Strategic Studies

Reassessing Clausewitz’s ‘Centre of Gravity’: Perspectives from the Israel-US and Iran War

The Israel–US–Iran conflict demonstrates that contemporary warfare no longer revolves around a single decisive source of power.

Photo by Saifee Art on Unsplash

Throughout warfare history, strategies have evolved, often shaped by the circumstances of their time. One such notable strategy is Carl von Clausewitz’s notion of the “Centre of Gravity,” which is defined as a “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. Hence, focusing all efforts on the COG, which yields maximum impact, should facilitate a decisive victory because it causes the opposing entity to collapse.

As evidenced in the Persian Gulf War, COG has a historical value. Analysing the enemy’s COG means devising an effective approach and directing force to the one that matters the most. In this case, the allied outlined their adversary, identifying the Republican Guard (RG) as the central entity fuelling the entire military efforts. In the aftermath, focusing on the RG triggered a series of reactions affecting the forces in the field and influenced Saddam’s overall. In terms of the result, the allied reached its goal. Following Operations Desert Storm and Desert Sabre, Iraq conceded.

As we find ourselves in the 21st century, it becomes evident that conflicts have evolved. More than one month ago, on February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion, which attacked Tehran and shook the security architecture of the Middle East. Various analyses have explored US and Israeli strategic considerations, spotlighting Iran’s regime leadership as the pivotal COG, as it represents the central system that commands forces, appoints senior officials, and maintains control over political institutions. This strategy functions as a blueprint to maximize the likelihood of securing victory in war. Hence, the US and Israel focus on a decapitation strategy, targeting the immediate locations of senior officials, such as leaders’ residences and palaces, which resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Contrary to that perspective, the COG concept overlooks the multifaceted nature of contemporary conflicts. Nowadays, crises and engagements are no longer solely about direct encounters, where overcoming a single factor compels an adversary to succumb to the other party’s demands. Instead, modern conflict encompasses shifting forms of warfare that challenge the simplicity of the COG concept. As a matter of fact, after their Supreme Leader was killed, Iran was still able to conduct an immediate counterattack against US bases across the Middle East.

First, although the COG approach might have effectively addressed past-era warfare, it struggles to grasp the hybrid nature of modern conflicts. The transition from conventional warfare to hybrid warfare, incorporating elements such as information warfare and disinformation campaigns, complicates the notion of a single focal point. Information warfare significantly affects intangible elements such as public sentiment, highlighting the limitations of Clausewitz’s COG framework. This powerful force in modern conflicts muddles the conventional boundaries of conflict. Disinformation campaigns, such as AI-generated imagery depicting the bombing of an Iraqi airport, are designed to exaggerate the scale of violence. By intensifying fears of escalation, such content can shape public opinion and encourage political calls for de-escalation.

Second, hybrid warfare, which includes economic pressure, leverages a network of interconnected strategies to achieve political ends. It obscures the lines of conflict and creates a system that gradually destabilizes the adversary through a series of minor, non-traditional engagements. As evident in the Strait of Hormuz situation, oil prices in the US have increased, which can generate internal pressure. Even if a closer examination shows that the impact on the US is not as severe as it is on Asia, it can still create external pressure from US and Israeli allies to push for an end to the war.

Third, in contemporary conflicts, multiple parties are involved, both directly and indirectly, in the ongoing crisis. On the US side, Saudi Arabia’s MBS has reportedly advocated for US attacks. On the other hand, several parties are visibly supporting Iran during this conflict, particularly non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Regarding state actors, some suggest that Russia has provided Iran with sensitive intelligence, while China continues to keep Iran afloat by remaining a primary buyer of Iranian oil despite US sanctions. Nevertheless, identifying a focal point in conflicts involving actors such as non-state groups, Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia becomes exceptionally intricate. Each party introduces different capabilities, resources, and leverage points, thereby obscuring the existence of a unified source of power to focus. These entities wield power beyond the boundaries of military capabilities; they utilize diplomatic pressure and adherence to international norms to dictate the conflict’s direction. In such an environment, attempts to isolate a single source of strength become impractical. This notable diffusion of power marks a significant deviation from the traditional COG concept.

In conclusion, the traditional COG concept, developed by Clausewitz, appears increasingly ill-suited to managing modern conflicts with intricate dynamics and multifaceted actors. While this strategy was fruitful in previous engagements, such as the Persian Gulf War, its relevance is now being questioned due to the evolving nature of warfare. This is evident in the current US–Israel and Iran crisis, which involves a range of intangible influences, including the battle of public opinion and the involvement of numerous global actors. Consequently, identifying a single decisive COG becomes highly challenging, highlighting the need to reassess and adapt the concept more holistically to navigate contemporary issues’ complex and nuanced landscape.