Zakāt Is Not a PAC — Revisiting al-Mu’allafah Qulūbuhum in Modern Fiqh

Question: Given that the Muslim community in the West is suffering from misappropriation of divinely instated zakāt money, with much of it being used for ways that Allāh did not sanction, can you clarify who are the true recipients of zakāt, especially those who are al-muʾallafati qulūbuhum?

Answer:

All praises belong to Allāh, Lord of the worlds, and may Allāh send ṣalāt and salām upon the Messenger of Allāh.

Zakāt is one of the obligations of Islām. The Prophet ﷺ said,

بُنِيَ الإسْلامُ على خَمْسٍ: شَهادَةِ أنْ لا إلَهَ إلّا اللَّهُ وأنَّ مُحَمَّدًا رَسولُ اللَّهِ، وإقامِ الصَّلاةِ، وإيتاءِ الزَّكاةِ، والحَجِّ، وصَوْمِ رَمَضانَ.

“Islām has been built upon five: Testifying that there is no God but Allāh and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing the prayer, giving the prescribed alms, pilgrimage, and fasting Ramaḍān.”[1]

As for the specification on who deserves zakāt, Allāh outlined this in His Book:

إنَّما الصَدَقاتُ لِلْفُقَراءِ والمَساكِينِ والعامِلِينَ عَلَيْها والمُؤَلَّفَةِ قُلُوبُهم وفي الرِقابِ والغارِمِينَ وفي سَبِيلِ اللهِ وابْنِ السَبِيلِ فَرِيضَةً مِنَ اللهِ واللهُ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ

The prescribed alms are only for the poor[2], the needy[3], those who collect them, those whose hearts are to be reconciled, freeing slaves, debtors[4], the cause of Allah, and the wayfarer — an obligation imposed by Allah. And Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise. (60)

Scholars in the West have already given fatwā that money from the poor can be allocated to large, well-capitalized organizations on account of a very liberal reading of, “the cause of Allāh,” but unfortunately are now attempting to expand the meaning of “those whose hearts are to be reconciled,” to justify Muslims giving the zakāt to political actors or campaigns.

The arguments proposed by the fatwā[5] are summarized as follows:

First: The Prophet ﷺ “gave non-Muslim chieftains large amounts from the spoils of war, most prominently after the Battle of Ḥunayn.”

As for the Prophet ﷺ giving to Muslims, for the reason which he stated, “ataʾallafuhum,” or, “seeking to reconcile their hearts,” the wording just before it is:

فَإِنِّي أُعْطِي رِجَالًا حَدِيثِي عَهْدٍ بِكُفْرٍ

“I give men who were recently disbelievers.”[6]

Based on these and other narrations, many of those who received this money were already Muslims, and the Prophet ﷺ gave them to settle any hard feelings. Note, that in the authentic narration above, some of the Anṣār argued, “He is giving Quraysh and leaving us, while our swords are still dripping of their blood.” It is quite clear from the context that this money was given to them to mend their hearts after having fought them.

What we do agree on is that the money that was given was from the spoils of war, not from zakāt.

Whether classified as ghanīmah or fayʾ, the funds distributed at Ḥunayn were not zakāt, and thus fell under the discretionary financial authority (taṣarruf al-imām) rather than divinely restricted entitlements. Muʾallafah in zakāt is a ṣifah of the recipient, not a policy objective. The Qurʾānic category describes persons whose hearts are reconciled, not projects intended to influence hearts.

So the question that needs to be asked is:

• Being that the categories of zakāt are identified in the Qurʾān, what relevance does the Prophet ﷺ giving fayʾ to nonbelievers for the purpose of taʾlīf al-qulūb have to modern day Muslims giving zakāt to politicians?

In reality, no legal relevance follows from this precedent. All this indicates is that the imām has the right to manage the money of the fayʾ in which way he sees fit. For example, in a narration reported by al-Nasāʾī (4139) and Abū Dāwūd (2694) with an authentic chain, the Prophet ﷺ said,

إنه ليسَ لي من الفيءِ شيءٌ، ولا هذه إلا الخمسَ، والخمسُ مردودٌ فيكم.

“I have no right to the spoils, not even by this much (other narrations say: ‘he raised his finger’); I am only entitled to the fifth, and that fifth is thereafter spent on you.”

Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī says, “Meaning, spent on things that provide you utility.”[7]

Therefore, this first argument fails both textually and juristically, as it relies on an analogy with enough essential differences to render the two cases dissimilar (qiyās maʿ al-fāriq al-muʾaththir). The spoils of war are not analogous to zakāt money. This table outlines these differences:

They then attempt to use a severely weak narration to ibn ʿAbbās, which al-Ṭabarī records with his chain of narration, saying:

حدثني محمد بن سعد قال، حدثني أبي قال، حدثني عمي قال، حدثني أبي، عن أبيه، عن ابن عباس قوله: ﴿والمؤلفة قلوبهم﴾ ، وهم قوم كانوا يأتون رسول الله ﷺ قد أسلموا، وكان رسول الله ﷺ يرضَخ لهم من الصدقات،(١٦) فإذا أعطاهم من الصدقات فأصابوا منها خيرًا قالوا: هذا دين صالح! وإن كان غير ذلك، عابوه وتركوه

Muḥammad b. Saʿd related to me, he said: my father related to me, he said: my uncle related to me, he said: my father related to me, from his father, from Ibn ʿAbbās regarding His statement, “and those whose hearts are to be reconciled”:

They were a people who would come to the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ having entered Islām, and the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ would allot to them from the alms. If he gave them from the alms and they obtained some good by it, they would say, “This is a good religion!” But if it was otherwise, they would fault it and abandon it.

This narration is extremely weak and filled with weak to very weak narrators (https://al-maktaba.org/book/31615/30943):

• Muḥammad b. Saʿd: Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī said he is weak in ḥadīth.

• His father, Saʿd b. Muḥammad: Imām Aḥmad weakened him.

• His uncle: Al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAṭiyyah al-ʿAwfī: Ibn Maʿīn said, “He is weak in judicial rulings, and weak in ḥadīth.” He was also judged weak by al-Nasāʾī, Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, and ibn Ḥibbān.

• His father: Al-Ḥasan b. ʿAtiyyah: He was weakened by al-Bukhārī, ibn Ḥibbān, and Abū Ḥātim.

• His father: ʿAṭiyyah al-ʿAwfī: He was weakened by Imām Aḥmad.

Therefore, this narration is extremely weak, and is almost musalsal biʾl-dhuʿafāʾ, so it is not admissible as evidence.

Next, the fatwā attempts to use the words of ibn Qudāmah to justify their belief, “The muʾallafah qulūbuhum are the leaders who have authority in their communities, and it is hoped by giving them something that their evil will be diminished, or their faith strengthened, or that they be repelled from the Muslims.”

The translation is not quite accurate, and there is a level of license being taken here that is unwarranted.

Let us examine the statement of ibn Qudāmah:

المؤلفة قلوبهم، وهم السادة المطاعون في عشائرهم الذين يرجى بعطيتهم دفع شرهم أو قوة إيمانهم أو دفعهم عن المسلمين

• The Arabic description does not speak of generic “leaders with authority in their communities,” but of obeyed tribal chiefs within their clans, whose authority was inherited, kin-based, and coercive by custom. It was not representative or institutional. As Shaykh John Starling further qualified in his article, “Commenting on the phrase “or whose harm is feared,” Ibn Qāʿid notes that its apparent meaning encompasses even a woman if she possesses such authority, citing figures such as Bilqīs and other reigning queens. The determining factor, therefore, is not tribal form, lineage, or gender, but concentrated and acknowledged authority that commands obedience within a defined polity. The juristic model is not limited to Arab tribal chieftainship; it extends to any ruler whose command is binding and whose reconciliation produces immediate and collective effect. What defines the category is not symbolic prominence or diffuse social presence, but binding authority capable of directing the conduct of others within an identifiable social order.” (https://www.hanbalidisciples.com/articles/the-fourth-category-of-zakat-in-the-%E1%B8%A5anbal%C4%AB-school)

• The term ʿashāʾir decisively places the discussion within a pre-modern tribal setting, and cannot be flattened into the modern sociological notion of “community” without distorting the legal category itself.

• Likewise, the phrase “yurjā bi-ʿaṭiyyatihim dafʿu sharrihim” refers to the immediate mitigation of identifiable harm or hostility, not speculative influence, long-term policy alignment, or probabilistic social benefit.

• Detaching this category from its tribal context and recasting it as a functional justification for funding modern political actors is not translation but reinterpretation, and it collapses a narrowly defined, context-bound category of recipients into a general policy tool. This is precisely the legal expansion the āyah sought to eliminate by naming the eight categories outright.

The correct translation of the passage of ibn Qudāmah’s work is, “The muʾallafah qulūbuhum are the obeyed chiefs within their tribes, whose being given to is hoped to avert their harm, or to strengthen their faith, or to restrain them from [acting against] the Muslims.”

Further, the Ḥanbalī scholars sharply restrict what is meant by “obedience” in this category. Burhān al-Dīn Ibn Mufliḥ states explicitly:

وَلَا يُقْبَلُ قَوْلُهُ: إِنَّهُ مُطَاعٌ، إِلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ

“The claim that one is obeyed is not accepted without proof.”

This qualification shows that the jurists did not permit speculative claims of influence or presumed benefit to justify giving to the muʾallafah qulūbuhum. Rather, such giving was conditioned upon clear, demonstrable evidence that the individual possessed real, effective authority within a tribal structure. They must have authority whose exercise could concretely avert harm, restrain hostility, or strengthen allegiance with respect to the Muslims. The purpose of this restriction is precisely to prevent the category from being expanded on the basis of conjecture or hoped-for outcomes, and to confine it instead to a narrowly defined, verifiable social reality. This stands in direct contrast to the fatwā’s attempt to justify the redirection of zakāt based on assumed influence or anticipated benefit divorced from any such evidentiary standard.

In addition to that, it is academically dishonest to present a view from a beginner fiqh book authored by ibn Qudāmah while ignoring the Ḥanbali scholars qualification of those unqualified statements. For example, Imām Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī, who lived between 957 and 1037 C.E., said in his book, al-Irshād, “The category of al-muʾallafah does not exist during present times.”[8] In al-Rawḍ al-Murbiʿ, al-Buhūtī says, “They are to be given only as much as it takes to accomplish taʾlīf; it is only to be done when the need arises (ʿinda’l-ḥājati faqaṭ).”

In Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, he says, “(And they are the leaders of their people) as stated likewise in al-Muqniʿ and other works. And they are the chiefs who are obeyed within their clans. Whoever is not of this description is not given zakāt for the purpose of reconciliation, even if his evil is feared due to his joining himself to an oppressor, because the designation ‘mu’allaf’ does not apply to him.” This is extremely restrictive. While they claim that this fatwā is “widening the scope that is found in the Ḥanbalī and Mālikī schools,” it actually contradicts the explicit qualification set by the Madhhab!

At this point, ibn Qudāmah’s words and the fatwā being established based on his theory do not align. I could analyze the rest of the classical opinions given, such as those by ibn ʿArafah and ibn Taymiyyah, but I believe the purpose has been already driven home by showing that the authors of the fatwā misused the words of ibn Qudāmah. If they did it with ibn Qudāmah, they likely did the same with the rest of the classical scholars.

In this next section, since it is the more technical section that outlines the fiqhī procedure to how they gave their fatwā, I will cite and respond to each point, line by line.

The fatwā says:

Given the reality that in Western democracies, there is no single leader (as used to be the case in the past), but rather an electoral body, the ratio legis, or ʿillah, of zakat being used for political influence for the benefit of the Ummah would then apply to members of the political body that wields the power of legislation.

Response:

This is not a description of the ʿillah, but a redefinition of the category as a policy instrument. They take the Qurʾānic category of, “those whose hearts are to be reconciled,” and re-state that as, “those whose influence brings about political change that benefits the Ummah.” There is a large difference between the two, since the first is a description of the recipient, and the second is a description of the alleged purpose. This shifts the discussion from: “who qualifies?” To: “what outcome do we want?”

With that said, even if we were to, for the sake of argument, grant “influence” as a rationale, it does not follow that legislators are muʾallafah. Classic jurists, including the line I quoted from Ibn Mufliḥ, treated “muṭāʿ” as an objective, evidenced social fact (bayyinah), typically in a tribal/clan obedience structure. A member of Congress is not “obeyed in his ʿashīrah,” nor does he possess coercive social obedience; he holds procedural authority constrained by institutions, parties, courts, and elections. Unless, of course, we redefine the ʿashīrah of the congressman or woman as being, “their constituents!”

The error they have made here is that, instead of asking the question: “does this person fit the waṣf that the Qurʾān outlines,” they stated, “that office has power, therefore, it fits.” This is, at best, qiyās bi’l-shabah, and not admissible as evidence. At worst, it is istiḥsān based on a shaky inference.

Additionally, if “benefit to the Ummah” is the controlling factor, it means zakāt collapses into arbitrary spending, all based on maṣlaḥah of the spender or zakāt collector. This should include lobbying organizations, media campaigns, legal funds, PACs, advocacy groups, “strategic messaging,” etc., and there is no real limit to what zakāt can be used for. This further diminishes what reaches the mouth of the single mother in my community who needs the Ummah’s help.

Next, they quote al-Juwaynī, saying,

And, in the absence of a Muslim ruler, or walī al-amr, a group of trusted scholars and reputable specialists will effectively take on the role of a walī al-amr, as al-Juwaynī stated.

Response:

I am perplexed by this quote. It does not fit anywhere in this discussion. Are they seeking to employ al-Juwaynī’s quote to state that all of us must fall in line with their fatwā, since they are all scholars? I offer another interpretation later, one that is more shocking to the reader.

However, for the sake of continuity, let us analyze the statement of al-Juwaynī and contextualize it. Al-Juwaynī says in Ghiyāth al-Umam:

560 — ثُمَّ كُلُّ أَمْرٍ يَتَعَاطَاهُ الْإِمَامُ فِي الْأَمْوَالِ الْمُفَوَّضَةِ إِلَى الْأَئِمَّةِ، فَإِذَا شَغَرَ الزَّمَانُ عَنِ الْإِمَامِ وَخَلَا عَنْ سُلْطَانٍ ذِي نَجْدَةٍ وَكِفَايَةٍ وَدِرَايَةٍ، فَالْأُمُورُ مَوْكُولَةٌ إِلَى الْعُلَمَاءِ، وَحَقٌّ عَلَى الْخَلَائِقِ عَلَى اخْتِلَافِ طَبَقَاتِهِمْ أَنْ يَرْجِعُوا إِلَى عُلَمَائِهِمْ، وَيُصْدِرُوا فِي جَمِيعِ قَضَايَا الْوِلَايَاتِ عَنْ رَأْيِهِمْ، فَإِنْ فَعَلُوا ذَلِكَ، فَقَدْ هُدُوا إِلَى سَوَاءِ السَّبِيلِ، وَصَارَ عُلَمَاءُ الْبِلَادِ وُلَاةَ الْعِبَادِ.

“Then every matter that the imam undertakes concerning wealth that has been delegated to the imams: if an era becomes vacant of an imam and devoid of a ruler possessing strength, competence, and sound judgment, then these matters are entrusted to the scholars. And it is incumbent upon the people — despite their differing ranks — to refer to their scholars, and to proceed in all matters of governance according to their judgment. If they do so, they will have been guided to the straight path, and the scholars of the land will become the governors over the servants.”

This passage is completely unrelated to whether politicians are considered al-muʾallafah. The passage is discussion on political necessity, not zakāt distribution, and not the redefinition of Sharʿī entitlements. The subject matter is wilayat, or: governance and public order. This is a book of emergency political theory, not financial fiqh.

Further, the wealth mentioned by al-Juwaynī is not restricted to zakāt. It is referring to all state-managed assets, such as: fayʾ, ghanīmah, public revenues, and so forth. Zakāt is not delegated to the imām by definition. It is owned by individuals, restricted by the Qurʾānic verbiage, and invalid if given outside of those restrictions, even by the command of a legitimate ruler. What this statement of al-Juwaynī does not say is, “Scholars may now reassign zakāt categories in lieu of a ruler.” The quote is entirely about maintaining governance when the authority collapses. It has no relevance at all to this discussion.

The fatwā says:

It is true that this fatwa is widening the scope that is found in the Ḥanbalī and Mālikī schools; those rules generally speak about politicians who already hold real influence and are obeyed in their communities (min ruʾūs al-ʿashāʾir al-muṭāʿīn), not those who hold partial influence (like members of a parliament, senate or congress), or those seeking such a position.

Response:

Here, they have actually conceded that classical fiqh requires actual obedience, not aspirational influence, and that candidates and legislators do not meet the criterion. Then instead of accepting the conclusion, they override it by appeal to “changing times.”

This is not ijtihād; it is setting aside conditions because they are inconvenient. This is known in Uṣūl al-Fiqh as fasād al-waḍʿ, which is to give a negative conclusion from affirmative premises, or an affirmative conclusion from negative premises. This is a form of a non sequitur.

An example of a negative conclusion from affirmative premises is to say:

1. All A is B.

2. All B is C.

3. Therefore, no A is C.

An example of an affirmative conclusion from negative premises is to say:

1. No A is B.

2. No B is C.

3. Therefore, all A are C.

Let’s state their own admissions and claims charitably but precisely, using their language.

Their admitted premises:

1. Classical fiqh restricts al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum to persons who are actually obeyed (muṭāʿūn), typically tribal chiefs with demonstrable authority.

2. Modern legislators and candidates do not possess this kind of obedience, but only partial, procedural, or aspirational influence.

Up to this point, the only valid conclusion would be:

Therefore, modern legislators and candidates do not fall under al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum. But instead, they conclude:

3. Therefore, because times have changed and influence is now diffused, legislators and candidates do fall under al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum.

Their reasoning, when formalized, looks like this:

1. All muʾallafah are actually obeyed persons.

2. Legislators are not actually obeyed persons.

3. Therefore, legislators are muʾallafah.

This is a positive conclusion drawn from premises that negate it.[9]

The fatwā then states:

Understandably, some of the scholars who are committed to strict adherence to a madhhab may feel uneasy with this extension, but this is precisely where legitimate ijtihād is warranted, given the changing times and circumstances we live in.

Response:

This is a thinly veiled ad hominem attack and does not engage the arguments against the fatwā at all. Instead, it recasts principled disagreement as emotional unease arising from methodological conservatism.

The fatwā:

If we apply the rules with strict adherence to classical conditions (which, it should be noted, are largely ijtihādī in nature as well), this would weaken the practical functioning or aims of the Sharīʿah for this category, and essentially make this category null and void.

Response:

This statement rests on the assumption that every Qurʾānic category must remain perennially operational, or else be reinterpreted in order to survive. Both assumptions are false. The Sharīʿah does not require that every category named in the Qurʾān be continuously instantiated in every time and place. If it did, we would be compelled to reconfigure fī al-riqāb (freeing slaves), despite the absence of slavery for the modern Muslim in America to address. Yet the classical scholars never viewed the functional absence of a category as a problem requiring reinterpretation. On the contrary, it is reported that ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb declared a moratorium on spending on al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum, and Ibn Qudāmah[10] notes that neither ʿUthmān nor ʿAlī allocated zakāt to this category. Thus, three of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs treated the category as functionally absent, without reinterpreting the verse or expanding its scope in order to preserve its operation.

This was not regarded as nullifying the Qurʾānic text, but as the absence of its subject matter (ʿadam wujūd al-maḥall). Indeed, there has always been broad scholarly disagreement over whether al-muʾallafah continue to exist at all, yet no scholar objected to certain categories becoming practically unavailable. We even pray and hope for a day when there are no fuqarāʾ or masākīn in need of zakāt; should that day arrive, it would not justify redefining those categories merely to keep them functionally active. The continued binding nature of the verse does not depend on the perpetual availability of its recipients.

Another foundational error in this argument is the failure to distinguish between ḥukm waḍʿī and ḥukm taklīfī. The designation of the eight categories of zakāt is a ḥukm waḍʿī: the Sharīʿah has identified the legal markers and conditions under which zakāt is validly discharged. It is not a ḥukm taklīfī that obligates the community to create, engineer, or force into existence the subject matter of those categories. The Sharīʿah has defined the signs by which zakāt is fulfilled; it has not tasked the Ummah with manufacturing eligibility to keep the ruling operational. To conflate the two is a category mistake. By the same logic advanced here, one could argue that in a society of widespread poverty, where few or no people reach the niṣāb, zakāt becomes “functionally non-operational,” and therefore individuals would be obligated to acquire wealth so as not to nullify the ruling of zakāt. No jurist has ever held such a view. The absence of the maḥall does not impose a duty to create it, nor does it constitute the suspension or nullification of the ruling itself. Zakāt remains binding when its conditions are met, and inoperative when they are not, without any need for reinterpretation or expansion.

The fatwā:

As this fatwā is being written, the world is seeing the impact that specific lobbies have had in unethically shaping domestic and foreign policy in aiding and abetting a genocide against our brothers and sisters in Gaza; it is imperative that people of conscience then also strive to influence policies to be more ethical and humane, and to save innocent life and to protect the most vulnerable of our Ummah.

Response:

This is rhetorical substitution, not legal reasoning. Moral outrage does not constitute legal evidence, and ethical urgency does not create alteration of zakāt categories. If genocide justifies redefining zakāt, then zakāt ceases to be a taʿabbudī obligation and becomes a contingent political fund.

Next, the authors of the fatwā go on to set some conditions. Let’s analyze them one by one:

Firstly, as a default, reputable institutions collect and distribute zakat funds on behalf of the body of Muslim in any locality or country.

Response:

Their claim rests on this hidden assumption: If a qualified institution decides collectively, then the zakāt use becomes valid. Whereas zakāt validity is determined by recipient status, not by institutional legitimacy or community trust. No amount of transparency, auditing, scholarly diversity, or governance structure can convert a non-eligible recipient into an eligible one.

They say:

The category of al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum has always been the purview of the walī al-amr…

Response:

Even if we grant this argument, it proves nothing. Why? The walī al-amr’s role was to identify who already fits the category, not to redefine the category, and not to substitute institutional judgment for textual criteria. Even a legitimate caliph cannot shift zakāt to anyone outside the 8 categories. Invoking the walī al-amr here is not a response to the real objection.

Further, they are arguing that: individuals are not to decide, but institutions can. This presumes that eligibility flows from decision-makers in legitimate institutions. Zakāt does not work that way; if an individual cannot give zakāt to a non-muʾallaf, then an institution cannot do so either, because institutions possess no independent Sharʿī agency, they are merely delegated hands.

The main issue here is that these “community institutions” destroy the uniformity of the Ummah. This fatwā guarantees divergent, contradictory zakāt outcomes, depending entirely on political culture. Here are some example outcomes that can very truly become realities:

● A Republican-leaning Muslim community:

o zakāt funds pro-Republican candidates “benefiting the Ummah”

● A Democrat-leaning Muslim community:

o zakāt funds pro-Democrat candidates “benefiting the Ummah”

● A liberal Muslim city:

o zakāt funds progressive causes

● A conservative Muslim suburb:

o zakāt funds conservative causes

This can all be done with transparency, scholarly backing, audits, and good intentions! So the same Qurʾānic verse yields mutually exclusive outcomes, based solely on local ideology.

In summary, all of their safeguards fall flat:

Next, they say:

Secondly, that the causes for which such funds are spent (as decided by such institutions and its advisory board) are directly related to benefitting the Ummah, either in one’s own country or locality (such as countering a clearly anti-Muslim politician with an agenda of harm) or internationally (such as helping a candidate who is opposed to genocide).

Response:

This condition replaces the Qurʾānic designation of recipients with a subjective political assessment of “Ummah welfare.” Terms such as “anti-Muslim” have no fixed Sharʿī meaning and are inherently elastic, varying with ideological, theological, and moral commitments. A conservative Muslim community may regard pro-LGBT legislation as fundamentally hostile to Islam, while a progressive Muslim community may regard opposition to such legislation as anti-Muslim; under this framework, zakāt could be directed to mutually opposed candidates, each justified as serving the Ummah. A divine obligation whose application fractures along ideological lines ceases to function as law and becomes political discretion. Zakāt eligibility cannot hinge on contested political characterization, nor can it be made dependent on speculative assessments of communal welfare without dissolving the Qurʾānic restriction of recipients altogether.

The third condition:

Thirdly, that there be reasonable signs to believe that such funds would help the cause for which it is being raised.

Response:

The appeal to ghalabat al-ẓann and iʿtibār al-maʾālāt in this condition reflects a fundamental misapplication of both concepts. Consideration of outcomes (iʿtibār al-maʾālāt) operates within the bounds of actions that are already permitted in principle; it does not function to alter the object of an obligation, redefine its recipients, or expand a divinely delimited category. In other words, maʾālāt governs how a lawful act is carried out, not whether a particular act is lawful to begin with. Zakāt, however, is not a discretionary act whose permissibility hinges on expected outcomes, but a restricted act of worship whose validity depends on correct placement among Qurʾānic categories. To invoke maʾālāt in order to justify redirecting zakāt to recipients whose eligibility is itself disputed is to apply the principle outside its proper domain.

The comparison drawn with the Prophet’s ﷺ giving to tribal chieftains further confuses the issue by conflating two distinct types of uncertainty. When the Prophet ﷺ gave to the muʾallafah qulūbuhum, the uncertainty was in the effect of the giving, not in the eligibility of the recipient. The recipients already satisfied the waṣf: they were chiefs who were obeyed within their tribes, and thus qualified under the category as understood by the jurists. That their hearts might or might not ultimately be softened did not call their status into question. By contrast, the present argument relies on uncertainty at a far more fundamental level: whether modern political actors qualify as muʾallafah at all. Uncertainty regarding outcomes within a valid category cannot be analogized to uncertainty regarding the existence of the category itself.

In effect, this condition collapses the distinction between zakāt and general charitable spending. If strong presumption of benefit were sufficient to establish zakāt eligibility, then any cause with a plausible chance of advancing Muslim interests could qualify: legal advocacy, media campaigns, public relations efforts, or foreign policy lobbying. The Qurʾānic restriction of recipients would be rendered functionally irrelevant, replaced by a sliding scale of perceived effectiveness. That is precisely the outcome the enumeration of categories was meant to prevent.

What is being proposed, then, is not a cautious application of classical principles, but a reorientation of zakāt from a rights-based obligation into a results-oriented instrument. The Prophet’s ﷺ practice does not support this. He gave where the Sharīʿah had already identified the recipients, and accepted uncertainty in outcomes as an unavoidable feature of human action. To invoke his example here is therefore misplaced, because assumes what must first be proven: that the modern recipients in question fall within the category at all. This is known as istidlāl bi maḥall al-khilāf.

The fourth condition:

Fourthly, given that this category is one of eight in the Quran, and that there will always be a need to fulfill to all of the other categories, and in particular the needy and poor, the Council strongly advises that one does not give a majority of zakat to this category alone; rather only a portion should be given… As a suggestion, and not a legal ruling, perhaps up to a maximum of 1/8th of one’s total zakat amount may be given to this category, while the remaining should be distributed in the other categories.

Response:

This condition is problematic not merely in its conclusion, but in the framework it assumes about zakāt itself. It treats the Qurʾānic enumeration of categories as though they were programmatic budget lines to be proportionally funded, rather than legal descriptions of eligibility that apply when their subject matter exists. Zakāt in the Sharīʿah is not a portfolio to be diversified across eight causes, nor is it governed by internal prioritization schemes such as “primary” and “secondary” goals. Rather, it is a rights-based obligation whose discharge depends on placing wealth into the hands of those who actually qualify at the time of payment. The fact that the poor and needy are frequently present does not render other categories “secondary,” nor does the infrequency or contestability of a category justify allocating to it a symbolic portion in order to preserve balance.

The introduction of proportional limits — especially the suggestion of a “maximum of one-eighth” — further exposes the non-juristic nature of this reasoning. No classical jurist ever treated the eight categories as each warranting an equal or capped share, nor did any authority assign numerical ceilings to individual categories. The Qurʾānic verse does not allocate fractions; it designates recipients. Distribution in practice has always followed need, availability, and qualification, not symmetry. To suggest a fixed percentage, even as “non-binding advice,” is to import an administrative logic entirely foreign to zakāt law, one that implicitly redefines zakāt as a managed fund rather than an obligation owed to specific claimants.

More importantly, this condition tacitly concedes the weakness of the underlying argument. If the eligibility of al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum were clear and well-established, there would be no need to preemptively restrict the share allocated to them.

The language of “primary” versus “secondary” goals is likewise foreign to the zakāt framework. Feeding the poor is indeed a central wisdom (ḥikmah) of zakāt, but it is not its sole legal objective, nor does the Sharīʿah authorize ranking categories by perceived moral urgency. The verse itself makes no such distinction. When a debtor qualifies, his right is not diminished because the poor also exist; when a wayfarer qualifies, his entitlement is not reduced because hunger elsewhere is more pressing. Zakāt does not operate on zero-sum policy, but on religious entitlement.

Conclusion:

The conclusion of the fatwā relies heavily on appeals to caution, trust, and good intention, yet none of these address the underlying legal defects. Zakāt is not validated by procedure, transparency, or stated aims, but by correct placement among the divinely ordained categories. Where placement is incorrect, no amount of oversight can cure the error. Likewise, the invocation of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah is misplaced. The preservation of religion and life are objectives within the law, not instruments for overriding explicit textual limits in a restricted act of worship. Expanding zakāt eligibility in the name of maqāṣid inverts their function and undermines the very structure they are meant to protect.

Moreover, acknowledging the prevalence of abuse in zakāt collection while simultaneously expanding discretion only compounds the problem. Where misuse is feared, the Sharīʿah responds by narrowing discretion, not widening it. Most telling, however, is the admission that such political causes are unquestionably permissible through voluntary charity. That concession alone removes any claim of necessity for extending zakāt into this domain. What can rightly be pursued through ṣadaqah does not justify stretching a divinely restricted obligation beyond its bounds. Zakāt is preserved not by aligning it with contemporary causes, however urgent, but by fidelity to the limits set by revelation.

Lastly, it must also be emphasized that, even in the classical formulations that recognized the continued applicability of al-muʾallafah qulūbuhum, it was given often to people whose disposition toward Islam was hostile or unstable, not aligned or cooperative. The purpose of taʾlīf al-qulūb was not to reward sympathy or fund allies, but to neutralize harm, restrain hostility, or soften opposition at moments of real social vulnerability. Accordingly, jurists spoke of giving to those whose evil was feared, whose enmity required mitigation, or whose power necessitated temporary conciliation, not to those already advocating for Muslim interests or advancing causes perceived as beneficial.

Taken seriously, this logic would imply that taʾlīf al-qulūb — where it applies at all — would be directed incidentally toward those whose public stance towards Islam is hostile, not toward ideological allies. In a modern setting, this would correspond, if anything, to figures known for antagonistic rhetoric toward Muslims, figures such as Donald Trump, Randy Fine, Ted Cruz, and others whose public records include statements widely perceived by Muslims as hostile. The purpose in such a case would not be endorsement, partnership, or political investment, but the narrow objective of softening enmity or reducing harm. That this conclusion appears counterintuitive to our sensibilities only furthers the objection to how far modern applications have drifted from the classical rationale.

A note on academic honesty:

I am quite disappointed to reveal this: this particular fatwā, and many of its conclusions and quotations were directly taken from an online fatwā on the Islamic Economics website, without citing the original reference.[11] Compare the following citations:

What are the chances that the Fiqh Council and AMJA researched these exact same 5 scholars to determine their views on the topic? They also cite:

● “Ibn ʿArafah (d. 1401 CE) from the Mālikī school…”

● “Ibn Qudāmah writes in his ʿUmdah…”

● “Amongst the contemporary scholars, Rashīd Riḍā…”

● “And Sh. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (d. 2022) opines…”

● “Sh. ʿAbdullāh b. Manīʿ from the Council of Senior Scholars of Saudi Arabia…”

I believe this further explains the quote above from al-Juwaynī, which is seemingly unrelated to the discussion at hand. I believe it was only cited because the author of the article cited it:

● “And, in the absence of a Muslim ruler, or walī al-amr, a group of trusted scholars and reputable specialists will effectively take on the role of a walī al-amr, as al-Juwaynī stated.”

However, I did not find this exact research paper cited.

Final Thoughts:

Zakāt is not a political tool or a discretionary fund to be shaped by contemporary urgency. It is a binding act of worship governed by precise legal limits, and its validity rests not on intention, impact, or institutional process, but on correct placement. Every individual remains personally responsible for ensuring that his or her zakāt reaches those whom Allāh Himself designated, foremost among them the poor and the needy whose entitlement is immediate and undisputed. Delegation does not absolve responsibility, nor does good intention compensate for misplacement.

The repeated effort to stretch zakāt beyond its lawful boundaries — whether in the name of benefit, urgency, or lofty objectives — risks hollowing out the obligation altogether. Where uncertainty exists, restraint is the safer course; where abuse is feared, discretion must be narrowed, not expanded. Zakāt was revealed to protect the vulnerable, not to finance strategies, campaigns, or causes whose outcomes are speculative and whose eligibility is contested. What may be pursued through voluntary charity must not be imposed upon zakāt, for to blur that line is to compromise both.

It is imperative that every Muslim takes it upon themselves to pay their zakāt to only those eligible. Further, they must question the institutions and organizations they are giving their zakāt to, to ensure that the funds reach only those who are outlined by the Qurʾān, and never given to those who are falsely included within those categories. Here are some potential questions you should ask your favorite zakāt organization before giving them your money:

1. Who receives the zakāt?

2. Is zakāt ever used for politics, lobbying, advocacy, media, or campaigns?

a. If they say: never, under any circumstances → continue.

3. Are zakāt funds kept completely separate from ṣadaqah and general donations?

a. If they say: yes, separate accounts and tracking → continue.

4. How is eligibility decided?

a. If they say: by clear Sharʿī criteria for each recipient → continue.

b. If they say: by board judgment, impact assessment, or Ummah benefit → do not give.

5. Do you give zakāt primarily to the poor and needy?

6. Is zakāt ever given to organizations instead of people?

a. If they say: no, only individuals who qualify → continue.

b. If they say: yes, organizations represent the category → do not give.

7. Is there any condition placed on the recipient?

a. If they say: no conditions whatsoever → continue.

b. If they say: attendance, participation, alignment, services, or outcomes → do not give.

8. Can you provide zakāt-only audited reports?

a. If they say: yes, with clear breakdowns → continue.

b. If they say: general transparency or trust-based reporting → do not give.

9. When eligibility is unclear, what do you do?

a. If they say: we refrain from using zakāt → continue.

b. If they say: we rely on ijtihād or benefit analysis → do not give.

If any of these questions result in unsatisfactory answers, ensure that you are giving the money yourself, and do not go through any organization.

[1] Reported by al-Bukhārī (8) and Muslim (16).

[2] Defined as those who cannot afford half of their living expenses.

[3] Defined as those who can afford half or more of their living expenses, but not all of them.

[4] Those who incurred debts to reconcile between feuding parties, or those who incurred debt to purchase their freedom or to pay for the living expenses of themselves or their families.

[5] Found here: https://fiqhcouncil.org/zakat-for-political-campaigns/

[6] Reported by al-Bukhārī (4331) and Muslim (1059).

[7] Mirqāt al-Mafātīḥ (6/2596).

[8] Al-Irshād ilā Sabīl al-Rashād (pg. 406); quoted by al-Mardāwī in al-Inṣāf (3/228).

[9] For more information on fasād al-waḍ`, refer to Rawḍat al-Nāẓir wa Junnat al-Munāẓir (2/304)

[10] Al-Mughnī (6/45).

[11]https://islamic-economics.net/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%85