The Normative Foundation, Part 3: Classical Marxism

Author’s Note: This article is Part 3 of a four-part series and presents the English translation of my essay, The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse. That essay, in turn, is based on my earlier work, A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism. This series is intended for a global audience. While every effort has been made to convey the original meaning accurately, some nuances may be lost in translation. The complete, original Japanese text is available for reference at the link below. 👉 **[Read the original in Japanese]**

Navigate the Series: Part 1: Normative Propositions Part 2: “The Special” and “The Boundary” Part 3: Classical Marxism Part 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones 👉 **[Read the complete version in English]**

The supplementary note (in Japanese) that follows this essay appears as a separate article.Please refer to the link below. 👉 **[The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse【Supplement】]**

The validity and originality of the arguments presented in this essay and its supplement have been analyzed with Gemini 3.0 Pro. For a detailed report of the results, please refer to the links below: 👉 **[Analysis Results for the Essay (English Version)] 👉 [[Analysis Results for the Essay and Supplement (Japanese Version)]](https://gemini.google.com/share/1ae3f1c4ee28)**

A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism

This essay confirms that normative propositions, which involve value judgments, lack any transcendent basis and are fundamentally distinct from factual propositions.

Building on this, it demonstrates that the core thesis of Classical Marxism — which treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” that is, as the driving force of change and development — is, in substance, nothing other than a normative proposition, and that Dialectical Materialism therefore lacks a coherent theoretical foundation.

On this basis, while pointing out the mechanism by which norms are disguised as facts, this essay proposes an attitude of adjustment grounded in diverse “hopes” as the basis for sustaining social norms without any absolute foundation.

Chapter 3: Classical Marxism

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, building on the discussion up to the previous chapter, Classical Marxism is taken up as a concrete example.

Because this doctrine adopts a position that rejects religion and transcendent beings like gods, normative propositions should, in principle, be unable to possess any decisive foundation within the theory itself. However, its core components — Dialectical Materialism (DM) and Historical Materialism (HM) — regard contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” treating them as the driving force of change and development. Although this appears, at first glance, to be a factual proposition, it is in fact nothing other than a normative proposition that treats contradictions and conflicts as “something that ought to be treated as special,” while subordinating all other factors as contingent elements and “positioning” them accordingly.

This central thesis, which takes the form of a factual proposition while being substantively normative, mutually reinforces itself — despite lacking any grounding — through acts such as “discovery,” “presumption,” “de-emphasis,” and “redefinition” (all of which are themselves normative propositions), thereby justifying the inevitability of class struggle.

It is pointed out that this theory, being a “castle in the air” devoid of a theoretical foundation, ultimately carries the risk of culminating in a dogmatized “praxis pursued as an end in itself.”

Main Argument

In this chapter, based on the discussion of normative propositions as well as the concepts of “The Special” and “The Boundary” in Chapters 1 and 2, I will examine “Classical Marxism” and its core theoretical foundations: “Dialectical Materialism” and “Historical Materialism.”

The reason for focusing on Classical Marxism is that it continues to exert a certain degree of influence even today.

§3.1

To begin, let us review Classical Marxism, focusing on the points relevant to the present discussion.

Classical Marxism is a social theory developed in the 19th century by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. It analyzes society and history primarily from an economic perspective and is grounded in a historical view that sees society as inevitably progressing toward socialism — and ultimately communism — through the internal contradictions of capitalism.

At the core of this theory lies “class struggle,” and especially in capitalist society, the conflict between the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat) is regarded as unavoidable. It is held that through this struggle, the capitalist system must be overthrown and the “proletarian revolution” must be achieved.

Classical Marxism also regards itself as a form of “scientific socialism” that seeks to understand the world in an empirical and rational manner. As a universal and fundamental theory for that purpose, it adopts “Dialectical Materialism (DM).”

According to this theory, in nature, society, and thought alike, contradictions and conflicts inherent within things are considered to be the universal and fundamental driving forces that inevitably lead to change and development. Therefore, the relations of contradiction and conflict are treated as The Special and are especially emphasized.

The application of this Dialectical Materialism to the analysis of society and history is known as “Historical Materialism (HM).” In this theory, class struggle is understood as the concrete manifestation of contradictions and conflicts within society. It is regarded as the driving force of history, and also as a historically inevitable phenomenon.

Political institutions (such as the state, government, and courts), legal systems (statutory law and customary law), ideologies (such as religion, ethics, and education), and culture (such as traditions and social customs) are categorized as the “superstructure.” These are said to be determined by the “base,” namely, the productive forces and the relations of production. Legal systems, religion, ethics, education, and social customs constitute social norms, and therefore social norms are included within the superstructure. The superstructure is believed to function to legitimize the domination of the ruling class; however, such legitimacy is not absolute, but rather relative, subject to change depending on historical conditions.

It should also be noted that Classical Marxism adopts an atheistic stance. As symbolized by Marx’s statement that “religion is the opium of the people,” it rejects religion and transcendent beings like gods, and critically regards them as means of escapism from reality.

§3.2

First, Classical Marxism, by taking the position of “rejecting religion and transcendent beings like gods,” entails the following propositions within its theoretical framework:

・According to the conclusion of §1.4, no normative proposition can possess a decisive (i.e., universally and absolutely valid) basis.

・According to the argument in §2.1, prior to our thinking, it is not determined that something ought to be treated as “The Special.”

・According to the argument in §2.2, no “Boundary” exists as if it had been predetermined prior to our thinking.

Furthermore, with regard to social norms, it is understood that Classical Marxism takes the same stance as this essay — namely, that such norms are not absolute but relative.

§3.3

For the purpose of the following analysis, we will clarify the concepts employed in DM (Dialectical Materialism) and HM (Historical Materialism).

Intrinsic and necessary elements: These refer to factors that are fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, where internal contradictions and conflicts are considered to be the driving force of development, causing change in a law-governed and inevitable manner. According to Engels, the totality of contingencies ultimately converges in the direction of necessity. Concrete examples include:

・class struggle

・contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production

・exploitation structure

External and contingent elements: These refer to factors that are not fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history. The timing and content of their emergence are unpredictable; although they influence the direction of change and development, they are not regarded as law-governed or necessary driving forces. According to Engels, even if such events seem important in isolation, they are subordinated to the overall structure. Concrete examples include:

・natural disasters

・the emergence or death of great individuals

・the accidental outbreak of war

・the sudden invention of technology

What is important here is the distinction that, while “intrinsic and necessary elements” are said to be fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, “external and contingent elements” are considered to be subordinated to that structure.

Furthermore, Engels refers to relationships other than contradictions and conflicts in capitalist society, such as the following:

・Mutual interdependence: Relationships such as between labor and capital, or between city and countryside, involve not only conflict but also mutual dependency.

・Functional interrelation: Institutions such as the state and the family function as parts of the whole, in connection with the economic base.

・Provisional coordination: Limited cooperation may arise, such as through labor negotiations or temporary reforms.

・Relationship with nature: Nature is both an object of exploitation and a being that interacts reciprocally with humanity.

§3.3.1

To begin our analysis of DM, we first introduce a simplified model. This model is based on the propositions derived in §3.2.

Let us consider a set [X] (composed of nature, society, thought, etc.) prior to the imposition of any boundaries. This state can be described as one in which boundaries can be freely drawn anywhere. Now, suppose we introduce a certain criterion [a] and [non-a] to observe [X]. The elements comprising [X] will then be classified into subsets such as [A], [non-A], and [others], according to the boundary determined by [a] and [non-a].

Even though the criterion itself is conceptual in nature, and thus the subsets [A], [non-A], and [others] may form a continuum without any clear boundaries, this does not change the situation.

It is easy to imagine that if we apply the same criterion [a] and [non-a] to other sets — say, [Y] or [Z] — we would obtain similar subsets [A], [non-A], and [others], just as we did for [X].

Now, if one were to claim that the criterion [a] and [non-a], or the resulting subsets [A] and [non-A], ought to be treated as “The Special,” such a claim would undeniably be a normative proposition and therefore cannot possess a decisive basis. Consequently, the claim that they ought to be treated as “The Special” cannot be justified. Therefore, the subset [others] stands on equal footing with the subsets [A] and [non-A]; and likewise, any observation based on a different criterion — say, [b] or [c] — stands on equal footing with the observation based on [a] and [non-a].

Based on the above, the following points can be noted:

・In the act of observation, the moment we choose a criterion, it already becomes possible to generate any boundary or set. Therefore, no criterion, boundary, or set can be regarded as absolute.

・If the criterion [a] and [non-a] is “emphasized” as “The Special,” then applying it to observe other sets such as [Y] or [Z] and obtaining subsets similar to [A] and [non-A] (as in the case of [X]) may lead to the judgment that “because the criterion is ‘The Special,’ similar results will be obtained no matter what is observed.” This, in turn, may result in the “presumption” that all objects of observation must fit into the [A] and [non-A] classification.

・By emphasizing the criterion [a] and [non-a] as “The Special,” the resulting subsets [A] and [non-A] may also come to be emphasized, while other subsets such as [others] or the results of observations using different criteria (such as [b] or [c]) risk being “de-emphasized.”

§3.3.2

When the model from §3.3.1 is applied to DM, it yields the following interpretation — for example, if the set [X] is taken to represent “society”:

The criterion [a] and [non-a] corresponds to “what stands in a relationship of contradictions and conflicts with the other side.” The subsets [A] and [non-A] represent “pairings that stand in such a relationship” — in a capitalist society, this would correspond to the capitalist class and the working class. The conflict between these classes — namely, class struggle — is treated as an Intrinsic and necessary element.

The subset [others] includes External and contingent elements, while the sets [Y] and [Z] correspond to domains such as “nature” and “thought.” The criteria [b] and [c] refer to relationships such as “mutual interdependence” and “provisional coordination.”

DM claims to have “discovered” that contradictions and conflicts are the universal and fundamental driving force behind change and development across the realms of nature, society, and thought. It therefore places “emphasis” on this relationship as “The Special.” Accordingly, the assertion that such contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” constitutes the central propositions of DM and HM.

However, although DM describes this as a “discovery,” the fact remains that one is free to choose any observational criterion and thereby free to generate subsets. For that reason, the relationship of contradictions and conflicts — which is claimed to have been discovered — cannot be regarded as absolute in its status as a subset. In other words, relationships of contradictions and conflicts are, in principle, on equal footing with other subsets and with the results of observations made using different criteria.

As a result of such a discovery, there arises the possibility of forming a “presumption” that contradictions and conflicts are what drive change and development in various parts of the object of observation. In other words, even in cases where phenomena arise through the operation of complex laws, there is a risk of forcibly interpreting and explaining them in terms of contradictions and conflicts.

In fact, DM presents various examples in which contradictions and conflicts are said to drive change and development. However, some of these examples employ other natural laws to explain the mechanisms involved — for instance, “the boiling of water” or “the growth of plants.” Such examples can only be regarded as “presumptions,” because in reality, the concept of contradictions and conflicts alone is insufficient to fully explain their mechanisms.

Furthermore, as a result of the emphasis on contradictions and conflicts — that is, on intrinsic and necessary elements — as “The Special,” there is a risk of a “de-emphasis” on the observation of external and contingent elements, as well as on other kinds of relations (such as mutual interdependence or provisional coordination). And indeed, while detailed analyses have been conducted regarding contradictions and conflicts, no such equally refined analyses have been applied to other elements or relationships. Thus, contradictions and conflicts were not regarded as “The Special” only after thorough comparative analysis with other elements and relations. This constitutes nothing but de-emphasis, and to the extent that these other aspects are neglected, our empirical and rational understanding of the world is diminished, and any theory derived from such a framework loses its universality.

What is crucial here is that while “presumptions” and de-emphasis can be derived from a discovery, a discovery can also be derived from “presumptions” and de-emphasis. In other words, when “presumptions” are made in every context — leading to the conclusion that contradictions and conflicts are present everywhere — or when there is a de-emphasis of other elements and relationships, it then becomes possible to claim the “discovery” that contradictions and conflicts are the universal and fundamental driving force.

§3.3.3

But what does the very expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” actually mean? In §2.1, the concept of special was examined, but is this expression — “contradictions and conflicts as ‘The Special’” — a factual proposition, or a normative one?

To clarify this question, let us begin by considering the following claim, hypothetically made from the standpoint of Classical Marxism:

“The expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as ‘The Special’ was used simply because they were exceptionally effective — compared to other elements — as a driving force that leads to change and development; it is no more than a factual proposition.”

In other words, the claim is: “The expression contradictions and conflicts are ‘The Special’ is a factual proposition.”

However, in that case, the very theory that regards class struggle as a historically necessary phenomenon would no longer hold.

This is because, if the claim is a factual proposition, then contradictions and conflicts in the dynamics of class struggle — that is, “intrinsic and necessary elements” — would be treated on the same footing as “external and contingent elements,” without receiving any special status. Therefore, no matter how effective contradictions and conflicts may be as driving forces, as long as they are regarded as necessary elements, the influence of contingent elements would render the outcome no longer necessary.

Therefore, history can no longer be regarded as a historically inevitable phenomenon with a certain directionality; instead, it can only be seen as an unpredictable accumulation of mere contingencies. In such a case, no justification can be provided for the claim that class struggle is historically inevitable, and the theory fails to hold. In other words, this factual proposition — which is supposed to provide a theoretical foundation for class struggle — ends up undermining the very theory it is meant to support. This is a logical inconsistency, a complete reversal of ends and means.

Accordingly, the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” cannot be accepted as a factual proposition.

§3.3.4

As clarified in the previous section (§3.3.3), when this expression is assumed to be a factual proposition, it results in a logical inconsistency. An analysis of why such an inconsistency arises reveals that this expression implicitly contains the following normative proposition.

As stated in §3.3, DM/HM hold that intrinsic and necessary elements are fundamentally embedded in the structure of society and history, whereas external and contingent elements are subordinated to that structure. However, the term “subordinated” in this context clearly implies a form of “positioning.” That is, the intrinsic and necessary elements are “positioned” relatively higher, while the external and contingent elements are “positioned” lower — as those which are “subordinated.” Such “positioning” is, as explained in §2.1, inseparable from the awareness that something ought to be treated as “The Special”; in other words, the “positioning” itself is unmistakably a normative proposition.

Although it is phrased as if it were a factual proposition, the act of “positioning” certain elements as “subordinated” and thereby engaging in their “de-emphasis” is based on a subjective value judgment. This judgment presupposes the normative proposition that such “positioning” is “desirable.” If one denies that such “positioning” is “desirable,” then there would be no necessity to deliberately position those elements in such a manner in the first place.

As a result, only the bare factual proposition — that such elements merely exist — remains. And this, once again, leads us to the same conclusion as reached in the previous section (§3.3.3).

As clarified in the analysis of §3.3.3, a mere magnitude difference between “Intrinsic and necessary elements” and “External and contingent elements” is insufficient to justify the claim that the former holds decisive superiority over the latter in the development of history. However, by introducing the concept of the “structure” of society and history, one can assert such superiority by “positioning” the two within the framework of “structure” as a hierarchical (“upper” and “lower”) relationship. This claim, however, is — needless to say — only established by way of such “positioning” as a normative proposition.

Therefore, in response to the question raised at the beginning of §3.3.3, it can be pointed out that when DM/HM expresses contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” what is implied is precisely this kind of “positioning” as a normative proposition.

What is crucial here is that the “positioning” is carried out through the “de-emphasis” of the “External and contingent elements” as that which is subordinated. This is semantically analogous to what was described in §3.3.2 — that a “discovery” may arise from a process of “presumption” or “de-emphasis.” In other words, this very act of “positioning” is itself an act of placing the “Intrinsic and necessary elements” — namely, contradictions and conflicts — relatively higher than the “External and contingent elements.” It is thus evident that the “discovery” of contradictions and conflicts and their treatment as “The Special” is closely related to this hierarchical positioning. Therefore, it becomes clear that this act of “positioning” and the act of “discovery” are mutually reinforcing.

As also discussed in §3.3, Engels stated that “the totality of contingencies ultimately converges in the direction of necessity.” Put simply, this means that he understood necessity as encompassing contingency. However, in the end, this merely constitutes a “redefinition” of the terms — shifting the “boundary” between the concepts so as to expand the scope of necessity and absorb contingency within it. Nonetheless, no matter how one attempts to “redefine” necessity and contingency, contingent elements never diminish, nor do they ever disappear.

What must be emphasized here — as already discussed in §2.2 and §3.3.1 — is the following point: no matter where one draws The Boundary between concepts, there is, in fact, no inherent boundary there to begin with. If one claims that some boundary “ought to be” drawn at a particular location, then that claim is unmistakably a normative proposition.

Also significant here is the fact that the notion of necessity encompassing contingency is semantically analogous to the “positioning” of Intrinsic and necessary elements and External and contingent elements in a hierarchical (“upper” and “lower”) relationship. Accordingly, it becomes evident that this “positioning” and “redefinition” are mutually reinforcing.

What becomes evident from the above analysis is that, although the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” actually implies a normative proposition as described above, it was, in the previous section, assumed to be a factual proposition.As a result, its normative significance was nullified, thereby rendering it incapable of serving as a theoretical foundation for class struggle, and ultimately leading to a logical inconsistency.

Therefore, it has become clear that the expression that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but a normative one.

§3.3.5

Therefore, from the considerations in §3.3.3 to §3.3.4, the following conclusion can be drawn:

The proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but rather a normative one that treats them as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

In other words, the central propositions of DM/HM, while taking the form of factual propositions, are in substance normative propositions.

Accordingly, all propositions derived from the premise that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” inevitably possess a normative character. Needless to say, the theory of class struggle is premised upon the normative proposition that treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special.” As a result, this normative character extends throughout the entire framework of DM/HM.

However, as discussed in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Therefore, neither the proposition that treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” nor any propositions derived from it possess decisive justification.

Based on the above considerations, the following conclusion can be drawn:

The theory that class struggle is a historically inevitable phenomenon cannot hold, for it loses its foundation.

The next question that arises here is: from what kind of “necessity” does this normative proposition originate? Judging from the fact that contradictions and conflicts are cited as the theoretical basis of class struggle, this “necessity” can only be understood as the necessity of justifying the theory of class struggle.

In light of the above, the following view may further be derived:

It is reasonable to assume that the reason DM/HM regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is for the purpose of justifying the theory of class struggle.

§3.3.6

Here, let us revisit the notions of “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” discussed in §3.3.1–§3.3.2.

As stated in the previous section (§3.3.5), the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is not a factual proposition, but rather a normative one that treats them as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

Accordingly, when one observes a given object, contradictions and conflicts are used as criteria that “ought to be treated as The special,” and on that basis, the observed object is classified by boundaries defined through such criteria. As a result, “pairings that stand in such a relationship” of contradictions and conflicts are discovered. Moreover, when another object is observed — again using contradictions and conflicts as the criterion — it is only natural, given the underlying principle, that similar “pairings that stand in such a relationship” are discovered. However, as contradictions and conflicts are given “emphasis” as criteria that “ought to be treated as The special,” other criteria — and the observational results derived from them — are subjected to “de-emphasis” and thus neglected. Based on the above kind of observation, DM asserts the universality of contradictions and conflicts, claiming that “whatever one observes, similar results are obtained precisely because the criterion is ‘The Special.’” However, this merely means that “similar results are obtained whatever one observes because that criterion has been treated as ‘The Special.’” This is because the criterion of contradictions and conflicts, and all other criteria, are originally on equal footing — and so are all possible outcomes of observation. In other words, to assert that only contradictions and conflicts are “universal” inevitably presupposes the normative proposition that contradictions and conflicts are “something that ought to be treated as The Special.”

Moreover, even when observing phenomena that are already directly and thoroughly explained by other laws, the underlying assumption that contradictions and conflicts are a universal driving force that “ought to be treated as The special” leads to forcing those phenomena into a framework of contradictions and conflicts. However, in order for contradictions and conflicts to serve as a universal driving force that “ought to be treated as The special,” they cannot be placed on equal footing with those other laws. Thus, one is compelled to interpret them as something operating as a driving force on a more fundamental level. Nonetheless, this amounts merely to an interpretation added on top of the explanation already provided by other laws. Therefore, it is impossible to fully explain the phenomenon by contradictions and conflicts alone. Even if there are laws that can directly and thoroughly explain the phenomenon, that alone does not justify deeming them fundamental. This is because doing so is nothing other than an act of “positioning” them at the fundamental level. In other words, if one still attempts a “positioning” of contradictions and conflicts as something operating at the fundamental level, then — as clearly shown in the discussion in §3.3.4 — there is no alternative but to presuppose a normative proposition.

What becomes clear from the above is that the claims that only contradictions and conflicts are “universal,” and that they are also fundamental, cannot stand unless a normative proposition is presupposed. That is, both “discovery” and “presumption” are established only when a normative proposition is assumed. Considering that “de-emphasis” is also the result of the “emphasis” based on the normative proposition that contradictions and conflicts ought to be treated as “The Special,” it becomes clear that a normative proposition is latent even in that “de-emphasis.” Therefore, it has been revealed that “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” all presuppose a normative proposition.

What is crucial here is that “discovery” is derived from “presumption” and “de-emphasis.” Thus, as stated in §3.3.2, it has become clear that “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” mutually lead to one another.

These actions, regardless of intent, are indeed being carried out in such a manner in reality. In other words, it can be said that these actions are rather compelled by the “pressure” of a normative proposition — namely, the claim that contradictions and conflicts ought to be treated as “The Special.”

However, as has already been stated in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Therefore, it can be pointed out that contradictions and conflicts stand on equal footing with other standards, their observational results, and other laws — that is, with the workings of countless forces — and are merely one among them.

§3.3.7

However, if the aim is to justify the theory of class struggle and to achieve revolution and transformation through it, merely treating contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” is by no means sufficient.

By synthesizing the previous discussions on “discovery,” “presumption,” “de-emphasis,” “positioning,” and “redefinition,” it can be pointed out that all of these acts, while presupposing normative propositions, are inseparable in that they treat contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — that is, they are all expressions of the very act of treating them as “The Special.” Accordingly, this series of acts is “interlinked” under the aim of justifying the theory of class struggle, and, in a mutually reinforcing relationship, they serve to strengthen the legitimacy of the entire theory by impressing upon us the special status of contradictions and conflicts. It is certain that these acts, regardless of intent, do in fact fulfill such a role in reality.

On the other hand, within the theory of class struggle, these acts remain merely theoretical reinforcements, and do not entail any effective force for the achievement of revolution and transformation. Therefore, they alone cannot eliminate the influence of external and contingent elements.

Here, what plays a role as an effective force is the “practicality” that asserts the necessity of achieving revolution and transformation through class struggle. This is because the historical inevitability of class struggle is not understood as something that progresses automatically like a law of nature, but rather as something realized through human, subjective praxis. By encouraging people to engage in the praxis of class struggle, it becomes possible to mitigate the influence of the external and contingent elements that undeniably exist. As a result, if the class struggle unfolds as intended, the legitimacy of the theory of class struggle can be asserted even more strongly. However, the advantage of this “practicality” does not end there. Even if the class struggle does not unfold as intended, it becomes possible to argue that this is simply due to an insufficient degree of praxis. Furthermore, even the deliberate “practical” construction of contradictions and conflicts can be justified as a means to effectively advance the struggle.

However, this “practicality,” being expressed as a clear normative proposition — namely, the necessity of achieving revolution and transformation through class struggle — is, in itself, essentially no different from other ideologies. It is here that the theory of class struggle comes to serve as the theoretical foundation. What gives this foundation real significance is the fact that the impression — that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” — has been reinforced by the normative proposition. In other words, it is precisely because contradictions and conflicts are regarded as “something that ought to be treated as The Special” that one can claim the necessity of praxis.

That is to say, in order to ensure achieving revolution and transformation, the theory and praxis of class struggle form a mutually driven relationship — so to speak, a relationship of two wheels, each requiring the other.

However, as reiterated, and as discussed in §3.2, no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Accordingly — and it goes without saying — this “practicality” also lacks any decisive justification.

§3.3.8

By synthesizing the analyses from §3.2 through §3.3.7, the following conclusion can be drawn:

Classical Marxism places class struggle at the core of its theoretical system, grounding itself in DM and HM as its foundational theories. However, as a result of the preceding examination, it has become clear that the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are, though disguised as factual propositions, in substance normative propositions that treat contradictions and conflicts as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.” Thus, it is revealed that all propositions derived from the premise that contradictions and conflicts are “The Special” inevitably possess a normative character, and consequently, DM/HM as a whole is imbued with a normative nature.

However, within the theoretical system of Classical Marxism, no normative proposition within the framework of DM/HM can possess decisive justification. Accordingly, the central propositions of DM/HM, as well as all propositions derived from them, are deprived of their justificatory basis — and consequently, even the theory of class struggle, which constitutes the core of Classical Marxism, can no longer be sustained. Thus, Classical Marxism finds itself in a state devoid of theoretical foundation, taking on the aspect of a so-called “castle in the air.”

Moreover, the theory and praxis of class struggle form what may be called a “relationship of two wheels,” yet both wheels presuppose normative propositions. Since the theoretical side of class struggle, as discussed above, cannot be sustained, the other side — its “practicality” — cannot be grounded in the historical inevitability of class struggle. In the first place, this very “practicality” is itself a normative proposition, and since no normative proposition within the theoretical system of DM/HM can possess decisive justification, it ultimately amounts to nothing more than “praxis aimed at realizing a hope.” Furthermore, if that hope diverges significantly from the actual trajectory of society, it may degrade into a “dogma,” and in due course, even into a form of “praxis pursued as an end in itself.”

Even if one attempts to ground the normative basis of “practicality” in revolution and transformation in concepts such as “ethical imperatives,” “moral obligations,” or “social justice,” these concepts — as components of social norms in the general sense — remain, as stated in §1.6 and §3.2, fundamentally relative. Moreover, insofar as they are subject to the constraints of the proposition derived in §3.2, if such concepts — or propositions derived from them — are treated as “The Special,” one would inevitably arrive at the same conclusions as those discussed in §3.3.1 through §3.3.7.

Looking back on the discussions in §§3.3.4–3.3.7, it becomes clear that normative propositions play a significant role primarily in the relationship between intrinsic and necessary elements and external and contingent elements, especially in the relationship between “necessity” and “contingency.” That is, normative propositions are primarily employed as the theoretical basis for justifying the historical inevitability of class struggle, by asserting that “necessity” holds decisive superiority over “contingency.” Needless to say, “practicality” is also expected to play an important role in reducing the influence of contingent elements. However, these points can rather be taken as evidence of an underlying sense of crisis — namely, that contingency could exert a significant influence over the historical inevitability of class struggle.

In the present age, such influences are regarded as even more decisive. Even if all natural laws governing space were fully elucidated, and the quantum state of the entire universe completely grasped, the constraints posed by the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics and the sensitivity to initial conditions in chaotic systems render it, in principle, impossible — or at least extremely difficult — to foresee the future. In other words, “deterministic” predictions such as “the future will turn out this way” or “if one does this, then that will inevitably follow” are now considered fundamentally impossible. Therefore, the underlying sense of crisis regarding the major influence of contingency is well-founded, and it may now be said that the historical inevitability of class struggle is undergoing a significant destabilization.

§3.4

Over the course of §3.1 to §3.3, I have developed this inquiry in detail; such meticulous analysis has been necessary precisely because the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are, in reality, nothing other than normative propositions disguised as factual ones.

This proposition is expressed in a manner that appears, at first glance, to be a factual proposition, making its underlying implications difficult to grasp and requiring considerable effort for clarification and analysis. Furthermore, the various concepts surrounding the central propositions — particularly the classifications such as “Intrinsic and necessary elements” and “External and contingent elements” — are developed in extremely abstract terms, and the analysis of these concepts inevitably becomes abstract as well.

It is highly significant that Marx, driven by ethical aims such as human emancipation and the salvation of the oppressed, developed the theory of surplus value in Capital and revealed the mechanisms by which capitalism exacerbates economic inequality. On the other hand, when Engels proposed dialectical laws analogous to natural laws and applied them to society in order to assert the inevitability of historical development, Marx’s original aim was no longer emphasized, and the theory of social transformation was reduced to something mechanical and inorganic. And, given that Classical Marxism adopts a stance that “rejects religion and transcendent beings like gods,” it inevitably loses any decisive foundation for its normative propositions. As a result, it is compelled to rely on “Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones” — a contradiction inherent in the ideology itself.

Since the time of Classical Marxism, various positions have emerged — up to the present day — that aim to critically develop or go beyond it. Representative positions include the following:

・Marxism–Leninism (Lenin, Stalin) A position that holds that the overthrow of capitalism requires a revolution and dictatorship led by a vanguard party. It seeks to realize socialism through the seizure of state power and the implementation of a planned economy.

・The Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno) A position that asserts capitalism dominates people’s consciousness through culture and media. It focuses not only on economics but also on the influence on thought and emotion.

・Structuralist Marxism (Althusser) A position that sees structures — such as institutions and language — rather than human will as the driving forces of society. It emphasizes systems over individual agency.

・Gramscianism (Gramsci) A position that claims domination is maintained more through consent — via culture and education — than through violence. It emphasizes the importance of ideological and linguistic struggle in social transformation.

・Analytical Marxism (G. A. Cohen, Roemer, Elster) A position that aims to reconstruct Marxism logically and clarify its ambiguous expressions. It employs formal and ethical methods to refine the theory.

・Post-Marxism (Laclau, Mouffe) A position that focuses not only on class but also on diverse forms of antagonism such as gender and race. It seeks to make the understanding of society more flexible and pluralistic.

In the Frankfurt School, there is a critical stance — albeit not always explicitly — toward the transformation of the theory of social transformation caused by Engels’s assertion of the inevitability of historical development, as discussed above. Analytical Marxism, while recognizing that the inevitability of historical development contains normative elements, does not deny normativity itself but instead adopts the position of attempting to reconstruct it logically. Structuralist Marxism, on the other hand, deconstructs the normative elements themselves, and in Post-Marxism, those norms and ideals are further relativized — thus taking a stance that reexamines normative elements from their very foundations.

However, all of these positions fundamentally differ from the stance of the present study, which holds that the central propositions of DM/HM — namely, the proposition that regards contradictions and conflicts as “The Special” — are themselves normative propositions. This is because each of those positions treats concepts such as “the emancipation of the proletariat” or “the abolition of exploitation” as normative elements.