Elections, Extortion, and Investment

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Recently in Indonesia, there have been several news reports about extortion by civil organization members, or what we call ormas (organisasi masyarakat). The cases are quite similar in their financial motivations — such as money extortion, asking for projects, or claiming land ownership.

One example is the extortion of money by demanding festive bonuses, or THR (a bonus meant only for formal workers), from companies or institutions. The conflict often erupts after raw footage shows ormas members using intimidation — such as damaging office property, raising their voices, or using physical threats. However, the ormas often deny wrongdoing, claiming they are simply asking voluntarily — “if they don’t give, it’s okay.” They justify their acts by saying they have the right to ask under a “mutual symbiosis” relationship, offering protection or security in return.

Another case involves an ormas demanding a project from an EV factory construction site. In the footage, one member is seen making the request using intimidation, not through negotiation or by offering a clear benefit. This also reflects broader tensions with reduced government-funded projects — efficiencies, as the government is cutting spending in ministries and tertiary facilities for civil servants to prioritize its flagship program: free lunches.

There is also a land dispute case involving an ormas claiming land whose legal ownership remains unclear. Indonesia’s weather and climate agency, BMKG, claims the land belongs to them. However, the ormas has used the land for building kiosks and renting it to food hawkers, charging monthly fees. This issue is common in Indonesia, where the land registry is often unreliable. Many people own land without official certificates, or buy bare land and leave it undeveloped, leading others to unknowingly occupy it — often using it for food stalls or temporary selling spaces.

All of these incidents have occurred in recent months. But after deeper research, I found that ormas-linked extortion is not new. There have been similar past cases, often involving property destruction and even deaths.

What’s interesting is the shifting pattern — possibly tied to changes in political leadership. Indonesia just elected a new president last year.

From 2016 to 2019, the most reported ormas cases were related to acts of intolerance. Certain ormas groups aggressively shut down food stalls and cafes during Ramadan, even taking food being sold during fasting hours — all in the name of religious tolerance. They were also allegedly involved in preventing the construction of minority worship places. The most well-known case was the mass protest demanding the imprisonment of Jakarta’s gubernatorial candidate for alleged religious blasphemy. This eventually led to his conviction over a misstatement made during a campaign speech.

Now, ormas actions appear to be more financially motivated, especially under the new president. In the previous administration, religious-based ormas were more active and stronger, pushing the government to adopt their values and principles. Acts of intolerance surged. People were more vocal about their religious beliefs, justifying their actions as the “majority voice” in a multicultural, multi-religious country.

My research also found a resurgence of *GRIB Jaya, led by Hercules, who has known ties to Prabowo, Indonesia’s current president. This rise may suggest that some ormas now feel backed by the current government. Meanwhile, during the previous presidency, ormas* reports mainly centered on religious intolerance — possibly linked to the religious identity politics that helped past candidates win.

There seems to be a recurring pattern: ormas often provide political support — through votes and manpower — and in return, once the candidate wins, they feel entitled to ask for something in exchange, such as money, positions, or special treatment. When their demands aren’t met, they may retaliate when the administration is still in office.

With the current economic downturn, the highly ambitious goal of the government to achieve 8% economic growth seems impossible. This is due to unpredictable business costs caused by extortion from ormas, along with irregular law enforcement and complicated bureaucracy, which have slowed the growth of foreign direct investment in Indonesia. In particular, there has been a sudden wave of industrial closures, leading to mass layoffs. Sritex, the largest garment industry in Indonesia, is also facing bankruptcy and a corruption scandal. If the wrongdoing of certain ormas are one of the reasons behind Indonesia’s low ranking in the Ease of Doing Business Index, it means the current government is now facing backlash from the very groups that helped them gain power.

So, What Is Ormas?

Civil organizations, or what we call ormas (organisasi masyarakat), are legal entities governed by Law №17 of 2013 in Indonesia. They are created as platforms for people who share the same vision, interests, or aspirations, and must align with Indonesia’s development and the values of Pancasila, the nation’s foundational philosophy. Ormas can establish their own rules (AD/ART) to maintain harmony and unity among their members.

In Indonesia, several large ormas have millions of members. Most are religion-based, bringing together people who share the same principles and interpretations of a religion — such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and FPI (which was banned in 2020). Others are based on identity, like ethnicity or region, such as Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR). There are also ormas that function more like paramilitary groups, such as Pemuda Pancasila and GRIB Jaya. Additionally, there are local youth organizations like Karang Taruna. Their large membership makes them a powerful base that can be mobilized as voters during elections.

Election: The Intertwining of Indonesia’s History and Ormas

According to the article “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order?” (1998), ormas as a voter base began during the New Order regime. Paramilitary ormas were formed by recruiting marginalized communities — like homeless people or the unemployed from urban traditional markets. Over time, they attracted jagoan daerah (local toughs) who brought more structure and control.

What we now call Pemuda Pancasila consistently campaigned and mobilized voters for Golkar (Suharto’s ruling party) since 1982. They acted as local enforcers, offering logistical support and conducting street-level campaigning.

These ormas also served as government extensions to suppress riots or clashes and to steer public opinion — much like online buzzers today. In return, they received concessions, such as control over money circulation in informal sectors like street parking and food hawker areas under the guise of “security fees.”

Not only Pemuda Pancasila, other ormas also allegedly had political affiliations and served as voter bases — such as PGRI (teacher organization) and Karang Taruna (youth organization).

While ormas were initially formed to represent civil society, many have functioned as political machines controlled by elites. These are just a few cases among thousands of ormas.

From the New Order era, Pemuda Pancasila became the wing of Golkar. According to **Politik Jatah Preman (2015)*, a similar pattern appears now, with GRIB Jaya acting as a wing of the Gerindra Party. Hercules, who led the earlier GRIB, asked Prabowo (Gerindra’s head) to be the Chairman of the Advisory Board. This reflects the close ties between Hercules — who is from East Indonesia and reportedly helped by Prabowo* during the East Timor conflict — and the current leadership.

Extortion: The Intertwining of Indonesia’s Economy and Ormas

The informal sector in Indonesia is thriving. I’ve written about this recently. Unlike formal companies that are taxed and regulated, informal businesses lack security rights and often operate illegally — such as selling on sidewalks or unregistered land. Ormas fill this gap by offering “protection” in exchange for continuous “security” or “access” fees. This becomes a source of income for ormas members. Allegedly, these privileges are granted through unofficial agreements, allowing ormas to control informal parking and vendor spaces in traditional markets.

The shortage of police or official security also adds to the problem. In some industrial zones, local ormas claim territory and demand compensation when companies want to build factories — such as requesting projects, employment, or other benefits.

In several government projects rejected by the public — like urban beautification through forced evictions — ormas are allegedly used to suppress grassroots opposition. They help “smooth” the projects by dealing with protests, acting as government proxies. This way, the government avoids direct confrontation, letting ormas handle community resistance.

Investment: Ormas Linked to Foreign Investment Hesitancy

Many foreign investors struggle to navigate Indonesia’s informal power structures dominated by ormas. Recent reports show ormas aggressively demanding money, bonuses, or projects from companies trying to build or operate factories in Indonesia. They demand “security fees” or “local cooperation,” adding unofficial and unpredictable costs.

While Indonesia needs foreign investment to sustain jobs and stabilize the economy, investors typically seek political stability and legal clarity. The government claims to want more FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), but without limiting ormas influence, the investment climate remains unstable.

With reports showing ormas members acting like preman (toughs), the police and Indonesian government are now trying to “clean up” the aggressive behavior of ormas that darkens the investment climate in Indonesia. According to recent news, many police officers have arrested toughs disguised as ormas members who disturb the public through extortion and other criminal acts. The government is also considering revising the ormas law, as many ormas now wear military-style uniforms, often described as “more military than the military.” Officials are also responding by creating an anti-premanisme task force. However, eliminating ormas influence remains politically risky, as these groups are deeply embedded in elections, bureaucracy, and security enforcement.