An Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding Lynas Advanced Materials Plant in Malaysia

Author: Sam Chong Zhao Xian Date: July 24, 2024 Contact Information: sam.chongzhaoxian@outlook.com PDF Version with Reference: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1V2o9oCGue90rTV8CFoMANivt5TE1J6M9?usp=sharing

Introduction

The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) in Malaysia has remained a source of intense controversy for fifteen years. Opponents express concerns over potential radiation hazards. At the same time, supporters emphasise its economic benefits, as it allows Malaysia to emerge as a strategic player in the rare earth supply chain.

The controversy has remained strong even after the plant began operating in late 2012. In 2013, the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat included the termination of Lynas’ operations in Malaysia as part of its election manifesto but failed to win. In 2018, Malaysia experienced its first change of government. Yeo Bee Yin, the new MESTECC minister, initially planned to require Lynas to remove its waste from Malaysia. However, then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad strongly opposed this plan. A compromise was reached between the stakeholders, requiring Lynas to relocate the controversial cracking and leaching (C&L) process, the primary source of radioactive waste, overseas and build a permanent disposal facility (PDF) for the radioactive waste already produced in Malaysia.

A breakthrough in extraction technology of thorium, the main radioactive element in C&L waste, has prompted the Malaysian government to lift the ban on the C&L process in 2023. Lynas was then required to scale the thorium extraction process within two years.

This extended dispute has caused confusion among many Malaysians. This article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Lynas issue by presenting a balanced overview of the arguments from both sides, enabling readers to form informed opinions.

Rare Earth Elements 101

Rare earth elements (REE) is a group of 17 elements including lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium. They are hailed as the “vitamins” of modern industry due to their indispensable role in modern technology. These elements are necessary for various high-tech products like computer hard drives, wind turbines, electric vehicles, radar systems and laser crystals.

Despite their name, REEs are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust, with some similar to common metals like copper in terms of availability. The “rare” designation stems from the fact that these elements rarely form concentrated ore deposits and are typically dispersed and tightly bound within other minerals, necessitating complex extraction processes. While modern technology has lessened the difficulties of REE extraction to some extent, the misnomer has persisted.

From U.S. dominance to China’s rising influence

The United States dominated REE production from the 1960s to the 1980s, accounting for 34% of the global output. However, stricter environmental regulations and rising costs caused a decline, allowing China to seize the opportunity with export tax rebates, lax environmental regulations, and cheap labour. In 2002, the closure of Mountain Pass, the largest rare earth mine in U.S., resulted in the complete cessation of rare earth mining production within the United States. In contrast, China’s output soared, increasing 14-fold between 1985 and 2005 and eventually dominating 98% of global production.

Despite recent progress in rare earth capabilities by nations like the United States, Australia, and Myanmar, China’s dominance in the rare earth market persists. In 2021, China controlled 63% of global rare earth mining, 85% of processing, and an astounding 92% of rare earth magnet production.

However, China’s dominance came at a steep environmental cost. Exports of rare earth elements have decreased since 2006 as a result of environmental restrictions in China. In 2010, the government acknowledged the “severe damage” caused by the industry, citing pollution, deforestation, and water contamination. In response, the Chinese government implemented export restrictions, leading to a 37% reduction in rare earth exports. The export restrictions, further fueled by territorial disputes with Japan and growing domestic demand, caused a dramatic 11-fold price surge between 2009 and 2011. Although prices eventually retreated with decreased demand, increased recycling efforts, and the emergence of substitutes, the episode highlighted the risks inherent in relying on a single source for such a critical resource. Amid this global struggle to control these vital materials, an Australian-listed mining company, Lynas Rare Earth Ltd., steps onto the international stage as a critical player.

Emergence of Lynas

In 2003, Lynas acquired the Mt Weld rare earth mining project in Western Australia from Ashton Rare Earth Pte Ltd. Lynas initially planned to process rare earth in China. However, they relocated their operations to Malaysia due to export restrictions and taxes. Although the Malaysian federal government agreed to a processing plant in Terengganu, opposition from the Terengganu state government forced Lynas to move the project to Gebeng, Pahang. Construction of the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) began in 2008. After receiving a temporary operating licence (TOL) from the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) in 2012, LAMP began producing early in 2013.

Lynas’ economic impact in Malaysia is undeniable. Between 2008 and 2018, the company generated RM2.59 billion in foreign direct investment and RM300 million in domestic investment, according to a report by Lynas. The company also contributed RM 969 million to the GDP in 2018. Lynas directly created over 1,000 jobs, with 98% of its local employees and 91% holding medium — to high-skilled positions.

Despite these economic gains, public concerns over the potential radiation hazards associated with rare earth processing have persisted, fueling a series of protests:

March 2011: Formation of the “Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas” movement.

March 2011: Hundreds protest outside Parliament.

May 2011: Protest by 200 people at the Australian Embassy in Malaysia.

September 2011: Establishment of the “Stop Lynas Coalition.”

October 2011: Thousands attend the first green rally in Kuantan.

February 2012: 15,000 attend Kuantan’s second green rally.

Some opposing parties questioned Lynas’ motives, asking why the company would relocate the processing operation to Malaysia if the economic benefits are substantial and there are no pollution risks. Would it not be more logical to conduct the processing within Australia?

Lynas has refuted these claims, stating that cost is the primary reason for choosing Malaysia. For instance, they cite the water scarcity in Western Australia, where water costs RM6 per cubic metre, seven times higher than Malaysia’s RM0.84. Electricity costs are also four times higher in Australia, at RM0.96 per kilowatt-hour compared to RM0.23 in Malaysia. Additionally, chemicals like caustic soda are three times cheaper in Malaysia.

However, certain opponents contend that the cost reduction encompasses more than merely less expensive resources and includes a less stringent regulatory environment in Malaysia. To understand these concerns, we first need to understand the rare earth processing procedures.

Rare Earth Refining

The rare earth refining process involves four main stages:

1. Cracking Raw ore is mixed with sulfuric acid and heated to dissolve valuable minerals. Leftover waste gas is neutralised to form gypsum.
2. Water Leach and Purification The solution is diluted and neutralised, causing impurities to solidify. The liquid containing rare earth elements is separated and sent for further processing, while the solid waste is stored.
3. Separation Hydrochloric acid and chemicals are added to remove the remaining impurities.
4. Product Finishing The purified rare earth elements undergo final processing to be transformed into final products.

The entire refining process generates three types of waste:

1. Flue Gas Desulphurization waste (FGD) from the cracking stage
2. Water Leach Purification waste (WLP) from the water leach and purification stage
3. Neutralisation Underflow waste (NUF) from the separation stage.

FGD and NUF waste have very low levels of radioactivity, similar to ordinary rocks and soil, and are therefore exempt from being treated as radioactive waste. However, WLP waste is considerably more radioactive, with an annual output of up to 30,000 cubic metres.

Radiation 101

Introduction

Radiation is the emission of energy in the form of waves or particles. Some radiation is “gentle”, like visible light, infrared radiation, microwaves, and radio waves. This type of radiation is known as non-ionising radiation, and is believed to have a minimal impact on our health.

On the other hand, there is another type of radiation known as ionising radiation. It is often produced by the decay of an unstable atom. Imagine this atom as a chaotic house filled with hot-tempered fighter. The house must expel some of the occupants in order to archive stability. When a single expulsion is insufficient, the house releases occupants in multiple batches. These fighters are furious about being kicked out by their community. They will release their anger in powerful blows to anything nearby.

One example of such an unstable atom is thorium-232, which can be found WLP. It first decays into radium-228, releasing alpha radiation, then into actinium-228, releasing beta radiation, and so on until it ultimately reaches the stable lead-208. The ionising radiation released at each stage carries enough energy to knock electrons out of atoms or molecules, potentially damaging our cells and increasing the risk of health problems.

Despite its potential risks, radiation is an unavoidable aspect of our environment. We are constantly exposed to natural radiation from cosmic rays and radioactive elements within the Earth’s crust. Certain regions, such as Perak in Malaysia, exhibit higher levels of background radiation due to historical mining activities. Additionally, human activities like medical imaging and smoking can significantly increase our exposure. Even our bodies contain trace amounts of a naturally occurring radioactive isotope, potassium-40.

Therefore, the objective is not to eliminate radiation, which is impossible, but to effectively manage our exposure. The crucial question then becomes: Is the level of radiation emitted from WLP considered safe? In the following chapters, we will discuss the factors that determine the safety of thorium-232 in WLP.

Radiation Pollution Risk from LAMP

Thorium-232 Carcinogenicity

Not all expelled fighters (ionising radiation) are the same. There are different types of fighters, like alpha, beta, and gamma radiation, each with its characteristics:

• Alpha radiation They are big, strong fighters. They pack a powerful punch (higher ionising power), but their size makes them easy to block, even with a simple sheet of paper.
• Beta radiation These fighters are less intense but can move faster and farther (higher penetration power). Something like a sheet of aluminium would shield us from them.
• Gamma radiation These are the stealthiest fighters. While they have less ionising power, they are fast and can penetrate deep into materials. It takes thick, dense materials like lead or concrete to block them

Th-232 primarily undergoes alpha decay, releasing alpha particles. They are big and can be easily blocked by our skin, or even a few centimeters of air. However, if they enter our body, this is when the real trouble begins.

In the early 20th century, thorium dioxide was injected into patients as a contrast agent in X-ray imaging to aid diagnosis. However, studies found that patients who received large amounts of thorium dioxide experienced significantly elevated rates of liver, gallbladder, and blood cancers. The U.S. National Toxicology Program (NTP) concluded that thorium dioxide injected into the body is carcinogenic, leading to the discontinuation of such medical practice. Similarly, International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classifies thorium as a Group 1 carcinogen, meaning there is sufficient evidence that it causes cancer in humans.

Some argue that this risk associated with alpha particles thorium is limited to direct injection and cannot be directly compared to the thorium present in Lynas’ waste. The most likely pathway for thorium in WLP to enter our bodies is through the inhalation of thorium-containing dust or ingestion of contaminated water. They point out that most ingested thorium will be excreted directly, with a mere 0.02–0.05% entering the bloodstream. This low level of absorption and short retention time within the body supposedly translate to a lower likelihood of alpha particle emission inside the body and thus a negligible cancer risk.

However, research in China has shown that miners exposed to thorium-containing dust will still have a higher cancer risk, challenging this assumption. While initially unclear whether this risk was due to thorium or other factors like smoking or silica dioxide, a study by the National Institute for Radiological Protection under the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that thorium dioxide itself may be carcinogenic, increasing cancer risk even after adjusting for other potential confounders.

In summary, the type of “fighter” that thorium-232 releases is considered harmful, and exposure should be limited. Nonetheless, if the thorium-232 does not come into close contact with us, it poses less of a threat. In the next section, we will discuss the mobility of thorium-232.

Thorium Mobility and Dispersal in the Environment

Understanding thorium’s mobility and dispersion in the environment is crucial for assessing the potential risks associated with its storage. Even a highly carcinogenic substance poses no threat to the public if it remains immobile and contained.

Proponents of thorium utilisation often emphasise the controlled storage of waste containing radioactive elements, asserting that thorium’s radioactive emissions (alpha, beta, and gamma radiation) and daughter nuclides (Radon, Thoron) are effectively contained within storage facilities, posing a negligible risk to the public or workers due to their limited interaction with the external environment. They further highlight thorium’s insolubility in water and strong affinity for clay, suggesting limited mobility even in the unlikely event of a leak.

However, some researchers challenge this assumption. Argonne National Laboratory reports that thorium-232 can be highly mobile in dust form. Additionally, while thorium is generally insoluble in water, under specific conditions, it can form soluble complexes with substances like carbonates and humic materials, thereby increasing their concentrations in water. This concern is compounded by its decay product radium, which is radioactive and soluble in water.

Thorium-232 Half-life

Different houses (radiation sources) not only release different types of fighters but also at different speeds. Half-life is a concept used to quantify the speed of releasing these fighters, representing the time it takes half of these houses to release the fighters (half of the radioactive atoms to decay). A material with a short half-life is like a house with a fighter who quickly rushes out, delivering a rapid barrage of powerful attacks, but they quickly run out of fighters, achieving a stable state. A material with a long half-life is like a house with a fighter who emerges gradually, launching attacks over an extended period.

Proponents of LAMP often highlight its long half-life as a key factor contributing to its relative safety. Relating this to our analogy, thorium-232’s 14 billion-year half-life translates to a slow release of radioactive aggressors, similar to the house with fighters emerging gradually. This slow decay process produces lower radiation intensity than isotopes with shorter half-lives.

However, the argument for thorium’s safety due to its long half-life is not without its critics. Detractors stress that lower radiation intensity comes with massive radioactive waste. Over 30,000 tonnes of waste are generated annually, presenting a significant challenge for long-term storage. After operations at the radioactive waste disposal facility cease, the waste generated by LAMP will need to be stored for approximately 1500 years. The accumulation of such large quantities of radioactive material, even with low radiation intensity, over prolonged periods could potentially increase the risk of accidental exposure and environmental contamination.

WLP Radiation Concentration

In line with the toxicological principle that “the dose makes the poison”, one way to mitigate the effect of radiation is to control the exposure level. This is why trace levels of naturally occurring radioactive materials like thorium found in groundwater, soil, and coal are generally considered safe. It is like have a few scattered fighters in a vast arena — the likelihood of them causing widespread damage is low.

The Becquerel (Bq) per gram or per litre is the unit used to measure the radioactivity (concentration of the fighter) in a substance. It indicates the number of radioactive emissions (number of fighters coming out) occurring per second per unit of material. Radioactivity increases with higher concentrations of the radioactive material, especially those with shorter half-lives.

However, the biological effect of radiation does not solely depend on the the type and energy of the radiation (how hard the fighters punch) and the level of radioactivity (number of fighters punching us). It can vary significantly depending on the specific organs or tissues exposed (how “strong” we are). This biological impact is measured in millisieverts (mSv).

In the case of the waste produced in LAMP, the radiation concentrations in FGD and NUF are minimal, with combined thorium-232 and uranium-238 concentrations below 0.05 Bq/g. Consequently, these materials are exempt from Malaysian authorities’ classification as radioactive waste. This classification is consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, which allow materials with radiation levels below 1 Bq/g to be excluded from being classified as radioactive waste.

The situation differs for WLP, which has a radiation level of 6 Bq/g. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allows for exemption consideration for materials with radioactivity between 1–10 Bq/g, this is contingent upon a radiation dose of less than 1 mSv/year. The Radiation Impact Assessment (RIA) estimated that employees working with WLP would be exposed to significantly higher doses, averaging 2 mSv/year, with some potentially receiving 13 mSv/year.

The IAEA’s assessment supports this concern, estimating that unprotected work near a 6 Bq/g gamma radiation source for a year could result in a 5 mSv dose. While these estimations might be conservative, the IAEA concludes that exceeding the 1 mSv/year limit is plausible for some workers, making exemption from radioactive waste classification inappropriate for WLP. Nevertheless, the IAEA concludes that the radiological risks to the public and the environment associated with the Lynas Advanced Material Plant operation are intrinsically low.

Furthermore, in a 2012 report, Dr. Ahmad Riadz bin Mazeli from the Disease Control Division of the Department of Environmental Health estimated the cancer risk caused by Lynas to be one in ten million. This estimation was based on an average total dose received by the public of 0.002 mSv/year and the risk coefficient of 0.0055% per mSv provided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Lynas’s radiation safety consultant, Ismail Bahari, further argued that this risk is relatively low compared to Malaysia’s cancer incidence rate of 7,200 cases per 10 million people, including 350 cases attributed to background radiation.

Lynas Execution

The previous section established that while WLP cannot be exempt from classification as radioactive waste, its impact can be minimised with proper handling. This section delves into the controversies surrounding LAMP throughout its lifecycle, from planning and construction to operation and waste disposal.

Construction

Critics argue that Kuantan’s natural environment is inherently unsuitable for a rare earth plant like LAMP. The site’s high annual rainfall, low evaporation rate, poor geotechnical stability of the clayey sandy fill over soft, swampy clay and groundwater which is only one meter below the surface contribute to its unsuitability for development. These concerns have only been amplified by various construction problems during the plant’s development have only amplified these concerns.

New York Times Report

In 2011, a New York Times report, based on leaks from anonymous Lynas engineers, exposed severe structural problems with 70 waste storage tanks, including cracks, air pockets, and leaks. Internal communications revealed that Lynas instructed contractors to disregard moisture concerns and proceed with lining installation, a request they refused due to safety risks.

In a bid to cut costs, Lynas opted for several construction methods that raised safety concerns.

This included omitting a protective plastic layer beneath the foundation, which increased the risk of moisture intrusion from the underlying reclaimed swamp. Additionally, the company chose to use standard steel piping instead of the more expensive but corrosion-resistant stainless steel or ceramic or rubber-lined steel piping commonly used in similar facilities. The tanks were built with conventional concrete rather than the more durable polymer concrete mixed with plastic often used in Western refineries.

Further controversy arose when AkzoNobel, the supplier of a crucial resin for tank lining known for its expertise in specialised resins for extreme heat and corrosiveness, withdrew from the project. Leaked emails revealed that AkzoNobel’s withdrawal stemmed from concerns about rising dampness and cracks in the concrete tank walls where the fibreglass liners were to be installed. The company stated that it could only recommend the use of its linings after successful long-term testing, which could not be completed within the project’s timeline.

Lynas, however, downplayed the significance of AkzoNobel’s departure, attributing it to a routine supplier switch. To reassure the public, Lynas introduced Trepax Thailand as their new partner, emphasising Trepax’s two decades of experience in the petrochemicals industry and their adoption of a vinylester resin meeting internationally recognised standards. Despite these concerns and the change in suppliers, Lynas executives maintained that the facility met all regulatory safety standards.

Oekoinstitut

Oekoinstitut, a non-profit environmental research institute based in Germany, has raised concerns about the design of the waste storage facility. They advocate for more robust designs that utilise thicker HDPE liners (2.5mm) and multiple layers of clay (25cm each) rather than the current single, thinner layer (1mm HDPE, 30cm clay). According to Oekoinstitut, the current design is expected to fail even before waste placement, with the risk increasing as the waste piles up. These concerns are echoed by the Australian NGO National Toxics Network, which warns that the current disposal plans are likely to contaminate groundwater within months.

Further exacerbating these concerns, the licensing conditions did not mandate a comprehensive hydrologic study. This oversight leaves critical information about the site’s hydrology unknown, including flow directions and seasonal transport speed profiles. With only seven boreholes on the site, each measured just once per day, potential leaks could go undetected for months. Even then, detection would only occur if the wells were located near the source and perfectly aligned with the leak’s flow path. In the worst-case scenario, contamination could spread undetected, and once identified, there would be no way to stop further leakage.

Waste Management

Recycle

Lynas initially aimed to commercialise its waste materials, which the company designates as residue. During 2013–2017, Lynas committed an annual investment of RM25 million (equivalent to 0.5% of sales) towards research and development initiatives in collaboration with institutions such as MARDI, Nuclear Malaysia, and various universities. The research activities entailed combining WLP and NUF with soil to develop Condisoil, a product envisioned as a substitute for gypsum in fertilisers and construction materials.

After analysing Condisoil, several organisations, including SIRIM, DoChem, MARDI, AELB, and DOA, determined that it was neither radioactive nor hazardous. Experiments conducted with Condisoil showed promising results, increasing oil palm and rice cultivation yields. However, elevated levels of heavy metals were also detected during these trials. Consequently, the Department of Environment (DOE) withheld approval for large-scale testing. Furthermore, concerns were also raised about its suitability as a construction material due to its increased plasticity.

An Australian NGO, the National Toxics Network, echoes this concern. In Australia, a similar radioactive waste, namely “Red Mud”, was used in road construction. Despite having lower radiation levels (1.1Bq/g) than WLP, it was found to have elevated radiation levels and was subsequently banned by the Western Australian Department of Health. In South Australia, experimental farm use of Red Mud resulted in animal illness and death, leading to farmer resistance. While proving a direct causal link is challenging, Red Mud dust was believed to be associated with pollution and health issues.

Oekoinstitut also raised significant concerns about the dilution of WLP waste. Even when diluted 1:1 with gypsum, the mixture will still exceed internationally accepted radiation levels by 200-fold. Even a 1:100 dilution, which is technically unrealistic, would still exceed the below BRC (below regulatory concern) levels. The institute concluded that a dilution ratio of 1:500 would be necessary to meet safety standards, but this is practically infeasible given the sheer volume of waste produced annually, which amounts to 30,000 tons.

Removal of waste from Malaysia

In 2012, due to public pressure, the Malaysian government required Lynas to issue a letter of undertaking promising the removal of any waste produced at the LAMP from Malaysia, if necessary, as a prerequisite for receiving a temporary license. Lynas Australia and Lynas Malaysia issued such letters on February 23, 2012, and March 6, 2012, respectively. The then-Ministers of International Trade and Industry (Mustapa Mohamed), Science, Technology, and Innovation (Maximus Ongkili), Natural Resources and Environment (Douglas Uggah Embas), and Health (Liow Tiong Lai) issued a joint statement that Lynas would remove the radioactive waste from Malaysia.

However, later that year, Lynas Malaysia contradicted this stance, stating they would not export the waste due to international conventions. Following Western Australia’s refusal to accept the waste in 2019, Lynas’s CEO denied any promise to return it, claiming the commitment was solely for the first temporary license period.

Permanent Disposal Facility (PDF)

Is Malaysia being unfairly scrutinised for its handling of Lynas’s waste management issue? Comparing other countries’ practices may provide valuable insights.

Consider Arafura, an Australian mining company, and their Nolan Project in northern Australia. In their 2019 proposal to the government for a rare earth mining and processing plant, they had already outlined a comprehensive waste management plan. Their radioactive solid waste will be stored in a lined and capped permanent residue storage facility, which will be ready two months before production begins.

Following the request to relocate its C&L process out of Malaysia, Lynas Australia constructed a rare earth processing facility in Western Australia. They initially proposed building a long-term by-product storage facility (BSF) on Yarri Road, located 3km from residential areas. The possible radioactive and air pollution hazards, combined with the pending Native Title determination for the proposed region, have aroused public concern.

In response to public concerns, Lynas Corporation has revised its proposal to return waste byproducts to the Mt Weld mine before a regulatory determination. This choice was made because of the existing low-level radioactive waste storage facility at the mine and its remote location, far from residential areas. The storage facility is designed to minimise seepage, with a 15-meter vertical distance from groundwater and a 300mm cover. The revised plan was approved by relevant authorities, including the Department of Mines, Industry Regulation, and Safety (DMIRS), the Western Australia Radiation Council, and the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in September 2021.

Conversely, the Malaysian authorities did not approach the waste management plan seriously. As early as 2011, the IAEA recommended establishing a long-term disposal strategy and requiring Lynas to submit such a plan before commencing operations, in addition to ensuring sufficient financial resources for responsible waste management. The IAEA also noted that the LAMP facility had a projected 20-year lifespan, while its radioactive solid facility (RSF) storage capacity was only five years.

Despite this recommendation, Lynas’s 2011 Radioactive Waste Management Plan and 2014 Long-Term Waste Management Plan only vaguely addressed the issue, proposing to store WLP in an unspecified off-site PDF and providing a USD 50 million as a security deposit. The adequacy of this amount was never thoroughly assessed. Oekoinstitut highlighted the unreasonableness of this estimation, citing that a smaller radioactive waste disposal facility in Bukit Merah had cost USD 100 million. The inadequacy of the initial projection was further demonstrated when the actual construction cost of the PDF, which could not accommodate all the waste, turned out to be RM400 million, nearly double the initial estimate.

By 2018, a Malaysian government statement revealed that 451,564 metric tonnes of WLP and 1.113 million metric tonnes of NUF had been stored at the plant for six years, far exceeding the limits set by the Environmental Quality Regulations. The Malaysian government also required Lynas to build a PDF to store the waste already produced in 2019; after the Western Australian government refused to accept the radioactive waste.

The Lynas controversy did not stop there. Following the Department of Environment’s rejection of the initial Bukit Ketam site, Lynas decided to build a smaller PDF adjacent to its existing LAMP facility despite the land lease being limited to 86 years. The PDF, with a planned capacity of 1.1 million cubic meters, would be the world’s largest surface radioactive waste disposal facility, surpassing the current leader in France, the Andra CIRES facility.

Andra CIRES was developed over many years by Andra, a French national agency with decades of experience in radioactive waste management. In contrast, the Lynas PDF construction contract was awarded to Gading Senggara, a company suspected of having no waste disposal experience. The involvement of prominent figures like Tengku Hassanal Ibrahim Alam Shah, the Regent of Pahang, and Bentong Umno Vice-Chief Johari Harun as shareholders in Gading Senggara further fueled public scepticism.

Extraction of Thorium

There are several methods for extracting thorium, including ion exchange, chemical precipitation, electrochemical methods, membrane separation, and adsorption. Among these, adsorption utilising materials like zeolite is considered optimal due to its safety, ease of operation, environmental friendliness, and cost-effectiveness. However, natural zeolite has limited adsorption capacity and requires additives to enhance its performance.

After receiving funding from Lynas, Malaysia began actively researching thorium extraction technology in 2014, with Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), and Nuklear Malaysia all participating. A breakthrough came in 2023 when researchers at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) successfully demonstrated the use of phosphate-modified zeolite to remove thorium from rare earth industrial residues. Their study, published in Nature, proved the effectiveness of this method in a laboratory setting. The experimental results indicate that a removal rate of 99.9% can be achieved when 0.03 grams of phosphate-modified zeolite and 2 millilitres of thorium solution are stirred at 775 rpm for 24 hours under acidic conditions of pH 3.

From the obtained results, it is estimated that each kilogram of adsorbent material can remove approximately 17.3g of thorium. To process 1.08 million tons of residue containing 1557 tons of thorium, about 90,559 tons of zeolite would be required. While this quantity may appear substantial, employing this process could reduce the storage volume by an impressive 95%. Although it is characterised by elevated radiation concentration levels, smaller-sized radioactive waste is more manageable and offers potential for commercialisation.

The Malaysian Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation announced that after evaluation, their team deemed the proposal feasible and upscaling achievable by the end of 2025, leading to removing the requirement for Lynas to relocate C&L out of Malaysia. The approval of thorium reactors is considered premature by critics, as the technology’s scalability remains unconfirmed. The proposal to commercialise extracted thorium is also subject to scrutiny due to the current absence of operational commercial thorium nuclear reactors. Without commercially viable reactors, Lynas must still formulate a long-term disposal plan for the more dangerous extracted thorium with higher concentrations.

Empirical Evidence of Lynas Environmental Impact

Radioactive Impact

Despite the criticisms, no substantial evidence indicates significant radiation pollution from Lynas’s Gebeng operation over the past decade.

The Radioactive Impact Assessment (RIA) report, based on data collected nine months after the plant’s operation, shows that the radiation dose for residents within 5km of the facility is 0.0131 mSv/a. The average radiation dose received by employees is 0.021 mSv/a. Most employees get below 1 mSv/a, yet two stand out with much higher doses of 2 mSv/a and 3 mSv/a, respectively.

Data provided by Lynas to the Western Australian government further supports this. It indicates that the maximum dose at LAMP between 2014 and 2019 was 1.7 mSv/year, with an average of 0.6 ± 0.3 mSv/year. These figures are below the national standard of 20 mSv, the public standard of 1 mSv, and the AELB’s specific standard for Lynas of 1 mSv.

The AELB has also monitored radiation levels in the Gebeng industrial area and Kuantan. From 2012 to 2019, the levels ranged from 0.05 to 0.4 mSv/hour, showing no significant difference from pre-2012 levels.

Water Pollution

The only direct evidence of contamination from the data is the excessive levels of heavy metals in groundwater. For example, nickel concentration increased from 7 µg/L in 2007 to 96,110 µg/L in 2015, exceeding the safety standard of 75 µg/L by 1280 times. Mercury, previously undetectable, reached 5.06 µg/L, surpassing the safety standard of 0.3 µg/L by 16 times. These are just a few examples of the concerning rise in heavy metal levels observed in the groundwater. Subsequent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports indicated a continued upward trend in these levels.

Additionally, Sg Balok was contaminated with Thorium-228 (Th-228), with levels ranging from 0.13 to 0.44 Bq/L. While the National Water Quality Standard (NWQS) does not specify a safety limit for Th-228, it stipulates that water with a Thorium-226 activity concentration exceeding 0.1 Bq/L cannot be used for any purpose. The 2016 RIA showed a significantly higher concentration of Uranium-238 in stream sediments at the LAMP effluent dump site compared to downstream locations. The EIA report revealed that radioactivity levels for thorium, uranium and radium on three fish species caught have exceeded parameters.

However, Relevant authorities have been unable to determine the source of the contamination.

After sampling and testing, the RIA concluded that Lynas’s operations did not cause radioactive contamination of surface water. At the same time, the EIA report attributed the spikes to natural occurrences. Lynas expressed confidence that metals could not migrate from their residues to groundwater, suggesting that the contamination originated from other factories. They cited a news article quoting scientists raising alarms about high concentrations of heavy metals in water drawn downstream from bauxite mines.

Conclusion

In my opinion, rare earth processing is not inherently harmful to our country. However, the regulatory practices surrounding Lynas’s operations raise significant concerns, particularly regarding transparency. For example, the 2008 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was not released to the public until 2011, and the Lynas Radioactive Waste Management Plan was only accessible for a limited time, with restrictions on copying or photographing the document.

This lack of transparency contrasts sharply with the openness demonstrated by Western Australia’s government, where relevant documents, even a proposal dating back to 1992, remain readily accessible online and provide comprehensive and detailed information.

While the evidence presented by NGOs may not be irrefutable, this is partly due to limited resources and restricted access to critical information. The public’s concern is reasonable and understandable, especially considering the Bukit Merah incident in the 1980s. The government bears the responsibility to protect its citizens and strike a balance between reaping the economic benefits of development and safeguarding the environment and public health. The principles of transparency, accountability, and responsible waste management are essential elements of long-term sustainability and should be integral components in all development projects.