Adler Read On Chalmers’ Piece “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience”

Adler Read

Eva Merkow

“The Puzzle of Conscious Experience”

Chalmers’ “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience” is a theoretical piece. It is a scholarly work that is focused wholly on abstract ideas. Although Chalmers successfully explains his concept of the “hard problem”, he does not intend to provide a practical guide to understand consciousness quantitatively. He aims to theorize about the nature of consciousness and particularly how it disagrees with some of the main arguments of physicalism. Within the broader spectrum of theoretical philosophy, this work can be more specifically classified as a metaphysical and analytical essay. He explores fundamental questions of reality and the nature of being, while also providing concrete evidence dissected in a way that allows the reader to comprehend his point. Chalmers’ primary concern is raising questions on how and why the physical brain can provide us all with deeply personal subjective experience. He argues that if the brain’s processes and attributes are entirely in the physical realm, there must be a more profound explanation for subjective experience. This is precisely what makes consciousness the “hard problem”.

• The Hard Problem: Understanding our objective experience of the world, not based entirely on physical science, based on aspects of consciousness, but not the same as consciousness itself. Ex. Why do objective things in the world give everyone different subjective experiences?
• The Easy Problem: Understanding our objective experience scientifically, consciousness. Ex. Why does our brain react to the color red? Why do we jump when something scares us?
• Qualia: Specific qualities of the conscious experience, not entirely based on physical experience. Ex. Why do we associate colors with unrelated, mental ideas? Why do they differ person to person?
• Reductionism: The idea that complex problems can be understood if broken down into simple problems, or simplification.
• Physicalism: The idea that everything in the universe is physical. The mind and brain are the same thing, and every problem can be solved with a physical explanation.
• Dualism: Descartes’ idea that the mind and the brain are two separate entities, with a non-physical connection between them. The mind is a nonphysical substance that cannot be explained fully in physical terms.
• Philosophical Zombies: The concept of an exact physical and behavioral duplication of someone, but lacking in qualia. Became a thought experiment that rejected physicalism, arguing that consciousness is a crucial non-physical substance.
• Fundamental Theory: Chalmers proposed a new set of fundamental laws that could be necessary to understand and quantify consciousness familiarly.

Criticism

A common misunderstanding that can be extracted from this essay is that Chalmers is rejecting science completely, implying that it is some non-physical realm where consciousness originates. Chalmers states, “Against reductionism I will argue that the tools of neuroscience cannot provide a full account of conscious experience”(92). It is quite easy to interpret this as a denial of the connection between neuroscience and consciousness. This interpretation, though, oversimplifies his position greatly. His position is not wholly antiscientific; it is metascientific. He is using the basic knowledge of neuroscience to explore a more complex and abstract concept, utilizing the scientific knowledge we already possess. This is a very common method of research, but a reader without that knowledge could infer that he is denying neuroscience completely, which is not the case. He acknowledges the physical explanations of our reality, while noting that they alone do not explain the entire picture.

Chalmers makes a clear distinction between the “easy problem” and the “hard problem”. The “easy problem” refers to the relatively objective aspects of individual experience. This describes attention, memory, and the five senses corresponding to consciousness. Chalmers describes these as “easy” because they are scientific mechanisms and functions with which we are all very familiar. The “hard problem,” though, is more concerned with the inner functions that vary person to person with no clear distinction. Chalmers invented these terms, which can very well be mistaken for a complete rejection of physicalism. On page 92, Chalmers describes how neuroscience has understood the “easy problem”, but a new system is needed to solve the “hard problem”. “It will probably involve new fundamental laws, and the concept of information may play a central role”. To believe that Chalmers is denying any of the pre-existing laws’ importance in understanding consciousness is to misunderstand his point entirely. He is not trying to convince the reader that science is completely mistaken about consciousness; he is saying that as a people, we must invent a new science-based system to measure consciousness by.

This misunderstanding is crucial to recognize because it would undermine Chalmers’ entire philosophical study of consciousness if not understood. To a reader who perceives this as a denial of scientific studies, Chalmers would lose all credibility. His essay presents a challenge to broaden our understanding of existing scientific knowledge. To obscure the true purpose of this work is to miss something essential: an attempt to bridge the gap between subjectivity and objective experience.

Is it true?

Chalmers’ main idea is that subjective experience cannot be explained solely through science. “Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by conscious experience?”(82). He explains that understanding brain activity doesn’t necessarily explain consciousness and why we all possess it differently. This idea is true to the extent that we believe in our own consciousness, and that science currently cannot explain why perceiving things makes us feel different ways. The hard problem remains presently unresolved, but we can do our best to identify and affirm the aspects that Chalmers brings up. To thoroughly evaluate this claim, I will draw on personal experience, philosophical principles, and scientific reasoning to reveal the arguments for and against the existence of non-scientific consciousness.

Chalmers frequently mentions the “explanatory gap,” which refers to the lack of scientific explanation for subjective conscious experiences. With what we currently know about neuroscience, there is a significant gap between our descriptions of things and how we actually feel about them. Science can explain almost all subjective experiences, but nearly none of the objective experiences. “Why do we have any experience at all? Could not an unconscious automaton have performed the same tasks just as well? These are questions that we would like a theory of consciousness to answer”(82). Chalmers used the example of the woman studying everything there is to know about the color red, but not actually seeing the color. If she undergoes eye surgery and someone lays red roses on her bedside table, when she wakes up and sees them, she gets an entirely different experience than anything she has ever learned about the color. We can never truly understand what it’s like to experience something by simply knowing everything about it. Science is unable to explain this thoroughly and completely, which validates Chalmers’ argument that science alone cannot solve this problem.

Correlation is not causation. Neuroscience can explain how the brain reacts to certain stimuli. For instance, if someone jumps out and scares you, your amygdala will send a signal to the rest of your nervous system and make you jump. This same chain of events applies to many outside stimuli that we experience in our day-to-day lives. This seems like it could be enough to understand our consciousness, but it is far from it. Chalmers argues that just understanding the neural processing doesn’t explain the connection between mechanics and feeling. “Why should synchronized oscillations give rise to a visual experience, no matter how much integration is taking place?”(82). When we physically react to something, why do we feel a certain way about it? For example, computers process an insane amount of data, responding to different signals just like us, but they don’t feel anything about it; they lack qualia. These arguments remain unanswered by science, proving Chalmers’ argument as correct. Yet, one of Chalmers’ other main arguments is that we could explain all of this by science; we just need to develop a new set of rules.

When I feel an emotion like nostalgia, no physical descriptions of neurons firing in my brain could explain the deep visceral emotion that overcomes my body. There are no words that could capture the feeling I get when hugging a loved one or eating my favorite food. These are all parts of life that are so integral to our presence and importance on this planet that reducing it down to an insignificant synapse is impossible.

I do recognize that Chalmers’ specific claims about consciousness being somewhat separate from science may not be entirely accurate. We have all seen that historically society tends to solve mysteries that were once “unsolvable”, which leaves the possibility of technological advances discovering that consciousness is actually completely scientific.

Chalmers’ claim that subjective experience cannot be fully understood by science is philosophically and experimentally accurate as of now, but there can always be a turning point in the near future. The fact is, Chalmers’ point about consciousness being separate from the brain reminds us how special it is to possess something so ineffable and unique. At least for now, we cannot be reduced to data, and our experiences are all our own. Recongnizing this truth leads me to think about how I understand myself and others. It makes me realize that the inner monologue in my head is truly the human essence in its purest form.

What of It?

Recognizing Chalmers’ claim that we all have a unique subjective experience is incredibly important to how I view myself and the world around me. If consciousness is truly not reducible to neurons firing, each thought and feeling carries a tremendous weight that likely affects every thought and feeling around us. This truth is incredibly relevant to us, not only because we all have subjective experience, but because it provides us with a certain humility: that we can never fully understand others, and others can never fully understand us. However morbid this sounds, it is truly a beautiful truth. My subjective experience is completely my own, and no robot or computer system could replace it.

There is an irrevocable value in the power of trauma, sadness, and regret. Although none of these attributes are positive, without them, we would be mere shadows of our former selves. Without our consciousness, we would never be able to understand these deep and powerful emotions. I realize sadness is something that should be felt relatively rarely, but every time I am sad, it is merely a sign for me to face the reality of my existence. I am human, and I am still human. The moment I stop experiencing these profound, inexplicable emotions is the moment I lose a great deal of value. Computer systems have value as well, but there is a reason we made them, and they did not evolve into existence naturally. Not even the most in-depth description could capture what any of these emotions feels like, which is what makes them so beautiful.

There are many implications of what this thought process has on empathy and ethics. For one, our empathy, or at least sympathy, increases greatly due to the realization that we will never fully understand what anyone experiences or feels, no matter how closely their situations relate to ours. In terms of ethics, we should treat certain specimens with more care. If the idea about empathy that I just described remains true, that would mean that we must treat all animals and AI with a level of moral consideration. Although I do not believe AI has anywhere near the same level of consciousness as us, we can never know if there is a level of subjectivity it experiences. We must acknowledge the irreducibility of consciousness to accurately measure the moral weight that all of our actions hold.

The wonder I experience for the mystery of consciousness is proof that I have some existential significance. If recognized correctly, consciousness is not just a background noise, but a source of awe and meaning for being alive. This truth makes me feel incredibly comfortable due to the fact that, since the dawn of time, we have had our meaning inside of us. Even the natural search we as humans have had to find the meaning of life was proof that the meaning is in our consciousness. The ability to develop deep questions about our existence is such an immense blessing, and I am so grateful for the ability to have this qualia.

This encourages me to rethink the ways I act in the world. I have more motivation to fully acknowledge the inner experience in others. Science is not being diminished by this question being unsolved–it is reinforcing the art that we have created in search for answers (philosophy, neuroscience, biology). I do not expect others to agree with me fully, but as long as this truth remains significant for me, I remain substantial. Accepting that consciousness is irreducible transforms the way I see myself and the world. It completely reinforces the value I hold in myself and all of those around me. The hard problem is not just a puzzle; it is living proof that the meaning we search for is inside of us.