The Ghosts of Akombe’s Report

Will the New IEBC Commissioners Escape the Same Traps?

In October 2017, Dr. Roselyn Akombe, a former Commissioner of Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), penned a scathing End of Assignment Report that laid bare the institutional rot, political interference, and operational chaos that plagued the commission during her tenure from January to October 2017.

Her resignation, announced from New York amid fears for her safety, was a clarion call for reform, warning that the IEBC was “under siege” by partisan interests and internal dysfunction.

As Kenya welcomes a new cohort of IEBC Commissioners, namely: Erastus Ethekon, Ann Nderitu, Moses Alutalala Mukhwana, Mary Sorobit, Hassan Noor Hassan, Francis Aduol, and Fahima Abdallah, Dr. Akombe’s report remains a haunting blueprint of the susceptibility areas these appointees must navigate.

With several commissioners linked to political heavyweights in the ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition and the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the question looms: Can they escape the traps that ensnared Dr. Akombe’s commission, or are they doomed to repeat history as the 2027 General Election approaches?

Samaismela — The Ghosts of Akombe’s Report

Dr. Akombe’s Warning: A Commission Under Siege

Dr. Akombe’s 92-page report is a masterclass in institutional critique, detailing how the IEBC’s independence was eroded by political intimidation, internal divisions, patronage-driven appointments, procurement scandals, and technological vulnerabilities.

Her tenure coincided with the tumultuous 2017 elections, marred by the Supreme Court’s annulment of the August presidential poll due to “irregularities and illegalities.” Dr. Akombe’s decision to resign, citing the commission’s inability to guarantee a credible repeat election in October, underscored her belief that the IEBC had become a pawn in Kenya’s polarized political chess game.

Her report identified five key susceptibility areas:

1. Institutional issues,

2. Election operations,

3. Electoral technology,

4. Public outreach, and

5. Legal reforms

Collectively, they continue to threaten the IEBC’s integrity.

For the new commissioners, these areas are not just historical lessons but active minefields, exacerbated by their own political affiliations.

Political Interference: The Invisible Hand

Dr. Akombe’s most damning revelation was the pervasive political interference that turned IEBC plenary meetings into battlegrounds of fear and intimidation. She recounts how government and party officials received “blow-by-blow briefings” of closed-door discussions, with commissioners facing calls from political actors after meetings (p. 20).

This created a chilling effect, where some commissioners remained silent or aligned with “reporters” to avoid retribution. The new commissioners, several of whom have ties to Kenya’s political elite, are particularly vulnerable to this pressure.

Erastus Ethekon, the new chairperson, is a close ally of Josphat Nanok, the State House Deputy Chief of Staff and a key figure in President William Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA). This connection places Ethekon in the crosshairs of government influence, much like Dr. Akombe’s colleagues who were reminded that their jobs were “provided by Government” (p. 19).

Similarly, Dr. Moses Alutalala Mukhwana, associated with the founding of the Amani National Congress (ANC) and linked to Musalia Mudavadi, the Prime Cabinet Secretary and a senior Kenya Kwanza figure, risks pressure from party operatives within the ruling coalition.

Hassan Noor Hassan’s alleged familial tie to ODM’s Junet Mohamed, despite ODM’s recent collaboration with the Ruto government, exposes him to dual pressures from opposition and government actors. Hassan is also linked to the unresolved National Youth Service (NYS) scandal from Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration.

Ann Nderitu, whose tenure as Registrar of Political Parties was criticized for perceived partisanship toward incumbent parties, may struggle to resist similar calls from ruling elites.

Prof. Francis Aduol’s leadership, during the Technical University of Kenya’s financial mismanagement crises, suggests possible connections to political or bureaucratic networks that enabled or overlooked the institution’s challenges. This controversial past could make him susceptible to pressure to avoid further scrutiny.

Sources have alleged that Mary Sorobit was an advisor to then Deputy President Ruto and this puts to question her impartiality at pressure point.

Dr. Akombe’s report warns that such interference thrives in an environment where commissioners and staff are appointed through political patronage rather than merit (p. 19).

The new commission’s composition, with at least six members tied to political figures, suggests that this vulnerability persists.

Without adopting Akombe’s recommendation for a cross-party, multi-sectoral appointment model (p. 22), the IEBC risks becoming a battleground where Ethekon, Mukhwana, Hassan, Nderitu, Aduol and Sorobit are pressured to serve their political patrons rather than the Kenyan electorate.

Internal Divisions: A House Divided

Akombe’s report vividly describes the IEBC’s internal dysfunction, driven by dual centers of power between the Chairperson and the CEO, which fractured the commission into factions (p. 17). This was starkly evident when five commissioners publicly disavowed Chairman Wafula Chebukati’s memo to the CEO in September 2017, undermining staff morale and exposing the commission’s disunity (p. 18). Political actors exploited these divisions, pitting factions against each other to advance their agendas.

The new commissioners face a similar risk, particularly given their political affiliations. Ethekon’s tie to Nanok may align him with pro-government factions, potentially alienating commissioners like Hassan, whose ODM connection could pull him toward opposition-leaning stances. Mukhwana and Nderitu, both linked to Kenya Kwanza by inference and public perception, may reinforce a ruling-party bloc, deepening divisions if they prioritize coalition interests over consensus.

Dr. Akombe’s observation that commissioners voted along partisan lines (p. 81) is a warning for Ethekon, who must unify a commission where political loyalties could fracture decision-making, otherwise the new IEBC risks repeating the factionalism that crippled her tenure.

Patronage and Lack of Expertise: The Cost of Compromise

Dr. Akombe criticizes the IEBC’s appointment process, noting that commissioners were selected through political deals rather than expertise or integrity (p.7). The 2017 commission, including herself, lacked election management experience, making it reliant on a politically influenced secretariat (p. 82). This patronage tied commissioners to the executive, undermining their independence and exposing them to accusations of bias. In the new IEBC Commissioners context, the previous IEBC working experience by Ann Nderitu risks creating a power base that the Secretariat will gravitate towards, especially if she becomes the Commission’s Vice Chair; worse if they settle for the inexperienced Fahima Abdallah.

The new commissioners’ profiles echo this concern. Ethekon’s appointment, linked to Nanok, and Mukhwana’s to Mudavadi, suggest political bargaining, aligning with Akombe’s critique of executive influence. Dr. Mukhwana’s sweaty appearance captured by national media before the IEBC Tribunal in 2022 petitioning IEBC’s revocation of his client’s (Mr. Walter Mong’are’s) nomination by the Umoja Summit Party as Presidential candidate over lack of a degree certificate gives a glimpse into potentially sweaty future moments.

Hassan’s controversial shortlist addition and tie to Junet Mohamed raise questions about merit, while Nderitu’s ORPP tenure, marred by failures in party register management, casts doubt on her electoral expertise, especially in a high pressure environment.

Francis Aduol’s association with the Technical University of Kenya (TUK) pension scandal further aligns with Dr. Akombe’s concern about appointing individuals with unresolved integrity questions (p. 7).

Mary Sorobit and Fahima Abdallah, while less overtly tied to political figures, lack public records of electoral experience, potentially leaving them unprepared for the IEBC’s complex mandate.

Dr. Akombe’s recommendation for commissioners with demonstrated electoral expertise and unquestionable integrity (p. 22) is a challenge the new team must meet. Without such qualifications, they risk being manipulated by political patrons or overwhelmed by the secretariat, as Dr. Akombe’s commission was.

Samaismela — The Ghosts of Akombe’s Report

Procurement Scandals: The Lure of Corruption

Procurement irregularities were a recurring theme in Dr. Akombe’s report, with processes for the Kenya Integrated Electoral Management System (KIEMS) and ballot papers mired in “intrigue” and allegations of corruption, which dubbed the “Ballot paper saga” (p. 27). She describes tender evaluation committees as “harvest season” for personal gain, recommending an independent audit of procurement from 2012–2017 (p. 21). Commissioners with financial or institutional scandals are particularly vulnerable to pressure from actors seeking to exploit these processes. Further, the Commissioners join IEBC when the Secretariat has already submitted the current financial year’s budget to Parliament. They will be sitting ducks for vote lines already pre-determined.

Dr. Akombe noted that procurement vulnerabilities were used to intimidate and guilt-trip commissioners (p. 33). Hassan’s association with the National Youth Service (NYS) scandal, a major corruption case, heightens his susceptibility to manipulation by actors shielding scandal-related figures. Nderitu, Mukhwana, Sorobit, and Abdallah, while not directly linked to scandals, operate in an environment where procurement decisions are politically charged, increasing their exposure to pressure.

Dr. Akombe’s call for transparent procurement and independent audits remains unheeded, leaving the new commissioners vulnerable to the same “vendor wars” that plagued her tenure. Without robust oversight, the IEBC risks becoming a conduit for corruption, with politically connected commissioners at the forefront.

Technological Vulnerabilities: A Ticking Time Bomb

Dr. Akombe’s report exposes the IEBC’s over-reliance on external contractors like Safran/OT-Morpho for electoral technology, particularly the voter register and results transmission (p. 34). The unauthorized use of Chairman Chebukati’s account 9,934 times (p. 77) and the use of insecure systems like FileZilla underscored the system’s fragility. She recommended an independent audit of the 2017 election technology and stakeholder oversight (p. 8).

The new commissioners, particularly those with political ties, face pressure to approve flawed technological processes or overlook irregularities. Ethekon and Mukhwana’s Kenya Kwanza connections could lead to demands to favor government-aligned contractors, while Hassan’s ODM link may prompt partisan challenges to technological decisions. Nderitu’s ORPP failures in managing party registers suggest a vulnerability to technological mismanagement. Having served TUK for fourteen and a half years including as the founder Vice Chancellor, Prof Aduol will forever bear the burden of the Auditor General’s report of 2021, which cited unpaid staff arrears, irregular expenditure, and unsupported allowances, painting a grim picture of chaotic accounting and lax oversight during his leadership. Sorobit, and Abdallah’s lack of documented expertise may leave them deferring to external actors, as Dr. Akombe’s colleagues did.

Without building internal technological capacity and involving stakeholders, as Dr. Akombe and the National Super Alliance (NASA) proposed (p. 75), the IEBC’s technology remains a weak link, susceptible to manipulation and public distrust.

The Path Forward: Heeding Akombe’s Call

Dr. Akombe’s report is not just a critique but a roadmap for reform. Her recommendations — adopting a cross-party appointment model, making plenary meetings public, strengthening commissioner support, conducting procurement audits, and building technological capacity — offer a way to mitigate the new commissioners’ vulnerabilities. Yet, the persistence of political appointments and unaddressed structural flaws suggest that these reforms remain distant.

For Ethekon, Mukhwana, Hassan, and Nderitu, the challenge is to transcend their political ties and prioritize institutional independence. Aduol must navigate his scandal-tainted past to affirm integrity, while Sorobit and Abdallah must assert themselves in a polarized commission. The 2027 election looms as a test of whether the IEBC can escape the ghosts of Dr. Akombe’s report or succumb to the same traps of interference, division, and corruption.

Kenya’s democracy deserves an IEBC that serves the people, not political elites. Dr. Akombe’s courage in speaking truth to power should inspire the new commissioners to confront these susceptibilities head-on. If they fail, the cost will be another election mired in controversy, further eroding public trust in the democratic process. The choice is theirs — will they be custodians of credible elections or pawns in a political game?

Click the link for Dr. Akombe’s *End of Assignment Report*

ENDS

The Author is a Social Consciousness Theorist, a Corporate Trainer & Speaker, an Agronomist consultant for golf courses and sportsfields & Author of “The Gigantomachy of Samaismela” and “The Trouble with Kenya: McKenzian Blueprint”

Samaismela.substack.com ; X (Twitter): @samaismela