Tuchel: The subs don’t work, they just make you worse

Did Thomas Tuchel get his subs wrong? This is the big talking point following England’s World Cup semi-final exit to Argentina.

Let’s analyse the second half, where the drama happened as Argentina came back to win 2–1 in the closing stages of the game.

Gordon’s gamble

England’s goal came off a Harry Kane long ball that wasn’t properly cleared by Nicolas Tagliafico. Argentina’s lines became stretched, allowing Declan Rice to collect the loose ball, drive forward and start the attack. Morgan Rodgers puts a cross in and Anthony Gordon gambles to finish at the back post.

Tuchel’s explanation for what followed is that England’s players decided to drop off after going ahead. In reality, Argentina were always the team trying to impose themselves with the ball, were threatening more in the second half anyway, and after going 1–0 down, they simply upped the tempo of play in search of an equaliser.

The 54th minute. England yet to score, but coming under pressure.

It’s a change in the dynamic of the match multiplied by the fact that England were probably tiring, having spent most of the game without the ball, applying pressure all over the field.

Argentina’s response

Argentina reacted to going 1–0 down by encompassing England’s 4–4–2 defensive block. They had a wide man on each side to catch loose crosses that came out the other end. They didn’t load up the box, but established and maintained control in England’s half, applying consistent pressure with waves of attacking.

They were helped by England’s lack of speed up front, multiplied by the tiring legs of Harry Kane and Jude Bellingham. There was absolutely no threat of Argentina’s centre-backs being unsettled by a ball over the top as the second half went on.

Unable to get a press going, England ended up retreating and Argentina did a good job of keeping them there, with their wing-backs forcing Gordon and Morgan Rodgers back to help Djed Spence and Reece James.

The first substitution was made by Scaloni: left winger Nico Gonzalez for defensive midfielder Leandro Paredes. Enzo Fernandez became Argentina’s deepest midfielder and got more involved in building their attack.

Gonzalez played wide left and Giuliano Simeone wide right, with help for both coming via timed runs from deep of the wing-backs.

Argentina’s wingers held their positions and didn’t get involved in creative play, focusing on running behind the England full-backs and offering for a switch ball or ball over the top.

Argentina encompass England’s defensive block.

Tuchel’s defensive sub sinks

Perhaps fresh legs up front would have helped England, but Tuchel stuck with Kane, Jude Bellingham and Morgan Rodgers all the way to the end. His first sub was to take off the goalscorer, Gordon, but rather than freshen things up, he introduced centre-back Ezri Konsa.

Still the tiring legs up front, but with more defenders on the pitch.

Kane and Bellingham were already failing to put pressure on Argentina’s centre-backs, who were helped by Fernandez dropping to collect the ball 3-v-2. The difference now was that England were defending 5–3–2, not 4–4–2.

England changed to a midfield three.

England had one less midfielder to defend the width of the field, and that gave Argentina more time and space to set up quality early delivery into the penalty box from inside-right and inside-left.

Tuchel’s first substitution was a negative one, but most importantly he left his own midfield overloaded.

Analysis of Argentina’s final ball

Argentina ramped up the pressure and created a number of chances off of crosses or balls into the box following Tuchel’s substitution of Gordon for Konsa.

Scaloni made three subs on 72 minutes that appeared like for like, but the key change was that Rodrigo De Paul did not play wide as Simeone had done; instead, De Paul played inside-right, while newly introduced wing-back Montiel overlapped him.

Argentina’s final ball was usually played early, from inside-right or inside-left. The addition of De Paul gave them another option with a good quality of final ball. There was a good understanding and co-ordination between the runners and the ball-players.

Mac Allister became particularly dangerous, liberated to attack the box from deep, passing through lines of defence and stretching England’s back line to breaking point in the process.

A typical Argentina final ball, flat, driven. Mac Allister runs from deep.

Mac Allister attacks from deep again. A tired, overloaded Rice can’t stop the cross.

The ball into the box was usually played flat and with speed, towards where the runners would be, not where they were standing. A few things about this:

1. Difficult for Jordan Pickford to come out and deal with
2. Mitigated the height advantage England’s defenders
3. Gave Argentina’s attackers something to run onto
4. Argentina’s attackers could glance the header; less need to generate their own power

O’Reilly disrupts

In the 83rd minute, Tuchel introduced Nico O’Reilly for Declan Rice. Bellingham dropped into Rice’s position in central midfield, leaving Kane as the lone striker. O’Reilly played left midfield and England went from 5–3–2 to 5–4–1.

O’Reilly instructs the new shape while Messi looks on.

O’Reilly added fresh legs in midfield and helped to stop the flow of Argentinian crosses into England’s box, alleviating some pressure on the back line. He disrupted Argentina’s play with blocks, pressure and offered aerial presence on the wing when trying to get up the pitch.

It’s still a defensive substitute, and a course correction of sorts, an admission by Tuchel that his first sub had a detrimental effect.

O’Reilly joins the midfield as England go 5–4–1.

Of course, it’s 10 v 10 outfield and moving one player here just means more space there.

The latest knock-on effect was giving room to Argentina’s central midfielders. Fernandez had got his eye in and now all he could see was the goal, with Kane on his own in England’s first line of defence.

When Fernandez did eventually slot the ball into the net off a short corner routine to make it 1–1, the goal had been coming and the goalscorer had plenty of practice.

Tuchel backs himself into a corner

The subs Tuchel made between going 1–0 up and Argentina leveling, were all in some way defensive. England were now all-out defending a draw with five minutes plus injury time to play, which is an awkward position to be in. And one can easily make the argument that Tuchel put the team in this position with his tactical decisions and substitutions.

In the 91st minute, Bellingham showed individual effort with a run down the left flank, but his attempts to inspire a counter were short-lived. He lacked support and the fresher Argentinian defenders simply walked him out of play.

With an England midfielder now out of position, Mac Allister found himself in acres of space to shoot on the edge of the box and hit the post. From the resulting rebound, Messi picked up the ball, cut onto his right foot and hung up a cross towards the back post.

Scaloni had brought on Lautaro Martinez to add more of a goal threat inside the box, with Julian Alvarez, Messi and Mac Allister all supporting, Gonzalez and Montiel wide. Argentina were by this point attacking in a broad 2–2–3–3 shape, and Martinez was in the right place at the right time to score.

Basic overview of Argentina’s attacking formation in the closing stages.

There has been criticism of England’s players in all of this, led in a sense by Tuchel, their manager. Stones, especially, caught flak for the second. This really is unacceptable, considering how important and consistent these players have been and are for their country. Without these players, England would likely still be going out to Iceland and Costa Rica as they were in the mid-2010s.

Stones is in a no-win position for Argentina’s second goal. He has to get some sense of where the ball is and can’t allow Martinez to get a run on him. If he goes back, Martinez probably steals in front. There are lots of ways for Stones to mess up and lots of ways for Martinez to score.

It does help Martinez, and doesn’t help Stones, that Messi hung up a perfect cross right on the forehead of his striker. There is an element of bad luck in this scenario. And if Stones and England’s defence must be criticised for missing one header, Tuchel must also be criticised for putting them in a situation where they had so many cross balls to defend.

“What if” becomes reality

The other side of Tuchel’s subs is the “what if” situation, which transpired in reality. What if England do concede, or even go behind?

Another of Tuchel’s subs was to bring off Reece James for yet another centre-back in Dan Burn. That meant Konsa playing at right wing-back.

When England went behind, they put Burn up front, added Ivan Toney, and went long over and over again. Unlike Argentina, they loaded the box with height. But also unlike Argentina, they failed to deliver with real quality.

It was volume-based, hit and hope play, and with James off, the likes of Konsa were now responsible for putting the ball into the box, which isn’t his forte.

Burn won a few headers, but Argentina simply cleared the second ball or got in the way of the next phase of attack. England showed no ability to work the ball around, but they were in a rush and Tuchel’s subs left them without some of their best attacking weapons.

Surprised? Not really

Ultimately, England lost a game from 1–0 up, against an Argentina team with a clear history both in this tournament and in the past, of winning from behind and surviving rough patches in games. They have a tremendous team spirit, probably emanating from their desire to protect and uplift Messi, who by this point surpasses typical national hero status.

The psychology of this Argentina team makes them a constant danger in the same way Carlo Ancelotti’s second Real Madrid side. 90 minutes must feel even longer playing against them.

Tuchel was correct to notice England dropping off and defending more. But this appeared less a tactical choice by the players, and more to do with natural fatigue in the first two lines of defence, plus Argentina’s desire to keep the play flowing and increase the tempo for an equaliser.

Argentina pushed all the right buttons, but this author’s argument would be that Tuchel did little to change the course of the second half and, in the substitution of Gordon for Konsa, actively made the situation worse and Argentina’s dominance more exaggerated.