China Alarmed by the War in Iran

Energy Security, Strategic Vulnerability, and the Risk of a Systemic Shift in the Global Balance of Power

The war in Iran is ceasing to be a regional conflict and is increasingly functioning as a lens that concentrates the most critical tensions of the contemporary world: great power rivalry, energy security, the credibility of military technologies, and control over global trade routes. What until recently could be interpreted as yet another episode of instability in the Middle East is now taking the form of an event with potentially systemic consequences. The scale of military operations, the pace of degradation of state infrastructure, and the parallel struggle for narrative dominance all indicate that this conflict extends far beyond a bilateral confrontation and is beginning to directly affect the interests of the world’s major powers.

In this context, the perspective of China becomes particularly significant. For Beijing, the stability of the Persian Gulf region is not merely a political issue, but an existential one in economic and strategic terms. China is observing a conflict that simultaneously undermines the security of its energy supplies, tests the credibility of technological systems associated with it, and potentially strengthens the position of its principal rival in the world’s most sensitive resource region. For this reason, the war in Iran is not just one of many crises for China, but a warning signal of a possible shift in the global balance of power — a shift that could directly threaten the very foundations of China’s development model.

The war in Iran, regardless of its immediate military trajectory, has the potential to evolve into one of the most significant turning points in contemporary geopolitics. For China, this is neither a distant nor a peripheral conflict, but a strategic development that directly affects the foundations of its energy security, international position, and technological credibility.

From Beijing’s perspective, the stability of energy supply chains is of paramount importance. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil, and a substantial share of this import originates from the Persian Gulf region. The Strait of Hormuz constitutes a critical chokepoint within this system, through which a significant portion of global energy supplies flows, including those destined for Asian markets. Any prolonged destabilization of this area — or, even more critically, its potential control by a single power or bloc — creates systemic risks for China. In the most adverse scenario, this would imply the possibility of influencing access to key energy resources, and thus the pace of the country’s economic development.

The second dimension of the problem concerns the balance of power and perceptions of military effectiveness. Contemporary conflicts are not only confrontations between armed forces, but also tests of technologies and weapons systems. When, within a given theatre of operations, the military infrastructure of one party is rapidly neutralized, immediate questions arise regarding the effectiveness of the defensive systems employed and their export value. For China, which in recent years has been intensively developing its defense industry and supplying military equipment to developing countries, any large-scale conflict constitutes a potential reputational test. Even in the absence of clear technical conclusions, the mere perception of ineffectiveness may influence procurement decisions in countries such as the Gulf states or Pakistan, which often balance between different suppliers of military technology.

The most consequential level of analysis, however, is structural. China views the international system through the prism of long-term competition with the United States, in which access to resources, control over trade routes, and the ability to maintain stable partnerships play a decisive role. In this context, any durable increase in U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf region would be perceived in Beijing as a significant shift in the strategic balance. The issue is not one of formal “control” over resources, but rather the capacity to shape their flow, the security of transport, and the conditions of trade.

At the same time, the position of Russia remains an important factor, as it constitutes one of China’s alternative sources of energy supplies. The weakening of Russia, resulting from prolonged conflict and economic pressure, reduces its ability to serve as a stable energy partner. Consequently, China may find itself in a position of increased dependence on a single region that remains highly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions. From the perspective of state strategy, such a concentration of risk is highly unfavorable.

Taken together, all of these factors form a picture that, in Beijing, is unlikely to be perceived as a single crisis, but rather as a potential systemic threat. The war in Iran is not merely a regional conflict from China’s perspective — it constitutes a test of the resilience of its energy security model, the credibility of its technological capabilities, and its ability to function in a world where key nodes of global infrastructure may fall under the influence of competing powers.

What is unfolding in Iran today cannot be interpreted in Beijing as a distant regional disturbance, but rather as one of the most concerning strategic developments of recent years. The scale of the U.S.–Israeli operations has already exceeded the threshold of a mere demonstration of force and has become a severe test of the resilience of Iran’s entire military, infrastructural, and political system. The U.S. Central Command has stated that American forces have struck over 20,000 targets in Iran, while U.S. officials have publicly referred to the destruction or damage of more than two-thirds of Iran’s missile and drone production infrastructure, as well as elements of its naval capabilities. At the same time, U.S. leadership and official sources have indicated the continued targeting of “strategic” assets. Iran, for its part, has presented a much broader account of infrastructural damage, claiming destruction affecting over 100,000 buildings. Regardless of the propagandistic discrepancies between the parties, the intensity of operations itself is an established fact: the conflict has entered a phase in which not isolated installations, but entire layers of state capacity are under sustained attack.

For China, however, the most alarming aspect is not only the number of targets struck, but the speed with which U.S. and Israeli forces have achieved operational reach over large portions of Iranian territory. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies describe the campaign as a race to achieve air superiority by systematically degrading Iranian air defenses, radar networks, and missile systems, thereby enabling forces to “operate virtually anywhere” and transition from costly stand-off strikes to deeper, more flexible operations. This represents a particularly troubling signal for Beijing, given that in recent years China has deepened its military-industrial ties with Iran. Chinese firms such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation have been reported to provide manufacturing technologies relevant to Iran’s military sector, while earlier reports indicated negotiations over the potential sale of Chinese CM-302 anti-ship missiles and Iranian interest in additional Chinese systems, including air defense capabilities. Furthermore, prior assessments by the International Institute for Strategic Studies have noted that China has for years supplied Iran and other regional actors with missile systems, components, and technological know-how.

In other words, even if it is not possible to attribute each neutralized system directly to Chinese origin, the war nevertheless impacts the reputation of Chinese military technology. It demonstrates that a state closely linked to Beijing has been unable to establish a deterrence architecture capable of preventing or significantly constraining a large-scale air campaign conducted by the United States and Israel. It is precisely this broader signal that is now being observed with concern not only in Beijing, but also in the capitals of Arab states and in Islamabad: not the technical specifics, but the political conclusion that China’s support architecture has not translated into effective defense.

Even more concerning for China is the energy dimension of the conflict. The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical maritime chokepoint for global energy flows: according to the International Energy Agency, in 2025 nearly 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through it daily, accounting for approximately 25% of global seaborne oil trade, with around 80% of these flows directed toward Asia. In addition, nearly one-fifth of global LNG trade transits the Strait. Roughly half of China’s crude oil imports originate from the Middle East, and China itself imported on average 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian oil — approximately 13% of its total seaborne imports — while about one-third of its LNG imports also come from this region. This means that, for Beijing, the war in Iran is not an abstract problem, but a direct threat to the security of supply.

Moreover, early indications already highlight this vulnerability: even PetroChina has acknowledged that approximately 10% of its own oil and gas supplies transit through Hormuz, while Reuters has reported cases of Chinese commercial vessels turning back when attempting to exit the Gulf, despite Iranian assurances of safe passage. This situation presents a deeply unsettling picture for Beijing: a state that has built its economic power on predictable access to energy and trade routes is suddenly confronted with the reality that a single conflict can simultaneously expose the weakness of a military partner, undermine confidence in associated technological systems, and threaten the primary resource artery supplying the entire Asian region.

At this point, the issue becomes almost existential for China. If the United States and its regional partners were not only able to weaken Iran militarily but also effectively impose a new security order in the Persian Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz, this would signify a substantial increase in U.S. capacity to influence Asia’s primary energy supply corridor. The issue is not merely formal “control over oil,” but the far more strategically significant ability to shape transport security, insurance costs, shipping availability, rerouting patterns, and the political conditions underpinning regional stability.

Under such conditions, China would become even more dependent on alternative suppliers such as Russia or Venezuela. Yet these alternatives provide only limited reassurance. Russian oil remains crucial for China and India, but Ukrainian strikes have reportedly damaged approximately 40% of Russia’s export infrastructure, constraining Moscow’s flexibility — while Russia itself remains engaged in negotiations with the United States. Meanwhile, imports from Venezuela accounted for only around 4.5% of China’s seaborne imports in 2025, and Venezuela’s oil trade remains heavily constrained by U.S. oversight. Even if both of these suppliers were fully aligned with China’s sphere of influence, they would still be insufficient to compensate for sustained instability in the Persian Gulf.

This is precisely why Beijing has strong reasons to view the war in Iran not as another Middle Eastern conflict, but as a situation in which three major risks converge simultaneously: the exposure of a military partner’s weakness, the erosion of confidence in China’s defense-industrial ecosystem, and the strategic threat of disruption to the primary energy routes sustaining the Chinese economy.

The most difficult challenge for China lies in the internal logic of the potential consequences of this war. Publicly, Beijing may emphasize de-escalation, diplomacy, and dialogue, but in reality it is observing a conflict that undermines several pillars of its strategy at once. If Iran proves too weak to defend its own strategic space, it is not only Tehran that is weakened, but also China’s broader model of building influence through arms transfers, technological cooperation, and long-term partnerships with non-Western states. If the Strait of Hormuz becomes blocked or even partially disrupted, it is Asia — and thus China — that suffers most. And if a new security order in the Gulf were to emerge under the dominant influence of the United States and Israel, Beijing would be forced to accept that the most critical energy sources for its economy lie within a region where its principal rival retains operational, military, and political superiority.

It is for this reason that the notion of “China being alarmed by the war in Iran” need not be dismissed as journalistic exaggeration. From Beijing’s perspective, this is not merely a crisis affecting a partner state. It is a warning that, in a future conflict, both its external networks of influence and the resource security underpinning its economic power may prove equally fragile.

From this perspective, it is unsurprising that Beijing is simultaneously intensifying its activities in the information domain. In recent years, the growing scale of China-linked influence operations in the digital space has been repeatedly documented, encompassing both networks of social media accounts and cooperation with content creators and foreign media outlets. In a crisis as profound as the war in Iran — one whose consequences may directly affect China’s energy security — it is natural that Beijing seeks to shape the narrative in ways aligned with its strategic interests.

A dominant element of this narrative is the emphasis on the humanitarian costs of the conflict and the need for its immediate termination, combined with highlighting the responsibility of Western states for its escalation. This messaging is not incidental; it fits within a broader Chinese communication strategy that portrays the country as a stabilizing force advocating peace, while simultaneously undermining the image of the United States as a guarantor of international order. In practice, this translates into amplifying content critical of U.S. and Israeli military actions, promoting interpretations of the conflict centered on civilian suffering, and questioning the legitimacy of continued escalation.

At the same time, increased activity can be observed in comment sections and across social media platforms, where recurring patterns of messaging — often consistent with Beijing’s official communication line — are amplified through coordinated networks of accounts. This does not imply that every critical opinion regarding U.S. or Israeli actions constitutes an influence operation; however, the scale and repetition of certain narratives suggest that the information space itself has become another arena of strategic competition.

Within this framework, China’s information activities are not an adjunct to foreign policy, but an integral component of it. If Beijing perceives the war in Iran as a threat to its energy and geopolitical interests, it logically follows that it will seek to accelerate its resolution not only through diplomacy, but also by influencing public opinion in Western societies. The ultimate objective is not merely the cessation of hostilities, but also the construction of a narrative in which responsibility for the conflict and its costs is attributed to China’s strategic competitors — thereby weakening their international position over the longer term.