This Week in Sanctions & Export Controls for the weeks ending 10 and 17 May 2026

Here are the five most important things that happened during the preceding two weeks in sanctions and export controls.

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1. The U.S. issues its first Cuba sanctions designations under Executive Order 14404

The United States Department of State issued its first designations pursuant to Executive Order 14404 (Cuba). Two companies were designated, one for operating in Cuba’s financial sector and the other for operating in Cuba’s mining sector, along with individual for being in the management of one the two companies. Both companies are also previously designated pursuant to the Cuba Assets Control Regulations (CACR) (31 C.F.R. Part 515), which — unlike Executive Order 14404 — does not include secondary designation risk tied to primary designations. Thus, these designations are the first by the U.S. related to Cuba that carry secondary designation risk. Expect the U.S. to continue designations of Cuban entities under Executive Order 14404 that are already designated pursuant to the CACR for the specific purpose of adding secondary designation risk tied to Cuban designees.

Notably, these designations are promulgated by the U.S. Department of State instead of the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). As with most U.S. sanctions programs, both have concurrent designation authority. Given Secretary of State Marco Rubio (himself the son of Cuban immigrants to the U.S.) is anchoring Trump administration policy vis-a-vis Cuba, it is anticipated that Executive Order 14404 designations to be promulgated by the U.S. Department of State.

In tandem with the designations, OFAC issued General License 1, which — in anticipation of further parallel designations of parties under Executive Order 14404 that are already designated pursuant to the CACR — authorizes any activity as to those designated pursuant to Executive Order 14404 otherwise already permitted relating to them under the CACR by either a currently operative general license or CACR’s general license provisions (see 31 C.F.R. Sec. 515.501 et seq.).

OFAC also published frequently asked questions (FAQs) 1251–1256, which — in addition to explaining General License 1, clarify that Executive Order 14404’s sectoral designation authority provisions do not categorically designate all parties within such categories, but instead specifically authorize the U.S. to specifically designate parties (which is the case with all U.S. sanctions executive orders that are so-worded). The FAQs also highlight that Executive Order 14404 provides a separate blocking authority than the CACR and the secondary designation risk for parties that interact with Executive Order 14404 designees.

2. The European Commission publishes EU member state compliance with dual use requirements and unilateral member state actions

The European Commission published an informative report that details numerous dual use actions taken by and additional measures imposed by each of the EU’s 27 member states relating to Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (dual use). In particular, the report details measures taken by member states relating to brokerage service licensing requirements, transit through member states of non-EU items that would be subject to EU dual use if of EU origin, technical assistance licensing requirements, public security-related requirements imposed by member states on items not otherwise subject to EU dual use requirements, intra-EU transfer licensing requirements imposed for EU dual use listed items of strategic importance, member state exercise of EU dual use requirements via customs authorities and on the respective authorities in member states relevant to enforcement of EU dual use law.

Notably, the report also details the application of export licensing requirements imposed unilaterally by member states for items not listed in Annex I to Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2021/821 pursuant to Articles 4(3) (wherein 16 member states imposed restrictions relating to non-Annex I items related to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and for military end-use) and 5(3) (where 10 member states imposed restrictions realating to non-Annex I items used for cybersurveillance used, internal repression or human rights violations). Recall that in a 2024 white paper, the European Commission encouraged member states to refrain from imposing unilateral controls on items not already in Annex I and advocated for more expedient, aligned revisions to Annex I to ensure a unified EU-wide application of dual use law.

3. The U.S. continues Operation Economic Fury designations to pressure Iran (and its oil clients)

As Iran’s continued blockade of the Hormuz Strait is pressing shipping companies to either pay Iran’s toll for transiting the international waterway or seek alternative solutions (yes, name pun intended), OFAC issued three separate designation notices targeting Iranian oil and weapons production.

First, OFAC designated Iraq’s deputy oil minister and three Iraqi persons and four companies involved in illicit diversion of Iraqi oil to Iran and Iranian-directed attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria. The designations signal increased U.S. targeting of Iranian proxy activity in Iraq aimed at proliferating political destabilization and oil theft the profits of which fund terrorist activity directed by Iran and are all pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (terrorism).

Second, OFAC designated 10 persons and companies in China, the U.A.E. and Belarus, all for involvement in procurement networks that feed Iran’s Iran’s Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missile programs. Shahed UAVs are currently used extensively by Iran in attacks on Middle East countries and provided by Iran to Russia for use in Ukraine. All of the designations are pursuant to both primary and secondary authorities in Executive Order 13382 (weapons of mass destruction).

Third, OFAC designated 12 persons and entities in Iran, the U.A.E., Oman and China involved obscuring and transporting Iranian Revolutionary oil to China for the benefit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The designations echo advisory warnings by OFAC related the sale of Iranian oil to China via so-called “teapot” refineries. As all of the designations are IRGC-related, they are promulgated pursuant to secondary authorities in Executive Order 13224 given the IRGC’s terrorism designation.

Notably, all three designation notices include wording that clearly warns non-U.S. banks to avoid secondary designation risk pursuant to Executive Order 13876 (post-JCPOA Iran) and Executive Order 13902 (Iran sectors) for involvement in Iranian commercial activity (most significantly, oil) and non-U.S. companies that aid Iranian airlines.

4. The U.K. issues Russia, Iran and illicit migration-related sanctions listings

The United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) issued diverse designations tied to three of its sanctions programs.

First, FCDO listed 12 persons and entities in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, the United Kingdom, the U.A.E. and St. Kitts and Nevis for activity directed at causing malfeasant harm to either the U.K. or other countries. All of the listings are pursuant to the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023. ¨

Second, FDCO listed 15 persons and two companies involved in illegal migration-related human smuggling of persons to the United Kingdom. All of the designations are pursuant to the Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025. Recall that last year the U.K. was the first jurisdiction globally to promulgated sanctions listing authorities tied to illegal migration. The European Union is considering similar sanctions regulations, while U.S. sanctions designations tied to illegal immigration are issued pursuant to Executive Order 13581 (transnational criminal organizations) or Executive Order 13224 where facilitated via U.S.-terrorism designated cartels.

Third, FDCO listed 63 persons and 22 entities, all Russian, involved in Russia’s forceable deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children and interference in Armenia’s upcoming June parliamentary elections. All of the listings are pursuant to the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. FDCO also separately listed 10 persons and eight entities, also all Russian, involved in Russian drone production for use in its war in Ukraine.

5. The EU issues listings tied to Russian abduction of Ukrainian children and prepares its 21st package agianst Russia

In tandem with the above-mentioned U.K. listings of Russian persons and entities involved in the abduction of Ukrainian children, the Council of the European Union listed 16 persons and seven entities, all Russian and Ukrainian, involved in the coerced abduction of Ukrainian children for placement in Russian indoctrination camps. The listings, all pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 269/2014, signal an increased practice by the Council to promulgate Russia-related sanctions listings on a rolling basis outside more formalized packages. While packages including diverse measures are expected to persist, anticipate that the Council occasionally also will promulgate ad hoc listings and modifications to trade-related prohibitions (such as revocation of the Russian oil price cap in favor of a maritime services ban).

On a related note, the Council is reported to be currently preparing its 21st tranche of sanctions on Russia, expected to be promulgated in late June or early July. Measures are anticipated to include furhter restrictions related to Russia’s shadow fleet, Russian banks, financial institutions and military-industrial companies as well as firms selling stolen Ukrainian grain. Notably, there are no current sanctions barring EU companies from involvement in Russian theft of Ukrainian grain absent other prohibitions such as involvement with sanctioned Russians.

Comments

Litigation before the General Court (GC) and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) challenging EU sanctions listings by targeted Russian sanctions targets (mostly oligarchs with the financial means to afford the fees charged by EU-based attorneys active in the sanctions delisting practice) has increased exponentially in line with the EU’s significant expansion of such listings after Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These cases have given rise to fascinating and probative considerations as to both GC and CJEU jurisprudential precedents flowing therefrom and related Council designation authorities.

On this subject, a recent piece titled “Legal Strategies to Prevent the Lifting of Asset Freezes: Towards the Immobilisation of Russian Private Wealth in the EU?” (European Journal of Risk Regulation (2006), 1–17) authored by Francesca Finelli and Celia Challet is recommended.

Further, on a related note OFAC quietly published a notice on its International Criminal Court sanctions program page clarifying that OFAC is not enforcing the asset freeze designation against Francesca Albanese upon a recent U.S. District Court decision granting Albanese temporary relief from her designation by OFAC pending the outcome of litigation challenging her designation.

The notice arises, as stated briefly by OFAC from a decision last week by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granting a plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief barring OFAC from enforcing Albanese’s sanctions designation pursuant to Executive Order 14203 (International Criminal Court) pending the outcome of the case brought by her husband and minor daughter challenging her designation (L.C., et al. v. Trump, et al., Civ. Case No. 26–688 (RJL) (D.D.C.)).

Albanese was designated by OFAC pursuant to Executive Order 14203 on 7 September 2025. Along with her designation, OFAC issued General License 8 (allowing for wind down of transactions to Albanese).

Albanese is an Italian citizen and the United Nations special rapporteur for the Palestine issue. In this role, among other things, Albanese has argued that Israel’s response to the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel is genocide and called for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and issue criminal warrants against U.S. companies active in Israel that Albanese claims support Israel.

OFAC’s designation of Albanese pursuant to Executive Order 14203 is upon the authority therein permitting designation of persons who “have directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute a protected person without consent of that person’s country of nationality” and upon OFAC’s finding that Albanese’s advocacy for ICC criminal investigations and indictments of U.S. companies satisfied this designation authority.

Not long after, Albanese sought support from the United Nations to challenge her designation — which the U.N. declined. Shortly thereafter, her husband (also an Italian) and minor daughter (a U.S. citizen born while the couple lived in the United States in 2013 during her husband’s tenure at the World Bank) brought the current action challenging Albanese’s designation.

Upon the court’s finding that her husband and daughter had third party standing to bring the lawsuit, the court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion that Albanese’s sanctions designation be temporarily void as unconstitutional. In particular, the court granted this temporary injunctive relief on the basis that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution bars OFAC from designating an individual solely on the basis if that person’s speech where such speech is not a mandatory instruction to others to perform some act that undermines U.S. national security interests as prescribed in sanctions designation authorities.

Here, Albanese — who is not an employee of the ICC — encouraged the ICC to investigate and issue criminal warrants against U.S. companies with business interests in Israel on the basis, as she claimed in her advocacy, that these companies facilitated genocide.

As noted, in Albanese’s designation, OFAC relied on Albanese’s speech alone to claim that such activity evidenced that she “directly engaged” in ICC efforts to investigate and prosecute Americans without the consent of the U.S. (which is required pursuant to the ICC’s Rome Statute). However, notwithstanding that Albanese did not work for the ICC, there was no evidence that the ICC took any such action as a result of her advocacy.

While the case remains in litigation, a U.S. District Court’s granting of temporary injunctive relief early in a case signal strongly that the litigant for whom such relief is granted is most likely to prevail in final judgement, thus plaintiffs are likely to be awarded final judgment annulling Albanese’s sanctions designation.

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The content of this newsletter is written entirely by me. No artificial intelligence is used.

Copyright 2026 — Jeff Nielsen