Toward a Durable Peace

Toward a Durable Peace

Policy Options for NATO Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Reagan Grecco

Bachelor of Arts Candidate, Political Science & International Security

Background of the Security Threat

Russia presents a conventional security threat through its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent threats towards Western European nations. While the direct threat is to the people of Ukraine with consistent missile launches, ground forces, and the direct intent of invasion, the effects expand to neighboring Post-Soviet countries and NATO allies. Despite the war continuing for more than four years, the urgency of the threat is considered high and imminent given Russian drone and missile strikes, as well as geopolitical policies targeting global institutions, and the continued absence of a negotiated peace settlement.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe became a persistent source of tension in Russian security policy. With the Cold War long over, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that interstate territorial conquest remains a central challenge to European security. Ukraine faces the brunt of the threat with consistent missile and drone strikes, territorial battles, and loss of life, while European allies have provided billions of dollars to support Kyiv and provide military aid (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; European Council, 2026). Beyond the battlefield, Russia has employed economic coercion by leveraging energy exports, extending the security threat beyond Ukraine’s borders and affecting broader European security.

Origins of the Conflict

Pro-Western protests raged across Ukraine as they desired closer relations with the West and NATO. In comparison, Russia viewed Ukraine’s desire for closer relations with its Western neighbors as a direct geopolitical threat (Mearsheimer, 2014). These concerns formed the foundation of Russia’s 2021 security proposals to NATO and the United States, seeking legally binding guarantees regarding NATO expansion and regional military deployments (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2021). In January of 2022, NATO responded with counterproposals but denied the fundamental demand to bar post-Soviet countries from joining, a move that preceded the full-scale invasion (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022). Whether these security concerns fully explain Russia’s motivations for the invasion remains debated among scholars; however, they have become central issues shaping Russia’s stated objectives and remain relevant to future negotiations.

Scope and Severity

The Russian invasion of Ukraine first and foremost affects Ukraine. Ukraine faces infrastructure damage, civilian casualties, military losses, and displacement. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, since the 2022 invasion, Ukraine has faced 16,126 civilian deaths on Ukrainian soil (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2026). Russia is similarly facing significant military and civilian losses, suffering approximately 400,000 — 450,000 fatalities since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Jones & McCabe, 2026). While the true number of Russian civilian casualties remains difficult to verify, Russia faces the risk of missile and drone strikes on its own territory (Gak et al., 2026). The rest of Europe does not face direct attacks involving military weapons or ground invasions; however, it faces hybrid-level threats, including economic coercion and damage, with some European nations dedicating up to 2.2% of their GDP to aid (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2024).

Audience and Policy Objectives

When creating policy objectives surrounding the Russo-Ukrainian War, NATO is the most direct and influential organization to target. NATO represents a significant audience for policy proposals because it was the first organization to negotiate with Putin before the invasion began and can communicate directly with Russia. Because NATO must manage deterrence against future Russian aggression, preserve unity, and avoid direct military confrontation, its policy decisions must balance military effectiveness and regional stability. These priorities make NATO the most appropriate audience for reviewing alternative approaches to European security.

Policy Response Options

Throughout history, conventional threats of war and invasion have been handled in various ways. The most common are defensive policies, ceasefires, and peace treaty negotiations. Each policy offers a different advantage, as well as distinctive strengths and limitations.

Military Assistance and Defense

This has been the current policy option within the Russo-Ukrainian war. Military assistance has been provided in different forms, with Western allies providing weapons, intelligence, and training. Defense also includes fortifying territories and enhancing border security, as seen in NATO, which has strengthened its deterrence posture (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2026). This has also been seen in the Vietnam War, with the National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 64 to French allies, and in the Gulf War, with the U.S., Germany, and Japan contributing billions in aid (NBC News, 2014). The strengths of this policy are that it helps build a nation’s military capabilities, aids in defending sovereignty, and deters aggressors from expanding their operations. However, it also requires heavy financial and military commitments, and, since it does not end the war, it risks prolonging the battle until a peace agreement is reached.

Ceasefire

A ceasefire policy was most recently seen in the Israel-Gaza conflict, where a peace plan was implemented. Conventionally, this means the two nations agree to halt the fighting and withdraw troops from their occupied areas, with a promise to cease all military operations and freeze the battle lines (Council on Foreign Relations, 2026). This ceasefire plan was designed in stages with gradual withdrawal and continued aid. However, this does not resolve existing tensions and can lead to a ceasefire being broken at any time. The benefits of a ceasefire are that it stops fighting immediately, allows for humanitarian relief, and reduces civilian casualties. Like military assistance, however, it does not resolve disputes and depends heavily on both parties honoring the agreement. It merely freezes the war, not necessarily resolving it.

Negotiated Peace Treaties

Peace treaties have been used in large-scale wars to formally and legally end the conflict, not just military operations. This is a longer-term plan that requires cooperation and negotiation. Most famously, the peace treaty that ended World War I, the Treaty of Versailles was signed, as was the peace treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War in the early 1900s (Office of the Historian, 2019). It was also used more recently with the 1995 Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian war after 3 years (2025). This comes with the benefits of addressing the original security concerns that contributed to the war and of creating a durable settlement that halts operations in the long term. However, it does require compromise from both sides and overall agreement, which can be tricky to obtain.

Policy Recommendation

The most effective policy for the Russo-Ukrainian war to ensure long-term security is to negotiate a peace treaty. In 2021, Russia drafted two treaties designed to overhaul the current European security system. The proposals required NATO to prevent Eastward expansion, deny accession to states of the former Soviet Union, withdraw troops and military equipment from states that joined after 1997, prohibit deployments of intermediate-range missiles, and ban the deployment of nuclear weapons (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2021; Council for a Livable World, 2021). On January 26, 2022, both NATO and the United States rejected the proposal. With this, a new policy to reach a peace settlement with Russia would have to include revisiting the 2021 proposal, evaluating Putin’s former demands, and finding ways NATO can compromise.

Reciprocal Border Distancing

Originally, in Article 4, Putin desired that NATO withdraw troops from the former Soviet states. Doing so in full would be a violation of collective defense. However, given that this was one of Vladimir Putin’s red-line issues, finding middle ground could further support efforts to end the war. NATO would offer a conditional, partial withdrawal of permanent heavy combat personnel from states directly bordering Russia while retaining defensive fortifications and equipment. This would address Putin’s security concerns about eastward expansion while still honoring collective defense with states like the Baltics and ensuring rapid response and re-entry if the peace is ever broken. This would be conditional on Putin withdrawing offensive troops and nuclear assets from NATO borders at an equal distance.

Missile Limitation Agreement

Russia originally proposed to NATO that it ban intermediate- and short-range missiles between NATO countries and Russia. NATO could agree to the proposal under steadier conditions by limiting missiles to a specified mutual distance and relying on missile verification by independent organizations, such as the Specialized Missile Verification Authority. All inspectors and analysts must be citizens of non-aligned, neutral nations, preventing any Russian or NATO interference. If any conditions are violated, nations have 60 days to amend or remedy the violation; if those 60 days pass without amendment, the treaty is void.

Enlargement Deadlock

It is impossible for NATO to abandon its Open Door policy, making it non-negotiable to meet Putin’s demand of barring any post-Soviet countries from gaining membership. However, it is possible to find common ground that provides Russia with security while preserving NATO’s integrity. It can include a non-deployment zone clause, agreeing that, even if Ukraine or any other bordering state becomes a member, it will not station permanent foreign troops, bases, or offensive-strike missiles on its territory during peacetime. If peacetime is violated, the agreement no longer applies.

Benefits

The benefits of this policy are immediate tension reduction; the proposed adjustments do not abandon NATO duties or concern post-Soviet states like the Baltics; it creates bargaining leverage; and it creates a path towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Risks

The main concerns with this policy include the possibility of Russian cheating, the policy becoming void, Baltic region concerns, and NATO domestic politics. The risk is also that it could be publicly seen as rewarding aggression by pursuing a peace treaty rather than an armistice or ceasefire.

Why this Framework is Preferable

This framework is preferable to additional sanctions or deterrence, as it paves the way toward a longer-term peace agreement. While the economic and defensive strategies have helped Ukraine build a stronger military capability against Russia, they have not stopped the conflict, leading to mass deaths from both militaries and continued risk to civilians. Given how long this war has already been going on, finding a way to end it is a top priority. This proposal improves NATO relations with Russia, strengthens security for NATO and Eastern European nations, gives Europe a chance to rebuild its economy, and paves the way toward ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. A negotiated peace treaty is the best course of action.

Conclusion

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents a high-priority conventional security threat, putting Ukraine, NATO-aligned countries, and Eastern European nations at risk. While current policies have been successful in providing aid to Ukraine and preventing the war from spilling over NATO borders, this policy proposes a long-term peaceful solution. By revisiting Putin’s 2021 proposal, this policy addresses partial withdrawals in Eastern Europe, mutual missile limitations, and the enlargement deadlock.

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