Migration flows as a weapon

Like the migrant waves from Syria and the crises on the borders of Finland and Belarus, it points to the systematic use of migration as an instrument.

Dynamics of the crisis

Migration pressure emerged abruptly on 28 July and continued to build over the following days. As of 1 August, fewer than half of the migrants remained in the enclave compared with the peak of roughly 60,000 recorded two or three days earlier — all concentrated within a very small area. “Refugees” are being returned to Morocco, yet new groups continue attempting to cross the border.

Ceuta’s Temporary Foreigners Detention Centre is critically overcrowded. Social tensions are mounting. Local residents have begun defending their property, and clashes have broken out in several places. The most determined “refugees” filter into other regions in an effort to move deeper into the EU, where welfare benefits are more generous.

The Spanish government has decided to deploy the Armed Forces and the National Guard should the situation escalate. Italy has temporarily reinstated border controls with Spain. France has tightened controls along its border with Spain while keeping its armed forces on standby. The events in Ceuta have deeply unsettled policymakers across the European Union, who are still trying to understand what is unfolding. Fortunately for them, they still have one advantage — time. At least for now.

Hypothetically, this migrant wave may have been a deliberately launched trial balloon. But what comes next?

Profile of “refugees”

Reports from the scene reveal several distinct characteristics of the migrants. They are clear enough to identify the risks involved.

The migrant population in Ceuta consists predominantly of people from the Maghreb — mainly Morocco and Algeria — and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In terms of age and gender, they are overwhelmingly men between 18 and 35 — of working and reproductive age. A significant number of unaccompanied minors has also been recorded. Reporters likewise note a small group of women carrying infants.

The migrants’ social profile is equally noteworthy. Most belong to economically vulnerable groups, including people with no fixed residence, asylum seekers, and those hoping to find employment in the European Union.

Available evidence also points to a high degree of coordination through messaging platforms. Criminal smuggling networks organize the supply of flotation devices, fins, and wetsuits. This supports the hypothesis that the “refugee” flow includes criminal elements, including rank-and-file members of organized crime groups.

Driving factors

The profile of the migrants in Ceuta suggests looking for the causes of the incident in the conditions prevailing in their home countries.

Overall, the economies of the Maghreb countries are moderately developed. In other words, conditions are generally acceptable, but economic growth is increasingly constrained by climate. Prolonged drought has left Morocco and Algeria facing chronic water shortages. Even periodic episodes of extreme rainfall and flooding damage agricultural land, undermining the sector. As a result, rural populations are pushed into cities, from where the road to emigration begins.

Climate-related economic stagnation has not produced widespread famine, but consumption among the poorest segments of the population remains critically low. Inflation and youth unemployment — reaching up to 30% — further encourage migration to the European Union.

Fortunately, the situation in the Maghreb is eased by the absence of active large-scale wars. Periodic clashes along disputed borders generally do not affect densely populated areas. As a result, the security factor contributes relatively little to the formation of migration flows.

The situation is worse in Sub-Saharan Africa. This vast region has been trapped in a prolonged humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations, more than 50 million people across the region face acute food insecurity.

The region is plagued by climate disasters. Drought, the southward advance of the Sahara, and increasingly unstable seasonal rainfall lead to repeated crop failures, driving both internal displacement and outward migration.

The region is also the scene of long-running, high-intensity armed conflicts. The bloodiest hotspot is Liptako-Gourma — the border region shared by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — where government forces continue to fight militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The situation is further aggravated by military coups and the activities of Russian mercenaries from the former Wagner Group, now operating as the Africa Corps.

Bloody conflicts also continue in Nigeria and across the Lake Chad Basin — Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Intense fighting is accompanied by terror and heavy civilian casualties. The situation is further complicated by violent conflicts over water and grazing land between Fulani pastoralists and settled farming communities.

Hunger and war remain the primary drivers of migration flows from Africa. At the same time, experience suggests paying attention to another factor — the cultural and value system, which is particularly pronounced in some regions. Religion — especially where it is the state religion — has a profound impact on everyday life.

The countries of the Maghreb are almost entirely Muslim, with Islam serving as the state religion, predominantly of the Sunni tradition. In many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims likewise make up the majority of the population, ranging from 80% to 99%.

What does Islam have to do with it? Under Sharia, a man who cannot provide for a woman’s basic needs is not entitled to marry. This principle, like many others, is deeply embedded in secular family law. In Morocco, the Family Code (Moudawana) obliges a husband to provide financial support for his wife, and failure to do so constitutes legal grounds for divorce. Algeria’s Family Code imposes the same obligation. In Tunisia, despite a more emancipated legal framework, the Code of Personal Status likewise places primary financial responsibility on the husband.

These rules shape everyday life in subtle but powerful ways. In our view, they also influence the formation of migration flows. It is worth recalling that the “refugees” in Ceuta are predominantly young men. In their home countries, the reality is simple — without a sufficient income, they are effectively denied socially accepted relationships, denied the opportunity to start a family, and denied the opportunity to have children. Religious, legal, and social norms impose strict constraints.

By contrast, many young Muslim men perceive the European Union as a “paradise of desires” — a place with an abundance of available women — making migration more attractive. This is, of course, a hypothesis. Yet there are too many indications to dismiss it outright. At the very least, it warrants dedicated socio-psychological research.

Alignment of governments and Russia

As we have seen, climate, economic, and social drivers all contribute to the formation of migration flows from Africa. Public discontent among the poorest segments of society continues to grow, unsettling governments across the region. On the one hand, they are unable to cope with these challenges. On the other, they have an interest in the outflow of “surplus” populations as a means of achieving relative stability.

The Sahel countries have been hit hardest by a large-scale security crisis. Armed conflicts, fuel blockades, and hunger have turned economic collapse into an everyday reality. People flee combat zones and famine in search of safer places.

Today, the number of internally displaced people across the Sahel and Sudan exceeds 10–12 million. Including internally displaced persons in the Central Sahel — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where the total exceeds 4.2 million — the overall number of displaced people across this regional belt reaches 13–14 million.

At times, transit countries such as Senegal have an interest in attracting labor migrants. But criminal syndicates enter the picture, with their smuggling networks directing migrants onward to Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco — and ultimately to the borders of the European Union.

The military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States, terminated security agreements with the EU, and expelled French military missions. In their place, they brought in Russian military formations.

Russian forces operate in coordination with Sahel governments, which effectively provide political cover for their operations. In Mali, for example, the activities of Russia’s Africa Corps, operating under the Main Directorate of the General Staff, have been accompanied by repression against civilians, particularly Tuareg and Fulani communities. The resulting terror artificially generates hundreds of thousands of new refugees who flee north toward Algeria, Morocco, and ultimately Europe.

Beyond direct military involvement, Russia actively employs hybrid methods of influence. Investigators from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and Logically have documented influence operations pointing to Russia’s role in shaping migration flows through information and psychological campaigns conducted via social media.

A large, well-organized network operates hundreds of Telegram channels, media outlets — including RT Afrique and Sputnik Afrique — as well as bot networks. It systematically promotes anti-Western and anti-European narratives, persuading local youth that “Europe is responsible for Africa’s poverty and therefore obliged to accept refugees.”

Across the North African segments of TikTok, Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, investigators have documented regular coordination among young Moroccans, encouraging them to cross the borders into Ceuta and Melilla en masse. Coordinators instruct participants to converge simultaneously at designated crossing points in order to overwhelm the operational capacity of Spain’s Guardia Civil and Moroccan border forces. Through this social media mobilization, thousands of people gathered simultaneously near the Tarajal breakwater in Ceuta on 30 July.

Dozens of open and closed messaging groups targeting prospective migrants in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Senegal are also active. Within these chats, coordinators publish departure schedules for vehicle convoys from transit hubs such as Agadez in Niger and Gao in Mali, assembly points near the Algerian and Libyan borders, precise GPS coordinates for safer desert routes, and instructions on how to avoid patrols. Short videos promoting “safe routes to Spain and Italy” are circulated extensively.

For Russia, the Sahel countries are merely a tool in a much broader strategy of destabilization. Its objective is to weaken the European Union economically and politically because of its support for Ukraine. In this context, migration flows become a weapon in hybrid warfare.

Russia’s strategic objective is to place sustained pressure on European social welfare systems — and, by extension, on the economies of the Eurozone — through mass migration. The influx also contributes to rising crime, further shifting public opinion toward support for far-right political movements.

Ultimately, this increases the chances of isolationist parties coming to power across the European Union. As is well known, many of these parties oppose continued assistance to Ukraine in its war against Russia — completing the strategic circle.

Recommendation

Besides Spain, the principal gateways for migrants entering Europe are Italy, the Western Balkans, Greece, and the countries along the EU’s eastern borders. Russia either exercises direct control over most of these routes or maintains influence through proxy groups and organized crime.

Unfortunately, the growing impression is that Europe lacks the resources to counter migration as a weapon effectively. The logical starting point would be to adapt its legal framework to a deteriorating security environment. Yet even in this area, Europe is only beginning to take its first steps.

Meanwhile, the risks are becoming increasingly tangible. If the hypothesis that the events in Ceuta were a test of Europe’s response is correct, Spain failed that test. We have seen that organization and coordination can assemble enough “refugees” to overwhelm a border and then disperse deep into EU territory. But what happens if similar mass breaches occur simultaneously at several points? Would European governments be willing — and able — to employ decisive measures to stop them?

Further work on this subject belongs to the realm of serious analysis and strategic forecasting. This article merely offers food for thought. Hopefully, someone will take the issue further and carry out the research it deserves. Then someone else may read it, draw the necessary conclusions, and make the right decisions.