Not a New Battlefield: How the Middle East Has Always Been a Stage for Great Power Rivalry

Afghanistan as a Case Study in the Continuity of Great Power Competition and Its Structural Constraints

Watching Victoria, I came across references to 19th-century British involvement in Afghanistan and the rivalry with the Russian Empire. What initially seemed like a historical side note quickly raised a broader question: why does this dynamic sound so familiar?

Conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan are often framed as regional or primarily religious struggles. However, this interpretation overlooks a longer historical pattern. Already in the 19th century, Afghanistan was not simply a local conflict zone, but a central arena in a strategic competition between the British Empire and Russia. What is often perceived as a modern or post–Cold War development is part of a much older geopolitical continuity. The region has repeatedly functioned as a space of great power competition, where external actors project influence, pursue strategic depth, and encounter persistent limits to control.

Rather than representing a new battleground, the Middle East, specifically Afghanistan, illustrates how historical patterns of rivalry, intervention, and resistance continue to shape contemporary geopolitics.

In this sense, great power competition in the Middle East between major powers reflects less a fundamentally new geopolitical reality and more a continuation of earlier strategic behavior under different conditions. Much like Cold War proxy dynamics, external powers seek influence without direct confrontation, relying on indirect engagement, local partners, and political leverage. What appears today as renewed great power competition may therefore be less of a return and more of a continuation that never fully disappeared.

The Great Game (19th century)

The 19th century was shaped by two major empires. The British Empire and the Russian Empire, and much like today, great power players competed for influence in different regions of the world. Colonization was one example, as is the Great Game between Britain and Russia in the 19th century. It was a long-term strategic rivalry between the two empires. Britain’s priority was the protection of British India, which was its most valuable colony, while Russia, on the other hand, wanted to expand its influence into Central Asia. The fear on both sides was that the other would gain a strategic advantage. Much like in the 20th-century Cold War and today’s great power competition, a security dilemma emerged. The battleground was in the Middle East, specifically in Afghanistan, which sits geographically between Russian expansion and British India and therefore functioned as a buffer state.¹ A similar dynamic can be observed in contemporary conflicts such as Ukraine, where the country’s geographic position between competing powers gives it strategic importance. Key invasion routes often passed through Afghanistan; therefore, control or influence over Afghanistan would give the winner a strategic advantage. Through expansion, Russia had already absorbed Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which brought Russian influence closer to Afghanistan and therefore increased British fear of a potential invasion route towards India. The British Empire had to react to defend its territory and influence in order not to lose strategic ground in the great power competition. Therefore, the British strategy attempted to install a pro-British ruler in Afghanistan through diplomacy, intelligence networks, and military intervention to create a friendly, or at least controllable, Afghan government.

This led to major conflicts such as the First Anglo-Afghan War, where the British invaded to install a ruler; however, it ended in a catastrophic retreat from Kabul. The Second Anglo-Afghan War was triggered by Russian diplomatic presence in Kabul. The British could not risk Russia gaining influence or installing a Russia-friendly government after they had failed so significantly themselves. In the end, Britain gained influence over Afghan foreign policy through treaty arrangements such as the Treaty of Gandamak (1879).² After the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Afghanistan asserted full independence. This pattern is strikingly familiar.

Just like the Cold War, this confrontation between major powers was not direct but indirect. Afghanistan can be seen as a ground for proxy conflict in a great power competition, with heavy use of espionage, mapping expeditions, local alliances, and political manipulation to gain influence over the buffer zone of Afghanistan in order to achieve foreign policy goals. Overall, external powers struggled for multiple reasons. The harsh terrain, with many mountains and limited infrastructure, posed a major challenge for both powers. Modern militaries benefit from past experience, advanced techniques, and extensive training in simulated conditions; however, these advantages do not fully translate to environments such as Afghanistan, where terrain and local dynamics limit their effectiveness. Another factor is the tribal and local power structure, meaning that diplomacy is not always an effective approach, as tribes have their own cultures and distinct political structures. Therefore, they may not simply comply with what great powers propose, as they have their own culture, history, and positions that they seek to defend, which leads to strong resistance to foreign control. This contributes to the struggle of great powers to maintain long-term occupation and influence.

Overall, the result of the competition between the Russian and British Empires in Afghanistan was that Afghanistan remained independent and was not colonized. It continued to serve as a buffer between the empires, and borders were later formalized, for example through the Durand Line Agreement. This outcome suggests that even early attempts at external control encountered structural limits that would reappear in later interventions.

While energy resources were not yet the central driver they would later become, the region’s geographic position already made it strategically valuable as a corridor between resource-rich areas and imperial centers. This geographic positioning would later become even more significant as global energy networks expanded, linking regional stability directly to international economic and security interests.

Continuity Across Eras

Cold War → Soviet Intervention

As previously mentioned, the end of the power competition between the British Empire and the Russian Empire was not the end of the Middle East, and specifically Afghanistan, being a major ground for competition between superpowers. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 during the Cold War.³ The Soviet Union returned with the objective of maintaining influence in a neighboring state and preventing the collapse of a Russia-friendly communist government. In order to strengthen Russian influence and avoid losing ground in a friendly country during the Cold War competition with the United States. Russia wanted to secure strategic depth in Central Asia. Losing control of internal opposition bears the risk of also losing external influence. Especially since the opposition was a decentralized insurgency (Mujahideen) that was supported externally by the United States and Pakistan. Just like the British Empire a century earlier, the Soviet Union initiated a full-scale military intervention and attempted a long-term occupation from 1979 to 1989, until it withdrew to prevent the United States from gaining more influence during the Cold War. It was therefore one of many proxy conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the end, it was another failed attempt to gain long-term influence in Afghanistan, including a failure to stabilize the country, which contributed to long-term internal fragmentation. This reinforces the pattern that external intervention does not resolve internal instability, but often deepens it.

Post-9/11 → U.S. Intervention

Just a little over 10 years later, the United States invaded Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks. The initial objective was to dismantle al-Qaeda and to remove the Taliban from power. This expanded to state-building and democratization in order to stabilize Afghanistan in the long term and establish a United States–friendly government seeking to democratize the country. The war in Afghanistan lasted for 20 years, attempting to achieve those goals while heavily relying on local partners and institutions to help establish a stable democracy. However, the United States also faced challenges, as the insurgency persisted despite military superiority and the difficulty of controlling rural areas.This allows insurgent groups to avoid direct confrontation, operate through guerrilla tactics, and retreat into areas that are difficult for external forces to access or control. Local support networks provide resources, intelligence, and shelter, making it harder for external powers to distinguish between civilians and combatants. As a result, military superiority does not translate into effective territorial control, especially in rural regions.

Just like the other two superpowers, the United States attempted to stabilize Afghanistan and gain long-term influence; however, despite 20 years of involvement, its withdrawal is often seen as catastrophic. The agreement between the United States and the Taliban, which set the framework for withdrawal, increased tensions within NATO, as it raised concerns among allies about coordination, long-term strategy, and the stability of the Afghan government.⁴ In the end, the Taliban, whom the United States sought to eliminate, returned to power, quickly reestablishing and strengthening their non-democratic system. Therefore, just like the British Empire and the Soviet Union, the United States ultimately failed, with heavy consequences and many lives lost.

Same Structural Dynamics

Across these periods, the pattern remains strikingly consistent. From the Great Game to the Soviet–Afghan War and the post–September 11 attacks intervention by the United States, Afghanistan has repeatedly served as a strategic arena for external powers seeking influence, security, or control through a favorable regime. Yet despite differences in ideology, capabilities, and stated objectives, each intervention encountered the same structural constraints: difficult geography, decentralized power structures, and a persistent misreading of local political realities.

Rather than representing separate historical episodes, these cases point to a continuity in the logic of great power competition itself, one in which external actors project power into Afghanistan, but struggle to sustain it. The constraints recur. This suggests that failure is not the result of specific policy mistakes, but of structural conditions that persist across different historical periods. Geography limits control, structures are decentralized, and local power systems prove too difficult to control or win over (a pattern visible since the 19th century), alongside the persistent misreading of political and social realities. These recurring constraints limit not only military effectiveness, but also the ability of external actors to build legitimate political authority, which is essential for long-term stability. The pattern of external intervention by external powers is consistently similar. Initially, they are militarily successful, but long-term strategic overstretch results in withdrawal without lasting control or success.

Overall, those decades of great power competition with different actors, Afghanistan remains a strategic space, not the primary actor.

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, energy security further reinforced the region’s strategic importance. Proximity to major oil and gas reserves, as well as key transit routes, elevated the stakes of external involvement. While ideology defined the Cold War and counterterrorism shaped the post-9/11 era, underlying material interests, including energy access and stability of supply, remained a consistent factor.⁵ This demonstrates that while the motivations of external powers evolve, the underlying strategic importance of the region remains constant.

Why External Powers Keep Failing

Geography as a Structural Barrier

The first reason why external powers keep failing is the geography of the country as a structural barrier. Afghanistan is dominated by mountains (Hindu Kush), valleys, and limited infrastructure. This terrain restricts movement, logistics, and centralized control. External powers struggle to maintain supply lines and territorial control. Local actors such as the Taliban have an advantage, as they are highly familiar with the terrain. There are many different local fighter groups apart from the Taliban, as Afghanistan remains, in many ways, a more tribally structured country. Therefore, establishing a centrally controlled form of government influenced by external powers, whether the British and Russians in the Victorian era or the United States and the Soviet Union in modern times, is nearly impossible. It is difficult to impose a centralized form of government, as local groups have their own cultures and actively defend their way of life.

Decentralized Power Structures

Decentralized power structures are not new; Afghanistan has never had a strong, historically consistent central authority. Power has been distributed across tribes, local leaders, and regional networks. External actors often overestimate the power of a central government, while local autonomy remains strong and historically persistent. Externally imposed governance models often lack legitimacy, as local populations are protective of their own political and social structures. External actors often establish control in Kabul but fail to extend control over the entire country because they underestimate local autonomy.

Misreading Local Politics

This connects to the misreading of local politics. External powers project their own political models and assumptions onto countries like Afghanistan in an effort to expand their influence within these proxy conflicts. They fail to understand local alliances, tribal dynamics, and shifting loyalties. The ideologies of external powers differ significantly from the diverse belief systems and political structures of local groups. External powers are often so focused on establishing a central authority they can influence that they support unreliable partners, alienate others, and strengthen opposition groups. Without a full understanding of the country’s structure and the diverse ideologies of local groups, which may be inherently difficult to achieve, long-term consent and a unified alliance with Afghanistan as a whole are unlikely.

Intervention Logic vs. Local Reality

The mismatch between intervention logic and local reality is another issue linked to the misreading of local politics. To gain influence in Afghanistan, intervention strategies must align with local realities. External goals have remained similar from the Victorian era to the post-9/11 war. External powers aim to stabilize the country in order to gain control and influence political outcomes to their geopolitical advantage within broader great power competition.

However, local dynamics are fluid, fragmented, and resistant to imposed systems. This creates a mismatch between strategy and reality, which contributes to the failure of external powers.

The Pattern Across Eras

This pattern has persisted for nearly two centuries. The British Empire, as well as the Russian Empire, failed to establish lasting control in the 19th century. The Soviet Union had to withdraw after a prolonged conflict, and the United States was also unable to sustain long-term state-building efforts.

Overall, these external actors often prioritize strategic and resource-related objectives, including energy security, while underestimating local political dynamics and legitimacy. Afghanistan does not simply resist control; it exposes the limits of external powers. The issue is not a lack of capability among these external powers, but rather geography, decentralized power structures, and the persistent misreading of local politics, which leads to a mismatch between external strategy and internal structures. None can achieve long-lasting influence without understanding internal structures and aligning strategy accordingly.

Strategic Implications Today

Today’s geopolitical dynamics reflect both traditional security concerns and ongoing competition over influence, stability, and strategic positioning.

Rather than representing a new phenomenon, these patterns in the Middle East, and specifically Afghanistan, follow a long historical trajectory. From the strategic rivalry of the British Empire and the Russian Empire during the Great Game, to the intervention of the Soviet Union, and later the involvement of the United States, external powers have consistently projected influence into strategically significant regions such as Afghanistan.

The Middle East is therefore not simply a renewed battleground of great power rivalry, but a persistent space of strategic and economic competition shaped by these historical patterns. What appears as a “new” era of competition is, in reality, the continuation of a long-standing geopolitical logic, one in which external powers repeatedly engage in regions defined by complex local dynamics and strategic relevance.

Contemporary great power competition is thus not a departure from the past, but its continuation, adapted to new actors, new tools, and the enduring strategic importance of energy.

If external powers seek to engage Afghanistan more effectively, this would require a fundamental shift in strategy. Rather than attempting to establish centralized control or uniform alliances, external actors would need to adapt to the country’s fragmented political and social structure. In the context of Afghanistan, this likely means recognizing that influence cannot be exercised uniformly across the entire state.

Instead, engagement may need to occur at the local or regional level, where power is actually held. However, even this approach is constrained by internal divisions, competing interests, and longstanding tensions between different groups. As a result, the idea of Afghanistan as a cohesive, stable ally may be inherently limited, not necessarily because of external failure alone, but because of structural realities within the country itself.

Any sustainable strategy would therefore require not just greater capability, but a willingness to fundamentally rethink what “success” in Afghanistan can realistically look like.

References

1. Jeff M. Smith. “The Great Game, Round Three.” American Foreign Policy Council. November 19, 2009. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-great-game-round-three
2. National Army Museum. “Second Afghan War.” Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/second-afghan-war
3. Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy. “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979.” Wilson Center. July 7, 2011. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/inside-the-soviet-invasion-afghanistan-and-the-seizure-kabul-december-1979
4. Reuters. “Foreign troops to stay in Afghanistan beyond May deadline.” February 1, 2021. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/foreign-troops-to-stay-in-afghanistan-beyond-may-deadline-nato-sources-idUSKBN2A00AG/
5. Le Monde. “The 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a solo decision.” June 19, 2025. Accessed May 7, 2026. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/history/article/2025/06/19/the-2021-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-a-solo-decision_6742489_157.html