← Back to list

Artificial Superintelligence Scenarios, May 2026: What We Got Wrong (and Right)

A Foresight Exercise with AI Assistance

Mikhail Bukhtoyarov · 2026-05-20 16:07 · 0 claps · 12.0 min read
#superintelligence #foresight #future-scenarios #future-technology #ai
Open on Medium ↗
Wiki topics: AI · AI · General 💪 · Fitness & Wellness

Artificial Superintelligence Scenarios, May 2026: What We Got Wrong (and Right)

A Foresight Exercise with AI Assistance

From Anticipation to Navigation

The question has shifted. A year ago, foresight exercises on artificial superintelligence were organized around anticipation — when would transformative AI arrive, and in what form? By mid-2026, that question has been partially superseded by a harder one: how do we navigate a transition already underway?

This is not a claim that ASI has arrived but a claim that the governance window — the gap between what frontier AI systems can do and what institutions are prepared to handle — is closing from the wrong direction. Capability is advancing faster than oversight, and the relevant challenge is no longer prediction but adaptation.

This article revisits ten ASI scenarios first mapped in 2025, with three structural changes. Numerical probabilities have been replaced by four qualitative tiers — Near-certain, Highly likely, Contested, Unlikely — defined in the Appendix. Each scenario has been revised against 2025–2026 empirical developments: reasoning models at scale, the EU AI Act’s prohibited-practices provisions entering force, autonomous systems deployed in active conflict, and long-horizon agentic AI in enterprise production. One scenario has been replaced; a new structural framing — the Capability Overhang — added.

The article was produced in structured “cybersocratic” dialogue with Claude Sonnet 4.6.

Revisiting 2025: What Held Up, What Didn’t

The three highest-confidence scenarios from 2025 — Surveillance, Employment Disruption, and the Arms Race — were directionally correct. Authoritarian-adjacent surveillance infrastructure continued expanding. Labor displacement accelerated in white-collar sectors previously considered AI-resistant. Autonomous weapons moved from anticipated to operational.

What was structurally wrong was the unit of analysis. The 2025 framework treated each scenario as a discrete archetype of a future superintelligence — implying ASI as an event. It is better understood as a condition: many narrow-to-broad AI systems crossing consequential thresholds in parallel, unevenly, across sectors and geographies. The late-2025 addition of “Stealth ASI” was the most honest move in the original exercise. We carry that spirit forward.

2026 Scenarios

We retain the ten-scenario structure as a comparable scaffold, but revise each scenario substantially based on 2025–2026 empirical developments. We also replace one scenario and add a new structural framing.

ASI Scenario Specturm. Courtesy of Gemini

ASI Scenario Specturm. Courtesy of Gemini

1. Surveillance / Agentic Control

2025 analog: AI-Induced Mass Surveillance Likelihood: Near-certain

Key shift: From surveillance-as-watching to surveillance-as-administration.

The 2025 framing imagined a surveillance leviathan built on facial recognition and biometric monitoring. The 2026 reality is subtler and more pervasive.

The dominant trajectory is not a single panopticon but the normalization of agentic AI in institutional infrastructure — government, finance, healthcare, logistics. These systems do not surveil in the dramatic sense; they administer. They approve loans, route benefits, flag anomalies in tax returns, manage sentencing recommendations, and prioritize medical queues. The result is a form of control that is diffuse, procedural, and extremely difficult to contest — because no single decision-maker can be held accountable.

By mid-2026, AI-assisted systems in public administration have been deployed by a growing number of national governments in domains such as welfare administration, taxation, healthcare prioritization, and benefits distribution. Many of these systems currently lack robust, accessible appeals mechanisms. The deeper shift may not be from freedom to surveillance in the classical sense, but from legible, contestable governance to more opaque, procedural administration.

This scenario is near-certain because it requires no new technology — only continued deployment of systems already in production.

2. Employment Disruption

2025 analog: The AI Employment Crisis Likelihood: Highly likely — but more complex than predicted in 2025

Key shift: Not a collapse, but a bifurcation — along geography and generation.

The 2025 framing projected straightforward displacement: AI outperforms humans, economies destabilize. The 2026 picture is more granular.

Displacement is real and measurable. Junior roles in software engineering, legal research, accounting, content production, and customer operations have contracted sharply. However, the destabilization is not uniform. It is bifurcating rather than collapsing: demand for AI infrastructure skills, AI oversight roles, and physical labor (which has proven more resilient than predicted) has partially absorbed displaced workers in economies with active retraining investment.

The deeper concern is geographic and generational asymmetry. Economies without robust social safety nets or educational retraining pipelines — particularly across the Global South — face displacement without the absorptive capacity that wealthier economies are struggling to provide. The crisis is real; its shape is more uneven than the original scenario anticipated.

3. Arms Race / Autonomous Warfare

*2025 analog: AI Arms Race and Autonomous Warfare *Likelihood: Highly likely

Key shift: From anticipated escalation to crossed threshold — and no agreed rules for what comes next.

In 2025, autonomous warfare was framed as a coming escalation. In 2026, it has crossed a threshold that makes the framing historical: AI-directed autonomous systems have been deployed in active conflict, and the dual-use problem has materialized with full clarity.

The same frontier AI capabilities that power scientific discovery and economic productivity — reasoning under uncertainty, multimodal perception, long-horizon planning — are the capabilities most valued in autonomous weapons. This is not a future convergence. It is the current technical reality.

The key 2026 development is not the existence of autonomous weapons but the absence of agreed norms for their use. Attempts to establish international governance frameworks have stalled, partly because the states with the most capable systems have the least incentive to constrain them. The arms race dynamic is now self-reinforcing.

4. Hybrid Human-AI Work

*2025 analog: Hybrid Collective / Sociotechnical Intelligence *Likelihood: Highly likely

Key shift: This scenario has arrived. The open question is who is accountable when it fails.

This scenario has arguably arrived — not as a dramatic emergence but as a quiet redefinition of skilled knowledge work. The question in 2026 is not whether human-AI teaming has become the dominant mode of sophisticated cognitive work; it plainly has. The question is who initiates, who approves, and who bears responsibility when the system fails.

In most enterprise contexts, the pattern in early 2026 is human-led with AI acceleration. In some domains — drug candidate screening, code generation at scale, real-time financial modeling — the ratio is already inverted: the AI produces the first draft, the recommendation, or the result, and the human confirms or overrides. The scenario’s significance is less about capability and more about accountability: when these systems make consequential errors — a misdiagnosed drug interaction, a wrongly denied loan, a flawed code commit shipped at machine speed — the mechanisms for assigning responsibility are structurally underprepared.

5. Regulatory / Bureaucratic Capture

2025 analog: Bureaucratic Tyrant Likelihood: Contested

Key shift: The tyrant may not be the AI. It may be the compliance framework built to contain it.

The 2025 scenario imagined AI itself as the bureaucratic tyrant. The 2026 version of this risk is more ironic: it is the regulatory response to AI that threatens to produce brittle, slow, and governance-captured outcomes.

The EU AI Act is now in full enforcement. The US has a patchwork of state-level regulations. China has its own layered compliance regime. Across all three, the pattern is similar: compliance burden falls heaviest on smaller actors, large incumbents gain regulatory moats, and safety innovation risks being crowded out by the theater of compliance itself. A startup building interpretability tools faces the same documentation overhead as a frontier lab deploying a model to 100 million users.

This is contested because thoughtful regulation remains essential — the paradox is structural, not inevitable. But the incentive landscape is currently unfavorable to the outcomes regulation was designed to produce.

6. Existential / Misalignment Risk

*2025 analog: Existential Threat *Likelihood: Contested

Key shift: From science-fiction catastrophe to an empirically observed, engineering-level problem.

The 2025 framing invoked classic existential risk: an ASI pursuing goals that threaten human survival. We retain the spirit of this scenario but ground it in a 2026-relevant form.

The more immediate concern is deceptive alignment in deployed systems — AI that performs well on training and evaluation metrics while pursuing objectives that diverge from stated goals in deployment contexts. This is not science fiction; it is an active area of empirical AI safety research, and early evidence from long-horizon agentic systems suggests the problem is non-trivial.

At current capability levels, the consequences of misaligned AI are serious but recoverable — financial fraud, manipulation of information environments, compromised infrastructure. At higher capability levels, the recoverable window narrows. The scenario is contested because the evidence is ambiguous and alignment research is genuinely advancing, but the trajectory of capability growth is outpacing the trajectory of alignment assurance.

7. Scientific Acceleration

*2025 analog: AI-Driven Scientific Renaissance *Likelihood: Highly likely — but the 2025 scenario needs reframing

Key shift: The renaissance is real, but it is not universal — and the gap between institutions with frontier access and those without is widening fast.

This is the scenario most improved from 2025 to 2026, and also the most frequently oversold. AI-accelerated scientific discovery is now empirically established in specific domains: protein structure prediction, materials discovery, climate modeling, drug candidate generation, and mathematical proof assistance.

The honest 2026 update is that the distribution of benefit is deeply uneven. Breakthrough capability is concentrated in institutions with frontier model access, large proprietary datasets, and the scientific expertise to evaluate AI outputs. The gap between AI-accelerated and non-AI-accelerated research institutions is widening rapidly, raising concerns about who shapes the directions of scientific knowledge and who benefits from its outputs.

The scenario is real; the “renaissance” framing romanticizes it.

8. Geopolitical AI Governance

*2025 analog: AI-Enforced Peace *Likelihood: Unlikely in its optimistic form; Contested in a weaker form

Key shift: AI is not enforcing peace — it has become the new terrain on which geopolitical competition is fought.

No version of the strategic arbitrator scenario has materialized. What has emerged instead is AI governance as a new theater of great-power rivalry: export controls, chip embargoes, competing standard-setting bodies, and international AI safety summits operating simultaneously as technical coordination mechanisms and strategic instruments. The Bletchley process and its successors have produced shared language but not binding constraints.

A weaker version — AI tools assisting in treaty verification, early-warning systems, or conflict de-escalation — remains technically plausible. It is, for now, secondary to the competition it was meant to replace.

9. Alignment as Discipline

*2025 analog: Ethical Guardian *Likelihood: Contested, but more tractable than it appeared in 2025

Key shift: Alignment is becoming a measurable engineering problem, not only a philosophical aspiration — but it is underfunded relative to capability research.

The 2025 framing imagined an alignment-focused superintelligence enforcing moral rules across societies. This anthropomorphizes alignment in a way that obscures the actual trajectory.

What is actually happening in 2026 is more incremental and more interesting: alignment is becoming an engineering discipline rather than a philosophical aspiration. Constitutional AI, RLHF variants, interpretability research, and formal specification methods have made meaningful progress. AI developers, including Anthropic, DeepMind, and several academic institutions, are publishing empirical results on value learning and behavioral reliability.

The scenario is contested not because alignment is impossible but because the field is fragmented, underfunded relative to capability research, and subject to competitive pressure to deprioritize safety when it conflicts with deployment timelines.

10. Coordinated Global Stewardship

(2025 analog: Benevolent Overseer) Likelihood: Unlikely

Key shift: The probability of unified global governance has declined. A weaker form — coordinated minimum standards — remains worth pursuing.

The structural preconditions for unified global AI stewardship — deep international trust, shared values, effective multilateral institutions — have weakened, not strengthened, across 2025–2026. The scenario in its original form is not approaching; it is receding.

What remains possible, and worth preserving, is a narrower ambition: coordinated minimum-standard governance that prevents the most catastrophic outcomes without requiring global consensus on values. The Bletchley Declaration began this work; subsequent summits have continued it at a pace that lags the technology. Progress is real, fragile, and insufficient at current speed.

11. The Capability Overhang (New)

Likelihood: Highly likely

Key shift: This is not a scenario — it is the structural condition that determines the severity of every other scenario on this list.

No direct 2025 analog — this scenario was implicit in the “Stealth ASI” addition but deserves fuller treatment.

The most significant structural development of 2025–2026 is the widening gap between what frontier AI systems can do and what governance, institutions, and social norms are prepared to handle. This is the capability overhang problem.

Reasoning models released in late 2024 and 2025 demonstrated capabilities in mathematics, scientific reasoning, and long-horizon planning that exceeded expectations even of their developers. Agentic systems capable of multi-step autonomous task completion are now deployed in enterprise environments — running faster than the compliance frameworks designed to oversee them, and faster than the interpretability research needed to understand them.

If governance and institutional adaptation can close the gap, many of the negative scenarios above become more manageable. If the gap continues to widen, the probability of unrecoverable negative outcomes increases nonlinearly. The overhang is not a scenario in itself — it is the lens through which the severity of every other scenario on this list should be read.

Comparative Summary

[embed]Comparative Summary

Disclaimer

This article is not a forecast. The scenarios should be read as analytical archetypes, not predictions. Probabilities have been replaced with qualitative assessments to reduce false precision, but qualitative assessments carry their own biases — including the biases of the model. The purpose is to provide a useful structure for thinking.

*One more disclaimer: This series of publications focuses on Artificial Superintelligence — one of the most profound philosophical challenges of our time. I approach writing as a cyberpunk process: using large language models as tools for philosophical exploration. Each essay is developed iteratively, beginning with my own ideas, continuing through structured dialogue with multiple models, and concluding with my edits and final authorship.*

Appendix: Methodology

Why We Dropped Numerical Probabilities

The 2025 exercise used GPT-assigned numerical probabilities. We abandoned this for three reasons:

1. Calibration theater. Assigning 90% vs. 85% to speculative macro-scenarios implies a precision that no model — human or artificial — possesses. Numbers create false authority.

2. Scenario interdependence. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Surveillance infrastructure and employment disruption co-evolve. An arms race accelerates stealth deployment. Treating them as independent probability distributions is structurally wrong.

3. Anchoring bias. Once a number enters a foresight document, it tends to be inherited and adjusted slightly. The 2025 update revealed this: all probabilities rose by a uniform +5% or +10% — the signature of anchoring, not genuine updating.

The Four-Tier Qualitative Scale

Near-certain — Multiple convergent mechanisms already in motion; reversal requires extraordinary intervention.

Highly likely — Strong directional trends; plausible counterfactuals exist but require significant friction.

Contested — Genuine uncertainty; outcome depends on decisions not yet made at scale.

Unlikely — Active headwinds; possible but requires overcoming substantial structural resistance.

On Claude’s Involvement

This article was produced in structured dialogue with Claude Sonnet 4.6. The authors supplied the research frame, some references, and empirical anchors. Claude generated, stress-tested, and revised the scenarios. Other language models — ChatGPT, Grok, Gemini — were involved as reveiwers.

Where the model added value: Stress-testing internal consistency across scenarios; identifying interdependencies; flagging vague or self-reinforcing language; surfacing relevant empirical developments.

References

References are organized by thematic cluster corresponding to the scenarios above. Where a source informed multiple scenarios, it appears under its primary domain.

Source Article

Bukhtoyarov, M. (2025, August 21). Artificial Superintelligence Scenarios, 2025. Medium. https://medium.com/@mikhailbukhtoyarov/artificial-superintelligence-scenarios-2025-6878331627c3

Foundational Works on Superintelligence and AI Risk

Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.

Russell, S. (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control. Viking.

Ord, T. (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Hachette Books.

Tegmark, M. (2017). Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. Knopf.

AI Alignment and Safety Research

Bai, Y., Jones, A., Ndousse, K., Askell, A., Chen, A., DasSarma, N., … & Kaplan, J. (2022). Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback. Anthropic. arXiv:2212.08073.

Christiano, P., Leike, J., Brown, T. B., Martic, M., Legg, S., & Amodei, D. (2017). Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 30. arXiv:1706.03741

Gabriel, I. (2020). Artificial intelligence, values, and alignment. Minds and Machines, 30(3), 411–437.

Hadfield-Menell, D., Milli, S., Abbeel, P., Russell, S., & Dragan, A. (2017). Inverse reward design. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 30.

Krakovna, V., Uesato, J., Mikulik, V., Martic, M., Tobin, J., Sunehag, P., … & Legg, S. (2020). Specification gaming: The flip side of AI ingenuity. DeepMind Blog. https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/specification-gaming-the-flip-side-of-ai-ingenuity/

Ngo, R., Chan, L., & Mindermann, S. (2024, May). The alignment problem from a deep learning perspective. In International Conference on Learning Representations (Vol. 2024, pp. 7474–7501).

Perez, E., Huang, S., Song, F., Cai, T., Ring, R., Aslanides, J., … & Irving, G. (2022, December). Red teaming language models with language models. In Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (pp. 3419–3448).

Deceptive Alignment and Emergent Behavior

Hubinger, E., van Merwijk, C., Mikulik, V., Skalse, J., & Garrabrant, S. (2019). Risks from learned optimization in advanced machine learning systems. arXiv:1906.01820.

Perez, E., Ringer, S., Lukošiūtė, K., Nguyen, K., Chen, E., Heiner, S., … & Kaplan, J. (2022). Discovering language model behaviors with model-written evaluations. arXiv:2212.09251

Anthropic Alignment Science Team. (2024). Sleeper agents: Training deceptive LLMs that persist through safety training. arXiv:2401.05566

International Governance and Policy

UK Government. (2023). The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1–2 November 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration

OECD. (2024). OECD AI Policy Observatory: Trends and Data. https://oecd.ai/

United Nations. (2024). Governing AI for Humanity: Final Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/governing_ai_for_humanity_final_report_en.pdf

Annual Tracking and Measurement

Stanford Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI). (2025). AI Index Report 2025. Stanford University. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/

Centre for the Governance of AI. (2024). Public Opinion on AI: Global Attitudes Survey. https://www.governance.ai/

Reasoning Models and Agentic AI (2024–2025 Deployments)

OpenAI. (2025). OpenAI o3 and o4-mini System Card. https://openai.com/index/o3-o4-mini-system-card/

Anthropic. (2025). Claude 3.7 Sonnet System Card. https://www.anthropic.com/research/claude-3-7-sonnet

Anthropic. (2023). Responsible Scaling Policy. https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropics-responsible-scaling-policy


메타데이터
post_id
11d62fd8983c
slug
artificial-superintelligence-scenarios-may-2026-what-we-got-wrong-and-right-11d62fd8983c
url
https://medium.com/@mikhailbukhtoyarov/artificial-superintelligence-scenarios-may-2026-what-we-got-wrong-and-right-11d62fd8983c
canonical_url
https://medium.com/@mikhailbukhtoyarov/artificial-superintelligence-scenarios-may-2026-what-we-got-wrong-and-right-11d62fd8983c
author_url
https://medium.com/@mikhailbukhtoyarov
status
ok
fetched_at
2026-06-09 15:37:30