Activating STANAG 4817: Building a More Robust Platform Reserves Force

Written in Spring 2025 as a thought exercise

TLDR

In anticipation of soon-to-be-ratified STANAG 4817, which emphasizes conflict-readiness of taskable vehicle nodes across all domains and autonomy levels, the U.S. should consider expanding its existing merchant forces to include numerous smaller, more autonomous vessels. This ensures cost and time-efficient readiness for conflicts requiring sizable fleets to perform routine yet essential tasks (see appendix for examples) to protect the homeland and project power. Implementation should avoid overreliance on preparing for modular payloads, instead prioritizing autonomy OEMs capable of reliably executing a broad set of foundational missions. Additionally, revising contract models for small autonomous vessels sourced from commercial firms could enable retrofitting autonomy and sensors as both a defense asset and financial incentive.

REVIEWING STANAG 4817

STANAG codes are standardized agreements developed by NATO to ensure interoperability between member nations’ military forces by harmonizing procedures, terminology, equipment specifications, and data formats. The following information about STANAG 4817 is sourced from personally interviewing Teodor Calin Hanchevici, 4817’s lead Norwegian technical point of contact.

STANAG 4817, currently under development, defines a multi-domain command and control (C2) architecture for unmanned systems. The goal is to enable C2 centers to maintain a reserve of personal and/or volunteer nodes that can be tasked using a standard communication architecture. A node can be a single platform, or a collaborative group of platforms that broadcast themselves as available for a specific task (e.g. patrol, investigate, engage).

The code is structured into multiple volumes. Volume One establishes the encoding standards for high, medium, and low bandwidth communication streams. Each stream level is tailored to distinct task categories and paired with clear criteria for task completion. Volume Two outlines the process for identifying the most suitable node for a given task. Volume Three will integrate ongoing research from CMRE’s Collaborative Autonomy Testbed Laboratory (CATL), further refining tasking logic in dynamic, multi-platform environments.

STANAG 4817 is ultimately meant to enable a platform/autonomy/middleware agnostic reserve force of collaborative manned/unmanned systems to fold into the command of existing militaries in the event of a conflict. Collaborative systems are defined by their communication architectures. However, in this paper, we will focus more on their implementation and readiness infrastructure.

For more details and examples regarding STANAG 4817, see the appendix.

ENHANCING THE AMERICAN MERCHANT FORCES

The United States Merchant Marines and Civil Reserve Air Fleet provide a multi-domain platform reserve force at present. However, to fully complement the capabilities and speed that STANAG 4817 envisions, such dual-use reserve forces need to modernize in the following ways: First, they must expand to include more small, un/minimally-manned vehicles. These are far more efficient for repetitive, simple STANAG tasks like reconnaissance that might demand time and numbers. Second, doing so means military standard-setting bodies must proactively coordinate with autonomy providers, platform manufacturers, and sensor companies to define clear interoperability requirements. Third, to contract such vehicles, the merchant forces must be open to a different contract structure where commercial owners beyond those employed by port authorities, shipping companies, or pilotage associations are allowed to participate. This is appropriate for smaller, potentially unmanned vessels because the task set and vehicle type likely don’t require a trained crew. Payment in the form of subsidizing approved autonomy/sensor-stacks could also be provided as an option to reduce retrofit time in a crisis.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LCS PROGRAM’S FOCUS ON MODULARITY

While the aforementioned modernization proposals all position our merchant forces to improve to the task-specific speed and flexibility of STANAG 4817, staying away from interchangeable “mission modules” is imperative. Some other, 4817-adhering, platform reserve forces like the Norwegian Vanguard Solution are statedly open to putting anything from sonars to rocket launchers on their reserve craft in a pinch. While such versatile modular retrofitting sounds ideal, it’s worth keeping in mind some of the pitfalls experienced by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The LCS was designed as a fast, modular surface combatant that could switch between roles like mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and anti-submarine operations. In practice, however, the mission modules were late, underperforming, and logistically burdensome — leaving the ships under-equipped and unreliable in actual deployments. Modernizing the American merchant forces doesn’t necessarily equate to standardizing all vessel designs to accept many outfits; Perhaps only a number of lower-cost unmanned reserve fleets need to be increased, each outfitted to excel at the most basic tasks/retrofits. Meanwhile, explicit combat-vessel production would continue as-is, and the current merchant force — largely dedicated to transportation tasks — could slightly increase its numbers and quality.

THE COMMON TOOLBOX

Establishing where and how to expand the merchant forces leads to the question of what, specifically, needs to be standardized. The most important piece is autonomy. We have often been very clear about setting guidelines for vehicle OEMs, but not with our autonomy providers. For STANAG 4817 to be widely adopted, autonomy providers need to be encouraged to cover a range of essential 4817 capabilities (e.g. survey, shadow at a specified distance) by requiring such capabilities for new entrants to the unmanned merchant forces. Clear guidance, acceptance criteria, and ideally training, should also be made available to autonomy providers. This approach makes it more likely that a given number of reserve vessels at a command center’s disposal can contribute to the same task in true cross-vendor swarm style. There is already an element of decentralized decision-making present in STANAG 4817 — technically, 4817 intends tasked nodes to be free to accomplish the task as they please. However, cross-vendor autonomy compatibility makes it easier to hand over full control of nodes to C2 centers for more complicated operations. Additionally, encouraging NATO autonomy vendors outside of the US to comply as well, could accelerate the interoperability ethos that STANAG 4817 strives for (specifically when needing large numbers of vehicles to accomplish the same task).

Beyond autonomy, propulsion and control system design must also be addressed. Using the example of water domains, while minimally/un-manned craft are ideal for certain roles, smaller (< 10 meter) diesel-powered boats still have strategic value — especially those capable of toggling between manned and unmanned operation with an autonomy package installed. For these platforms, drive-by-wire systems should be strongly encouraged, since they ease the integration of autonomy kits. An alternative is roll-on autonomy, where a device can be physically strapped on or plugged in with minimal or no mechanical modification. Supporting these design patterns for the merchant force means many more vessels can be brought online rapidly, without costly conversions.

SUBSIDIZING DUAL-USE HARDWARE AS COMPENSATION

To promote these platform characteristics at scale, the U.S. could optionally offer a hardware-as-payment model. Rather than rely solely on monetary compensation for merchant fleets, the government could subsidize modular autonomy kits or approved sensor suites. There are plenty of commercial UAV or boat owners who might jump on the opportunity to acquire cost-saving drive assist or awareness-increasing sensor stacks if made more affordable and approved by the government. This approach shortens integration time, simplifies upgrades — since most sensor and autonomy packages can be swapped in or out with relatively minimal disruption — and promotes innovation by expanding the user base and thus the opportunity for feedback and testing. Bigger vessels already in the merchant fleet can be upgraded through this method as well. Doing so would simultaneously improve conflict readiness and commercial performance (e.g. fuel efficiency and enhanced situational awareness through better onboard sensing).

This method also provides a level of future-proofing for the fleet. Platforms retain autonomy kits and sensors even after contracts expire, enabling rapid reacquisition if strategic demand spikes. Technological payment also ensures operators are familiar not just with the vehicle but with the gear too, improving task performance and/or expanding capabilities under STANAG 4817. The result is a low-friction, vendor-diverse ecosystem that aligns innovation incentives with defense readiness.

CONCLUSION

STANAG 4817 lays the groundwork for a faster, more flexible reserve force. However, putting it into practice will require a shift in the peacetime DoD relationship with commercial vehicle vendors. Instead of designing overly complex, one-size-fits-all platforms, focus should be on building a network of small, specialized vessels that are easy to upgrade, easy to task, and ready when called. That means creating clear standards that autonomy and sensor vendors can build toward. Offering cost-saving vehicle-intelligence/efficiency in place of cash can help bring more participants into the fold, while keeping platforms aligned with military needs. The goal isn’t just more platforms, but instead building the conditions for more platforms, from more sources, to respond together when it counts.

Appendix

STANAG 4817 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The Kongsberg Vanguard Solution for Norway is 4817 compliant and uses Kongsberg Geospatial’s MDCS product for C2. MDCS and 4817 were tested in an exercise in 2019 funded by the Canadian Navy, and have been tested multiple times since with other systems at REPMUS.

Each country has a country representative for 4817, whom industry members approach to be added to the list of Custodian Sport Team (CST) members allowed to attend the yearly conference at NATO HQ. Canada’s country representative for 4817 is Mae Seto at Dalhousie University.

STANAG codes are generally ratified through a vote by NATO member nations who express interest in adhering to the code. Note that this can be a subset of NATO member nations.

Example scenario 1: Boston is under attack and wants to patrol a wide swath of water just off the coast. A given C2 center has two volunteer nodes at its disposal. One is a civilian AUV, and the other is a visiting British Navy USV with several launchable and recoverable UAVs that can be deployed from it. The C2 center will advertise a patrol task, and the two nodes will each respond with the amount of time they can complete it.

Example scenario 2: Boston is under attack, and wants to check on a submerged fiber optic cable just off the coast. A given C2 center has two volunteer nodes at its disposal. One is an AUV from the MIT sailing pavilion, and the other is a commercial ship from Kongsberg with several deployable Hugin AUVs. The C2 center will advertise an investigation task, and the two nodes will each respond with the amount of time they can complete it.

EXAMPLE TASKS FOR SMALL UN/MINIMALLY-MANNED VESSELS

Reconnaissance and Surveillance:

Patrolling key chokepoints or coastlines for unusual activity; Investigating radar or sonar contacts to confirm presence, type, or movement of other vessels; Shadowing enemy units at a distance without risking manned platforms;

Targeting Support

Locating targets for artillery, naval guns, or airstrikes; Acting as forward observers to relay spotting corrections; Electromagnetic triangulation of enemy radar, comms, or jamming sources

Communications and Signal Relay

Extending line-of-sight communications between units in difficult terrain (e.g., valleys, underwater between nodes); Serving as temporary relay nodes for disrupted or jammed communications networks

Deception and Decoys

Simulating friendly force signatures to draw fire or mislead enemy; Emitting false radar or acoustic signatures to spoof enemy sensors; Creating false positive visual (e.g., heat flares, silhouette dummies)

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Jamming or spoofing enemy communications, GPS, or radar systems; Probing enemy EW defenses to elicit responses and map capabilities; Deploying payloads that create temporary electronic noise fields

Mine/IED Detection and Mapping

Sweeping potential minefields (maritime) to detect or trigger devices; Mapping obstacles or hazards in contested areas (reefs, urban rubble, underwater obstructions); Deploying passive sensors to monitor for future activity

Logistical and Support Tasks

Transporting small payloads (e.g., ammo, water, batteries) to forward positions; Deploying small sonobuoys or acoustic sensors in key maritime zones

Scientific or Environmental Recon

Measuring chemical traces in water or air to detect enemy submarine passage; Sampling battlefield air/water quality for contamination warnings

Mapping and Navigation Aid

Mapping terrain or bathymetry under enemy fire zones; Exploring routes through urban, jungle, or shallow-water areas for larger units; Testing traversability of rivers, channels, or streets under combat conditions

CITATIONS

https://www.kongsberg.com/kda/what-we-do/defence-and-security/vanguard/vanguard-solution/

https://economist.com/briefing/2025/06/26/the-war-in-ukraine-shows-the-west-can-re-arm-without-re-industrialising

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/rf-analog/article/14198263/electronic-warfare-unmanned?

https://theweek.com/defence/how-drone-warfare-works?

https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2252181/flying-metal-detectors-navy-tests-new-unmanned-mine-detection-system/

https://gcaptain.com/op-ed-u-s-merchant-mariner-shortage-demands-action-now/

https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-fourth-arm-of-defense-the-u-s-merchant-marine?

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753520301946?

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2025/06/30/pentagon-awards-5-billion-contract-to-speed-up-ship-manufacturing/

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2025/06/30/pentagon-awards-5-billion-contract-to-speed-up-ship-manufacturing/