Dear John Henry: Greg Weissert Isn’t the Problem. His Role Is.

Dear John Henry: Greg Weissert Isn’t the Problem. His Role Is.

Dear Mr. Henry,

Please stop using Greg Weissert like he is a five-alarm fireman.

This is not a “Greg Weissert is terrible”. It is actually the opposite. This is a “please use Greg Weissert in the role where he has shown he can succeed.

Because right now, the Red Sox are taking a pitcher who was useful in 2025 and putting him into situations that his 2026 numbers very clearly say are the wrong spots for him.

In 2025, Weissert was a valuable bullpen piece.

He appeared in 72 games, posted a 2.82 ERA, had a 1.16 WHIP, held opponents to a .647 OPS, recorded 17 holds, and gave the Red Sox exactly the kind of steady relief innings a team needs over a long season.

He was not perfect, but he was useful.

And most importantly, he was used in a way that made sense.

In 2025, Weissert inherited 28 runners all season. Only 7 of them scored.

That means just 25% of the runners he inherited came around to score.

That is a helpful reliever. That is a pitcher who can be part of a functional bullpen. That is someone who can bridge the game from the starter to the late innings.

But in 2026, the usage has changed dramatically.

This year, in only 25 games, Weissert has already inherited 21 runners.

Last year, he inherited 28 runners in 72 games.

That means his inherited-runner burden has more than doubled.

In 2025, he inherited 0.39 runners per appearance.

In 2026, he is inheriting 0.84 runners per appearance.

And the results are screaming that this is not the right role.

In 2026, 12 of the 21 runners he inherited have scored.

That is 57.1%.

So the Red Sox are not just asking Weissert to pitch. They are asking him to clean up other pitchers’ messes. And right now, that is the one job his numbers say he should not be doing.

The splits make this impossible to ignore.

With nobody on base in 2026, opponents are hitting:

.227 / .277 / .341 / .618 OPS

That is playable.

That is useful.

That is a pitcher who can start a clean inning and get outs.

But with runners on base, opponents are hitting:

.313 / .370 / .583 / .954 OPS

With runners in scoring position:

.269 / .333 / .615 / .949 OPS

And with the bases loaded:

.750 / .800 / 1.500 / 2.300 OPS

That is not a small difference. That is the entire explanation.

Greg Weissert should not be the guy entering with traffic.

He should be the guy starting the inning before the traffic exists.

Even with just a runner on first base, the problem shows up. If you take his overall runners-on numbers and separate out the runners-in-scoring-position situations, you can estimate what has happened when there is only a runner on first.

With a runner on first only, opponents are roughly hitting:

.364 / .417 / .545 / .962 OPS

So this is not only about bases-loaded disasters.

It is about traffic, period.

With nobody on, Weissert has been usable.

With any runner on base, he has become vulnerable.

With runners in scoring position, the damage has become game-changing.

That is why the inherited-runner number matters so much.

His official ERA is 4.24, but that does not fully show the damage. Inherited runners are charged to the pitcher who put them on base. So when Weissert allows those runners to score, the runs damage the scoreboard, damage the game, and damage the previous pitcher’s ERA, but they do not fully show up in Weissert’s line.

The box score may say he gave up one earned run.

The game may say he let three runs score.

That matters.

And yes, I understand that Team Italy used him as more of a fireman or closer in tournament play. He was successful in that type of role. But tournament baseball is not the same thing as the everyday grind of a 162-game regular season.

In tournament baseball, you can ride adrenaline. You can ask a pitcher to empty the tank in short bursts. You can build around one matchup, one moment, one country, one inning.

That does not mean the same pitcher should automatically become a regular-season fireman for the Boston Red Sox, entering with runners on base every few days and being asked to rescue innings already on fire.

That is not the same job.

A closer starting the ninth with a clean inning is not the same as a reliever entering in the sixth with two runners on and one out.

A tournament save is not the same as being used repeatedly as a regular-season inherited-runner specialist.

The Red Sox need to separate those two things.

Weissert’s 2026 numbers say he can still help this team. But they also say exactly how he should be used.

Use him to start clean innings.

Use him with nobody on.

Use him in the sixth or seventh when the inning is his from the beginning.

Use him against the bottom of the order.

Use him in medium leverage until the contact damage stabilizes.

But stop using him as the guy who inherits the mess.

Because right now, this is not just hurting Weissert. It is hurting the team.

And this is not just about Greg Weissert.

This is about the way the Red Sox roster appears to have been built.

Too often, this front office seems to build the team around ideas /projections instead of actual roles.

• What if this player can handle second base?
• What if this starter can become a reliever?
• What if this young player can adjust on the fly?
• What if this bench player can become an everyday answer?
• What if this bullpen piece can cover a leverage role we never actually went out and acquired?

That is not roster construction.

That is wish-casting.

Greg Weissert is a perfect example.

The Red Sox did not go out and get a true inherited-runner fireman. They are trying to turn Weissert into one.

But his 2026 numbers say that is not who he is.

So the question should not be, “Can we imagine Weissert becoming a fireman?”

The question should be, “What is he actually showing us?”

And what he is showing is very clear.

He can help this team when he starts clean innings.

He should not be used as the emergency escape hatch with runners already on base.

That is the larger issue with this roster. The Red Sox keep putting players into theoretical roles instead of defined ones.

They are building around maybe instead of is.

• Maybe Weissert can be a fireman.
• Maybe Ceddanne Rafaela can be a second baseman.
• Maybe Marcelo Mayer can bounce around the infield instead of settling into his natural position.
• Maybe the extremely young lineup can work without clear veteran structure.
• Maybe the bullpen can survive without enough defined leverage arms.
• Maybe young players can keep adjusting while the organization keeps changing the assignment.
• Maybe starting pitching and defense can keep our season alive.
• Maybe the team can all fill their potential at once so we don’t need a proven veteran slugger.
• Maybe, maybe, maybe…

But a major-league roster should not be built on that many maybes.

There is a difference between player development and role confusion.

There is a difference between versatility and instability.

There is a difference between giving a player opportunity and asking him to become something the roster failed to acquire.

If the Red Sox needed a fireman, they should have acquired a fireman.

Instead, they are taking a useful reliever and forcing him into the fireman role because the roster was not built with enough true leverage protection.

And then when it goes badly, it looks like the player failed.

But sometimes the player did not fail.

Sometimes the role failed.

Sometimes the roster construction failed.

Sometimes the front office created a job that needed to be filled and then handed it to the closest available player, whether or not that player’s skill set actually matched the job.

That is what this feels like with Weissert.

He is not useless.

He is miscast.

If the Red Sox had used him like they did in 2025, he would have inherited about 10 runners by this point instead of 21. Even if he still struggled at the same 2026 rate, that would mean roughly six inherited runners scoring instead of twelve.

And if he were used like 2025 and performed closer to his 2025 inherited-runner rate, the number would be more like two or three inherited runners scoring.

That is the difference between a manageable bullpen issue and a game-changing problem.

This is where the frustration comes in.

The Red Sox keep talking about run prevention, matchups, process, versatility, and putting players in positions to succeed.

Then put Greg Weissert in a position to succeed.

Do not make him something he is not.

He is not, based on this year’s numbers, the guy to bring in with the bases loaded.

He is not the guy to bring in with runners in scoring position.

He is not the guy to use as the emergency escape hatch.

He is a useful reliever when used correctly.

And right now, the Red Sox are not using him correctly.

So please, John, tell the front office and coaching staff to stop trying to prove how clever they are and just use the player in the role his own numbers support.

Start the inning clean.

Let him get three outs.

Stop handing him someone else’s mess and then acting surprised when the inning explodes.

Greg Weissert does not need to be buried.

He needs to be used properly.

And honestly, so do a lot of players on this roster.

Too many of them are not just being asked to perform. They are being asked to solve roster-construction problems they did not create.

Sincerely,

A Red Sox fan who can read the splits