Spinoza’s Proposition 35 in Part II
Note that, out of respect, I have listed both the original text and the English translation (by R. H. M. Elwes) of Spinoza’s words that are…
Spinoza’s Proposition 35 in Part II

Note that, out of respect, I have listed both the original text and the English translation (by R. H. M. Elwes) of Spinoza’s words that are the subject of this explanation. The following abbreviations are used: Definition: Def. Axiom: Ax. Proposition: Prop. Demonstration (Proof): Dem. Corollary: Cor. Scholium: Schol.
The basic elements of the Ethics are abbreviated according to the following convention: Pars: E, Definitio: D, Axioma: A, Propositio: P, Demonstratio: d, Corollarium: C, Scholium: S
(e.g.) Part I, Proposition 8, Scholium 2: E1P8S2
------------------------------- Prop. XXXV Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione, quam ideæ inadæquatæ, sive mutilatæ, & confusæ involvunt.
Prop. XXXV Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. -------------------------------
This proposition addresses the relationship between “falsity” itself and “inadequate ideas.”
On the one hand, “falsity” is a privation of cognition and therefore does not exist. On the other hand, “inadequate ideas” do exist. It may appear contradictory that something nonexistent nevertheless exists. As I explained earlier, however, once we distinguish between “falsity” and “the idea of falsity” (that is, the inadequate idea), the contradiction disappears.
The statement “falsity is the privation of cognition contained within an inadequate idea” can be clarified metaphorically by means of the Rubin’s vase. If we regard the two facing faces as the positive, convex elements, then the central vase appears as the negative, concave element. The “inadequate idea” corresponds to the two facing faces and exists positively. By contrast, the Rubin’s vase (falsity itself), being the reversal, exists only as the negative, concave region and has no positive existence of its own. That Rubin’s vase is precisely “the privation of cognition contained in the inadequate idea.”

When we apply this metaphor, the meaning of the phrase in the proof of Prop. 35 — “falsity cannot exist in an absolute privation of cognition” — also becomes transparent. If the two facing faces, that is, the “inadequate idea,” do not exist as convex elements, then the negative vase of central privation of existence — the Rubin’s vase — likewise cannot exist. In an “absolute privation of cognition” where the convex elements are absent, the falsity of the concave region also cannot exist.
Although I have omitted the quotation from the scholium, the passage is frequently cited as a Spinozistic example, so I will comment on it briefly.
On the Falsity of the Idea of Free Will
① The idea of freedom arises from ignorance of the causes of action. For if one knew the causes of one’s actions, one would not be free.
② Human beings therefore regard their actions as proceeding from a free will. Yet they remain ignorant of the cause of this free will itself. Consequently, the idea of free will also arises from ignorance.
Spinoza’s account ends here, but I should like to add a further observation. To begin with, the very claim that the freedom of action is caused by free will is already contradictory; for in that case human action would be necessarily constrained by the cause called “free will.” Likewise, even if one were ignorant of the cause of “free will,” the moment that cause became known an aporia would arise: “free will” would itself be necessarily constrained by its own cause — in other words, it would be unfree. What emerges spontaneously from this line of thought is that “freedom” is nothing other than the idea of an effect that lacks a cause. In Spinoza’s terminology, it is an “inadequate idea,” and therefore a false idea.
Nevertheless, even within Spinoza’s own logic the “idea of freedom” exists as an “idea of falsity” (E2P36).
This point, too, can be illustrated metaphorically by the Rubin’s vase. The free body itself corresponds to the central concave region of the Rubin’s vase figure and does not exist. The unfree body, by contrast, exists as the convex element constituted by the two facing faces. So long as human beings regard the central privation of existence (the Rubin’s vase = freedom) as something real, they fail to see the two facing faces of the convex region that actually constitute that privation. Those convex faces represent nothing other than the concrete causal reality on the basis of which the human body necessarily exists and acts.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — - Of course, I am writing with the expectation of receiving reactions from my readers. Otherwise, I wouldn’t publish anything at all. Even I myself am still amazed that I can write articles of this quality. And yet the response has been rather thin. Perhaps it’s because of the World Cup? (No, the real cause is probably my own arrogant self-love.) Even I, who am normally indifferent to sports, find myself getting swept up in the excitement — soccer is pure adrenaline. I can’t take my eyes off it. I had been planning to suspend my writing until August, but then, unexpectedly, I received a large number of reactions and decided to start writing again. After all, there is a joy in actively writing that passive reading simply cannot satisfy.
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