully examining their nature, as well as their underlying basis and actual content. As the analysis unfolds, it will be clarified that the central propositions of Dialectical Materialism — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are, in reality, nothing other than “Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones.” Building upon this point, I will demonstrate that Dialectical Materialism cannot possess decisive justification, and therefore, the theory of class struggle — which constitutes the core of Classical Marxism — cannot hold, for it loses its foundation. Furthermore, I will examine the influence of such “Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones” on our thought and conceptual frameworks, and ultimately, explore what can truly serve as the “foundation” of social norms.

A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism

In this essay, we explore the nature of normative propositions and examine how they influence our thought and conceptual frameworks, with reference to classical Marxism as a concrete case.

Chapter 1: Normative Propositions

In this chapter, we begin by considering what constitutes a normative proposition.

§1.1

Let us begin by examining expressions such as “ought not to ~.”

Sentences that express norms — such as “one ought not to ~” or “one should ~” — and their standards are called “normative propositions” (they involve value judgments, such as good/bad or right/wrong). Normative propositions are also referred to as deontic propositions. Examples of normative propositions:

・“One ought not to kill.”

・“Democracy is a system that ought to be protected.”

・“The environment should be valued.”

In contrast, sentences that merely describe actual facts or states of affairs are called “factual propositions” (they do not involve value judgments). Factual propositions are also referred to as descriptive propositions or existential propositions. Examples of factual propositions:

・“Water boils at 100°C under standard atmospheric pressure.”

・“Japan adopts a parliamentary democracy.”

・“Forest conservation is effective for mitigating global warming.”

Natural laws, when expressed as factual propositions, are by nature not subject to deviation; we cannot act against them in the first place. On the other hand, normative propositions — such as “ought not to ~” — have the characteristic of permitting the action in principle (“one could do it if one tried”), yet declaring it impermissible (“but one ought not to do it”). This marks the decisive distinction between natural laws and normative propositions.

For further discussion on normative and factual propositions, Hume’s Law — also known as the is-ought problem (David Hume) — is a useful reference. The is-ought problem addresses the principle that “one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’,” in other words, that value (ought) cannot be derived from fact (is).

§1.2

Let us now clarify the following points for the discussions to follow.

The definitions of key terms used in this essay are as follows:

・Exist: To be regarded as “there” in some form, including within concepts or imagination.

・Actually exist: To be regarded as “there” with form or properties in the real world.

・Subjective: A state based on personal perspective or feeling.

・Objective: A state of seeing things fairly, or as appearing the same to anyone.

・Universal: Applicable broadly across all places and times.

・Relative: Subject to change in meaning or value depending on situation or standpoint.

・Absolute: Unchangingly valid regardless of any situation or exception.

・Transcendent: That which goes beyond the limits of experience or understanding.

・Transcendent being: An absolute entity that transcends the limits of experience or understanding.

In this essay, we take a neutral stance regarding a “transcendent beings like gods,” on the grounds that, precisely because it is transcendent, it cannot be affirmatively asserted nor denied.

The reason for establishing these definitions here is that this essay analyzes how normative propositions can be clarified — and what may be derived from them — without presupposing the existence of a transcendent beings like gods.

§1.3

As a concrete example, let us examine a representative normative proposition: “One ought not to kill a human being.”

As soon as we begin to reflect on this, several questions naturally arise:

・Where does “a human being” begin and end? Does it begin from the moment of fertilization, or only after several weeks have passed? When considering cells within tissue just removed from a living body, or cells still alive in various organs at the time of a doctor’s declaration of death, how far should we go in treating them as part of “a human being”?

・Even though “to kill” seems straightforward, should it include not only causing physical death, but also brain death or cerebral physiological death? And how should we distinguish between cases of intentional killing and those where death results from negligence?

・Furthermore, if “to kill” is interpreted as “to take life,” then the discussion expands beyond the category of “human beings” to life itself. It would then extend to questions regarding the relationship between humans and non-human organisms, the food chain within ecosystems, and ultimately to the very definition of life.

In short, we find that making this proposition more precise requires an enormous number of supplementary concepts.

§1.4

Next, let us consider what it would mean for a normative proposition — such as “one ought not to ~” — to physically exist.

Is it conceivable that such normative propositions have physically existed, like natural laws, since the very beginning of the universe, as principles forming part of its structure?

Here, physical existence refers to that which exists within space and time, and which can be confirmed through sensory perception or scientific observation.

In light of the discussion in §1.3 regarding the normative proposition “One ought not to kill a human being,” the following point can be made:

If we do not presuppose transcendent beings like gods, then it is difficult — even impossible — to justify the claim that an enormous number of concepts like normative propositions could have physically existed, as structural principles of the universe, from its very beginning — at a time when not even genetic material existed.

The reason is that normative propositions can only be expressed as “something like sentences” — that is, as sequences of signs representing concepts, arranged according to a system of language.

If such entities were to actually exist, it would be difficult to find a rational explanation other than to assume that they were brought into being by a transcendent entity — one capable of having intentions and of acting.

Normative propositions — because they have the characteristic of permitting the action in principle (“one could do it if one tried”), yet declaring it impermissible (“but one ought not to do it”) — are difficult to situate within any logically coherent framework of observation or proof that would support the claim that they physically exist.

That said, the fact that such an explanation is difficult at present does not preclude the possibility that it may become feasible in the future.

The above considerations apply not only to propositions such as “one ought not to ~” or “one must ~,” but also to all normative propositions, including those such as “one should ~,” “one needs to ~,” or “it is desirable that ~.”

Accordingly, in this essay, the term normative proposition is used in a broad sense — not limited to morality or ethics, but also encompassing propositions related to law, politics, culture, custom, and even aesthetics or practical utility.

In light of the foregoing, the following conclusion may be drawn:

If we do not presuppose transcendent beings like gods, then no universally and absolutely valid basis has been identified that would justify the conclusion that all normative propositions have physically existed — since the beginning of the universe — as principles constituting part of its structure.

§1.5

Let us now examine the existence of morality as it is embedded within normative propositions. There are broadly two positions regarding whether morality truly exists:

・Moral realism: The position that moral facts do exist, and that they exist independently of the human mind or culture.

・Moral anti-realism: The position that moral facts do not exist, and are merely expressions or reactions that depend on the human mind or cultural context.

§1.5.1

In moral realism, moral propositions (e.g., “Murder is wrong,” “Kindness is good”) are not regarded as mere personal feelings or social norms, but are considered to be objectively either right or wrong. Furthermore, moral realism does not necessarily presuppose transcendent beings like gods; rather, it maintains that moral facts can exist independently.

However, the term existence as used here refers to the idea that moral facts are objective and universal — not that they physically exist in the sense discussed in §1.4.

The main types of moral realism include the following:

・Naturalistic moral realism: The view that moral facts are grounded in natural properties, such as pleasure, desire, or evolution.

・Non-naturalistic moral realism: The view that moral facts are based on special properties distinct from those found in nature.

Nevertheless, no version of moral realism has succeeded in definitively proving that moral facts actually exist.

As with the considerations in §1.4, we are again compelled to conclude that asserting the existence of such facts faces the same fundamental difficulty: it is extremely hard even to propose a coherent foundation for such a claim.

§1.5.2

On the other hand, in moral anti-realism, moral propositions (e.g., “Murder is wrong,” “Kindness is good”) are not considered to be objectively right or wrong, but rather are seen as mere expressions of individual emotions or attitudes, or as reflections of social and cultural conventions.

Major positions classified under moral anti-realism include the following:

・Error theory: The view that moral facts do not exist, and that all moral claims are therefore false.

・Expressivism: The view that moral claims are not factual but rather expressions of feelings or attitudes.

・Relativism: The view that moral rightness varies between individuals or cultures, and that there are no universal standards.

However, none of the positions within moral anti-realism have succeeded in definitively proving their claims.

Relativism, in particular, may appear at first glance to be close to the stance taken in this essay. However, the assertion that there is no universal standard must, conversely, entirely negate the possibility of any such standard — an undertaking that must be acknowledged as extremely difficult.

While this essay does not deny the possibility that, in the future, either moral realism or moral anti-realism may be shown to be provable, the following analysis proceeds solely on the basis of the conclusion drawn in §1.4.

§1.6

Next, let us consider social norms.

Social norms are rules that have been formed and maintained through power structures, religion, culture, and interpersonal relationships — rules that were necessary for humans to live stably in groups. They vary across time and region and are subject to constant change.

However, in light of the conclusion drawn in §1.4 and the discussions reviewed in §1.5, social norms cannot be regarded as having any universally and absolutely valid basis.

At the same time, it is evident that the process through which social norms incorporate individual hopes within a group, coordinate them, and evolve through consensus is of critical importance in maintaining social order.

While this essay acknowledges that fact, it proceeds on the premise that social norms themselves do not possess a universally and absolutely valid basis, and are instead to be treated as relative constructs in the analysis that follows.

Chapter 2: “The Special” and “The Boundary”

In this chapter, based on the examination of “normative propositions” in Chapter 1, we will explore the concepts of “The Special” and “The Boundary.”

§2.1

We begin by examining the concept of “The Special.”

When we consider something to be special, we may, at times, merely be stating a factual proposition — that it is different from others. However, if there also arises a sense that it ought to be treated as “The Special,” then we can say that some kind of normative proposition is present.

In such contexts, building on the conclusion reached in §1.4, the following argument becomes possible:

If we do not assume the existence of transcendent beings like gods, then it is not predetermined that something ought to be treated as The Special, prior to our thinking.

Here, something may refer to any object or concept, such as norms, beings, values, standards, states, relations, or classifications.

This is because, without presupposing transcendent beings like gods, no normative proposition can be regarded as having a universally and absolutely valid basis that would allow us to conclude that such propositions have physically existed since the origin of the universe and form a principle embedded in its structure.

In other words, in that case, the normative proposition that something ought to be treated as The Special cannot be regarded as having a universally and absolutely valid basis. Therefore, it cannot be said that such a thing has been predetermined to be treated as The Special.

When we consider why this sense — that something ought to be treated as The Special — arises, we can point out that it emerges as a result of that object being given a certain kind of “positioning” within a society or an individual consciousness.

This positioning can be roughly categorized into the following three origins:

・Positioning based on ethical value: Arising from perspectives that emphasize universal values such as fairness, humanitarianism, or dignity within society.

・Positioning based on practical utility: Arising from perspectives that emphasize benefit, efficiency, or contribution to development for a society or group.

・Positioning based on sensory or emotional value: Arising from subjective standards such as personal emotions, aesthetic sensibilities, or personal significance.

From the above analysis, we can see that each origin is based on some kind of necessity, and from that arises a consciousness that assigns a particular positioning, such as: “It ought to be this way,” “Doing so will lead to desirable results,” or “In order to be fulfilled, one must act in this way.”

Therefore, since such positioning is inseparable from the awareness that something ought to be treated as The Special, we can say that positioning is itself the awareness that something ought to be treated as The Special.

In other words, it is through some form of necessity that positioning arises — that is, the awareness that something ought to be treated as The Special.

Based on the above, we can rephrase the idea as follows:

When we believe that something ought to be treated as The Special, there exists some kind of normative proposition grounded in necessity.

Concrete examples: ・Fundamental human rights

・The value of gemstones

・The golden ratio (1:1.618…)

・The moon and the sun, as well as the relationship between them

With regard to the moon and the sun, not only has each played a critically important role in the emergence and evolution of life on Earth, but their relationship has also been interpreted and referenced in various ways — as something special — for example, as symbols of “yin and yang.”

However, based on the conclusion of §1.4, it was not predetermined — prior to our thinking — that these things ought to be treated as The Special.

§2.2

Building on the considerations in §2.1, we can now develop the following argument concerning the concept of “The Boundary.”

If we do not presuppose the existence of transcendent beings like gods, then no Boundary — as if predetermined — exists in this world prior to our thinking.

This is because no standard used to define such a boundary has been determined to ought to be treated as The Special.

In other words, it is only when a standard is established through some kind of normative proposition that we begin to conceive of a Boundary as “existing” there.

Taking the above into account, we can rephrase the idea as follows:

When we think that there is a Boundary at a certain point, there exists some kind of normative proposition grounded in necessity.

This world contains phenomena that must be analyzed in terms of vectors or tensors — as continuous entities — such as fluid flows like wind or physical fields. At the same time, it also contains discontinuous phenomena that take on discrete values, such as quantum energy levels or the spin of elementary particles.

Even in such discontinuous phenomena, it is ultimately we who determine where the Boundary lies.

Furthermore, the term “this world,” as used here, includes not only all physical objects but also even abstract concepts.

Originally, there are no Boundaries between concepts. However, when we express them in language, we impose Boundaries between them for the sake of convenience — driven by a necessity to distinguish one concept from another.

Therefore, in thinking as it unfolds from such concepts, Boundaries, too, do not originally exist.

Concrete examples: ・National borders

・The boundary between a child and an adult

・The boundary between the colors that make up a rainbow

・The boundary between oneself and the world

As for the boundary between oneself and the world, we usually take it for granted — unconsciously assuming that it simply exists. However, when asked precisely what standard determines where this boundary lies, we come to realize that no such standard has been determined to ought to be treated as The Special.

This fact is of great importance: There exists no Boundary — as if predetermined — between oneself and the world prior to our thinking.

Chapter 3: Classical Marxism

In this chapter, based on the discussion of normative propositions as well as the concepts of “The Special” and“The Boundary” in Chapters 1 and 2, I will examine “Classical Marxism” and its core theoretical foundations: “Dialectical Materialism” and “Historical Materialism.”

The reason for focusing on Classical Marxism is that it continues to exert a certain degree of influence even today.

§3.1

To begin, let us review Classical Marxism, focusing on the points relevant to the present discussion.

Classical Marxism is a social theory developed in the 19th century by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. It analyzes society and history primarily from an economic perspective and is grounded in a historical view that sees society as inevitably progressing toward socialism — and ultimately communism — through the internal contradictions of capitalism.

At the core of this theory lies “class struggle,” and especially in capitalist society, the conflict between the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat) is regarded as unavoidable. It is held that through this struggle, the capitalist system must be overthrown and the “proletarian revolution” must be achieved.

Classical Marxism also regards itself as a form of “scientific socialism” that seeks to understand the world in an empirical and rational manner. As a universal and fundamental theory for that purpose, it adopts “Dialectical Materialism (DM).”

According to this theory, in nature, society, and thought alike, contradictions and conflicts inherent within things are considered to be the universal and fundamental driving forces that inevitably lead to change and development. Therefore, the relations of contradiction and conflict are treated as The Special and are especially emphasized.

The application of this Dialectical Materialism to the analysis of society and history is known as “Historical Materialism (HM).” In this theory, class struggle is understood as the concrete manifestation of contradictions and conflicts within society. It is regarded as the driving force of history, and also as a historically inevitable phenomenon.

Political institutions (such as the state, government, and courts), legal systems (statutory law and customary law), ideologies (such as religion, ethics, and education), and culture (such as traditions and social customs) are categorized as the “superstructure.” These are said to be determined by the “base,” namely, the productive forces and the relations of production. Legal systems, religion, ethics, education, and social customs constitute social norms, and therefore social norms are included within the superstructure. The superstructure is believed to function to legitimize the domination of the ruling class; however, such legitimacy is not absolute, but rather relative, subject to change depending on historical conditions.

It should also be noted that Classical Marxism adopts an atheistic stance. As symbolized by Marx’s statement that “religion is the opium of the people,” it rejects religion and transcendent beings like gods, and critically regards them as means of escapism from reality.

§3.2

First, Classical Marxism, by taking the position of “rejecting religion and transcendent beings like gods,” entails the following propositions within its theoretical framework:

・According to the conclusion of §1.4, no normative proposition can possess a decisive (i.e., universally and absolutely valid) basis.

・According to the argument in §2.1, prior to our thinking, it is not determined that something ought to be treated as “The Special.”

・According to the argument in §2.2, no “Boundary” exists as if it had been predetermined prior to our thinking.

Furthermore, with regard to social norms, it is understood that Classical Marxism takes the same stance as this essay — namely, that such norms are not absolute but relative.

§3.3

For the purpose of the following analysis, we will clarify the concepts employed in DM (Dialectical Materialism) and HM (Historical Materialism).

Intrinsic and necessary elements: These refer to factors that are fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, where internal contradictions and conflicts are considered to be the driving force of development, causing change in a law-governed and inevitable manner. According to Engels, the totality of contingencies ultimately converges in the direction of necessity. Concrete examples include:

・class struggle

・contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production

・exploitation structure

External and contingent elements: These refer to factors that are not fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history. The timing and content of their emergence are unpredictable; although they influence the direction of change and development, they are not regarded as law-governed or necessary driving forces. According to Engels, even if such events seem important in isolation, they are subordinated to the overall structure. Concrete examples include:

・natural disasters

・the emergence or death of great individuals

・the accidental outbreak of war

・the sudden invention of technology

What is important here is the distinction that, while “intrinsic and necessary elements” are said to be fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, “external and contingent elements” are considered to be subordinated to that structure.

Furthermore, Engels refers to relationships other than contradictions and conflicts in capitalist society, such as the following:

・Mutual interdependence: Relationships such as between labor and capital, or between city and countryside, involve not only conflict but also mutual dependency.

・Functional interrelation: Institutions such as the state and the family function as parts of the whole, in connection with the economic base.

・Provisional coordination: Limited cooperation may arise, such as through labor negotiations or temporary reforms.

・Relationship with nature: Nature is both an object of exploitation and a being that interacts reciprocally with humanity.

§3.3.1

To begin our analysis of DM, we first introduce a simplified model. This model is based on the propositions derived in §3.2.

Let us consider a set [X] (composed of nature, society, thought, etc.) prior to the imposition of any boundaries. This state can be described as one in which boundaries can be freely drawn anywhere. Now, suppose we introduce a certain criterion [a] and [non-a] to observe [X]. The elements comprising [X] will then be classified into subsets such as [A], [non-A], and [others], according to the boundary determined by [a] and [non-a].

Even though the criterion itself is conceptual in nature, and thus the subsets [A], [non-A], and [others] may form a continuum without any clear boundaries, this does not change the situation.

It is easy to imagine that if we apply the same criterion [a] and [non-a] to other sets — say, [Y] or [Z] — we would obtain similar subsets [A], [non-A], and [others], just as we did for [X].

Now, if one were to claim that the criterion [a] and [non-a], or the resulting subsets [A] and [non-A], ought to be treated as “The Special,” such a claim would undeniably be a normative proposition and therefore cannot possess a decisive basis. Consequently, the claim that they ought to be treated as “The Special” cannot be justified. Therefore, the subset [others] stands on equal footing with the subsets [A] and [non-A]; and likewise, any observation based on a different criterion — say, [b] or [c] — stands on equal footing with the observation based on [a] and [non-a].

Based on the above, the following points can be noted:

・In the act of observation, the moment we choose a criterion, it already becomes possible to generate any boundary or set. Therefore, no criterion, boundary, or set can be regarded as absolute.

・If the criterion [a] and [non-a] is “emphasized” as “The Special,” then applying it to observe other sets such as [Y] or [Z] and obtaining subsets similar to [A] and [non-A] (as in the case of [X]) may lead to the judgment that “because the criterion is ‘The Special,’ similar results will be obtained no matter what is observed.” This, in turn, may result in the “presumption” that all objects of observation must fit into the [A] and [non-A] classification.

・By emphasizing the criterion [a] and [non-a] as “The Special,” the resulting subsets [A] and [non-A] may also come to be emphasized, while other subsets such as [others] or the results of observations using different criteria (such as [b] or [c]) risk being “de-emphasized.”

§3.3.2

When the model from §3.3.1 is applied to DM, it yields the following interpretation — for example, if the set [X] is taken to represent “society”:

The criterion [a] and [non-a] corresponds to “what stands in a relationship of contradictions and conflicts with the other side.” The subsets [A] and [non-A] represent “pairings that stand in such a relationship” — in a capitalist society, this would correspond to the capitalist class and the working class. The conflict between these classes — namely, class struggle — is treated as an Intrinsic and necessary element.

The subset [others] includes External and contingent elements, while the sets [Y] and [Z] correspond to domains such as “nature” and “thought.” The criteria [b] and [c] refer to relationships such as “mutual interdependence” and “provisional coordination.”

DM claims to have “discovered” that contradictions and conflicts are the universal and fundamental driving force behind change and development across the realms of nature, society, and thought. It therefore places “emphasis” on this relationship as “The Special.” Accordingly, the assertion that such contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” constitutes the central propositions of DM and HM.

However, although DM describes this as a “discovery,” the fact remains that one is free to choose any observational criterion and thereby free to generate subsets. For that reason, the relationship of contradictions and conflicts — which is claimed to have been discovered — cannot be regarded as absolute in its status as a subset. In other words, relationships of contradictions and conflicts are, in principle, on equal footing with other subsets and with the results of observations made using different criteria.

As a result of such a discovery, there arises the possibility of forming a “presumption” that contradictions and conflicts are what drive change and development in various parts of the object of observation. In other words, even in cases where phenomena arise through the operation of complex laws, there is a risk of forcibly interpreting and explaining them in terms of contradictions and conflicts.

In fact, DM presents various examples in which contradictions and conflicts are said to drive change and development. However, some of these examples employ other natural laws to explain the mechanisms involved — for instance, “the boiling of water” or “the growth of plants.” Such examples can only be regarded as “presumptions,” because in reality, the concept of contradictions and conflicts alone is insufficient to fully explain their mechanisms.

Furthermore, as a result of the emphasis on contradictions and conflicts — that is, on intrinsic and necessary elements — as “The Special,” there is a risk of a “de-emphasis” on the observation of external and contingent elements, as well as on other kinds of relations (such as mutual interdependence or provisional coordination). And indeed, while detailed analyses have been conducted regarding contradictions and conflicts, no such equally refined analyses have been applied to other elements or relationships. Thus, contradictions and conflicts were not regarded as “The Special” only after thorough comparative analysis with other elements and relations. This constitutes nothing but de-emphasis, and to the extent that these other aspects are neglected, our empirical and rational understanding of the world is diminished, and any theory derived from such a framework loses its universality.

What is crucial here is that while “presumptions” and de-emphasis can be derived from a discovery, a discovery can also be derived from “presumptions” and de-emphasis. In other words, when “presumptions” are made in every context — leading to the conclusion that contradictions and conflicts are present everywhere — or when there is a de-emphasis of other elements and relationships, it then becomes possible to claim the “discovery” that contradictions and conflicts are the universal and fundamental driving force.

§3.3.3

But what does the very expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” actually mean? In §2.1, the concept of special was examined, but is this expression — “contradictions and conflicts as ‘The Special’” — a factual proposition, or a normative one?

To clarify this question, let us begin by considering the following claim, hypothetically made from the standpoint of Classical Marxism:

“The expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as ‘The Special’ was used simply because they were exceptionally effective — compared to other elements — as a driving force that leads to change and development; it is no more than a factual proposition.”

In other words, the claim is: “The expression contradictions and conflicts are ‘The Special’ is a factual proposition.”

However, in that case, the very theory that regards class struggle as a historically necessary phenomenon would no longer hold.

This is because, if the claim is a factual proposition, then contradictions and conflicts in the dynamics of class struggle — that is, “intrinsic and necessary elements” — would be treated on the same footing as “external and contingent elements,” without receiving any special status. Therefore, no matter how effective contradictions and conflicts may be as driving forces, as long as they are regarded as necessary elements, the influence of contingent elements would render the outcome no longer necessary.

Therefore, history can no longer be regarded as a historically inevitable phenomenon with a certain directionality; instead, it can only be seen as an unpredictable accumulation of mere contingencies. In such a case, no justification can be provided for the claim that class struggle is historically inevitable, and the theory fails to hold. In other words, this factual proposition — which is supposed to provide a theoretical foundation for class struggle — ends up undermining the very theory it is meant to support. This is a logical inconsistency, a complete reversal of ends and means.

Accordingly, the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” cannot be accepted as a factual proposition.

§3.3.4

As clarified in the previous section (§3.3.3), when this expression is assumed to be a factual proposition, it results in a logical inconsistency. An analysis of why such an inconsistency arises reveals that this expression implicitly contains the following normative proposition.

As stated in §3.3, DM/HM hold that intrinsic and necessary elements are fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, whereas external and contingent elements are subordinated to that structure. However, the term “subordinated” in this context clearly implies a form of “positioning.” That is, the intrinsic and necessary elements are “positioned” relatively higher, while the external and contingent elements are “positioned” lower — as those which are “subordinated.” Such “positioning” is, as explained in §2.1, inseparable from the awareness that something ought to be treated as “The Special”; in other words, the “positioning” itself is unmistakably a normative proposition.

Although it is phrased as if it were a factual proposition, the act of “positioning” certain elements as “subordinated” and thereby engaging in their “de-emphasis” is based on a subjective value judgment. This judgment presupposes the normative proposition that such positioning is “desirable.” If one denies that such “positioning” is “desirable,” then there would be no necessity to deliberately position those elements in such a manner in the first place.

As a result, only the bare factual proposition — that such elements merely exist — remains. And this, once again, leads us to the same conclusion as reached in the previous section (§3.3.3).

As clarified in the analysis of §3.3.3, a mere magnitude difference between “Intrinsic and necessary elements” and “External and contingent elements” is insufficient to justify the claim that the former holds decisive superiority over the latter in the development of history. However, by introducing the concept of the “structure” of society and history, one can assert such superiority by “positioning” the two within the framework of “structure” as a hierarchical (“upper” and “lower”) relationship. This claim, however, is — needless to say — only established by way of such “positioning” as a normative proposition.

Therefore, in response to the question raised at the beginning of §3.3.3, it can be pointed out that when DM/HM expresses contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” what is implied is precisely this kind of “positioning” as a normative proposition.

What is crucial here is that the “positioning” is carried out through the “de-emphasis” of the “External and contingent elements” as that which is subordinated. This is semantically analogous to what was described in §3.3.2 — that a “discovery” may arise from a process of “presumption” or “de-emphasis.” In other words, this very act of “positioning” is itself an act of placing the “Intrinsic and necessary elements” — namely, contradictions and conflicts — relatively higher than the “External and contingent elements.” It is thus evident that the “discovery” of contradictions and conflicts and their treatment as “The Special” is closely related to this hierarchical “positioning.” Therefore, it becomes clear that this act of “positioning” and the act of “discovery” are mutually reinforcing.

As also discussed in §3.3, Engels stated that “the totality of contingencies ultimately converges in the direction of necessity.” Put simply, this means that he understood necessity as encompassing contingency. However, in the end, this merely constitutes a “redefinition” of the terms — shifting the “boundary” between the concepts so as to expand the scope of necessity and absorb contingency within it. Nonetheless, no matter how one attempts to “redefine” necessity and contingency, contingent elements never diminish, nor do they ever disappear.

What must be emphasized here — as already discussed in §2.2 and §3.3.1 — is the following point: no matter where one draws The Boundary between concepts, there is, in fact, no inherent boundary there to begin with. If one claims that some boundary “ought to be” drawn at a particular location, then that claim is unmistakably a normative proposition.

Also significant here is the fact that the notion of necessity encompassing contingency is semantically analogous to the “positioning” of Intrinsic and necessary elements and External and contingent elements in a hierarchical (“upper” and “lower”) relationship. Accordingly, it becomes evident that this “positioning” and “redefinition” are mutually reinforcing.

What becomes evident from the above analysis is that the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” despite implying a normative proposition as described above, was treated as if it were a factual proposition. As a result, its normative significance was nullified, thereby rendering it incapable of serving as a theoretical foundation for class struggle, and ultimately leading to a logical inconsistency.

What becomes evident from the above analysis is that, although the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” actually implies a normative proposition as described above, it was, in the previous section, assumed to be a factual proposition.As a result, its normative significance was nullified, thereby rendering it incapable of serving as a theoretical foundation for class struggle, and ultimately leading to a logical inconsistency.

Therefore, it has become clear that the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but a normative one.

§3.3.5

Therefore, from the considerations in §3.3.3 to §3.3.4, the following conclusion can be drawn:

The proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but rather a normative one that treats them as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

In other words, the central propositions of DM/HM, while taking the form of factual propositions, are in substance normative propositions.

Accordingly, all propositions derived from the premise that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” inevitably possess a normative character. Needless to say, the theory of class struggle is premised upon the normative proposition that treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special.” As a result, this normative character extends throughout the entire framework of DM/HM.

However, as discussed in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Therefore, neither the proposition that treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” nor any propositions derived from it possess decisive justification.

Based on the above considerations, the following conclusion can be drawn:

The theory that class struggle is a historically inevitable phenomenon cannot hold, for it loses its foundation.

The next question that arises here is: from what kind of “necessity” does this normative proposition originate? Judging from the fact that contradictions and conflicts are cited as the theoretical basis of class struggle, this “necessity” can only be understood as the necessity of justifying the theory of class struggle.

In light of the above, the following view may further be derived:

It is reasonable to assume that the reason DM/HM regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is for the purpose of justifying the theory of class struggle.

§3.3.6

Here, let us revisit the notions of “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” discussed in §3.3.1–§3.3.2.

As stated in the previous section (§3.3.5), the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but rather a normative one that treats them as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

Accordingly, when one observes a given object, contradictions and conflicts are used as criteria that “ought to be treated as The special,” and on that basis, the observed object is classified by boundaries defined through such criteria. As a result, “pairings that stand in such a relationship” of contradictions and conflicts are discovered. Moreover, when another object is observed — again using contradictions and conflicts as the criterion — it is only natural, given the underlying principle, that similar “pairings that stand in such a relationship” are discovered. However, as contradictions and conflicts are given “emphasis” as criteria that “ought to be treated as The special,” other criteria — and the observational results derived from them — are subjected to “de-emphasis” and thus neglected. Based on the above kind of observation, DM asserts the universality of contradictions and conflicts, claiming that “whatever one observes, similar results are obtained precisely because the criterion is ‘The Special.’” However, this merely means that “similar results are obtained whatever one observes because that criterion has been treated as ‘The Special.’” This is because the criterion of contradictions and conflicts, and all other criteria, are originally on equal footing — and so are all possible outcomes of observation. In other words, to assert that only contradictions and conflicts are “universal” inevitably presupposes the normative proposition that contradictions and conflicts are “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

Moreover, even when observing phenomena that are already directly and thoroughly explained by other laws, the underlying assumption that contradictions and conflicts are a universal driving force that “ought to be treated as The special” leads to forcing those phenomena into a framework of contradictions and conflicts. However, in order for contradictions and conflicts to serve as a universal driving force that “ought to be treated as The special,” they cannot be placed on equal footing with those other laws. Thus, one is compelled to interpret them as something operating as a driving force on a more fundamental level. Nonetheless, this amounts merely to an interpretation added on top of the explanation already provided by other laws. Therefore, it is impossible to fully explain the phenomenon by contradictions and conflicts alone. Even if there are laws that can directly and thoroughly explain the phenomenon, that alone does not justify deeming them fundamental. This is because doing so is nothing other than an act of “positioning” them at the fundamental level. In other words, if one still attempts a “positioning” of contradictions and conflicts as something operating at the fundamental level, then — as clearly shown in the discussion in §3.3.4 — there is no alternative but to presuppose a normative proposition.

What becomes clear from the above is that the claims that only contradictions and conflicts are “universal,” and that they are also fundamental, cannot stand unless a normative proposition is presupposed. That is, both “discovery” and “presumption” are established only when a normative proposition is assumed. Considering that “de-emphasis” is also the result of the “emphasis” based on the normative proposition that contradictions and conflicts ought to be treated as “The Special,” it becomes clear that a normative proposition is latent even in that “de-emphasis.” Therefore, it has been revealed that “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” all presuppose a normative proposition.

What is crucial here is that “discovery” is derived from “presumption” and “de-emphasis.” Thus, as stated in §3.3.2, it has become clear that “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” mutually lead to one another.

These actions, regardless of intent, are indeed being carried out in such a manner in reality. In other words, it can be said that these actions are rather compelled by the “pressure” of a normative proposition — namely, the claim that contradictions and conflicts ought to be treated as “The Special.”

However, as has already been stated in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Therefore, it can be pointed out that contradictions and conflicts stand on equal footing with other standards, their observational results, and other laws — that is, with the workings of countless forces — and are merely one among them.

§3.3.7

However, if the aim is to justify the theory of class struggle and to achieve revolution and transformation through it, merely treating contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is by no means sufficient.

By synthesizing the previous discussions on “discovery,” “presumption,” “de-emphasis,” “positioning,” and “redefinition,” it can be pointed out that all of these acts, while presupposing normative propositions, are inseparable in that they treat contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — that is, they are all expressions of the very act of treating them as “The Special.” Accordingly, this series of acts is “interlinked” under the aim of justifying the theory of class struggle, and, in a mutually reinforcing relationship, they serve to strengthen the legitimacy of the entire theory by impressing upon us the special status of contradictions and conflicts. It is certain that these acts, regardless of intent, do in fact fulfill such a role in reality.

On the other hand, within the theory of class struggle, these acts remain merely theoretical reinforcements, and do not entail any effective force for the achievement of revolution and transformation. Therefore, they alone cannot eliminate the influence of external and contingent elements.

Here, what plays a role as an effective force is the “practicality” that asserts the necessity of achieving revolution and transformation through class struggle. This is because the historical inevitability of class struggle is not understood as something that progresses automatically like a law of nature, but rather as something realized through human, subjective praxis. By encouraging people to engage in the praxis of class struggle, it becomes possible to mitigate the influence of the external and contingent elements that undeniably exist. As a result, if the class struggle unfolds as intended, the legitimacy of the theory of class struggle can be asserted even more strongly. However, the advantage of this “practicality” does not end there. Even if the class struggle does not unfold as intended, it becomes possible to argue that this is simply due to an insufficient degree of praxis. Furthermore, even the deliberate “practical” construction of contradictions and conflicts can be justified as a means to effectively advance the struggle.

However, this “practicality,” being expressed as a clear normative proposition — namely, the necessity of achieving revolution and transformation through class struggle — is, in itself, essentially no different from other ideologies. It is here that the theory of class struggle comes to serve as the theoretical foundation. What gives this foundation real significance is the fact that the impression — that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” — has been reinforced by the normative proposition. In other words, it is precisely because contradictions and conflicts are regarded as “something that ought to be treated as The Special” that one can claim the necessity of praxis.

That is to say, in order to ensure achieving revolution and transformation, the theory and praxis of class struggle form a mutually driven relationship — so to speak, a relationship of two wheels, each requiring the other.

However, as reiterated, and as discussed in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Accordingly — and it goes without saying — this “practicality” also lacks any decisive justification.

§3.3.8

By synthesizing the analyses from §3.2 through §3.3.7, the following conclusion can be drawn:

Classical Marxism places class struggle at the core of its theoretical system, grounding itself in DM and HM as its foundational theories. However, as a result of the preceding examination, it has become clear that the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are, though disguised as factual propositions, in substance normative propositions that treat contradictions and conflicts as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.” Thus, it is revealed that all propositions derived from the premise that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” inevitably possess a normative character, and consequently, DM/HM as a whole is imbued with a normative nature.

However, within the theoretical system of Classical Marxism, no normative proposition within the framework of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Accordingly, the central propositions of DM/HM, as well as all propositions derived from them, are deprived of their justificatory basis — and consequently, even the theory of class struggle, which constitutes the core of Classical Marxism, can no longer be sustained. Thus, Classical Marxism finds itself in a state devoid of theoretical foundation, taking on the aspect of a so-called “castle in the air.”

Moreover, the theory and praxis of class struggle form what may be called a “relationship of two wheels,” yet both wheels presuppose normative propositions. Since the theoretical side of class struggle, as discussed above, cannot be sustained, the other side — its “practicality” — cannot be grounded in the historical inevitability of class struggle. In the first place, this very “practicality” is itself a normative proposition, and since no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification, it ultimately amounts to nothing more than “praxis aimed at realizing a hope.” Furthermore, if that hope diverges significantly from the actual trajectory of society, it may degrade into a “dogma,” and in due course, even into a form of “praxis pursued as an end in itself.”

Even if one attempts to ground the normative basis of “practicality” in revolution and transformation in concepts such as “ethical imperatives,” “moral obligations,” or “social justice,” these concepts — as components of social norms in the general sense — remain, as stated in §1.6 and §3.2, fundamentally relative. Moreover, insofar as they are subject to the constraints of the proposition derived in §3.2, if such concepts — or propositions derived from them — are treated as “The Special,” one would inevitably arrive at the same conclusions as those discussed in §3.3.1 through §3.3.7.

Looking back on the discussions in §§3.3.4–3.3.7, it becomes clear that normative propositions play a significant role primarily in the relationship between intrinsic and necessary elements and external and contingent elements, especially in the relationship between “necessity” and “contingency.” That is, normative propositions are primarily employed as the theoretical basis for justifying the historical inevitability of class struggle, by asserting that “necessity” holds decisive superiority over “contingency.” Needless to say, “practicality” is also expected to play an important role in reducing the influence of contingent elements. However, these points can rather be taken as evidence of an underlying sense of crisis — namely, that contingency could exert a significant influence over the historical inevitability of class struggle.

In the present age, such influences are regarded as even more decisive. Even if all natural laws governing space were fully elucidated, and the quantum state of the entire universe completely grasped, the constraints posed by the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics and the sensitivity to initial conditions in chaotic systems render it, in principle, impossible — or at least extremely difficult — to foresee the future. In other words, “deterministic” predictions such as “the future will turn out this way” or “if one does this, then that will inevitably follow” are now considered fundamentally impossible. Therefore, the underlying sense of crisis regarding the major influence of contingency is well-founded, and it may now be said that the historical inevitability of class struggle is undergoing a significant destabilization.

§3.4

Over the course of §3.1 to §3.3, I have developed this inquiry in detail; such meticulous analysis has been necessary precisely because the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are, in reality, nothing other than normative propositions disguised as factual ones.

This proposition is expressed in a manner that appears, at first glance, to be a factual proposition, making its underlying implications difficult to grasp and requiring considerable effort for clarification and analysis. Furthermore, the various concepts surrounding the central propositions — particularly the classifications such as “Intrinsic and necessary elements” and “External and contingent elements” — are developed in extremely abstract terms, and the analysis of these concepts inevitably becomes abstract as well.

It is highly significant that Marx, driven by ethical aims such as human emancipation and the salvation of the oppressed, developed the theory of surplus value in Capital and revealed the mechanisms by which capitalism exacerbates economic inequality. On the other hand, when Engels proposed dialectical laws analogous to natural laws and applied them to society in order to assert the inevitability of historical development, Marx’s original aim was no longer emphasized, and the theory of social transformation was reduced to something mechanical and inorganic. And, given that Classical Marxism adopts a stance that “rejects religion and transcendent beings like gods,” it inevitably loses any decisive foundation for its normative propositions. As a result, it is compelled to rely on “Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones” — a contradiction inherent in the ideology itself.

Since the time of Classical Marxism, various positions have emerged — up to the present day — that aim to critically develop or go beyond it. Representative positions include the following:

・Marxism–Leninism (Lenin, Stalin) A position that holds that the overthrow of capitalism requires a revolution and dictatorship led by a vanguard party. It seeks to realize socialism through the seizure of state power and the implementation of a planned economy.

・The Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno) A position that asserts capitalism dominates people’s consciousness through culture and media. It focuses not only on economics but also on the influence on thought and emotion.

・Structuralist Marxism (Althusser) A position that sees structures — such as institutions and language — rather than human will as the driving forces of society. It emphasizes systems over individual agency.

・Gramscianism (Gramsci) A position that claims domination is maintained more through consent — via culture and education — than through violence. It emphasizes the importance of ideological and linguistic struggle in social transformation.

・Analytical Marxism (G. A. Cohen, Roemer, Elster) A position that aims to reconstruct Marxism logically and clarify its ambiguous expressions. It employs formal and ethical methods to refine the theory.

・Post-Marxism (Laclau, Mouffe) A position that focuses not only on class but also on diverse forms of antagonism such as gender and race. It seeks to make the understanding of society more flexible and pluralistic.

In the Frankfurt School, there is a critical stance — albeit not always explicitly — toward the transformation of the theory of social transformation caused by Engels’s assertion of the inevitability of historical development, as discussed above. Analytical Marxism, while recognizing that the inevitability of historical development contains normative elements, does not deny normativity itself but instead adopts the position of attempting to reconstruct it logically. Structuralist Marxism, on the other hand, deconstructs the normative elements themselves, and in Post-Marxism, those norms and ideals are further relativized — thus taking a stance that reexamines normative elements from their very foundations.

However, all of these positions fundamentally differ from the stance of the present study, which holds that the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are themselves normative propositions. This is because each of those positions treats concepts such as “the emancipation of the proletariat” or “the abolition of exploitation” as normative elements.

Chapter 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones

In this chapter, I will further deepen the analysis of “normative propositions disguised as factual ones,” the final theme that emerged in the previous chapter.

§4.1

In Chapter 3, I analyzed actions such as “discovery,” “presumption,” “de-emphasis,” “positioning,” and “redefinition,” though these labels were merely provisional terms for the sake of understanding and organization. However, upon reexamining these actions, it becomes clear that they can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” all involve acts of “seeing” in some form, and thus can be understood as concepts related to “perspective” — that is, to the standpoint or orientation from which things are viewed. In contrast, “positioning” and “redefinition” involve matters of classification and the boundary of concepts, and thus can be understood as concepts related to “framework” — that is, to the underlying structure used to make judgments about things.

“Perspective” refers to one’s subjective standpoint — how one views the world — which includes personal experiences, values, emotions, and the like. Needless to say, unless normative propositions are presupposed, all perspectives are, in principle, on equal footing. This concept of perspective is closely related to the idea discussed in §2.2 — that there is originally no boundary between the self and the world — and to phenomenology, which attempts to describe the world from such a perspective of the self, as well as to the subsequent developments in philosophical thought.

“Framework” refers to any structure, concept, or theory used to organize and interpret knowledge and experience, and includes social norms, cultural backgrounds, academic theories, language, and more. Needless to say, unless normative propositions are presupposed, all frameworks are, in principle, on equal footing. If this concept of framework is understood in terms of “structure,” it becomes closely related to the development of philosophical thought from structuralism to post-structuralism, and further to deconstruction.

These perspective and framework are thought to play a central role in the process of cognition, particularly in terms of from where and how one grasps and makes judgments about the world. As revealed in the analysis in Chapter 3, a perspective can be shaped within a particular framework, and conversely, a framework can also be shaped by a particular perspective. Thus, the two stand in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

The critical issue here is that, even though these particular perspectives and frameworks lack decisive justification, the intervention of normative propositions disguised as factual ones can enable them to be asserted as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

By presupposing such assertions, it becomes possible, for instance, to lend an appearance of legitimacy to particular ways of understanding or resolving social issues.

Such assertions are not limited to ideologies like Classical Marxism, but continue to be propagated across various domains of society — including organizational propaganda, social studies education, and media reporting. In all such cases, they are believed to function very effectively in leading people to internalize certain norms, often without being consciously aware of it.

§4.2

Why, then, do these Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones function so effectively?

In principle, assertions that employ explicit expressions such as “one ought to ~” or “one needs to ~” are clearly normative propositions. Therefore, it is only natural for the audience to question the justification behind such claims. As a result, it is unlikely that the audience would unconsciously accept and internalize such norms through these kinds of expressions. Thus, it becomes evident that what plays a crucial role in these propositions is the specific manner in which they are disguised — that is, the way they take on the appearance of factual statements.

Here, in considering the manner in which these propositions are disguised, it is worth examining one key expression: “correct” or “right.” When we consider the contexts in which the expression “correct” or “right” is used, it becomes clear that it spans both factual propositions and normative propositions.

Examples where it is used as part of a factual proposition: ・“1 + 1 = 2 is correct.” ・“It is correct that biodiversity is declining due to deforestation.”

Examples where it is used as part of a normative proposition: ・“It is right that one ought not to kill another person.” ・“It is right to protect the natural environment so as not to destroy it.”

In the above examples, distinguishing between factual and normative propositions is relatively easy. However, there are also propositions in which this distinction becomes blurred or ambiguous.

・“It is correct (right) behavior to remain quiet in public.” This proposition may appear to be stating a social rule or etiquette. Yet it also contains an evaluative judgment — that not being quiet constitutes “incorrect” (wrong) behavior.

・“It is correct for the answer to this calculation to be 5.” This proposition may seem to state a mathematical truth. Yet it also implies a value judgment — namely, that if the answer is not 5, then an “incorrect” method of calculation has been applied.

Although these propositions may appear to be stating mere facts, the presence of value judgment reveals that they are, in fact, normative propositions — normative propositions disguised as factual ones. And it becomes clear that the very use of the expression “correct (right)” is one of the key elements in the “manner of disguise” that determines the persuasive power of such propositions. By taking on this kind of disguise, these propositions are likely to be unconsciously accepted and internalized by their audience, without their normative content being noticed.

Note: In English, the term “correct” is primarily used for factual propositions, whereas in explicitly normative contexts, expressions like “right” or “appropriate” are generally considered more natural. In this paper, however, “correct” is deliberately employed to highlight the conceptual ambiguity that spans the boundary between fact and norm. This paper was originally written in Japanese, where the word “tadashii”（正しい）encompasses an inherent ambiguity that includes both factual correctness and normative rightness. This nuance is difficult to reproduce precisely in English, and translating “tadashii” into either “correct” or “right” presents conceptual interpretive challenges. The purpose of this note is to clarify that background.

§4.3

This paper has developed its argument on the premise that, if one does not assume the existence of transcendent beings like gods, then no universally and absolutely valid basis can be identified for any normative proposition.

Nevertheless, even those who do not possess religious faith or a comparable background may blindly accept normative propositions — such as “one ought not to ~” — as if they were absolute. Moreover, even in discussions that concern nothing more than methodology, people may pass normative judgments like “one ought not to ~.”

Various factors may be involved in such judgments, but it is conceivable that one significant cause lies in the form of education received during early childhood and elementary schooling.

For example, in mathematics classes during elementary schooling, lessons are often conducted on the assumption that the method of solving a problem — set by the teacher and leading to the correct answer — is the “correct” method. However, what becomes problematic here is the possibility that any method which does not lead to the correct answer is regarded as “incorrect,” and consequently, a normative and coercive mindset is instilled — namely, that such a method is one “one ought not to” use.

Through such excessive internalization, the judgment of what is “correct” — which was originally limited to methodologies for deriving mathematical truths — may expand into various other domains of methodology, as the reinforcement of the notion that one “ought not to” employ an “incorrect” method blurs the original boundaries. As a result, there arises a risk of making normative and blind judgments even when considering social issues — namely, that only the method of analyzing and solving problems from a particular perspective or within a particular framework is “correct,” while relying on any other perspective or framework is “incorrect” and thus one “ought not to” do so.

This tendency is presumed to be further reinforced in environments or societies where (social) pressure to conform is particularly strong. And the aforementioned concerns have already been pointed out in fields such as cognitive science, pedagogy, and social psychology.

In the previous section (§4.2), it was discussed that the use of the expression “correct” is one of the keys in considering the manner in which these propositions are disguised. This particular “strength” of the expression “correct” is likely to be, at least in part, a consequence of the educational practices described above. This “strength” refers to its capacity to give the impression that what is labeled as “correct” is an objective fact, thereby encouraging a suspension of critical thinking by avoiding any inquiry into its underlying basis. It also refers to its psychological power to guide people through (social) pressure to conform — for example, by suggesting that “everyone believes it to be correct.”

Expressions that produce effects similar to “correct” include such phrases as “it is natural that ~,” “it is wise to ~,” and “it is common sense that ~.” These expressions, when used in Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones, are considered to work very effectively in leading people, unconsciously, to accept certain perspectives or frameworks as “something that ought to be treated as The Special,” and to internalize them as norms. As a result, it becomes possible, for instance, to lend an appearance of legitimacy to particular ways of understanding or resolving social issues.

§4.4 In Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined Classical Marxism as a case study, with a particular focus on Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones, in an attempt to clarify both their underlying basis and actual content, and to consider the impact they exert on our thought and conceptual frameworks.

However, this is not to claim that such normative propositions “ought not to be used.” For to begin making such a claim would itself amount to the act of generating a new norm. In other words: “If you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.” — Friedrich Nietzsche

Therefore, this study seeks to present not only an attitude of continually questioning the underlying basis and actual content of all propositions, but also an attitude of questioning, in the same manner, the norms that lie at the foundation of one’s own consciousness.

Moreover, it goes without saying that this study does not in any way deny the existence of normative consciousness — that is, the will to act in accordance with norms. As confirmed in §1.6, even if social norms have no universally and absolutely valid basis, it goes without saying that the process through which they incorporate individual “hopes” within a group, coordinate them, and evolve through consensus is of critical importance in maintaining social order. It is also clear that normative consciousness plays a decisive role in the formation and development of such social norms.

On the other hand, as was made clear in the discussion in §2.1, the normative proposition that something ought to be treated as The Special arises based on various forms of necessity. Individual hopes within a group are underpinned by these diverse forms of necessity, and therefore, it can be seen that hope exists in a wide range and with great diversity. Needless to say, in a context where such diverse hopes coexist, attempting to coordinate them is an extremely difficult task.

As has been stated repeatedly, in a social system that does not presuppose transcendent beings like gods, no normative proposition can be granted a universally and absolutely valid basis. Therefore, normative propositions themselves cannot serve as the “foundation” of social norms. Just like Classical Marxism, any structure that lacks such a foundation inevitably becomes a “castle in the air.”

However, it can be pointed out here that “hope” itself can serve as the “foundation” of social norms and as a starting point for their development. That is, no matter how difficult it may be, the attitude of mutually recognizing diverse hopes, patiently coordinating them, and striving for consensus can become the very foundation of social norms, and ultimately contribute to their development.

This is because the act of having “hope” is, within its scope, a “factual proposition.”

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Supplement

For the supplementary note (in Japanese) to this essay, please refer to the link below.

👉 **[The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse【Supplement】]**

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