The Normative Foundation, Part 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones

Author’s Note: This article is Part 4 of a four-part series and presents the English translation of my essay, The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse. That essay, in turn, is based on my earlier work, A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism. This series is intended for a global audience. While every effort has been made to convey the original meaning accurately, some nuances may be lost in translation. The complete, original Japanese text is available for reference at the link below. 👉 **[Read the original in Japanese]**

Navigate the Series: Part 1: Normative Propositions Part 2: “The Special” and “The Boundary” Part 3: Classical Marxism Part 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones 👉 **[Read the complete version in English]**

The supplementary note (in Japanese) that follows this essay appears as a separate article.Please refer to the link below. 👉 **[The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse【Supplement】]**

The validity and originality of the arguments presented in this essay and its supplement have been analyzed with Gemini 3.0 Pro. For a detailed report of the results, please refer to the links below: 👉 **[Analysis Results for the Essay (English Version)] 👉 [[Analysis Results for the Essay and Supplement (Japanese Version)]](https://gemini.google.com/share/1ae3f1c4ee28)**

A Study of Normative Propositions: An Inquiry with Reference to Classical Marxism

This essay confirms that normative propositions, which involve value judgments, lack any transcendent basis and are fundamentally distinct from factual propositions.

Building on this, it demonstrates that the core thesis of Classical Marxism — which treats contradictions and conflicts as “The Special,” that is, as the driving force of change and development — is, in substance, nothing other than a normative proposition, and that Dialectical Materialism therefore lacks a coherent theoretical foundation.

On this basis, while pointing out the mechanism by which norms are disguised as facts, this essay proposes an attitude of adjustment grounded in diverse “hopes” as the basis for sustaining social norms without any absolute foundation.

Chapter 4: Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones

Chapter Summary

In the final chapter, I examine the structure and effects of “Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones,” which were brought into sharp relief in Chapter 3.

The “perspectives” from which we view things and the “frameworks” by which we judge them ought, in principle, to be on equal footing; however, by employing expressions that take the form of factual propositions, such as “correct (right)” or “natural,” certain norms come to behave as though they were objective facts, and are thereby internalized by people. In education and society, this mechanism — which deflects inquiry into underlying grounds and encourages the suspension of thought — can become a powerful force of conformity. That said, this paper does not argue that normative propositions should not be used. What is crucial is to maintain an attitude of continually questioning the norms that lie at the foundation of one’s own consciousness.

Within social norms that do not possess any universally and absolutely valid foundation, what, then, can serve as their “foundation”? It is the individual “hopes” that exist against the background of diverse “necessities.” The act of having “hope” is itself a factual proposition, and it is precisely the attitude of mutually acknowledging diverse hopes and persistently engaging in repeated coordination that can become the starting point for the development of social norms.

Main Argument

In this chapter, I will further deepen the analysis of “normative propositions disguised as factual ones,” the final theme that emerged in the previous chapter.

§4.1

In Chapter 3, I analyzed actions such as “discovery,” “presumption,” “de-emphasis,” “positioning,” and “redefinition,” though these labels were merely provisional terms for the sake of understanding and organization. However, upon reexamining these actions, it becomes clear that they can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, “discovery,” “presumption,” and “de-emphasis” all involve acts of “seeing” in some form, and thus can be understood as concepts related to “perspective” — that is, to the standpoint or orientation from which things are viewed. In contrast, “positioning” and “redefinition” involve matters of classification and the boundary of concepts, and thus can be understood as concepts related to “framework” — that is, to the underlying structure used to make judgments about things.

“Perspective” refers to one’s subjective standpoint — how one views the world — which includes personal experiences, values, emotions, and the like. Needless to say, unless normative propositions are presupposed, all perspectives are, in principle, on equal footing. This concept of perspective is closely related to the idea discussed in §2.2 — that there is originally no boundary between the self and the world — and to phenomenology, which attempts to describe the world from such a perspective of the self, as well as to the subsequent developments in philosophical thought.

“Framework” refers to any structure, concept, or theory used to organize and interpret knowledge and experience, and includes social norms, cultural backgrounds, academic theories, language, and more. Needless to say, unless normative propositions are presupposed, all frameworks are, in principle, on equal footing. If this concept of framework is understood in terms of “structure,” it becomes closely related to the development of philosophical thought from structuralism to post-structuralism, and further to deconstruction.

These perspective and framework are thought to play a central role in the process of cognition, particularly in terms of from where and how one grasps and makes judgments about the world. As revealed in the analysis in Chapter 3, a perspective can be shaped within a particular framework, and conversely, a framework can also be shaped by a particular perspective. Thus, the two stand in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

The critical issue here is that, even though these particular perspectives and frameworks lack decisive justification, the intervention of normative propositions disguised as factual ones can enable them to be asserted as “something that ought to be treated as The Special.” By presupposing such assertions, it becomes possible, for instance, to lend an appearance of legitimacy to particular ways of understanding or resolving social issues.

Such assertions are not limited to ideologies like Classical Marxism, but continue to be propagated across various domains of society — including organizational propaganda, social studies education, and media reporting. In all such cases, they are believed to function very effectively in leading people to internalize certain norms, often without being consciously aware of it.

§4.2

Why, then, do these Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones function so effectively?

In principle, assertions that employ explicit expressions such as “one ought to ~” or “one needs to ~” are clearly normative propositions. Therefore, it is only natural for the audience to question the justification behind such claims. As a result, it is unlikely that the audience would unconsciously accept and internalize such norms through these kinds of expressions. Thus, it becomes evident that what plays a crucial role in these propositions is the specific manner in which they are disguised — that is, the way they take on the appearance of factual statements.

Here, in considering the manner in which these propositions are disguised, it is worth examining one key expression: “correct” or “right.” When we consider the contexts in which the expression “correct” or “right” is used, it becomes clear that it spans both factual propositions and normative propositions.

Examples where it is used as part of a factual proposition: ・“1 + 1 = 2 is correct.” ・“It is correct that biodiversity is declining due to deforestation.”

Examples where it is used as part of a normative proposition: ・“It is right that one ought not to kill another person.” ・“It is right to protect the natural environment so as not to destroy it.”

In the above examples, distinguishing between factual and normative propositions is relatively easy. However, there are also propositions in which this distinction becomes blurred or ambiguous.

・“It is correct (right) behavior to remain quiet in public.” This proposition may appear to be stating a social rule or etiquette. Yet it also contains an evaluative judgment — that not being quiet constitutes “incorrect” (wrong) behavior.

・“It is correct for the answer to this calculation to be 5.” This proposition may seem to state a mathematical truth. Yet it also implies a value judgment — namely, that if the answer is not 5, then an “incorrect” method of calculation has been applied.

Although these propositions may appear to be stating mere facts, the presence of value judgment reveals that they are, in fact, normative propositions — normative propositions disguised as factual ones. And it becomes clear that the very use of the expression “correct (right)” is one of the key elements in the “manner of disguise” that determines the persuasive power of such propositions. By taking on this kind of disguise, these propositions are likely to be unconsciously accepted and internalized by their audience, without their normative content being noticed.

Note: In English, the term “correct” is primarily used for factual propositions, whereas in explicitly normative contexts, expressions like “right” or “appropriate” are generally considered more natural. In this paper, however, “correct” is deliberately employed to highlight the conceptual ambiguity that spans the boundary between fact and norm. This paper was originally written in Japanese, where the word “tadashii”（正しい）encompasses an inherent ambiguity that includes both factual correctness and normative rightness. This nuance is difficult to reproduce precisely in English, and translating “tadashii” into either “correct” or “right” presents conceptual interpretive challenges. The purpose of this note is to clarify that background.

§4.3

This paper has developed its argument on the premise that, if one does not assume the existence of transcendent beings like gods, then no universally and absolutely valid basis can be identified for any normative proposition.

Nevertheless, even those who do not possess religious faith or a comparable background may blindly accept normative propositions — such as “one ought not to ~” — as if they were absolute. Moreover, even in discussions that concern nothing more than methodology, people may pass normative judgments like “one ought not to ~.”

Various factors may be involved in such judgments, but it is conceivable that one significant cause lies in the form of education received during early childhood and elementary schooling.

For example, in mathematics classes during elementary schooling, lessons are often conducted on the assumption that the method of solving a problem — set by the teacher and leading to the correct answer — is the “correct” method. However, what becomes problematic here is the possibility that any method which does not lead to the correct answer is regarded as “incorrect,” and consequently, a normative and coercive mindset is instilled — namely, that such a method is one “one ought not to” use.

Through such excessive internalization, the judgment of what is “correct” — which was originally limited to methodologies for deriving mathematical truths — may expand into various other domains of methodology, as the reinforcement of the notion that one “ought not to” employ an “incorrect” method blurs the original boundaries. As a result, there arises a risk of making normative and blind judgments even when considering social issues — namely, that only the method of analyzing and solving problems from a particular perspective or within a particular framework is “correct,” while relying on any other perspective or framework is “incorrect” and thus one “ought not to” do so.

This tendency is presumed to be further reinforced in environments or societies where (social) pressure to conform is particularly strong. And the aforementioned concerns have already been pointed out in fields such as cognitive science, pedagogy, and social psychology.

In the previous section (§4.2), it was discussed that the use of the expression “correct” is one of the keys in considering the manner in which these propositions are disguised. This particular “strength” of the expression “correct” is likely to be, at least in part, a consequence of the educational practices described above. This “strength” refers to its capacity to give the impression that what is labeled as “correct” is an objective fact, thereby encouraging a suspension of critical thinking by avoiding any inquiry into its underlying basis. It also refers to its psychological power to guide people through (social) pressure to conform — for example, by suggesting that “everyone believes it to be correct.”

Expressions that produce effects similar to “correct” include such phrases as “it is natural that ~,” “it is wise to ~,” and “it is common sense that ~.” These expressions, when used in Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones, are considered to work very effectively in leading people, unconsciously, to accept certain perspectives or frameworks as “something that ought to be treated as The Special,” and to internalize them as norms. As a result, it becomes possible, for instance, to lend an appearance of legitimacy to particular ways of understanding or resolving social issues.

§4.4 In Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined Classical Marxism as a case study, with a particular focus on Normative Propositions Disguised as Factual Ones, in an attempt to clarify both their underlying basis and actual content, and to consider the impact they exert on our thought and conceptual frameworks.

However, this is not to claim that such normative propositions “ought not to be used.” For to begin making such a claim would itself amount to the act of generating a new norm. In other words: “If you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.” — Friedrich Nietzsche

Therefore, this study seeks to present not only an attitude of continually questioning the underlying basis and actual content of all propositions, but also an attitude of questioning, in the same manner, the norms that lie at the foundation of one’s own consciousness.

Moreover, it goes without saying that this study does not in any way deny the existence of normative consciousness — that is, the will to act in accordance with norms. As confirmed in §1.6, even if social norms have no universally and absolutely valid basis, it goes without saying that the process through which they incorporate individual “hopes” within a group, coordinate them, and evolve through consensus is of critical importance in maintaining social order. It is also clear that normative consciousness plays a decisive role in the formation and development of such social norms.

On the other hand, as was made clear in the discussion in §2.1, the normative proposition that something ought to be treated as The Special arises based on various forms of necessity. Individual hopes within a group are underpinned by these diverse forms of necessity, and therefore, it can be seen that hope exists in a wide range and with great diversity. Needless to say, in a context where such diverse hopes coexist, attempting to coordinate them is an extremely difficult task.

As has been stated repeatedly, in a social system that does not presuppose transcendent beings like gods, no normative proposition can be granted a universally and absolutely valid basis. Therefore, normative propositions themselves cannot serve as the “foundation” of social norms. Just like Classical Marxism, any structure that lacks such a foundation inevitably becomes a “castle in the air.”

However, it can be pointed out here that “hope” itself can serve as the “foundation” of social norms and as a starting point for their development. That is, no matter how difficult it may be, the attitude of mutually recognizing diverse hopes, patiently coordinating them, and striving for consensus can become the very foundation of social norms, and ultimately contribute to their development.

This is because the act of having “hope” is, within its scope, a “factual proposition.”

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Supplement

For the supplementary note (in Japanese) to this essay, please refer to the link below.

👉 **[The Normative Foundation — How Dialectical Materialism Contains the Seeds of Its Own Collapse【Supplement】]**

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