Worse Than Putin: The Eastern Threat That Keeps Growing

Ai Generated Image, Google Gemini.

The invasion of Ukraine, so far, has had devastating effects on the Russian economy, demographics, and international standing. An ever-closer reliance on China has become the norm for a country that a mere two decades ago was warning its people of the growing threat from the east, and a period of extended isolation from the international community is expected. A significant portion of the stockpile inherited from the Soviet Union has been burnt through by a prolonged war of attrition originally meant to last ten days. Potentially even more damaging for the future of the country, roughly 800,000 men have left, many permanently, leading the looming demographic collapse to present itself perhaps sooner than initially expected by Russian demographers.

With the situation all but under control, many analysts in the West have once again begun discussing the very real potential of a future in which the Russian state as we know it might no longer exist. This brief article, however, aims to present a perhaps more concerning reality.

What if the Russian state were to endure this crisis?

Keen observers of Eastern European affairs have long noted the difficulty in dismantling Soviet-style corruption, inefficiency, and mistrust. Though decades have passed since the collapse of the Union, Eastern Europe remains an area profoundly defined by its Soviet-era legacy, and Russia is perhaps the pinnacle of the example. Corruption in Russia is systematic and weaponised by the regime to ensure its continued survival. The media, judicial system, and industry have been concentrated in the hands of a few select people close to the President, and the opposition finds itself fighting against an oligarchy so heavily entrenched that the potential for change is nearly impossible.

Yet, the disastrous results of the war in Ukraine have begun to show cracks in the regime’s hold on power. Domestic fuel spikes, economic stagnation, and a looming financial crisis are the exact opposite of what Putin has promised the Russian people, whose support relies on a complicated social contract that enables the regime to continue its existence. Yet, the regime has worked for decades to ensure that, even in the case of a failure to uphold its end of the bargain, external opposition to it is near non-existent. With the murder of Alexei Navalny in 2024, Putin has seemingly eliminated the last of the major leaders of the anti-establishment movement.

Putin’s concerns now lie in a growing opposition from within his own cohort.

Though the situation for ordinary citizens is suboptimal by Western standards, a quasi-return to Soviet-style economic planning in provincial regions has yielded positive results by “buying out” a large section of the population, which has seen its wages skyrocket thanks to new jobs in ammunition production facilities, vehicle plants, and connected industries. Though this frantic defense spending has triggered severe inflationary pressures and risk of overheating, it has, for now, successfully bound regional economies to the state’s war machine. In large urban centers, massive investments in infrastructure and quality of life have potentially bought the regime some time to plan its next moves in Ukraine, as the perceived increase in quality of life, coupled with numerous examples of state-sanctioned violence against protesters, reduces the threats faced by the Kremlin.

Hence, the largest threat facing the regime comes from those who have so far propped it up.

In recent months, an increased number of well-known commentators and security figures have begun hinting at disapproval with the way the war in Ukraine is going. The intelligence and military elites, alongside traditional oligarchs, are unlikely to be pleased by the tactical handling of the war, especially since the beginning of a sustained, and successful, effort by Ukraine to hit critical energy and industrial infrastructure deep within Russia.

Hits to the economy were expected, but successful attacks on Russian soil were not, and Putin’s framing of the war is not coincidental. In the opening speech given on the 24th of February 2022, he announced a military operation aimed at toppling a regime “hostile” to Russia, promising the public and the ruling class that the Russian Army would be able to conduct this war of aggression far from home. Now that Ukraine poses a real threat to the internal interests of those who allow Putin to remain in power, the threat Putin faces, and by extension the West faces, is the rise of a figure more extreme than himself that can successfully deliver on the promise he himself had made. If Putin proves unable to sustain the interests of the security and ruling class, he is likely to be replaced by the same group that has so far shielded him.

But what would that transition look like?

It’s difficult to give an honest and well-informed answer about such a fundamental change to one of the most powerful countries in the world. Putin has ruled Russia since December 31, 1999, and imagining a world without him as the Russian head of state is difficult. Speculating as to the possible future of Russia’s leadership, it all depends on whether Putin will be able to achieve the results expected of him by a group of statesmen and hardliners whose interests and objectives are nearly impossible to fully grasp. Rationally, almost none of what Putin has done fits the mainstream globalist narrative, and the potential benefits of plunging his country into a more than four-year-long war against the West still elude many analysts familiar with Russian affairs.

If and when Putin is replaced, Russia will likely shift towards a further degree of instability and aggression. The Western expectation of a sudden democratic awakening in Russia neglects the country’s unique sociopolitical landscape. Even perceived liberal leaders such as Alexei Navalny don’t fit the mold of Western mentality and approach. Sovereignty, nationalism, and suspicion of the West are deeply rooted in Russian society, and a weakened Kremlin might just produce the right environment for a more extreme, ruthless, and expansionist leader to emerge. In its eager anticipation of a Russian collapse, the West may find that its true strategic nightmare is not Putin’s survival, but what comes after him.